Writings

Poems

The Lost Field*

The Tumbrils Are Here Again*

Freedom*

Memoir

Prison Journey” is a book length account of the causes and consequences of my decision to initiate and lead the action that forced General Yahya Khan to hand over power to Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. It also describes how the usual fate of kingmakers overtook me.

*Note 1: The poems marked thus (*) are contained in my Memoir, Prison Journey, (Appendix - The Attock Poems), and are not reproduced here (except for the alternative beginning of The Burden). The remaining two (not so marked) are shown under the "Poems" heading below.

Note 2: My friend, Ingolf, is largely responsible for sorting out this section of the Website (including the Index above). His assistance in getting this Website functioning has proved invaluable.

Poems

[ Note : I wrote this poem in Attock Fort, shortly after I was brought there as a prisoner. I was still deeply distressed. Originally it was entitled "I am not Christ", and the opening lines were as given below.

I am not Christ

Yet, there are these many hills

Up each one of which

I have wound my weary way.


I am not Christ

Yet, there are these many hills

Upon each one of which

I am crucified.

When I was going to include this poem in my Memoir, I consulted my friend, Ingolf, as I had done on many occasions while writing the draft. I found him to be rather 'unenthusiastic' about including the poem, especially with that title. I did not agree with him on this occasion; however, I changed the title and the opening verses, as I thought it might cause some misunderstanding among Christian readers. It was difficult to explain that my experience as a child, living for several years in the boarding house of a Catholic Convent school, had caused me to view Christ as a supremely tragic figure -- but no more than that.


* * *

[Note: This poem, composed by me, was published in The Athenaeum (Col Lang's second website) in 2011. I attached the following note to it:

After the last hockey match of the recent Stanley Cup finals, riots broke out in downtown Vancouver. In one of the police charges, a young woman was hit with a policeman’s shield and knocked down. Her boyfriend lay down besides her, trying to comfort the injured girl. Someone took a picture. ]

A Moment in Time

A moment in time

When Time itself stood still

The world’s clamour died away

All Reality and Being

Reduced to a single point

You and I........locked

In this desperate embrace.

For this is how it is

Whenever a world ends

As the pillars shake and tumble

And the roof comes crashing down

If you’re lucky you will have

Someone to cling to.

And this is how it will be

When the world finally ends

Whether with a bang or a whimper

All that is left to do

Is find someone to hold

In one last desperate embrace.


* * *

We shall see it


We shall see it

Of that there is no doubt

We shall also see it

The day that was promised

At the dawn of Creation

We shall see that day!


When the rocky peaks of tyranny

Are scattered in the wind like fluff

And the earth shall shake and tremble

Under the tramp of the oppressed

And over our rulers’ heads

Lightning bolts shall crackle.

We shall see it.


When, in the Kaaba of God’s people,

The idols are all thrown out

And we, rejected but pure of heart,

Are ushered to the seats of honour.

We shall see it.


When crowns are tossed up in the air

And thrones are cast unto the ground

And all that remains is Allah's name

Who is unseen but always there

Who can be seen but also sees.


And the cry shall sound: An al-Haqq!

I am Him and you are Him

And the rulers shall be God’s people

I am them and you are them.


We shall see that day!


[ I made this translation of the poem Hum Daikhen Gay by Faiz Ahmad Faiz in 2010. In 2019 an Indian newspaper had an article about this poem. It also contained a link to Iqbal Bano singing the song. ]


* * *


Fiction

[ I wrote this short story in 1950. After passing out from the Pakistan Military Academy in November 1948, and after a couple of courses at the Infantry School, the officers assigned to the Artillery were attached to various regiments prior to going to Nowshera for the basic Artillery course. Three of us were sent to 1 Mountain Regiment, which was still deployed in Kashmir, even though the short war with India had been suspended with a cease-fire. No one could be sure when it might start again.

1 Mountain was commanded by Lt Col Milne, one of the few British officers still serving in Pakistan. A rather strange man, reputed to be living with his mistress (supposed, officially, to be "his sister"!). He visited his batteries, scattered all across the hilltops of Kashmir, dressed as a 'Pathan', in spite of the official embargo on the British officers still with the Pakistan and Indian armies from getting involved in the Kashmir war between the two newly-created countries. Soon after our arrival in the unit, Milne decreed that we should visit each of his batteries in their battle positions.

It was this experience that served as the basis for this short story ].

The Captain and His War

The Captain was fighting a war. It was a small war, one of the many that have plagued the world ever since the close of the Second World War -- but it was still war.

No doubt for the civilian, far from the battlefield, it was difficult to keep on remembering there was a war going on, but for the soldier there was no forgetting. For him war is always the same, war as it has always been.

The Captain looked at his watch; it was five minutes past one o'clock, just about an hour to go before the move, four and a half to the attack. He lighted a cigarette and took a long slow pull. It was a cheap brand with a bitter, burning taste, but tonight he found himself almost liking it. The map spread out on his cot flickered before his eyes, as the lantern’s flame played in the light breeze coming through the crevices in the log walls of his bunker. He shivered slightly, not so much from the chill in the air as from the hollowness in the pit of his stomach. One always got like that before a 'show’, no matter how long one had been at it — and he was comparatively new.

He was very young; this was his first real attack, and he was going to command a Company - all on his own, sole custodian of about a hundred and ten lives, responsible for his unit's success or failure in battle. For perhaps the hundredth time he scanned his map, a crazy pattern of brown contours denoting heights, green patches for pine-woods, and black lines for mountain nullahs. His eyes followed the red arrows that showed his Company’s route, from the big nullah below, up the steadily rising slope of the hill opposite, through the belts and patches of pine-woods, to the top, his battalion’s objective.

He tried to visualise it as he had seen it that afternoon from his forward positions: a large feature rising sharply out of the regular slope, shaped somewhat like a T. Standing out on the horizontal arm were three small peaks. The vertical arm, sloping down a little, was the Spur, his Company's objective. Once again he went over the battalion plan of attack.

The plan sounded simple, especially as it was estimated that the enemy had, at the most, a company on the whole feature, but this could not stop the Captain from worrying. A very great deal depended on his reaching his objective without the enemy becoming aware of it, and he could not help worrying about this - suppose the time schedule was wrong, suppose there were obstacles in the way, suppose he ran into an enemy patrol, suppose something else went wrong, suppose.....suppose….. .

He shook himself; he was letting his imagination run away with him. After all, the attack had been carefully planned. The only weakness was the lack of artillery support. In those hills, there were only a few old mountain guns, with a limited number of shells available to support the several infantry units operating there.

However, no reassurance could still the shapeless apprehension that gnawed at him. He extinguished the cigarette, covered the lantern and slipped out through the sacking that made a curtain over the bunker's entrance.

Outside, it was dark, for the sky was hidden by the trees. The pine needles made a gentle rustling as the breeze slipped through them. It was very quiet; he walked to where the trees were thinner and the ground started sloping down; on the way he was challenged twice by sentries. Standing there he could see, down below, the big nullah, and, opposite, the rising slope that ended in the Spur, his Company’s objective. All around were the mountains— dark, grim, foreboding. The moon was shining, and overhead the sky was clear, lighted with twinkling stars ̶ pure, bright, peaceful.

His eye wandered back to the hills opposite, but now he was not thinking of the morrow. He was thinking of a girl, a girl who lived in a big city hundreds of miles away, a girl who meant more to him than everything else put together. He saw her now as he had last seen her, months ago, a slim figure framed in a doorway, trying to smile through the tears in her eyes, while a reluctant hand waved farewell. When would he see her again? Would he see her again? Stop it, he said, you shouldn't let such thoughts distract you. Turning around, he walked back to his bunker.

Lying on his cot, he lit another cigarette. On the packing case that served as a table, the food his batman had brought him earlier in the evening lay uneaten. He had tried to eat, but it had seemed to stick in his throat. Once again, he went over the details of the plan, details that had by now become indelibly imprinted on his mind. Once again he considered all the things that could go wrong, and what he would do in each case. The cigarette burning his fingers brought him back with a start. Leaning over to rub it out on the floor, he realized how tense his body was.

"Come on now, relax", he said to himself, flexing his limbs and breathing deeply to loosen the muscles that bound tight his chest. "Let’s think of something else, something quite different, something pleasant, something.....Leave! That's right, let’s think about going on leave".

He saw the trap ahead and braked abruptly.

"All right, let’s think of something neutral; let's think of the past, of something nice that happened to you long ago. There was, for instance, that day……." He sat up suddenly. "All right, let’s face it; you're afraid! So what?....... Everyone gets that way. You’ll do all right today…. Come on now… relax!"

Two o’clock, and the Captain found himself approaching a small group of shadowy figures, restless but not making any noise: his Company HQ. All around were muffled sounds of furtive activity ̶ his Company starting to move down to the nullah, walking down the well-marked path, a steady crunching of boots and the clatter of pebbles and stones, occasionally the clink of steel, but not the sound of a human voice. "Like a funeral procession", thought the Captain. "Whose? ........ Don't be morbid!" He lengthened his stride. He was not feeling too good. Something was fluttering about in his stomach and his clenched hands were clammy with sweat.

The ground was now levelling off and the trees were thinner, but it was darker here down below and he often stumbled. He could hear the nullah now; it must be just a little stream but it was roaring like a river in flood. His watch showed 0245 hours, which meant half an hour's rest,. He checked up that his platoons were all in, and everything was ready. The men lay around in groups, dark silent shapes, hardly discernible. He walked towards the nullah bank and sat down with his back to a tree. Somewhere to the left were sounds of movement; that must be A Company crossing. He wanted desperately to smoke, but beyond the nullah was enemy territory.

He found himself acutely conscious of the men around him. He had commanded them for some time now, and knew each one of them; many of them quite well. Before the day was over, some of them would be dead. He felt oppressed with the weight of his responsibility, and of what could happen. Carefully, almost ponderously, he framed the thought and held it up before him ̶ in a few hours I may be dead, too. He smiled to himself. No sooner had he released his hold than the idea slid off his consciousness without leaving behind any imprint. He knew it was quite possible, and yet it seemed preposterous. Whimsically, he began to wonder why humans were constitutionally incapable of accepting even the possibility of their own death.

The half-hour slipped by and black figures began to disengage themselves from the dark shadow of the ground. He got up, glad to have things happen; glad to end the waiting, to be able to say, "Well, this is it!"

Things went smoothly; the nullah crossed, he found himself walking at the head of his HQ group, up the gently rising wooded slope. "Yes, this is it", he said to himself, "the attack is on", and then discovered that he was no longer tense.

They had been steadily climbing for 45 minutes without incident. He was about to congratulate himself when something went wrong. The men ahead suddenly stopped, some of them crouching down. He halted to listen but could hear nothing; all of a sudden the wood seemed to have gone dead. He began to walk ahead, carefully but fast, to the edge of the wood where two or three men crouched in a ditch.

"What is it?" he whispered to the platoon commander. “Listen!” At first he could hear nothing, then suddenly he heard it: from away to their right and higher up came the sound of several men moving — an enemy patrol. His stomach seemed to turn over, and he could feel the sweat on his palms. The platoon commander bent over, "It’s a patrol, but I can't make out whether they're coming down or going back up".

The agonizing seconds ticked on; the enemy patrol moved carefully but they could not help dislodging an odd stone or two, or striking a rifle against rock. He was hardly breathing and his ears ached with the strain of listening. One moment the sounds seemed nearer, the next they receded, and the seconds ticked on. Minutes passed, and then the dawning hope flooded over him in a burst of realization: the patrol was going up, away, away. He felt weak with relief and realized how tense he had been; he was sweating all over.

