WORKING PAPER

• Heterogeneous Agent Quantal Response Equilibrium (April 2023, revised April 2025), with Jeevant Rampal and Luis Menegetti

We define and analyze quantal response models for sequential-move games where players have heterogeneous skill levels, and players can dynamically update beliefs about the opponent’s skill level. We empirically study these models with respect to experimental data from a diverse set of sequential-move games: Stackelberg competition, Centipede games, investment games, and race games. We find that modeling heterogeneity, subjective priors, and belief updating about skills can each yield better fit to the experimental data, particularly in settings where social preference concerns are reduced by design. 

PRESENTATION IN CONFERENCES

• 2025: Queen Mary University of London

• 2023: Meeting of Young Economists (Turin), Behavioural Game Theory Workshop (University of East Anglia ); Queen Mary University of London; BSIM Conference (IIM Ahmedabad, India)

• 2022: Behavioural Research in Economics Workshop (BREW-ESA, IIM Bangalore, India)