Felix Zhiyu Feng
Department of Finance and Business Economics
Michael G. Foster School of Business
University of Washington
Tel: 919-627-0157 Email: firstname.lastname@example.org
My research focuses on understanding the impact of agency frictions in financial markets and exploring the role of incentives in corporate management, governance, and investment. Prior to joining UW, I was an assistant professor of economics at the University of Notre Dame and a concurrent assistant professor of finance at the Mendoza College of Business. I received a PhD in Economics from Duke University and am a member of the Finance Theory Group.
Setbacks, Shutdowns, and Overruns, with Curtis Taylor, Mark Westerfield, and Feifan Zhang
In Search of a Unicorn: Dynamic Agency with Endogenous Investment Opportunities, with Yifan Luo and Beatrice Michaeli
Ignorance Is Bliss: The Screening Effect of (Noisy) Information, with Wenyu Wang, Yufeng Wu, and Gaoqing Zhang
The Incentives of SPAC Sponsors, with Tom Nohel, Xuan Tian, Wenyu Wang, and Yufeng Wu
What happens when agency frictions in a dynamic investment model have persistent effects?
Published and Forthcoming Articles
Dynamic Resource Allocation with Hidden Volatility, with Mark Westerfield
We study a firm's internal resource allocation problem in a dynamic principal-agent model with endogenous cash flow volatility. The optimal contract can be implemented with a constant pricing schedule: a static, decentralized, linear mechanism that rationalizes the use of hurdle rates above firms’ cost of capital and transfer prices above the marginal cost.
Excessive risk-taking, lower bonus hurdles, and substantial compensation to corporate managers during a financial crisis? They can be part of an optimal contract when firms face systemic uncertainty shocks but cannot fully commit to long-term contracts.
Renegotiation and Dynamic Inconsistency: Contracting with Non-Exponential Discounting, with Doruk Cetemen and Can Urgun
We study a dynamic contracting problem with renegotiation and dynamic inconsistency arising from non-exponential discounting and provide a novel argument for the existence and characteristics of the solution.
Foreign Competition and CEO Risk-Incentive Compensation, with Tor Erik-Bakke, Hamed Mahmudi, and Caroline Zhu
How do firms optimally adjust CEO risk-incentive compensation in response to increased foreign competition? The answer is theoretically ambiguous but can be empirically identified through a quasi-natural experiment.
Productivity and Liquidity Management Under Costly Financing, with Jianyu Lu and Jing Wang
More productive firms could demand less capital assets and hold more liquid assets compared to less productive firms when financing costs are sufficiently high.
Caught in the Crossfire: How the Threat of Hedge Fund Activism Affects Creditors, with Qiping Xu and Caroline Zhu
Firms under the threat of hedge fund activism on average experience significant losses of outstanding bondholder wealth and receive inferior terms when initiating new loans.
Human Capital Development and Labor Market, with Mark Westerfield
Incentives, Synergies, and Disclosure, with Hwa Young Kim and Beatrice Michaeli
University of Washington: Financial Theory and Analysis, Financial Strategy and Planning, Business Finance (Global EMBA)
University of Notre Dame: Intermediate Microeconomic Theory, Asset Pricing Theory
Duke University: Advanced Microeconomic Analysis, Advanced Topics in Financial Economics, Introduction to Econometrics, Time Series Analysis