Very soon, they began to move again. However, he had gone only a few hundred yards when there was another stop. His leading platoon commander came back and reported that there was an enemy outpost watching the nullah quite some distance ahead — his scouts had almost bumped into it. There was no other alternative; he swung his company to the left, deep into the wood, and began to move by compass.

They reached the end of the wood, and, going ahead, he saw the old nullah. He had made it! He was feeling a quiet confidence; everything was going smoothly, everyone seemed to know just what to do; he knew everything would go off well.

It was before dawn, and it had grown very dark. He knew he was passing under the Spur, which he was to attack at dawn, but he could see nothing in the blackness all around. The thought that his company would go into action in about half an hour did not now stir him unduly. There was a little thrill of excitement, yes, anticipation even, but no nervousness, no fear. He thought of his condition a few hours ago, and smiled.

A little way ahead they reached the small patch of pine-wood from which the company was to start the attack in 15 minutes. The men dropped down, in their sections, well spread out, resting but also checking their weapons. The Captain went out with his platoon commanders to a little hollow beyond the wood. It was getting lighter now, and he took out his binoculars. As yet he could not make out the configuration of the ground, but he gave them their final orders.

It was exactly 0525 hours when he heard the machine gun, for he had just looked at his watch. Its stuttering came muffled; the machine gun spoke, stopped, spoke again and was joined by others. A Company's attack was on — 5 minutes early. That was not so good! He could feel the tension in the men around him; this was really it!

Suddenly a machine gun fired from above, from the Spur, its staccato beat shattering the silence enveloping them. But it was firing over them, to somewhere far behind. He was just raising his binoculars when a shot rang out from his 1 Platoon. "Hell!", he thought, "hell, that's torn it!" The machine gun stopped, there was silence for a few moments; then it opened up again, this time spraying the woods in which they were concealed. Several other machine guns joined the first.

Everyone lay flat, behind trees and logs and in ditches, while the whining bullets ricochetted from tree to tree. The Captain hugged his wireless set and wondered what he should do. Suddenly from his right came a choking cry and someone began to whimper. He was surprised that he took it so calmly. Last night (that night hundreds of years ago) he had wondered how he would feel to see his men fall, but now it did not matter so much; in fact nothing seemed to matter except the success of the attack. That was the only thing that mattered: his attack must succeed!

Then he heard the whistle, the whistle that grew like that of an approaching train; instinctively he nestled closer to the ground. The mortar bombs crashed into the wood, and their splinters whirred angrily about, lopping off branches and twigs, and a human limb or two that got in the way. The woods became an inferno, flares burst over them, gusts of bullets swept through the trees, which were shaken again and again by the burst of the mortar bombs. The Captain made up his mind: it was suicide remaining where they were. Flicking the switch on his wireless, he ordered his platoons to advance. He shouted to his HQ group, and, crouching, ran forward.

Clear of the wood, lying in a ditch with his ‘runner’, he saw his platoons moving up -- dark figures dashing from bush to bush, from rock to rock. Occasionally a figure would pitch forward and lie still; or yet another would not arise from behind its bush. The din was terrific. Above was the dark, ominous, tree-topped Spur, now alive with the stuttering of machine guns and rifles; while the hillside below crackled with the fire of his platoons; behind, the mortar bombs still crashed in the wood.

Something was wrong, he thought, and at once realized what it was: there was at least one medium and several light machine guns firing from the Spur. He had been led to expect a platoon there, but there must actually be about a company. "Tough", he thought, "damned tough; first surprise lost, and now this". But almost angrily, he brushed the thought aside. As his platoons advanced, he too moved up with his HQ, dashing from bush to bush, rock to rock.

Occasionally, bullets would crack overhead or kick up soil ahead or behind, but he hardly noticed them, he was so intent on the action. His whole being seemed concentrated into one beam that focussed itself on the progress of his men. All else had fallen away; his total existence — the past, the present, the future — was no more than this stretch of ground that lay between him and the belt of trees. One of his HQ men got an LMG burst in his chest and died without a sound; he gave the broken, twisted corpse a glance and dashed on to the next cover.

To half-way up the slope his platoons moved up well, but then their advance began to slow down. That heavy, hollow feeling of foreboding that he he’d been trying to repress, rose within him again. Ever since he had heard the full weight of the fire from the Spur, this grim fear of impending disaster had begun to lurk in the dark corners of his mind. His radio crackled into life. One of his platoons reported the heavy fire they were receiving from the Spur that was impeding their advance. He replied that they should keep moving. Soon the other attacking platoon reported the same thing; he gave them the same reply.

The advance struggled up, the fire grew more intense (two men of his HQ fell, wounded) and soon he saw that the attack had petered out. He fought back the rising tide of hopelessness that threatened to engulf him. Suddenly he was tired, very tired. "It was all over; we had had it". His earphones buzzed again; his platoon commander reported that they couldn’t advance so long as the enemy machine gun was firing at them.

Wearily, he called up his Battalion Commander on the bigger wireless to ask for some artillery fire to silence the machine gun, but the Colonel told him none was available. He pointed out the enemy's unexpected strength but his pleading was all in vain — this was just a small war, and such things as artillery were unaffordable luxuries.

He tried again to get his platoons to move up, but in his heart he knew it was useless. The enemy fire was too intense; human flesh and blood could not surmount that barrier of steel.

He was filled with a black, murderous rage. At himself, for his helplessness. At the cursed, confounded, utterly damned, useless artillery guns that poked their swinish snouts out of the gaping holes of snug bunkers, and would not fire to help his men. At the cruel, criminal madness that saved shells but let men die. At the vicious, malignant Fate that had stretched them out naked on this doomed hillside. At the hated enemy that had them at his mercy now. At himself, for his helplessness.

"Steady now", he told himself, "you're losing your head. Think now; isn't there anything else you can do, something that would be more useful than just dying? Let's get this straight. You can’t advance because of this damned fire, and most of it is from that one heavy machine gun. If you could silence that, it might be possible to go on; that was the last chance. And before you can silence it, you’ve got to locate it. So let's see if we can find this blasted machine gun".

He put up his binoculars and began carefully to scan the top of the Spur, very slowly, very carefully. He could hear the machine gun quite clearly, its fire distinct from that of the other lighter machine guns because of its longer bursts. Several minutes passed, the intensity of the fire slackened; the enemy knew he had broken the first impetus of the attack.

At last he thought he had located it! Of course he had not been able to spot the gun itself, but he was reasonably sure of the area in which it was located. He decided to go down to one of his platoons and bring up one or two of their light machine guns with which to engage it and keep it quiet. A little flicker of hope came to life in him. Now that he was doing something, his confidence began to revive. Telling his sadly reduced HQ to stay, he crept down, dashed to a boulder, crawled a little, then made another little dash to the next one.

The enemy machine-gunner lay in the trees on the forward edge of the Spur, and looked down at the slope where the attacking troops had been halted. He heaved a sigh and altered the position of his cramped limbs. His head was splitting with the sharp continuous drumming that beat on inside, his mouth had an awful taste, and in his stomach was a terrible emptiness. He was afraid, terribly afraid. But like the others around him, he aimed his gun and fired, burst after burst, at the tiny figures that suddenly appeared here and there on the slope below. The barrel of his machine gun was burning hot, even though he had changed it once. His fevered, bloodshot eyes peered down at the hillside for signs of movement, for a target.

For some time now things had become quieter, and the small dark figures that at one time had seemed to be swarming all over the slope had now vanished. Suddenly he saw a solitary figure dash from one shadow to another. He brought his sights there. Another dash and he let off a burst, but he knew it had gone wide. Now he was following the direction the figure had taken, waiting for it to appear again. Another dash, and another burst. For a while the figure did not reappear, and he thought that he had got him, when it made another dash quite some distance away. This time he was more cunning, and at the next dash the figure ran straight into his sights. He squeezed the trigger.

The Captain lay on his back and looked up at the sky. It was now pink and, at places, shot with gold. He was dead.

A casual observer would hardly have noticed this, for where the bullet had entered his side was not visible, and otherwise he seemed to be just resting, interested only in the gyrations of a pair of eagles, two tiny specks high above. It required a close look to see the small red trickle from the corner of his mouth. Or, the glazed look in his staring eyes.

On the slope above him sprawled his platoons, halted, still firing, but beaten, knowing it, knowing that it was all over, but still firing, still sticking there, while the men fell one by one.

In a big city hundreds of miles away, a young girl woke from her sleep, and then shut her eyes tight to keep before them the beautiful vision she had been seeing in her dream. On her face played a little smile and in her heart still surged the aching joy that had been hers in her dream. The vision was gone, but she hugged to herself the bits and pieces that lingered on in her mind.

But the Captain still lay on his back and stared up at the two tiny dots that went round and round in circles, high above him.

Red streaks spread across the sky; a light breeze stirred the pine-trees; the men of D Company moved up through the broken platoons on the hillside; the noises of battle again rose to an ear-shattering crescendo; the frightened machine-gunner on the hill had lost his fear in a pool of his own blood, the girl in the big city hundreds of miles away lay with her eyes shut tight and dallied tenderly and lovingly over each captured fragment of her beautiful dream.

But the Captain still lay on his back, his lifeless eyes staring up at the eagles, circling far, far above.

The Captain had fought his war. All of his wars.


* * *

The Blind Janitor

[ Note: This short story was written by me in 2013, and submitted to our Toronto paper, The Star, as an entry in their annual short story competition. It won no prizes; but I think it's worth reproducing here ]

Johnny Demeter killed himself last night. No, he didn’t put a gun to his head or anything like that. His sports car skidded off the road and into a wall. He always drove too fast; he liked to take risks; he enjoyed the thrill of danger. He was also lucky, but it seems his luck ran out last night on a rain-slicked curve.

We got the call very early this morning. Still half-awake, we barely understood what was being said. When the realization came, Helen and I were devastated. He had become so much a part of our life in the last few months. And then there was the ruin of all our plans for the future.

We had met him six or seven months ago at one of these big family weddings. Someone introduced us; he turned out to be a cousin of a cousin of mine. He stood out in the gathering: young, handsome, fashionably dressed, and with a striking blonde hanging on to his arm. We learned that he was rich; an only child, his father had died some years ago and left him a lot of money and property. People thought he was something of a playboy; he owned several fast cars, and seemed to have a string of girl friends. Later that evening he sought us out again, and we chatted for quite a while. The three of us were about the same age, and we seemed to like each other. Helen is shy, and doesn’t talk much, but with him she was quite animated. We enjoyed our conversation till the abandoned blonde found him and dragged him away.

A few days later Johnny came to our coffee shop. Helen and I had started this business a couple of years ago, shortly after we got married. We were just managing to keep our heads above water; in fact, we would have gone under if some of our loans hadn’t been from our families, which they were prepared to stretch out. Johnny arrived just as we were closing up. He helped us to tidy up the place, and then we went upstairs to the small apartment above the shop where Helen and I lived. He had brought along a bottle of wine, and we sat up late after supper, talking away.

Pretty soon this became a pattern in our lives. Every few days, Johnny would turn up with a bottle or two of wine, and we would eat Helen’s supper and talk and talk for hours. He seemed to enjoy it just as much as we did; perhaps he found in us what he missed as an only child. For us he became a bright light in our rather drab lives. We worked all day, and seldom had the urge to go out or meet people afterwards; we had hardly any friends. Johnny was such good company. Helen, especially, blossomed in the friendship; in the beginning, when he would tease her gently, she would just blush and laugh, but then gradually she opened up, and joined equally in the chatter and kidding around. We all laughed a great deal. We were happy together.

