I have several servers that I'm using for an online business. I have passwords for MySQL, Wordpress, SSH, FTP, Domain Provider, Paypal, and many more. I wanted to have a different, very long password for each service to minimize the possibility of brute forcing and of accessing my other servers in the event that one of the services experiences a security breach.

First things first, you should use a password manager to solve the problem that you're trying to solve. A 256-bit hash like SHA-256 outputs to 32 bytes of hexadecimal characters. This means that for every character, there are 16 possible choices, 0-9 and a-f. Using a password manager like KeePass, you can generate a 32-digit passphrase using 64 or more possible characters per digit, which makes brute forcing harder.


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Offline password managers like KeePass use a single strong passphrase of your choosing to encrypt a database of as many passwords as you like, so those passwords can be as complex as you'd possibly want. You should definitely do that rather than rolling your own methods of generating passwords. Rotating passwords becomes easier as well.

There is an entire class of cryptographic algorithms called "key stretching functions" or key strengthening functions or password-based key derivation functions which are designed specifically for taking a key and generating a secure one-way hash which is resilient to the kind of attacks you care about. Use Scrypt if it's possible, Bcrypt if Scrypt isn't possible, and PBKDF2 if neither Bcrypt nor Scrypt are possible. There are libraries for these key stretching functions in your language of choice.

A hash function is a cryptographic primitive. There are a few applications for using SHA-1 or SHA-256 directly, but deriving passwords is best handled by key derivation functions. A good use case for a cryptographic hash function as a primitive is for generating checksums of files. Hashes were designed for exactly this use case: verification without authentication.

Cryptographic hash functions were not designed to resist the kind of attacks that key stretching functions are supposed to stand up against. Programs like oclHashcat can compute anywhere in the range of 1 billion SHA-256 hashes per second on fairly inexpensive hardware. Key-derivation functions like Scrypt and Bcrypt were designed to be attacked and to slow down attackers so that they can generate, say, one password per second on a CPU core. Scrypt was designed to be flexible to prevent the GPU attacks that oclHastcat leverages against these algorithms.

As many key stretching functions use either a hash for the input or for the output, the question is raised: what does a key stretching function give me that a hash does not? Doesn't the attacker still need to sweep the whole key space, as in 2256 in SHA-256's case? The answer to that is decidedly no and here's why: hashing (and even salting!) a user-entered password isn't going to distribute well over 2256 choices. Since computing SHA-256 is so cheap, computationally speaking, I can just brute force and start with 'a', then 'b', etc. at billions of times per second. Alternatively, I can use a good word list like the RockYou list, and oclHashcat will try these out for me and even append random salts to them; all this is done billions of times per second, so it's not that hard. A key stretching function on the other hand, should fairly evenly distribute the key over the entire key space (ie 2256 choices, more than the amount of particles in the known universe), making every password search more or less exhaustive if the function is a good one. Do remember that if you took a 1PB (petabyte, 1000/1024 terabytes) file, generated a SHA-256 sum of it, then flipped a single bit at some random place in the file, your second SHA-256 sum would be completely different and would be entirely unrelated to the first checksum.

TL;DR: Store your passwords in an offline password database like KeePass, and if you're trying to derive passwords, use a key-derivation function. That's what both of these things are designed for.

So you have your key, which is unknown to the attacker. If an attacker manages to get at the hashed values on the back-end of one of the systems you use, they would simply run their password guess list through the same method that you used to generate it. i.e.

If the attacker tries each hashed password guess generated as above, hashes it with the salt and algorithm used in the breached system, and then gets a match they have then found your password on that system. She can then simply derive the password from your other systems now the master password is known.

Since pure SHA-256 is used, and not a slow hashing algorithm such as PBKDF2, the hashing of the guesses would run relatively quickly, although the actual speed of the attack will per site will depend on the password storage algorithm that particular site used. Therefore you are as secure as the weakest algorithm in any breached site.

I wouldn't do what you are suggesting. It's too easy to guess the Website info ("Wordpress" in your example) and the salt is presumably public. You would do better hashing MasterPassword+Website where MasterPassword is a well-chosen, secure, random string. You can use the same master password for all of your sites. Even if the password for a site gets exposed, the attacker will not be able to calculate your master password.

Adding a specific string in a password is also very deterministic. Breaking cryptography often results in reduced cracking times. If an attacker cracks one of your passwords, next ones will be easier, as he knows that you use the same string every time. This would make further attacks quicker.

Now if you would use a different word you can use this trick to get your salting from the name (factorise the ascii values of the name for example). and hash the key word n times with sha256.(as the salt was in your original and n from your original question.

Don't use some website for generating a hash of your password, this is just risky. You typed your super secure password on an unecrypted connection (http) and gave it to a third party site that may or may not store it (along with your IP). This sounds paranoid, but if you are trying to protect this password, then you are making lots of mistakes along the way. That password is no longer able to be used in my opinion.

MD5 is not an acceptable hashing algorithm for passwords. It is too fast, and if I got a hash of your password, I'd probably be able to crack it in less than a day, and probably even sooner. That would be if you were using a salt, which you probably weren't. In that case, your password would be cracked in seconds with a rainbow table. You want something like bcrypt/scrypt/pbkdf2 since they have a configurable work factor that makes them slower.

Your app.config should be a fairly secure file, and some would be comfortable storing passwords/connection strings in plaintext here. It's good that you want to protect this, but the correct way to do this is to encrypt the config file (or just the specific fields). Encrypting => reversible : hashing => non-reversible.

the reason to use hashes to store passwords is that it is NOT possible to retrieve the original password. This way the password is securely stored.The way to authenticate is instead to use the same hashfunction (MD5 in your case) on the password, and compare the two hashes for equality and not the passwords themselves.The hashfunction only works in one direction, but it will reproduce the same result for the same input.

I am currently working on a Form Application in C# that has a login system where users must input their username and password to use the program. These user accounts are stored in an XML file and are currently stored in plain text (I am only in the prototype stage). I am looking for a way to hash the passwords (and maybe the usernames) then store them in the XML file.

I have already done some research into this, but every time I do another search, I find a different way of encrypting a sting. Some ways were able to encrypt and decrypt the string while others are only able to encrypt the string. I am trying to find what will work best for my situation.

For my code, I only need to hash the passwords. This will help keep them more secure to my understanding. I can apparently just hash the password on login and then compare so decrypting isn't a real issue. Also, the process needs to work on any computer. I've seen some answers which only work on a single machine, I am looking for something that is cross-machine compatible if possible. Another thing is, the output of the hashing must be able to be serialized to an XML file without much reworking of the code used to write to the XML file. Currently I am using an XMLSerializer and a StreamWriter to write to the XML file.

Again, I've seen many ways to encrypt or hash a password but I am relatively new to encrypting and hashing stuff so I do not know a good way to do this. Any help will be greatly appreciated and if need be I can add some sample code.

UPDATE:Ok, maybe this approach is not good enough. If you want really strong security you should use special slow hashing algorithm. Some of them already maintain salt. I don't claim to be specialist in cryptography. Never rely on single opinion in this area.

Fast hash algorithms like MD5, SHA-1 or even SHA-256 are not good choices to hash passwords, because they are much too fast and can be brute-forced too easily. One can calculate about 3 Giga SHA-1 per second with common hardware.

Sometimes I need to ask the user to renter a password just to verify they are the legitimate user before they perform critical actions such as changing passwords.

With SHA encryption this is easy as i simply hash the password and compare the sting to the stored string.

However, due to the nature of Argon, i believe this is not a valid method of confirmation be457b7860

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