If you have forgotten your Toshiba BIOS password and need to access your laptop settings, you can use a special code generator to unlock it. This method works for most Toshiba models that have a challenge code and a response code system. Here is how to do it:

To protect your BIOS settings, Toshiba laptops require you to enter a password when you press F2 during boot. If you forget your password, you can use a challenge code and response code system to unlock it. This system is designed to prevent brute force attacks or guessing attempts by generating a random challenge code every time you enter the wrong password. You need to use a special code generator to get the corresponding response code that matches the challenge code.

Toshiba Challenge Code Keygen Crack

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The code generator is based on an algorithm that uses your laptop's serial number and challenge code as inputs. The algorithm is not publicly available, but some programmers have managed to reverse engineer it and create their own code generators. You can find one of these code generators on GitHub[^1^], where you can post your serial number and challenge code as a comment and get a response code within minutes.

Toshiba.challenge.response.code is a keyword that refers to a method of unlocking Toshiba BIOS password with a challenge code and a response code system. This method works for most Toshiba laptops that have this security feature. You can use a special code generator on GitHub[^1^] to get the response code that matches your challenge code. This way, you can access your BIOS settings without opening your laptop or contacting Toshiba support.

The EC has a 7-byte ID code that it keeps in flash. This code is used by the built-in bootrom to allow/deny access to the flash via the 'Standard Serial I/O' protocol for programming (selectable via M0/M1 straps). If the programmer does not provide the code, no flash dump/write access is allowed.

So, before having to redesign the makeshift probe into something more useful, I figured it might be easier to try a simpler timing attack first. I quickly made the STM32 measure the time between the last bit of the code sent and the time until the busy line got deasserted again (which takes quite a bunch of cycles after the last ID byte received, hmm). Just looking at the data directly didn't make me optimistic, as all the results were jittery at first glance. However, I sent over the data (50 measurements per first byte, iterating over 256 values) to Redford. To my surprise he was able to find an outlying byte - 0xFF!

Redford did a whole lotta work reverse engineering the BIOS code and figured out that most of the interesting stuff (password check, challenge/response for lost password) is actually done by something off the main x86 processor. We figured out that it's probably the EC/KBC (Embedded/Keyboard Controller) which we found earlier on the laptop mainboard.

As it turns out, it's based off the TLCS-870" architecture, which is kind of like-ish to a weird Z80. We quickly skimmed through some specs we found for the CPU core itself, decided that it's probably powerful enough to run password verification code, and started figuring out what to do next.

Usually, the CH48 model is a mask-ROM model. Thankfully, our laptop shipped with the PH version, which is one-time programmable by the user. And, thanks to that, it actually contains a programming and verification interface. As it turns out, if you pull one of its' pins low, it can be treated as a generic PROM chip. This means we can read out the code from the chip just by asserting a 15-bit address on a port and reading out 8 bits of data on another port. Easy!

The programmer/reader interface is very basic - just a Spartan6 FPGA with a bit of Verilog to receive an address (one byte, then multiplied by 0xFF) over UART from a PC, then reply with 256 bytes of data read from the EC starting from the requested address. The code is available at -prom-dump/. A quick and dirty Python script dumped all 32kbytes of memory a few times to check for read errors.

The code could've easily be written for a microcontroller with a lot of I/O pins (or with a I/O multiplexer) - I just had an FPGA on me, so that's what I chose. And, of course, a cheap EEPROM programmer would also do the job.

I had the same problem with some Toshiba eStudio devices. The prompt to enter the code at the workstation would not come up. The only way I was able to get this to work was by going into the printer driver preferences and entering the code there.

For instance, the driver defaults to "auto" instead of black and white or color. Well, that, of course, annoys the users because if even one character is in color, they have to enter their department code, and even then, they didn't want to print in color in the first place(nor does the company want people to do so on everything). So, I go to the print server and set the default to black and white. If they want to print in color, they have to select it themselves. Which works fine usually. Then, once every two or three months, the driver reverts back to "auto." I don't know why. Toshiba doesn't know why.

This is my first job that had Toshibas as well. I have three of them. Two of them are absolute workhorses, the other one needs service calls all the time. They almost never jam. Something I just got used to with other brands. But, the department code thing drives me insane. It's a love/hate relationship, for sure.

i'm ready for screaming here - these flaming department codes, and they want private print setup for everyone! i've installed the printers on the server, shared them, deployed with GP - and they even deploy ok - BUT when i come to print there is no prompt for department code - anyone any ideas?

The department code is just not publishing for the users. It is set up on the print server in printing defaults. When the printer maps for the users via GPO, all other features are there - black/white, duplex, etc - but the department code is blank. 

After applying these changes, I actually am unable to print even with the right department code. I manually enter it and save it for the user, but the print job complains of an 'invalid department code'. The code is very simple, and 100% matches what I see right on the printer's 'Department Management' list.

I've had this issue before. Make sure the print driver port is setup as a standard TCP/IP port and not a WSD or it will not prompt for the code putting the jobs into the invalid queue on the copier instead.

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For example, when other communications security methods are unavailable, the U.S. military uses the AKAC-1553 TRIAD numeral cipher to authenticate and encrypt some communications. TRIAD includes a list of three-letter challenge codes, which the verifier is supposed to choose randomly from, and random three-letter responses to them. For added security, each set of codes is only valid for a particular time period which is ordinarily 24 hours.

Challenge-response protocols are also used to assert things other than knowledge of a secret value. CAPTCHAs, for example, are a sort of variant on the Turing test, meant to determine whether a viewer of a Web application is a real person. The challenge sent to the viewer is a distorted image of some text, and the viewer responds by typing in that text. The distortion is designed to make automated optical character recognition (OCR) difficult and preventing a computer program from passing as a human.

One way this is done involves using the password as the encryption key to transmit some randomly generated information as the challenge, whereupon the other end must return as its response a similarly encrypted value which is some predetermined function of the originally offered information, thus proving that it was able to decrypt the challenge. For instance, in Kerberos, the challenge is an encrypted integer N, while the response is the encrypted integer N + 1, proving that the other end was able to decrypt the integer N. In other variations, a hash function operates on a password and a random challenge value to create a response value.

Such encrypted or hashed exchanges do not directly reveal the password to an eavesdropper. However, they may supply enough information to allow an eavesdropper to deduce what the password is, using a dictionary attack or brute-force attack. The use of information which is randomly generated on each exchange (and where the response is different from the challenge) guards against the possibility of a replay attack, where a malicious intermediary simply records the exchanged data and retransmits it at a later time to fool one end into thinking it has authenticated a new connection attempt from the other.

Authentication protocols usually employ a cryptographic nonce as the challenge to ensure that every challenge-response sequence is unique. This protects against a man-in-the-middle attack and subsequent replay attack. If it is impractical to implement a true nonce, a strong cryptographically secure pseudorandom number generator and cryptographic hash function can generate challenges that are highly unlikely to occur more than once. It is sometimes important not to use time-based nonces, as these can weaken servers in different time zones and servers with inaccurate clocks. It can also be important to use time-based nonces and synchronized clocks if the application is vulnerable to a delayed message attack. This attack occurs where an attacker copies a transmission whilst blocking it from reaching the destination, allowing them to replay the captured transmission after a delay of their choosing. This is easily accomplished on wireless channels. The time-based nonce can be used to limit the attacker to resending the message but restricted by an expiry time of perhaps less than one second, likely having no effect upon the application and so mitigating the attack. be457b7860

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