Prof. Hong Duong
Title:
Evolutionary Game Theory, Evolution of Cooperation and Institutional Incentives
Abstract:
Darwin's theory of evolution by natural selection, also known as “survival of the fittest”, implies that evolution is based on a fierce competition between individuals and should therefore only reward selfish behavior. However, cooperation occurs at all levels of biological organizations, from cellular clusters to bees to humans. Cooperation is in fact needed for evolution to construct new levels of organization. The problem of promoting cooperative behaviour within populations of self-regarding individuals has been intensively investigated across diverse fields of behavioural, social and computational sciences. Evolutionary Game Theory provides a powerful mathematical framework for understanding this key challenge over the last 50 years. Under this framework, several mechanisms for promoting the evolution of cooperation have been identified, including kin selection, direct reciprocity, indirect reciprocity, network reciprocity, group selection and different forms of incentives.
In this talk, I will discuss these topics and present our recent research on promoting cooperation via institutional incentives. We will show how this practical problem can be formulated into mathematically constrained, multi-objective optimization problems, where one wishes to minimize the cost of providing incentives while ensuring a minimum level of cooperation, sustained over time.