And then Johnny offered us a way out of the dead end in which our lives were stuck. One of the properties he had inherited from his father was a building on the Danforth in which there was a Greek restaurant. This had been running for a long time, and was very successful, but the owner now wanted to retire, and was putting it up for sale. Johnny wanted to buy it, and he wanted us to run it as his partners; his contribution would be the capital, ours would be to manage and run it. At first we thought he was joking, but he was quite serious. We talked about it, we checked out the place; Johnny had his accountant check the books; we talked to lawyers, and they began to draw up papers.

From a tantalizing hope, it suddenly became a doorway into a new life full of promise. We were living hand to mouth, and always with the fear that one of the big chains would open an outlet in our neighbourhood and put us out of business. And now here was a way out. Helen and I were so excited; we talked about it all the time and made plans for the new restaurant. We even discussed how, perhaps in a year or two, we might be in a position to have a baby.

Now this terrible early morning call had changed everything. A dear friend, almost a brother, had been torn out of our lives, and so had our future. Bereft, we clung to each other and cried out our grief. Helen could not be consoled; she curled up into a ball on the bed and wept and wept. I sat beside her with my head in my hands and this awful emptiness inside me. But, finally, we had to get up and get ready to go downstairs and open up the shop.

The usual morning rush of people going to work, picking up their coffee and doughnuts or gulping them down at the tables, was a relief – we were too busy to think. Then things quietened down, and gradually the regulars started dropping in; these were older people, retirees, who used our coffee shop as a meeting place to sit and chat. They were mostly from this community of new Canadians that had a large presence in our neighbourhood. Sometimes, new arrivals from the old country would be brought to the shop, and there would be excited reunions.

The General came in at his usual time. He was a regular at the shop, coming in almost every day to drink his coffee and read his newspaper. Even before I found out that he had been a General in his old country’s army, I guessed he had a military background from the way he stood and sat and walked. He was tall, always well-dressed, and his greying hair added to the distinguished air about him. Most of our regulars seemed to know of him, though they appeared to hold him in some awe. A few might respectfully greet him as they walked by his table, but no one ever stopped to talk to him. He would be discreetly pointed out to newcomers, and this would usually be followed by an animated but low-voiced discussion.

I found out there was quite a story attached to the General. One day, after he had left the shop, a group around a table began to talk about him; one of them had been in the army with the General and knew the details of what had happened. Frankly, I was curious, and stopped nearby to listen. Apparently, the General had had a brilliant military career, and was expected to go, in time, right up to the top. But one day he was arrested (along with several other officers) on charges of conspiring to overthrow the dictator who ruled their country. After a short trial the General was sentenced to death. It was only after angry rumblings began in the army that the President commuted that death sentence to imprisonment for life. The General spent many years in prison, most of them in solitary confinement. He gained his freedom when the dictator was finally overthrown by the army.

The new regime offered the General his choice of several high positions, but he turned them all down, and moved to Canada.

As I said, the General came to our coffee shop almost every day. He and I would exchange polite greetings, but nothing more. The only person he talked to was Helen. He would always spend a few minutes at the counter getting his coffee and chatting with her. I asked her once what they talked about. She said, nothing special. But she thought he was nice, a real gentleman. Today the General did not linger at the counter; he must have noticed Helen’s red, puffy eyes, the pale face and the shaky hands. Later, as I passed by his table, he lowered his newspaper and said, “Tell me, my friend, is something the matter?”

I had been carrying this heavy weight inside my breast all morning. It was only when the General spoke to me that I realized how much I needed to share my grief with somebody, anybody. I sat down and told him what had happened, and what effect it had on our lives. He listened gravely, his face sympathetic. When I expressed my bitterness at how a freak accident could ruin so many lives, he said softly, almost to himself, “Ah! The old war game again.”

“War game?” I wasn’t sure I had heard him correctly.

“Yes,” he replied. “Let me tell you about the war game. Long ago, in another life, another country, I was for a time the Chief Instructor at our War College. The best and brightest colonels in the army would come to the college on a year’s training course; how they did on it largely determined their future careers: those who did really well went on to become generals, most of the others marked time till they retired. At the end of each four-month session was a war game.”

“The game was played on a large terrain model over a couple of days. The students would be divided into several teams and presented with a sequence of tactical problems. For each one the teams would make their plans and then present them to the instructors. We would then decide what the odds were of each plan succeeding, but the final decision as to whether a plan actually succeeded or not rested with what we called the Wheel of Chance. We would call in this blind janitor who looked after the model room, and he would spin the wheel; if the number that came up was within the odds that we had assigned, that plan succeeded, but if the number was greater, then it failed.”

“Later on, I realized that life is very much like this war game. We go through our lives trying to achieve goals, solve problems, overcome difficulties. In each of these efforts we use all our abilities and resources to come up with a winning plan. But all we can really do is increase the odds of success; the final outcome is still dependent on chance, a blind spin of the wheel can give us what we want, or reduce everything to dust and ashes.”

I had been only half-listening to him; I was still wrestling inside with the disaster that had hit us. Now, something in his tone made me focus back on him. He seemed to be looking far away, with an expression on his face that I could not make out. I suddenly remembered something I had heard about him. The person who had told the General’s story had remarked in wonder how trivial had been the event that had unravelled the General’s plans, and led to the arrest and imprisonment of the conspirators. I had forgotten the details, but, apparently, one of them, under some silly misunderstanding, had casually said something he shouldn’t have to the wrong person. That one slip had brought the whole thing crashing down, and shattered the General’s life.

I realized that he had been talking as much about himself as about me.

He came back from wherever he was and, folding his newspaper, looked again at me. “I am truly sorry, my friend, at the tragedy that has struck you both. Some things cannot be undone, but I do hope that the future will work out for you as you would wish. Till tomorrow, then,” he said, getting up.

When the weight of worry or grief becomes too much, our minds seek relief in trivia. I caught up with him at the door.

“General.” He stopped and turned around.

“Was there really a blind janitor?”

His eyes twinkled. “No,” he said. “I used some poetic licence there. He makes the point so much better than a random number generator.”

He put his hand on my shoulder. “The real point, of course, is that there is always another game in the next session. Au revoir, my friend.”

He turned and walked out.


* * *

Memoir

Prison Journey

[ Note: I started composing this book in 2006. The main part of its content is based on the journals I kept in prison. As I composed each chapter, I shared it with my friend Ingolf, and finalised it after discussing with him the changes he suggested. When completed, I undertook its printing myself as a Kindle book in 2012-14. I finally published it myself in 2014 - in North America, and, in Pakistan, with the assistance of Najam Sethi, through Vanguard Books. Reproduced here are the cover, the dedication, the Preface, the Introduction, and the Postscript (edited, where appropriate) from the NA edition.

The whole book, Prison Journey, can be accessed by clicking on the link embedded in the title (left). ]

Dedication

For Jamila

My companion on this journey, without whose selfless support, steadfast courage and determined efforts on my behalf, I would not have survived it.


And for Afroze and Yawar

Who, without being asked, got taken along on the ride but maintained their good humour, coping with

the ups and downs of the journey, and joining in the fight to bring it to a happy ending.


Also for 'the band of brothers' of Attock

Who, for the sake of their country, dared to look beyond the narrow bounds of duty and sacrificed their liberty and their futures in the endeavour, and then cheerfully bore their adversity with fortitude and great courage.


* * *

Preface

The decade beginning in 1969 was the start of Pakistan's time of troubles. I was caught up in the events that marked this period; my attempts to do what I could to stop the downward spiral were not successful, and resulted in my spending over 5 years in prison, most of it in solitary confinement.

From time to time family and friends have urged me to write about those times and my role in what transpired during them. But I found myself reluctant to revisit a period that was for me a painful memory of loss and failure. However, what finally tipped me over the edge was when the issue was put to me in terms of duty. My nephew Omar told me it was something I owed to the younger generations of the family; my friend Mehmud Ahmed said I owed it to history.

In writing about that time in my life and in the history of Pakistan, I have based the account on various documents that I had, most notably the journal that I wrote while in prison. Many readers will not be familiar with the events of that time, and the first part of this book deals with the road that led me to that first prison, the fort at Attock. The second part covers the time I spent in various prisons, and is based on my prison journal. Wherever appropriate, I have used the original account, modified to omit unnecessary detail or improve readability, or as the basis for the narrative. It also occurred to me that some readers might like to know a bit about my background and career in the army; I have provided a short factual narrative covering this in the Introduction.

Now that it is done, I am glad I was pushed into writing this account of part of my life and times, and grateful to those who did that. I am greatly beholden to my friend, Ingolf, for reading through the draft and suggesting improvements. But even more so for his friendship these many years: it is a rare gift to discover a mind and spirit so in tune with one's own, especially at this stage of one's life when Time has usually robbed one of the few real friends made during life's journey, leaving a large gap in one's life.

I am deeply thankful to all those − relations, friends, acquaintances, and even strangers − who, by their support, help and acts of kindness, enabled me and my loved ones to cope successfully with this difficult time in our lives.


* * *

Introduction

My father was the son of a small-time farmer in Patiala state. He was orphaned at a young age and was brought up by his older brothers. Through sheer ability and application he completed his education by obtaining a Master’s degree from Government College, Lahore, and then won a place in the Indian Police service through the all-India competitive examination. My mother had Central Asian ancestry, her mother having come to India as a young girl from Turkmenistan while her father was a Lodi, a tribe that had originally come to India from Afghanistan.

I was born on the 20th of February, 1929, in New Delhi, where my father was posted as a young police officer. My brother, Kaiser, was born a little over a year later. My first connected memories of childhood are of living in Karnal, where my father was posted as the superintendent of police; I must have been about 4 or 5 years old. One of these memories is of our house being wired up to receive electricity from the first power station that was being set up in the town.

When I was about seven, my parents became concerned about our education, since the local schools were considered inadequate, and this would also be the case in other places that my father was likely to be posted to every 3 years or so. After due research, my brother and I were placed in a boarding school in Mussoorie that had a good reputation – the Convent of Jesus and Mary. We knew little English, which is what was spoken in the school, and we had never had to manage on our own. The first few months were hard; I grew up in a hurry (I suppose my brother did, too). After this initial period I began to enjoy this school-life, though I am sure I must often have been homesick that first year.

We spent 4 years in Mussoorie, and finally left this school in late 1939. Our father was then superintendent of police in Hoshiarpur, and we joined schools there; I appeared in my matriculation examination in 1942. Soon after, my father was transferred to Muzaffargarh but, after a short stay, I left to go to Lahore where I had obtained admission into the Government College, considered to be the premier educational institution in the province.

My first two years there were a lot of fun. Living independently, especially in a big vibrant city like Lahore, was exciting and enjoyable. As was attending classes taught by good professors in the ornate old college buildings, and the communal life in the hostel. The college had an excellent library and I made good use of it, spending a lot of time reading. In sports, I took up boxing, and became quite good at it.

I used to spend the summer vacations at home in Muzaffargarh, during which I would accompany my parents during my father’s frequent tours of the district. We would stay in small rest houses in the countryside, often situated on the banks of canals, with wide open spaces all around dotted with fields and trees and small villages. I got to see and learn something about the ordinary people who lived in these villages, simple folk who lived hard lives of continuous toil. There was also the desert; our house was on the edge of town and the sand dunes began about a mile away. I used to take long solitary walks, thinking about my future and the world into which I was growing up, and soaking up an intuitive feeling for my land and its people.

