Optimal Auction Design with Contingent Payments and Costly Verification
with Teemu Pekkarinen
Conditionally Accepted, Theoretical Economics
Quota Mechanisms: Finite-Sample Optimality and Robustness
with Deniz Kattwinkel
Conditionally Accepted, Journal of Political Economy
Should the Timing of Inspections be Predictable?
with Jan Knoepfle
Revise & Resubmit, Review of Economic Studies
Robust Robustness
with Deniz Kattwinkel
Reject & Resubmit, American Economic Review
Checking Cheap Talk
with Xin Gao
Experimental Persuasion
with Jose-Antonio Espin-Sanchez
Probabilistic Verification in Mechanism Design
with Deniz Kattwinkel
Forthcoming, Theoretical Economics
Scoring Strategic Agents [Online Appendix]
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics (2025)
Benefiting from Bias: Delegating to Encourage Information Acquisition
with Xin Gao
Journal of Economic Theory (2024)
Content Filtering with Inattentive Information Consumers
with Justin Grana, James Bono, Nicole Immorlica, Brendan Lucier, and Alex Slivkins
AAAI '24
Dynamic Information Provision: Rewarding the Past and Guiding the Future
Econometrica (2023)
Corrigendum to “Role of Linking Mechanisms in Multitask Agency with Hidden Information” [JET, 2010]
with Deniz Kattwinkel
Journal of Economic Theory (2023)
Comment on Jackson and Sonnenschein (2007) "Overcoming Incentive Constraints by Linking Decisions"
with Matt Jackson and Deniz Kattwinkel
Econometrica (2022)
On Regularity and Normalization in Sequential Screening
with Teemu Pekkarinen
A Unified Theorem of the Alternative for Linear Inequalities
Bauer's Maximum Principle for Quasiconvex Functions
Simple Proofs of the Variational and Multiple Priors Representations