I am on the job market this year and will be available for interviews at the EEA Job Market in Naples in December, 2018.
Job Market Candidate
Central European University
My research interests are behavioral economics, experimental economics and decision making.
How one thinks their action affects others often depends on how they think a third party will influence the potential impact of their action. This paper examines whether people use such third parties as excuses to act self-interestedly. For example, when buying plastic bags one might use the excuse that someone (a third party) will take care of recycling. As a consequence, she ends up with more optimistic beliefs about recycling, and the harm she causes, even though she knows that leatherback turtles are threatened by extinction, in part because they mistake plastic bags for jelly fish. To identify such belief distortion, I set up a lab experiment where participants could decide how much money they take, knowing that it might, or might not be taken from passive participants, depending on the success of a third party in solving a puzzle. The experiment exogenously varies whether it is the success, or the failure of the third party that results in taking the chosen amount from passive participants. After participants decide the amount, they report their beliefs about the success of the third party. I find that the proportion of participants believing in the success of the third party is 13 percentage points higher when it is the success of the third party that results in not taking from the passive participant. With material incentives for correct beliefs, this effect goes down to 6 percentage points and becomes insignificant. This means that the presence of a third party might result in even more self-interested behavior, than it has been previously thought.
We investigate the effect of division leaders' health shocks on the separation rate of their employees. We hypothesize that previous illness experience of managers at a company may affect their consideration towards employees. To test our hypothesis, we measure changes in the separation rate of employees assigned to managers before and after the managers' illness episodes. Our results show that employee separation rate is 7.1% larger after the illness compared to before. Furthermore, we provide a descriptive analysis of managers' own employment outcomes. We find that adverse employment effects are present even four years after the illness episode. While 12.8% of previously ill managers have no job four years out, only 11.2% of managers without illness episodes are without jobs, and this difference stems from the difference in their likelihood of having a manager position. Conditional on staying at the firm, managers' wage in the year following the illness is 7.9% lower than that of their healthy counterparts.