These experiences and reflections had their full impact when I returned to college in my third year there. I was no longer the carefree young person enjoying college life, as my fellow students were, but instead became acutely conscious of the times I was living in, and the need for me to take part in the struggle of my people. The time was 1945, and the Muslims of India were locked in a bitter struggle against the British and the Hindu Congress (and some of their own compatriots) to achieve a homeland of their own – Pakistan.

Muslim students were taking an active part in this movement – except in Government College, Lahore. Like students in general in this institution, and in line with its traditions, they showed no interest in political activism. I decided to remedy this. It took me many months of continuous effort but, with the assistance of a few others, I managed to set up the first unit of the Muslim Students Federation in the college, which the majority of Muslim students joined. I was elected its President, and later became a member of the Working Committee of the Punjab Federation. (Some years ago, visiting the Pakistan gallery of the Lahore Museum I was pleasantly surprised to see displayed there a picture of this Working Committee taken with the founder of Pakistan, QA Muhammad Ali Jinnah).

These two years were a whirlwind of activity. Mobilizing the students of my college to take part in all the political activity going on – public meetings, processions, demonstrations. Sending groups of students into the countryside to canvas for Muslim League candidates during elections. Once, being in-charge of the contingent of students guarding Mr Jinnah during his overnight stay at Mamdot House (the Khaksars had threatened to assassinate him). Inevitably, my studies suffered; I did not care but my parents were concerned, though they were very understanding. In 1946 I appeared in the BA examination, and passed with average marks.

I was only 17 – too young to think about getting a job. I joined MA classes, but soon dropped out; I could not summon up enough interest. The situation in India was getting ugly: with the British bumbling along trying to devise some acceptable post-Raj setup, the various communities were jockeying for position, and riots and killings were breaking out in different places. It seemed to me that these clashes could widen, but the Muslims were not prepared for such a development. I wrote a proposal to remedy this by training and arming a corps of students and young men, and discussed it with my friend, Qasim Rizavi, a prominent student leader. He took me to see Mumtaz Daultana, a Muslim League leader, who told us he would raise the matter in a top level Muslim League meeting he was attending in Delhi in a couple of days.

When Daultana returned he told me to get in touch with Khurshid Anwar, who had been appointed to organize the Muslim League National Guards. Anwar asked me to organize the student wing of the Guard, putting me in charge of it. Events were moving too fast for either of us to do much organizing. Khurshid Anwar had a bent for ‘cloak and dagger’ stuff, and I became involved in some of his ventures. This was a bleak period for me; I was living in pretty Spartan style, sharing an attic of some League bigwig’s house with one or two other operatives, frustrated at the lack of a clear path ahead, with little to show for my time and efforts, and the situation in the country getting worse by the day.

Meanwhile, Khurshid Anwar had got involved in other things. In the Punjab the Muslims had launched a protest movement against the Unionist government, and it was in danger of fizzling out because the leaders were all being arrested; he went ‘underground’ and sustained and directed the movement until it succeeded. He then went off to the NWF Province to repeat that tactic against the Congress government there. In August 1947 I met him in Karachi where we both had gone to witness the birth of Pakistan. He told me that he had been given the go-ahead to lead a force of tribesmen into (the princely state of) Kashmir to ensure its accession to Pakistan; would I like to accompany him? I readily agreed. But on my return home, my father put his foot down and vetoed the idea.

I then decided to join the Pakistan Army, and was duly selected. In January 1948 I reported to the newly established Pakistan Military Academy. The time at PMA was both busy and tough, but I enjoyed the challenge and the opportunity to learn my new profession. Our one-year course was cut short due to the fighting in Kashmir, and we passed out in November. I had wanted to be commissioned into the Armoured Corps (based on the influence of the military writers I had read, especially Maj Gen JFC Fuller), but, even though topping my course entitled me to the only vacancy available, some usual hanky-panky resulted in my going to the Artillery. Later on, I was very happy this had happened because I soon found out that the only two combat arms in the army that were ‘professional’ were the Artillery and the Engineers.

In June 1952 my brother, Kaiser, died. He had joined the Navy and had gone to England on a long training course; there he was involved in a fatal collision while driving to London. It was a devastating blow to my parents. Their grief was somewhat blunted by having a young son to look after. Daniyal had been born in 1947, and had become a source of great joy to our parents, whose lives had become lonely and empty ever since both their elder children had left home. Kaiser’s loss was a great tragedy; he was a late bloomer, but had grown into a very smart and accomplished young man.

Later that year I went on an instructor’s course to the School of Artillery, and then was kept on as an instructor there. In November 1953 Jamila and I were married (this was something we had both set our hearts upon many years ago). Life in Nowshera as a young newly married couple was idyllic, with several other young couples there (notably Bashir and Riffat Chowdhry) who became lifelong friends. Our daughter, Afroze, was born in early 1955. She was only a few months old when we went to England for a year’s course at the School of Artillery there (in Larkhill). This, too, was a wonderful experience. My father had retired and the three of them came and stayed for some months with us. We took advantage of their presence to leave Afroze with them while we drove around Europe during the summer holidays (we visited 7 countries during the 21-day holidays, returning to Larkhill late on the last night of the vacation!).

After the course I returned to the School of Artillery, Nowshera, as an instructor. The army was undergoing a big change as American equipment began to flow in under a military aid agreement. I was put in charge of a small group of instructors to develop new artillery doctrine and procedures that could apply to both the new US weapons and the old British ones which we still had. This was a very fulfilling time during which we developed and produced a whole set of new training manuals for the Artillery, and ran courses to train the other instructors in these new methods and procedures.

During his visit to us in England my father had, unfortunately, suffered a heart attack. Back home he was not keeping good health, so I asked for and got a posting to Lahore so that we were able to live with him and the family. It was here in 1959 that our son, Yawar, was born. I had appeared in the examination for entry into the Staff College, and was selected to attend a foreign staff course, a prized outcome. However, my father’s condition was not improving, and I declined the course. In 1960 my father suffered a fatal heart attack. I, then, reappeared for the staff course examination and was selected to attend the Canadian Army staff college. The two years we spent at Kingston were an enjoyable and exhilarating time for all of us; we made many friends and developed warm feelings for the country and its people.

On our return to Pakistan in 1963 I was posted as second-in-command of a medium artillery regiment in Lahore. A few months before the 1965 war broke out I was called to GHQ to join a newly created Research & Development Directorate. Immediately after the short war I was posted as second-in-command of the newly raised 44 (SP) Field Regiment, but after a few months was promoted Lt Col and called back to the R & D Dte in GHQ. In 1967 I went to command 44 (SP), which I did for two years, moving from there on promotion in early 1970 to become chief of staff of 18 Division in Karachi. In early 1971, I was promoted Brigadier and sent to the Pakistan Military Academy as its Deputy Commandant, and was then ordered to take over command of the artillery of 6 Armoured Division shortly before the 1971 war. I commanded this formation during the war, but shortly thereafter was posted as Commandant of the School of Artillery.

In August 1972 I was retired from the army. I have described the background to this life-changing event in my memoir, Prison Journey.


* * *

Postscript [in Memoir]

Requiem for a Lost Country

[ I wrote this piece in August 2010 after the devastating floods that hit Pakistan that summer. It was published in the weblog Sic Semper Tyrannis..... It seems appropriate to reproduce it here as the conclusion of this memoir.

I should record, however, that the response of the people of Pakistan, especially the young, during the recent (2013) elections leaves me with a glimmer of hope for the future.]


The earth gods are not mocked lightly. They are slow to anger, but scorn them long enough, defy them long enough, and they will rise up and unleash their fury upon you. This is what they are now doing. This year their baleful gaze has focussed on hapless Pakistan. They could hardly have picked a better target: a country with limitless vulnerability, and no defences. Over-populated, under-resourced, practically bankrupt, no governance to speak of, with a corrupt, bloodsucking ruling class, smothered under the weight of men with guns, some wearing uniforms, others sporting beards.

But it is not this country that I mourn. It will survive, as will its hardy people. Like the lowly of the earth everywhere, survival is about the only skill that their forbears bequeathed to them. They will pick themselves up, bury their dead, bind their wounds, and resume their threadbare lives ‒ till the next calamity strikes. For, with Nature up in arms, it will be the drought next year, or the year after, or another flood, or some pestilence. If, at some point, the country begins to totter, one set or other of the hollow men with guns will take it over. No joy to be found there, for all they think about is war, all they care about is “the enemy”. To them (even the well-intentioned ones) the country is just a base to be used to mount their unending campaigns.

The country I mourn is the Pakistan that was meant to be, that could have been. The Pakistan that its founder wanted, the country he conjured up in that vision he held out to the millions who laboured and struggled and sacrificed to help him bring it into being. A country founded on the ideals and values of Islam, in which all its citizens would be equal whatever their faith, with liberty, social justice and the rule of law.

Many forces opposed it, but the bitterest enemies were the self-proclaimed guardians of religion, for they knew their narrow, ossified creeds would have no place to thrive in the country that he wanted to build. He beat them back, as he did all the others arrayed against his mission. Muhammad Ali Jinnah's spirit was indomitable, but the arduous struggle wore out his frail body, and he did not live long enough to shape the country that he had created.

It is the loss of this country that remained just a dream that I mourn. This dream that is now dead. It survived the depredations of man, but with Nature now joining the assault, its time is finally gone. I mourn its passing as do many others: the dwindling numbers of those whose youth, like mine, was set ablaze by the promise of this vision, the others who came to it later but gave it their allegiance, all of us who kept the dream alive in our hearts and strove to bring it into being. And, above all, the few, the happy few, who stepped unhesitatingly forward when the dream beckoned that it may need their lives to ensure its survival.

It is necessary for all of us committed to this dream to bear witness to it while we are still around. Since, as it has faded, there have crept out of the shadows many who opposed its realization as well as those who now seek to desecrate its memory: those who claim that creating this country was a mistake, and the many others who falsely claim that it was meant to be a theocratic state.

We owe it to this shining dream of long ago, the Pakistan that could have been, and to ourselves, to step forward and say:


It was not inevitable that things had to be as they are. It could have

been different. Our lives are proof that the dream was real, that it

could have come about, that it was a goal worth striving for.

Dreaming that dream and striving to bring it about is what has made

our lives worthwhile, even if the world sees them as failures.


* * *

Articles

List of Published Articles

Date Publication Title

1. Dec 1950 Military Digest (Pakistan Army) Strategic Bombing

2. March 1951 Royal Pakistan Artillery Journal Soviet Artillery

3. Dec 1951 Military Digest (Pakistan Army) Tragedy of the Tank (Part 1)

4. April 1952 - do.- Tragedy of the Tank (Part 2)

5. Aug 1953 R U S I Journal (UK) ME Nationalism & Strategic Thought (Trench Gascoigne Second Prize Essay)

6. Dec 1953 Royal Pakistan Artillery Journal - do.-

7. Aug 1954 Military Digest (Pakistan Army) Threat of Communism to Pakistan Army Essay Competition (First Prize)*

8. Dec 1957 The Artillery Journal (Pakistan) Artillery in Nuclear War

9. Sep 1959 British Army Review The Pakistan Army

10. Jun 1960 The Artillery Journal (Pakistan) Artillery of the New US Infantry Div

11. May 1963 R U S I Journal (UK) The Principles of War

12. June 1964 The Artillery Journal (Pakistan) The History and Development of the Staff

13. Aug 1966 Govt of Pakistan Publication The Management of National Research (Joint Report)

14. Dec 1966 Pakistan Army Journal The Case for a General Staff

15. June 1967 Pakistan Army Journal Limited War

16. Jan 1968 Pakistan Management Review The Management of Scientific Research (Management Essay Competition – First Prize)

17. Dec 1969 Pakistan Army Journal A Scientific Approach to Tactics

18. Jan 1981 The Muslim World (USA) Al-Hudaybiya ̶ An Alternative Version

19. 1982 ̶ 86 Provincial Nuclear Emergency Plan (Ontario)

The Rise of Nationalism

[Note: This article was written in 1952 as my entry in the (UK) Army Quarterly's Trench Gascoigne Essay Competition. The subject of the competition was : "How far does the rising tide of Nationalism in the countries of the Middle and Far East affect previous strategic thought ?"

