How To Download Desert Storm [PORTABLE]

The Pentagon stated that satellite photos showing a buildup of Iraqi forces along the border were the source of this information, but this was later alleged to be false. A reporter for the St. Petersburg Times acquired two commercial Soviet satellite images made at the time, which showed nothing but empty desert.[116]

Iraq hoped to provoke a military response from Israel. The Iraqi government hoped that many Arab states would withdraw from the Coalition, as they would be reluctant to fight alongside Israel.[89] Following the first attacks, Israeli Air Force jets were deployed to patrol the northern airspace with Iraq. Israel prepared to militarily retaliate, as its policy for the previous 40 years had always been retaliation. However, President Bush pressured Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir not to retaliate and withdraw Israeli jets, fearing that if Israel attacked Iraq, the other Arab states would either desert the coalition or join Iraq. It was also feared that if Israel used Syrian or Jordanian airspace to attack Iraq, they would intervene in the war on Iraq's side or attack Israel. The coalition promised to deploy Patriot missiles to defend Israel if it refrained from responding to the Scud attacks.[133][134]

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Shortly afterwards, the US VII Corps, in full strength and spearheaded by the 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment, launched an armored attack into Iraq early on 24 February, just to the west of Kuwait, surprising Iraqi forces. Simultaneously, the US XVIII Airborne Corps launched a sweeping "left-hook" attack across southern Iraq's largely undefended desert, led by the US 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment and the 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized). This movement's left flank was protected by the French Division Daguet. The 101st Airborne Division conducted a combat air assault into enemy territory.[225] The 101st Airborne Division had struck 249 km (155 mi) behind enemy lines.[225] It was the deepest air assault operation in history.[225] Approximately 400 helicopters transported 2,000 soldiers into Iraq where they destroyed Iraqi columns trying to flee westward and prevented the escape of Iraqi forces.[227] The 101st Airborne Division travelled a further 80 to 100 km (50 to 60 mi) into Iraq.[225] By nightfall, the 101st cut off Highway 8 which was a vital supply line running between Basra and the Iraqi forces.[225] The 101st had lost 16 soldiers in action during the 100-hour war and captured thousands of enemy prisoners of war.[citation needed]

[By February 26], the Iraqis totally lost heart and started to evacuate occupied Kuwait, but airpower halted the caravan of Iraqi Army and plunderers fleeing toward Basra. This event was later called by the media "The Highway of Death." There were certainly a lot of dead vehicles, but not so many dead Iraqis. They'd already learned to scamper off into the desert when our aircraft started to attack. Nevertheless, some people back home wrongly chose to believe we were cruelly and unusually punishing our already whipped foes.

Global Positioning System (GPS) units were relatively new at the time and were important in enabling coalition units to easily navigate across the desert. Since military GPS receivers were not available for most troops, many used commercially available units. To permit these to be used to best effect, the "selective availability" feature of the GPS system was turned off for the duration of Desert Storm, allowing these commercial receivers to provide the same precision as the military equipment.[349]

Early on 17 January 1991, Operation desert shield came to an end when the air campaign of Operation desert storm began. Task Force normandy, consisting of nine AH-64 Apache helicopters from the U.S. Army's 101st Aviation Regiment, 101st ABN DVN (Air Assault), accompanied by four Air Force MH-53 Pave Low special operations helicopters, flying fast and low, opened fire at 0236 - Baghdad time - on 17 January.

Successful execution of the attack was the result of months of training with our coalition allies and validated the soundness of the Air-Land Battle doctrine. Air-Land Battle was developed after the Vietnam War for conventional warfare and oriented on the European theater but tested during Operation desert storm.

A U.S. Navy commander stands near an Iraqi T-55 main battle tank that was destroyed during Operation Desert Storm. The tank is lying in the desert outside of Kuwait City, 1 February 1991. (National Archives identifier: 6465076)

Having constant training in the jungle terrain of Hawaii, Carretti was initially surprised when he found out his unit would be deploying to Kuwait. As a rifle company, Carretti and his Marines were conducting constant training to participate in the unit deployment program in Okinawa. Because of this, a deployment to the desert was not something Carretti expected. This taught him to constantly be prepared for anything.

No one else up to that point had carried out such an operation; it was a game-changer and a resounding success. Desert Storm effectively shattered the war-hardened Iraqi military by eliminating its ability to command and control its fielded forces and maintain situational awareness of battlefield conditions. The Iraqi war machine was subjected to decapitating cyber, air, and missile strikes and left its army to be annihilated in the deserts of Kuwait and Iraq.

An F-15 Eagle flies a patrol over the desert during the cease-fire between coalition and Iraqi forces following Operation Desert Storm. The aircraft is carrying four AIM-9 Sidewinder missiles on its wing pylons and an AIM-7 Sparrow missile beneath its fuselage. (Courtesy photo)

In addition to the radar systems many U.S. reconnaissance systems and combat vehicles were equipped with night-vision devices (infrared detectors that form images by measuring small differences in temperature on the scene). Iraqi night-vision devices were neither as numerous nor as effective. As a result coalition military forces "owned the night." Infrared detectors, for example, were used to determine which bunkers had tanks inside (surveillance was conducted at dusk when the desert sand had cooled down, but the metal in the tank still held its heat). This contributed to the large-scale destruction of the Iraqi tank forces that took place before the ground war started. After the ground war began, the night-vision devices in U.S. tanks, infantry fighting vehicles and helicopters were used to direct fire against Iraqi tanks, often before the Iraqis even knew coalition forces were present.

Coalition forces also made effective use of navigation data from global positioning satellites. Many U.S. aircraft, ground vehicles and infantry units were equipped with GPS receivers, which gave them their precise location on the battlefield, as well as the precise time (for synchronization purposes). GPS was important to coalition ground forces because it enabled them to locate their units accurately, which otherwise would have been difficult in the desert because of the absence of natural identifying features. GPS was important to coalition air forces because it allowed them to update the accuracy of their inertial guidance systems and to improve the delivery accuracy of unguided ("dumb") bombs against fixed-coordinate targets. GPS provides location accuracies of about ten meters, more than a tenfold improvement over the navigation systems of previous generations.

Finally, the critics expressed a general concern that the new systems would lose their effectiveness because of the confusion on the battlefield, the "fog of war." In fact there were many factors, both physical and psychological, that caused confusion in this war. Coalition troops faced desert sand and dust, they contended with unseasonable rainstorms, and they fought combat missions under the cloud of an unprecedented man-made catastrophe-the smoke from hundreds of oil wells set on fire by the Iraqis. In addition the Iraqis tried in various ways to confuse, misdirect and demoralize coalition forces.

While this new military capability will add a new dimension to deterrence, it also has significant limitations. It will not add to the ability of the United States to deter a nuclear attack; for the foreseeable future, that deterrence will depend on the strength of U.S. nuclear forces. Also, the new capability will be quite limited in its effectiveness in any regional conflicts that are basically civil wars or dominated by guerrilla warfare. No one should be deluded into believing that the military capability that can easily defeat an army with 4,000 tanks in a desert is going to be the decisive factor in a jungle or urban guerrilla war. e24fc04721