I am on the job market this year and will be available for interviews at the EEA Job Market in Naples in December, 2018.
Job Market Candidate
Central European University
My research interests are behavioral economics, experimental economics and decision making.
This paper examines whether people distort beliefs about third parties – such as the ability of scientists to offset one’s environmental impact – to excuse self interested behavior. I set up a lab experiment in which dictators decide how much money to take, with the success of a third party in solving a puzzle determining whether the money comes from passive participants or another source. The experiment exogenously varies whether it is the success or the failure of the third party that results in taking the chosen amount from passive participants. After participants decide the amount, they report their beliefs about the success of the third party. I find that the proportion of participants believing in the success of the third party is 13 percentage points higher when the success of the third party results in taking the money from a different source. With monetary incentives for correct beliefs, this effect goes down to 6 percentage points and becomes insignificant. This means that the presence of a third party might result in even more self-interested behavior than it has been previously thought.
We investigate the effect of managers' health shocks on the separation rate of their employees. Our hypothesis is that previous illness experience of division leaders at a company may affect their attitudes towards employees. To test our hypothesis, we measure changes in the separation rate of employees assigned to managers before and after the managers' illness episodes. Our results show that employee separation rate increases in the manager's employee pool after the manager's illness by 8%, a phenomenon mostly driven by an increase in the number of dismissals, as opposed to an increase in the number of employees leaving the firm voluntarily. We provide a descriptive analysis of managers' own employment outcomes as well. We find that adverse employment effects are present even four years after the illness episode. While 18.23% of previously ill managers has no job by this time, the corresponding ratio is only 13.02% for the control group, and this difference is almost entirely coming from the difference in their likelihood of having a manager position. Conditional on staying at the firm, managers' wage decreases by 13.4% following the year of illness, compared to the wage evolution of their matched healthy counterparts.