My entry won the second prize in the Essay Competition, and was considered worth publishing in the Royal United Service Institution (RUSI) Journal issue of May 1952. Below is a link to the article. (Incidentally, in the title, when printing my name, they have transcribed RPA to read "Royal Pakistan Army", instead of RP Artillery)].

Here is a link to the article.

The Principles of War

[Note: This was written in 1963 while I was at the Canadian Army Staff College, as one of the assignments given to students. I had put in quite a lot of effort into it, and thought it was rather well done. It seemed to me it was wasted as just a Staff College assignment. So I sent it to the RUSI (Royal United Service Institution) in London for consideration for their Journal (probably the premier military periodical in English). They accepted it, and it was published in the May 1963 edition of the Journal. Later on, it was reproduced from the RUSI Journal in the Miltary Digest of the US Command & General Staff College].

Here is a link to the article.


1971 -- The Year of Shame

[ Note: This article was written for the Pakistan journal, Newsline, in August 2000 for their special 30th anniversary issue on the 1971 war. They published it under the title "Conduct Unbecoming". The concluding portion of the article is reproduced separately below under the title The Black Jester. ]

The Supplementary Report of the 1971 War Inquiry Commission (headed by Chief Justice Hamoodur Rahman) has recently been published in the magazine India Today. There is little doubt that this is a genuine document. It is unfortunate that, even though 30 years have passed, the Commission’s report has not been made public in Pakistan, and we are forced to depend on foreign sources to learn of its contents in dribs and drabs. It is easy to guess why this report has been buried so deep in secrecy : the report is a scathing critique of the conduct of many leading politicians and senior military officers, and recommends that many of them be tried for their actions and failures which led to the shameful defeat and dismemberment of the country. Since neither ZA Bhutto, who set up the Commission, nor any succeeding government was prepared to carry out these recommendations, they were unwilling to make them public and then face the inevitable questions and public anger. In Bhutto’s case his complicity in the breakup of the country (which must have been clear in the Main Report of the Commission) was an added reason to keep the report secret.

The Role of the Army

The devastating account in this Supplementary Report of the despicable actions of a large number of senior officers in East Pakistan in 1971 could create the false impression that these strictures apply to all officers in that theatre, even though the Commission has itself cautioned against this. Even among the senior officers there were outstanding exceptions. Maj. Gen. Shaukat Riza, one of the finest officers to serve in the Pakistan Army, vocally disagreed with both the military strategy adopted as well as the policy and practice of excessive force against the civilian population. He was promptly removed from East Pakistan, as, later on, was Maj.Gen Khadim Hussain Raja, for similar reasons. Many officers, such as Lt. Col. Mansoorul Haq Malik, refused to participate in the violence against civilians and other unethical military conduct, even though there were very strong feelings of revenge among the troops because of atrocities committed by the Mukti Bahini, who were often indistinguishable from civilians. Only strong leadership and discipline could have kept such emotions in check, but with so many rotten senior commanders this did not happen. Other commanders, such as Brig. Tajammul Hussain, fought bravely against the invading Indian Army.

Another wrong impression that has persisted, and which the Commission report may reinforce, is that the Yahya regime was established and propped up by the Pakistan Army. That is not the truth. The Yahya regime was brought into power by a small group of generals and top civil servants. It stayed in power because of the strong tradition of discipline and obedience in the Army. It further consolidated its position by promoting its own henchman to senior positions while removing those who would not go along. It ensured the loyalty of its henchmen by giving them full licence to indulge in corruption and moneymaking. The rest of the officer corps was sidelined, and watched with increasing disgust as the regime wallowed deeper and deeper in this corruption while leading the country to disaster. It is either not well-known, or often forgotten, that it was the Pakistan Army that removed the Yahya regime, as I shall describe further on.

Some Interesting Reactions

Maj. Gen. M. Rahim Khan has reacted violently to the publication of the Hamoodur Rahman Report. He doth protest too much. Surely the Commission did not invent the details of what they term his “shameful cowardice and undue regard for his personal safety”; these were based on the evidence of persons who witnessed these events first hand. In fact, Gen. Rahim should be thankful the Commission did not investigate the murky episode in which he had himself flown out of Dacca to Burma just before the surrender.

I find it amusing that Gen. Rahim throws all the blame on ZA Bhutto, while attempting to distance himself from him. Gen. Rahim was in the inner circle of the Martial Law regime. After the People’s Party won the 1970 election in West Pakistan despite the regime’s best efforts, Gen. Rahim began to establish relations with Bhutto. I was there, I saw it. He engineered a reconciliation between the regime and Bhutto, and became the link between the two as they conspired to wreck the newly elected National Assembly, in which the Awami League had a majority. Gen. Rahim was also one of the main contributors to the plan to use military force to crush the popular reaction in East Pakistan that would inevitably follow the scuttling of the political process. It was because of his special equation with ZA Bhutto that the latter appointed Gen. Rahim as Chief of the General Staff upon his return from Burma, and later on elevated him to Secretary General, Ministry of Defence.

Maj. Gen. Rao Farman Ali Khan has confirmed that the report published in India is genuine. In this report the Commission has completely exonerated Gen. Farman, and has even bestowed words of praise upon him. In the interests of historical truth this picture needs to be balanced. Gen. Farman was not in the inner circle of the Yahya clique, but he was a key member of the regime’s Election Cell, which used extortion, intimidation, and bribery to ensure a victory for the Jamaat Islami and other religious parties in the 1970 election. Huge sums of money were illegally raised and channeled to these parties. When this attempt failed and the Awami League won in East Pakistan, Gen. Farman initially supported the efforts of Lt. Gen. Yaqub Ali Khan to arrange a peaceful political settlement. But when this policy was rejected by Yahya Khan and Gen. Yaqub was sacked, Farman saw which way the wind was blowing and trimmed his sails accordingly. As he said to me at the time : I was a dove, but when the doves lost out I became a hawk and showed them that I was the most hawkish of them all. He also became one of the principal architects of the plan to use force in East Pakistan.

In his evidence before the Commission Gen. Farman sought to deflect any blame that might attach to Gen. Tikka Khan for his role in East Pakistan. The Commission’s report is itself remarkably silent on this role (Tikka was the Army chief when this report was written). It is well-known that Tikka Khan was fully involved in the use of military force in East Pakistan, and all that this entailed.

Gens. Rahim and Farman were contemporaries of mine; I knew them both. They were intelligent and capable officers. In their private lives they would be considered good and decent men. That is why they must be held to higher standards, and judged more harshly for their failures (propelled mainly by ravenous ambition), than lowborn scoundrels and blackguards such as AAK Niazi.

The War in the West

This Supplementary Report of the Commission deals mainly with the events in East Pakistan. The war in West Pakistan was covered in the Commission’s Main Report, which is still suppressed. I participated in these operations, and appeared twice before the Commission. I have no doubt that in its Main Report the Commission paints an equally black picture of the conduct of the war in the West, and is as scathing in its condemnation of the regime and senior military commanders who lost large areas of the country and then cravenly accepted an ignominious cease-fire.

The details of the faulty strategy and tactics that were partly the cause of this debacle are no longer of general interest. But we must not forget the essence of what transpired; we must not let vested interests whitewash the dark truth or bury it. Nations that forget history are condemned to repeat it. My experience of the 1971 war is one window into the past as it really happened.

I commanded an artillery formation in the Sialkot-Narowal-Gujranwala sector, which was defended by 1 Corps under Lt. Gen. Irshad Ahmad Khan. Since I was simultaneously filling several other command positions, I was able to observe all that went on in this sector. The war was initiated by Pakistan on 3rd December 1971 with a few very limited attacks. GHQ had given strict orders that nothing was to be done beyond this; all the requests of local commanders to be allowed to exploit the surprise and success of the initial attacks were firmly rejected. It appears that the Yahya regime started the war in the West just to put pressure on the international community to intervene and impose a cease-fire in East Pakistan.

This did not happen, and after a few days the Indians recovered from their initial disarray and began to push into our territory. There was total paralysis in the command on our side : GHQ gave no orders, while the field commanders were content to sit and wait for direction from above that never came. Meanwhile, every day the enemy was advancing, every day we were giving up territory, every day we were steadily losing the war. I had about 14 or 15 regiments of artillery available to me, and I made the necessary plans and preparations to mass them against the enemy advance. From the 8th December onwards I tried every method I could, official and unofficial, formal and informal, to persuade my superiors and GHQ to use this great potential of firepower available to them, but in vain.

One day I attended, in my capacity as Commander Artillery of Army Reserve North, a meeting called by Gen. Irshad, Commander 1 Corps, at his HQ in Gujranwala. After the dismal opening briefing about more areas lost the night before, I asked Gen. Irshad why he wasn’t doing anything about this continuing loss of territory. He replied : You are worried about this territory; according to the GHQ plan I can give up all the area North of the MRL canal. (This was many times the area we had already lost!). I was so fed up that I said rather roughly : If you are not going to use your reserve armoured brigade why don’t you give it to us so that we can try to recover it? For a few moments he was too shocked to reply; then he burst out : Don’t forget that after the war you will come back under my command and I will write your ACR (annual confidential report).

Even before the war started Gen. Irshad clearly indicated how he was going to fight it. When one of his division commanders, Maj. Gen Ihsanul Haq Malik, protested against his plans to abandon territory without a fight, he had him transferred out; this was about a week before the war started. This general spent less time commanding his corps than he did on improving the security of his HQ and living quarters : getting deeper bunkers dug, piling on more sandbags, personally siting and inspecting daily the slit trenches and weapon pits of his defence platoon. The War Inquiry Commission recommended that Lt. Gen. Irshad Ahmad Khan should be court-martialled for surrendering nearly 500 villages to the enemy without a fight.

The territory we lost in West Pakistan was given up without a fight because the Army was not allowed to fight by its commanders. In the few places where we did fight the younger officers and soldiers displayed extraordinary valour and self-sacrifice. But the bulk of the Army was kept out of battle. Halfway through the war it became a commonplace saying among officers : If you want to fight this war, forget about the generals and do it yourself.

Cutting Out the Cancer

On 17th December, after Yahya Khan announced the acceptance of the cease-fire, I was quite certain, as were most other people, that he and his government would accept responsibility for the debacle and announce that they were quitting. That evening I handed in my resignation from the Army, in acknowledgment of my responsibility (shared by all other senior officers) for having silently acquiesced in the takeover and maintenance of power by these corrupt, self-seeking generals who had brought the country to this sorry state.

Next day, the 18th, I was stunned to learn that Yahya Khan had no intention of leaving; instead, he announced that he was going to promulgate a new constitution. Meanwhile, angry public demonstrations demanding that the regime should quit had erupted all over the country. There was a real danger that Yahya Khan might use troops to quell the public outcry, which would have imposed an unbearable strain on the discipline of the Army, itself angry and upset over what had happened. I became convinced that the regime had to be clearly told that it no longer had the support of the Army and must go. I tried to persuade my division commander, Maj. Gen. MI Karim, to send such a message to the government through GHQ, but, although he appeared to share my views, he hesitated to take such a step. Finally, on 19th December, I could wait no longer, and took over effective command of the division from Gen. Karim. He tacitly accepted this, and gave me valuable support throughout the succeeding events.

