My research focuses on organizational economics, institutional design and business strategy, with an emphasis on the interaction between formal and relational governance mechanisms, and between governance and institutions. I believe in an interdisciplinary approach to the study of organization, which combines the analytical tools of economics (formal modeling and econometric analysis) with thick knowledge of the institutional, legal and social environment of business, in the spirit of Coase and Williamson.

Papers published in peer-reviewed journals

Papers under review and working papers

  • “The Role of Relational Contracts in Outsourcing: Evidence from the 2008 Shock to the US Airline Industry,” with Ricard Gil and Kim Myongjin, December 2018, Revise & Resubmit at Management Science.
  • “Governance in the Wild,” with Gani Aldashev, April 2019.
  • “Managing Social Comparisons in Organizations,” with Oscar Contreras and Matthias Fahn, March 2019.
  • “Contracting to Dis-Incentivize,” with Desmond Lo and Mrinal Ghosh, January 2019.

Book chapters

  • Contracting in Innovative Industries,” with Ricard Gil, 2018, in Ménard, Claude, and Mary Shirley (editors), A Research Agenda for New Institutional Economics, Edward Elgar Publishers, 2018.
  • “Restricting Franchising: An Empirical Analysis of the Allocation of Control Rights in Car Dealership Contracts,” in CAFAGGI, F., Corporate Governance, Networks and Innovation, CEDAM, Padova, 2005.

Other publications

  • “Informal Contracting within and between Firms,” 2017, with Ricard Gil, RAUSP Management Journal 5: 492-496.
  • “Contratos Alrededor de la Ley: El Caso de la Distribución de Automóviles,” 2010, Economía Industrial 376: 111-118.