In this action I also had the support of some other senior officers who felt as I did. Our position was that the regime should quit and hand over to the elected representatives of the people, and that all those incompetent and corrupt commanders who had led us into defeat should be sacked. In practical terms this meant handing over power to ZA Bhutto and his People's Party, who had won the 1970 election in West Pakistan. Even though I was by no means a fan of Mr. Bhutto's, I believed that their elected status gave them the right to govern, and obtain the allegiance of the armed forces.

Cols. Aleem Afridi and Javed Iqbal went to Rawalpindi with a message from us for Yahya Khan : he should announce by 8 p.m. that evening his readiness to hand over power to the elected representatives of the people. In addition, all those generals who had led the army into this disaster should also quit. In case such an announcement was not made by 8 p.m. then we could not guarantee control of the situation, and any resulting consequences. The two officers met with Gen. Gul Hassan, Chief of the General Staff, and asked him to convey this message to Yahya Khan. Gul Hassan went to Gen. Hamid, the Chief of Staff, who said he would arrange for a meeting with the President at 7 p.m.

Gen. Hamid then went into a flurry of activity. He called several army commanders to see if they could help to restore the situation, but they all expressed inability to do anything. Maj. Gen. AO Mitha, another stalwart of the regime, tried to get some SSG (commando) troops for action against our divisional HQ, but was unable to obtain any. The failure of these efforts, and the obvious absence of any support in the Army, left the Yahya clique with no option. Shortly before 8 p.m. the broadcast was made that Yahya Khan had decided to hand over power to the elected representatives of the people

After this announcement Gen. Gul Hassan and his friend, Air Marshal Rahim Khan, the Air Force chief, in consultation with GM Khar, a PPP leader, arranged for ZA Bhutto’s return from Rome, where he was sitting out the crisis, apparently because he was not sure about his personal safety if he came back. When Bhutto arrived on the 20th Gul Hassan and Rahim told him that the military was behind them, and it was they who had removed the Yahya regime. That night Mr. Bhutto made a broadcast to the nation in which he announced the retirement of all the generals in Yahya Khan's inner clique, saying that he was doing this "in accord with the sentiments of the Armed Forces and the younger officers". He also made Lt. Gen. Gul Hassan the Army chief, and confirmed Rahim Khan as the Air Force chief, though they did not last long when they proved insufficiently pliable.

The true significance of the events of 19th – 20th December 1971 is that it was the Pakistan Army which rid the country (and itself) of this foul regime which had ruled in its name. The overt action was taken by a small group of officers, but it depended for its success on the tacit support of the rest of the army. If even a small element of the military had acted to preserve the regime, our move could well have failed since we were determined that there would be no clash within the army. Even so, this does not diminish the great credit due to this small group of officers. They risked everything (their careers, their liberty, their families, even their lives) to answer the call of this critical moment in their nation's destiny. If ever a true history of Pakistan is written, then high up on the roll of honour of its great patriots should be inscribed the names of Lt. Col. Muhammad Khurshid, Col. Aleem Afridi, Col. Javed Iqbal and Brig. Iqbal Mehdi Shah. My own role in this matter has sometimes been exaggerated. It would be fair to say that I initiated the action, that I was responsible for selecting and maintaining the aim of the action, and for holding everything together through the many crises that occurred till the aim was achieved. But I could not have achieved anything without the support and assistance of the others. Apart from those I have named there were many others who knew what we were doing and supported us.

Bhutto made no attempt to purge the Armed Forces of the rotten layer at the top, even though he must have known how discredited these officers were in their own services, especially with the War Inquiry Commission hearing evidence of their doings, which were becoming generally known. It suited him to have weak commanders who depended on him for their positions and lacked the respect and support of those under them. But he readily acquiesced in Gul Hassan’s removal of a few remaining upright and competent generals, namely, Maj. Gens. Shaukat Riza, Ihsanul Haq Malik and Khadim Hussain Raja. Then, in August 1972, Bhutto retired me and five other officers who had been the principals in the removal of the Yahya regime. He publicly accused us of having engaged in a conspiracy to prevent the elected representatives of the people from coming into power in December 1971!

Darkness Descends Again

Zulfikar Ali Bhutto had a glorious opportunity when he became President. The people of Pakistan were shaken down to the roots of their national psyche. The country had splintered, but much worse was that the very basis of their nationhood, their justification for being a people, long chipped away, had finally been shattered. Their lives, devoted mainly to selfish, individual pursuits, suddenly stood starkly revealed in all their pettiness and worthlessness. Shorn of their illusions and their excuses, in their helplessness they looked longingly for a leader to guide them back to the right path; they were prepared to give up the weaknesses and follies of the past, to make a new beginning as a cohesive, caring people ready to work together again to achieve the vision that had created their homeland 25 years ago. All they wanted was a leader who felt the same pain and yearned for the same goal.

Bhutto could have rallied the people of Pakistan to herculean effort, led them to reverse the decline of the past years, and recreated the nation that had, against all odds, established Pakistan in 1947. But at this great crossroads in history, the man of the hour was found pitifully wanting. His lack of vision, meanness of spirit, and pettiness of mind, all led him to see this historic moment as just an opportunity to grab personal power. Even the use of this power was affected by his limitations : witness, as one of his first acts as President, the arrest and public humiliation of persons against whom he harboured personal grudges; witness the childish revelling in the trappings of office, typically exemplified by the monkey uniforms in which he clothed himself and his ministers.

In the succeeding months I sometimes had qualms about my role in enabling this man to ascend to power. These were assuaged by the thought that he would have gotten there anyway, though perhaps not in a bloodless fashion. After all, in his quest for power he had not hesitated in contributing significantly to the break-up of the country, with all its attendant horrors. He would have used any means, including his popular support, to wrest power, and if that required the sacrifice of people's blood, so be it. Soon, however, Bhutto began to consolidate his power and establish a dictatorship : repression increased, and so did the subversion and undermining of the few remaining national institutions (the judiciary, the civil service, and the armed forces). My responsibility for this state of affairs, however limited, began to weigh more and more heavily upon me.

When it became clear that Bhutto was not going to remove the incompetent and corrupt officers still remaining in the senior ranks of the military, a wave of anger spread among the younger officers of the Army and the Air Force. Many of them began to talk about changing the government if this was the only way of purging the Armed Forces. This talk became serious among the brightest and bravest of them, who felt most deeply the shame inflicted upon the Armed Forces and the country in 1971, and for whom the profession of arms was an honourable calling in the service of the nation. The moving spirit in the Army was Major Farouk Adam Khan, while in the Air Force it was Sq. Ldr. Ghous. They got in touch with Col. Aleem Afridi, who contacted me. The gnawing sense of responsibility that I felt for the existing situation would not let me stand aside; I decided to explore whether I could undo what I had done, even though I knew the risks and difficulties that the undertaking involved. While the young officers were mostly motivated by the desire to purge the military, I was mainly concerned (as were the other senior officers involved) about the dictatorship that Bhutto was rapidly establishing.

Matters had not gone beyond the serious discussion stage when a traitor in our midst, Lt. Col. Tariq Rafi, betrayed us to the generals. Early in 1973 a large number of Army and Air Force officers were arrested in a particularly brutal fashion, confined under very harsh conditions, and tried by courts-martial at Attock and Badaber. Bhutto saw this as an excellent opportunity to teach a lasting lesson to anyone else in the Armed Forces who might think of acting against him; he tried very hard to have a few of these Army officers sentenced to death, but some of the junior officers on the Attock court-martial would not go along.

In spite of a superb defence led by Mr. Manzur Qadir, the outcome was a foregone conclusion : all the accused were convicted, and many of them were given long prison sentences, including life imprisonment for Aleem Afridi and me. Manzur Qadir (whose equal in intellect and nobility has seldom been produced by this land) was ill but continued to defend us, even though we could barely pay enough to cover his expenses (his normal fees were totally beyond our means), and lived for long periods in primitive conditions in the Attock rest house, as did his colleagues, Ijaz Hussain Batalvi, Aitzaz Ahsan and Wasim Sajjad.

The emotions that drove these young officers to contemplate such a drastic step, involving grave risks, and then stoically suffer such harsh consequences, were poignantly expressed by Major Saeed Akhtar Malik in his address to the Attock court-martial trying him for his life. This is some of what he said :

"When the war became imminent, I took leave from the PMA and joined my unit, with thanks to the CO who requisitioned my services. The next day the war started. But instead of glory, I found only disillusionment. With each successive day the truth that dawned on me became harder and harder to swallow. The truth was that we were a defeated army even before a shot was fired. This was a very bitter truth. With each corpse that I saw, my revulsion increased for the men who had signed the death warrants of so many very fine men. Yes, fine men, but poor soldiers, who were never given the chance to fight back, because they were not trained to fight back. When they should have been training for war, they were performing the role of labourers, farmers or herdsmen - anything but the role of soldiers. This was not ‘shahadat’. This was cold- blooded murder. Who was responsible for this? I was responsible! But more than me someone else was responsible. People who get paid more than me were responsible. You and your generation were responsible. The distinction of making all the dubious records in history falls on us. This time we have established an unbreakable record. We have a generation which created a homeland. Then it tore and destroyed that homeland. It now continues in its efforts to blow into smithereens what is left of it. What about these men? What were some of these men - these callous, inhuman degenerates - doing when their only job was to prepare this Army for war? Were these men not grabbing lands and building houses? Did it not appear in foreign magazines that some of them were pimping for their bloated grandmaster? Yes, Generals, wearing that uniform (he pointed at the court’s president) pimping and whoremongering!…..….I wonder whether the Hamoodur Rahman Commission will ever see the light of day".

High on the roll of honour of those great patriots who suffered and sacrificed for this country must be inscribed the names of Majors Saeed Akhtar Malik, Farouk Adam Khan, Asaf Shafi, Ishtiaq Asif, Farooq Nawaz Janjua, Nadir Parvez, Munir Rafiq, Iftikhar Adam, Sajjad Akbar, Tariq Parvez, Ayyaz Ahmed Sipra, and Nasrullah Khan; Capts. Sarwar Mahmood Azhar and Naveed Rasul Mirza; Lt. Cols. Muzaffar Hamdani, Iftikhar Ahmed, and Afzal Mirza; Col. Aleem Afridi; Brigs. Wajid Ali Shah and Ateeq Ahmed; Sq. Ldr Ghous, Wing Comd. Hashmi, and Gp. Capt. Sikandar Masood.

To the reader whose eyes have just skipped over the last paragraph I would say : Pause a moment. These are brave men who fought for you and your children and your country, not only against the foreign enemy but also against the dark night of tyranny that was descending over this land. Even though they did not succeed, at least they tried, when so many others just sat and watched, or wrung their hands, or joined the victors. The least you can do is pay them the tribute of reading their names.

Equal honour is due to our families, especially those whose husbands and fathers spent long years in prison. Effectively reduced to widows and orphans, in a hostile environment created by a powerful government that branded their men as traitors, they refused to be cowed down or give up. They waged constant battle in the courts of law and in the court of public opinion, all the while sustaining us with steadfast support. Without it many of us could not have survived.


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The Black Jester

[ Note: This is the concluding portion of the above article, "1971 -- The Year of Shame" ]

I was instrumental in bringing Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto into power in December 1971. This had an immediate effect upon the career of one Brig. Zia ul Haq, who had recently returned from Jordan (where he had been a military adviser) under something of a cloud due to his involvement in the crushing of the PLO by King Hussein. Bhutto made Zia’s friend and patron, Gul Hassan, the Army chief, who promptly promoted Zia to the rank of Maj.Gen. As a junior general Zia was picked to be president of the Attock court-martial. Bhutto took a strong personal interest in the progress of the Attock trial and required Zia to provide him with regular briefings; these private sessions gave Zia the opportunity to profess and prove his personal loyalty Bhutto.

Bhutto wanted very much to have a few of the Attock accused sentenced to death. Zia assured him that he could manage to do this in my case and Aleem Afridi’s. So sure were they of this that the gallows in Campbellpur Jail was prepared, and we were both moved next to the jail so that as soon as the court passed the sentence it could be immediately carried out. However, to accomplish this Zia needed the votes of some of the younger officers on the court, but they would not go along.

Having failed to get me hanged, Bhutto continued to pursue me with a vengeful ferocity. When he learnt that “life imprisonment” meant, in practice, 14 years behind bars, he had the rules changed so that such court-martial sentences really meant imprisonment for life. As required by prison regulations, all the Attock case prisoners were moved to jails near their homes – except me. When my wife questioned this she was told that all decisions in my case were made by Bhutto. She then tried through Nusrat Bhutto and others close to him, but to no avail. So I spent about 4 1/2 years in solitary confinement far away from home. Finally, after Zia ul Haq dethroned Bhutto, I was moved to Kot Lakhpat Jail. Interestingly, shortly thereafter Bhutto arrived in the prison as my neighbour, housed barely a 100 yards away. We were both in solitary confinement, but he was in a death row cell while I was in an A-class suite!

After the Attock trial, Zia assiduously built upon the foundation he had laid during it to convince Bhutto of his fealty (it is said, he even swore an oath on the Qur'an to this effect). When the time came, Bhutto picked him to be the next Army chief, even though he was the junior-most of the five contenders. Not one of these other generals, any one of whom Bhutto could have picked instead of Zia, possessed the ruthlessness required to have him hanged later on. But it was Zia whom he picked.

But for his early promotion in 1972 and the resulting opportunity provided by the Attock court-martial to establish a personal equation with Bhutto, Zia ul Haq would not have become Army chief. If he had not been so chosen, Zia would not later on have been able to take over as President of Pakistan. Perhaps then he would not have been riding in that plane that plunged in that (still unexplained) nose-dive straight into the Bahawalpur desert in 1988!

I sit now in a faraway land, and it is but rarely that I view the events of the past unfold, as if on a dim stage. Sometimes the side curtains move, and it seems to me that, in the shadows there, I catch a glimpse of the grinning face of History’s Black Jester.


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The End of the Journey


In my memoir, Prison Journey, I have described how I was released from Lahore's Kot Lakhpat Jail in May of 1978. I have also described why -- because Zia-ul-Haq was afraid that I was going to be released anyway by the Supreme Court as a result of my review petition to them, and decided to gain some credit for freeing me.

On May 11, at around 2 p.m., I got a small chit from the prison Deputy Superintendent about my release.

The other day, rummaging around in my old papers (as part of an effort to throw most of them out) I came across this note. It is perhaps fitting that this strange journey should end in this fashion -- with a whimper! Anyway, I thought I should save this note, which is appended below.

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* * *

The Wisdom of Merlin

[ Note : This was written for my grand-children, Wesley and Shawn (now Cassandra). By the time it was completed, I found them both grown up, and it appeared inappropriate for me to offer them such advice].


“Before you act, understand !”


SECRETS OF UNDERSTANDING :


The Bell Curve


All things of a kind lie under a Bell Curve


Ockham’s Razor


The simplest explanation is usually the most likely one


The Wheel of Chance


The final outcome always depends on the wheel


The Rule About Rules


All rules have exceptions


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Articles on Islam

Notes on the Qur'an

As I have stated earlier, I began this study in prison towards the end of 1973, completing it while still there towards the end of 1976. In these 3 years I worked at it regularly for several hours almost every day. In addition, I was doing as much reading on Islam as I could, depending on the availability of books. I wrote up these Notes as I went along in my study.

After my release from prison in 1978, I wanted to make my work on the Qur'an available to others. I wrote up a short pamphlet entitled "What Really is Islam", had it printed (with the monetary assistance of my friend, Ihsan, and his Karachi friends), and tried to give it as wide a distribution as possible (for link, see below).

When I came to Canada, I brought along these hand-written Notes. For many years they just lay on my bookshelves. Finally, after I retired from the Ontario Public Service, and got the contract to develop and draft the Provincial Nuclear Emergency Plan, I could afford to get a secretary. In-between preparing the drafts of the Nuclear Plan, Rita also worked on these Notes. However, I have not had the opportunity to proofread them.

My friend, Michael Brenner, has urged me to put them up on my Website as they are. I am putting them up without checking the typescript for errors, if any. The Introduction (which explains what they are) is appended below.

The reader should note that the views expressed in the Notes (and the pamphlet) are those held by me at the time. (For my current beliefs, see the Beliefs section of this Website).

My Notes on the Qur'an can be accessed by clicking on the embedded links in the individual volumes of the Notes: Volume I. Volume II. Volume III. Volume IV. Volume V . Translations. Also, accessible in a similar fashion is my pamphlet "What Really is Islam".


Introduction (to Notes on the Qur'an)


1. These notes are an interpretation of the Qur’ān. Someone who wishes to evaluate them would naturally like to know something about the interpreter’s background and qualifications in this field, the approach adopted, the method used, etc. This introduction provides information on these aspects.

2. The family I grew up in was not very religious. As a child I learnt the ‘namāz’ from my mother, and completed the required reading through of the Qur’ān in Arabic with a moulvi. A very religious uncle gave me an English translation of the Qur’ān (Maulana Muhammad Ali’s, of the Lahore Ahmaddiya), into which I dipped occasionally. When I was about 17 and in college I went through a religious phase: praying regularly, reading the Qur’ān, etc. This lasted about 6 months or so.

3. Involved in the business of living, I retained a strong emotional attachment to Islam without delving too deeply into its details or practising its rituals (except the Ramadan fast). Perhaps, subconsciously, I was aware that a closer examination would raise troublesome questions. In 1952 I became friends with then Major (now General) Ihsan-ul-Haq. He introduced me to the views of G.A. Parwez on Islam.

I took to them at once. They gave to Islam the content which one expected and desired, but which was singularly lacking in the orthodox exposition. It was as if a great load had rolled off my mind, a load I became fully conscious of only after it was removed.

Over the course of the years I read some of Parwez’s books, and for a period attended his weekly lectures on the Qur’ān. I found his exposition on the whole quite satisfying. However, there remained a desire to study the Qur’ān for myself, but a lack of time and opportunity prevented me from fulfilling it. Then, in 1973, the vicissitudes of fortune brought me into prison and provided me with both the time and the opportunity.

4. I began this study, while imprisoned, towards the end of 1973. I am completing it now towards the end of 1976. In these 3 years I have worked at it regularly for several hours almost every day. In addition I have been doing as much reading on Islam as I could, depending on the availability of books.

5. The way in which this study has progressed is as follows. First of all I read carefully through Parwez’s Mafhūm ul-Qur’ān side by side with M. Muhammad Ali’s English translation. Any verse that touched on a subject of interest to me I made a note of. This comparative reading I repeated a second time. The third time I read through the English translation only.

Then I collated together the references I had noted under various heads. I then proceeded to translate all these verses into English. Initially I used for this purpose M. Muhammad Ali’s translation, Parwez’s Mafhūm, and translations in some of his books. Later on I obtained and used Parwez’s Lughāt ul-Qur’ān, an Urdu lexicon of Qur'ānic terms based on the standard Arabic lexicons. In the beginning my approach was to try and fully understand the meaning of a verse and then render this meaning into English, if necessary paraphrasing where required. Later on I realized that there were pitfalls in this, and switched to renderings as close to the Arabic original as possible. This change is noticeable in these notes, and is also responsible for the corrections and revisions made in the earlier recorded verses.

6. I do not know Arabic. Thus, translating a Qur'ānic verse into English has meant translating each word from Arabic into Urdu, and then from Urdu into English. Often a most laborious task; sometimes I have spent days struggling with a single verse, trying to unravel the possible meanings that it could contain. My lack of Arabic also leaves me open to the committal of silly errors: while the main terms are probably correctly rendered I could well have made mistakes in small things like tenses, genders, prepositions etc. which could make a considerable difference. I have tried hard to avoid these, but there may be some still.

This disadvantage had, I think, a compensating advantage. Arabic is a language in which every word carries several alternative meanings; even a humble preposition can be rendered into several different ones in English, considerably varying the sense of a sentence. However, one well versed in a language tends to assign to words their common, familiar meanings, usually ignoring other possible meanings attached to them. In my case every word, big or small, rare or common, has been equally unfamiliar. Each one I have had to look up in a lexicon, and each of its possible senses has been for me equally valid. I have then had to juggle the various permutations and combinations possible to make acceptable sense out of the sentence. I have thus tackled the Qur’ān without any linguistic pre-conceptions. I have found this a valuable asset, since because of it I have been able to discover meanings in many verses that are lexically perfectly legitimate, but which appear to have been ignored through a common-usage approach. In the section on Interpretation (pp. 39 ff) I have discussed other aspects of what seems to me to be the correct approach to the Qur’ān.

7. Having translated all the verses I had noted, I took up each subject in turn. Putting the Quranic verses on a subject together I attempted to derive what the Qur’ān’s view or teaching on that subject is. This, along with the supporting verses, I have recorded in these notes. Inevitably, as I went along new aspects arose, new questions, new problems. These would send me back to the Qur’ān. Often this involved examination of the Qur'ānic treatment of a certain term or concept. Not having a Qur'ānic Index or Concordance this necessitated my going through the whole Qur’ān, abstracting the relevant references; this I have done numerous times. These new aspects, new viewpoints, often affected points earlier recorded, necessitating modifications in them. Having completed these notes I then revised them from the beginning; as will be seen this sometimes required major rewriting of certain sections.

8. As will also be noted I have tried to understand the Qur’ān from the Qur’ān. This is the approach advocated, and adopted, by Parwez. I consider this to be one of his major contributions to Islamic studies. To me it seems to be the only correct approach. If the Qur’ān be divine revelation, then its meanings should be clear in and from itself; its elucidation should not require the commentaries and opinions of human beings. This latter approach has resulted in the original Qur'ānic message being lost amid a welter of human views imposed upon it.

9. Another pre-condition advocated by Parwez is that one should approach the Qur’ān with one’s mind empty of all preconceptions. This, too, I tried to do. So much so that I consciously kept open the question whether the Qur’ān was in fact divine revelation; this was something to be decided after study, not taken as a starting fact or assumption. However, it is now obvious that there was one unconscious preconception that I did start with. This was the supposition that, in my study, I would find that the main features, the fundamental aspects, of the Qur'ānic system, its ideology, would be essentially the same as that discovered and expounded by Parwez. I was prepared to find disagreements on matters of detail here and there, but did not expect any on basic points. This was partly due to the fact that whatever I had read of his exposition of the Qur’ān had seemed to make eminent good sense, partly to the awareness that his views were the result of a lifetime of study, and partly to a realistic consciousness of my own limitations in this field. It was not that I held his views to be sacrosanct, but I fully expected to find them confirmed by my study of the Qur’ān. It is perhaps because of this that in the beginning I did not even feel the need to obtain a lexicon. (Parwez, himself, has, of course, never claimed any finality for his own views, in fact to the contrary).

10. It will be seen that in the beginning these notes express Parwez’s views on the initial topics considered. However, when I came to examine two central features of the Qur'ānic system ‒ requital and Allah’s role in human affairs ‒ I began to run into serious difficulties. So far I had accepted Parwez’s views on these subjects without really subjecting them to careful analysis. When I did this, grave problems became apparent. His interpretation of the Qur’ān’s views did not seem to tally with actual human experience in the world; logical inconsistencies appeared; and inconsistencies with other aspects of Qur'ānic teaching emerged. And yet, Parwez’s interpretation seemed to be based on Qur'ānic verses.

11. I found myself in an acute crisis. The whole concept of the Qur’ān as divine revelation seemed to be foundering. This was no academic issue; it was something that deeply affected me personally. The disaster in which I found myself encompassed had been partly caused by my holding certain beliefs that impelled me to adopt certain positions. Were these all baseless? Was I mistaken and misled? Had it all been pointless? My ability to bear whatever I was undergoing, and what lay in the future, largely depended on a certain view of what had happened to me as an aspect of the way the whole system of life worked. Was this wrong? Was I just deluding myself? Were there, then, no grounds for hope?

These personal considerations made the problem a sharply poignant one, but the problem itself was the general one: does the Qur’ān provide a view of the human world and human life which is not only internally, logically consistent but also conforms to our actual experience? The Parwezian version appeared to have serious flaws in this respect.

12. This crisis lasted two to three weeks. It was a time of considerable anguish. My work stopped. All day, and often at night, I would wrestle with these problems, trying to find some satisfactory solution. Abandoning all preconceptions, conscious or unconscious, I tried to relate the facts of our experience to the broad but fundamental themes of the Qur’ān, in their essence, ignoring secondary details. Gradually a picture began to emerge, a picture that conformed both to the Qur’ān and to factual experience. But the central part of the picture, the foundation of the whole structure, came to me as an insight (in the psychological sense ‒ a sudden grasp of the solution to a problem that has baffled one, defying detailed or systematic solution). Actually, I had had a similar insight earlier, but not being confronted with the problem then, I had missed its full significance. It is both ironic and apt that this second, and clinching, insight should have been provided, inadvertently, by Parwez.

13. The first incident had occurred some months earlier. I was still doing comparative reading of Parwez’s Mafhūm and M. Muhammad Ali’s English translation. I was sitting one morning in the ‘dormitory’ I shared with some of my companions in Campbellpur Jail, alone, doing my usual study. I came to a passage that I had read several times before (as I had several similar passages in the Quran). This time, reading it, it was as if I had been struck by an electric shock. The passage was verses 93 and 95 of Sūrah 23 :

23:93: “ Say: My Nourisher, if You were to show me that which they are promised”.

23:95: “Surely We have the power to show you that which We promise them”.

What hit me was the fact that the Prophet is made to ask Allah for help and an assurance of success, and then his request is turned down! What verse 95 is saying is: I have the power to do this (and left unsaid but clearly implied is) but this is not the way I function. If Allah does not provide succour and assistance to the Prophet, then no other human can expect it.

14. I am by nature suspicious of insights and intuitions, being all too aware of the facility with which our minds can show to us the indubitable truth or eminent rationality of something that they want us to believe. But in this case the conclusion that was being forced upon me ran counter to a deeply cherished belief that I held, one which I heavily leaned upon for support in my current adversity. It is natural for a person struck by an unmerited calamity to hope for salvation and redress from a just God. Further, in this particular case I had come to suspect that, in what was happening to me, I was in some way being used by Him for some purpose of His ‒ too many chances had seemed to conspire together to land me in my present predicament ‒ and, therefore, I could expect that He would ultimately take care of me and not abandon me. But what the Qur’ān seemed to be saying struck at both these expectations. I was shaken, and puzzled, but did not follow up the wider implications of the Qur'ānic statement. I had had an insight, but not being aware of the problem yet, did not realize its significance.

15. Even when, some months later, I was thrown into the turmoil that I have mentioned earlier, this Qur'ānic passage did not help with the main problems. These problems that I wrestled with were the age-old ones of reconciling Allah’s omnipotence with human freedom, His righteousness with the prevalence of evil, His justice with the injustice all around us, human powerlessness with His requital.

Every verse of the Qur’ān is imbued with the sense of His awful majesty, His total power over every single thing, His justice, His mercy and benevolence, and yet we live, and have always lived, in evil, in misery and chaos, in filth and squalor. Are these, then, just empty words, and Blind Chaos the only reality? Parwez’s solution, which is to replace Him with an omnibus collection of unspecified divine laws, is no solution, especially as he adds on a divine purpose functioning in human affairs.

In beating my head against these many walls I had occasion one day to look up the word khalifa in Parwez’s lughāt. In it Parwez argues strongly against the view that the Qur’ān’s use of this term (meaning surrogate or successor) for Adam is in the sense of Allah’s khalifa or viceregent. The argument he uses is that a person can act as another’s khalifa only in the latter’s absence, and since Allah was present in our world this view was wrong. The word "absence" echoed as if a huge gong had been struck; all the intractable walls collapsed, the maze vanished, the warring postulates ceased their strife and fell into orderly ranks, the problems could all be solved.

16. As these notes show, even though I had the key, I did not use it until I was absolutely sure that it was the Qur’ān’s key. This it proved overwhelmingly to be. With this key I entered a domain where I was on my own, having had to leave at the door all my Parwezian preconceptions. With this key I think I have been able to construct the framework of a structure that is coherent and self-consistent, and that also conforms to the Qur’ān and to factual experience. It is a structure that is intellectually satisfying, even though emotionally it can be deeply distressing and frightening at first sight. But not for long, since its main message is one of hope and purpose and endeavour. It makes some sense of life as we actually live it. However, as far as these notes are concerned, its main qualification is that it is what the Qur’ān appears to be saying.

17. This point bears reiteration. In this study my constant endeavour has been to cast aside all preconceptions, all personal predilections, and seek out the Qur’ān’s own message. The Qur’ān does not lay out its message in cut and dried fashion. How could it, for its claim is that it has not one message, but a message for every age. In each new period of history human beings must discover from it the message that applies to them, to their circumstances. This message is by no means a totally new one; the foundational structure will largely be the same as in earlier formulations, but the superstructure can differ. So, for the student of the Qur’ān, the task is one of discovery.

In pursuing this task different approaches are possible. The one that seemed the soundest, and which I adopted, was based on the following considerations:

(a) If the Qur’ān is in fact what it claims to be, then it should provide answers to the major questions which affect human life in this world.

(b) These answers must be consistent with each other. In other words they must provide an integrated, self-consistent system.

(c) This system must be consistent with all the fundamentals of the Qur’ān.

(d) This system should also be consistent with our factual experience.

(e) If there be any apparent errors, contradictions, unrealities etc. in the Qur’ān, then these should all have some reasonable, logical and intellectually honest explanation or reconciliation, which is also factually probable.

18. It will be seen that each one these considerations is implicit in the Qur’ān’s claim to be divine revelation. What I have done is to take the Qur’ān at its own word, at its own valuation, and give it the fullest chance (as far as my mind can assist it) to prove itself. This proof can be considered as adequate only if it meets in full every single one of the above requirements; no allowances can be made, no awkward angles glossed over with faith, no difficulties overcome with a bi-la kaif. The Qur’ān’s claim is so vast that only the most rigorous standards of proof can be required of it.

The results of this endeavour are in the following notes. To me, at least, it seems as if the requirements have been met.

19. I am well aware of the likelihood that there are fallacies and errors in my exposition of the Qur'ānic system. A logician or philosopher could probably pick holes in it. But I think that the main pillars of this system that I have identified are real and valid, and that it should be possible for better minds than mine to construct around them a structure free from the faults that may exist in mine.


* * *

Rediscovering Islam


[Note: I wrote this paper in 2006, and it represents the views held by me at the time (for my current beliefs, see the Beliefs section of this Website). It was first published on Colonel Pat Lang's second website, The Athenaeum, in March 2007. I also sent it to a number of people who I thought would find it of interest. It was published in a couple of print magazines, and on several web sites (details are in my computer's saved Documents) ]

It is necessary that we Muslims face up to the reality that the Islam that we profess, practice and preach today is not working. And has not worked for a long time. This is true both for our communal life as societies, and our personal lives as individuals.

In Muslim countries and communities around the world there is no shortage of mosques and preachers; prayer and fasting are common; millions perform the Hajj every year. Yet most of these societies are rife with corruption and injustice; poverty and illiteracy prevail; sickness and malnutrition are common. It is not just a question of resources; those Muslim countries that are lucky enough to have oil or other natural resources may have avoided some of these problems but face other serious ones (which are also common throughout the Muslim world): lack of individual freedom and human rights; deep economic and social class divisions; materialism and consumerism; the status of women; the alienation of youth, etc.

This failure of Muslim societies to solve internal problems has been matched by their failures to deal with external challenges. In the 19th and early 20th centuries they were unable to withstand the European colonial and imperial tide that swept over them. Today, they are not able to effectively resist the external political, economic and cultural pressures to which they are subject, nor have they been able to keep up and cope with the rapid technological changes occurring in the modern world.

No Muslim society today, whatever its geography or history, can be pointed out as one where humanity has progressed, or as a model of how human beings should live.1 There has not been such a one for centuries.

At the personal level, for each Muslim there is a fundamental paradox that, whether we face it or not (and most of us do not), subconsciously undermines the central pillar of our faith. This pillar is our belief in Allah, in a Being who is all-powerful, all-knowing, all-just and all-merciful. But our daily observation and experience show that there is not much justice and mercy in the world; the strong and wicked prosper, the meek and innocent suffer; good deeds bear no fruit, bad ones reap rewards. Of course, not in all cases, not everywhere, not all the time, but frequently enough to raise the question: how can we reconcile this wide prevalence of injustice and suffering with our belief in a world in which a just and merciful God reigns supreme?

We adopt different methods to avoid acknowledging (much less dealing with) these problems and paradoxes in our personal and communal lives. Many of us resort to total denial, and refuse to believe that there are any problems at all. Others avoid these issues by plunging into blind belief, adopting dogma and ritual without any thought or question. Some acknowledge that there are problems, but believe that they are due to Islam not having been applied correctly or not fully (this open-ended argument ignores the inconvenient cases of Saudi Arabia, Iran and Taliban Afghanistan). For many others these problems do not matter because their adherence to Islam is purely formal: they pay it lip service, and practice it to the extent that is socially necessary or convenient. A number of Muslims blame all our problems on the “enemies of Islam”, and, in recent years, some of them have taken up violent jihad2 against these “enemies”, a solution that does nothing to deal with the basic issue facing us all.

This basic issue is that the Islam we believe in and follow is not producing the results we expect in our communal and our personal lives, the results that the Quran itself has promised us. Islam cannot dodge this issue as other religions do by promising their rewards and punishments in the Hereafter. Instead of avoiding this issue in one way or another, we must ask ourselves: why is this so?

We know that this sad state of affairs was not always the case. When the Quran brought Islam into the world some 1500 years ago, it had a remarkable effect on the warring tribes and worldly townspeople of Arabia: it transformed them into a single people imbued with a transcendent vision for all humanity, and a sense of mission to spread it. The moral fervour generated in them carried them far and wide, sweeping away empires and kingdoms, and freeing their peoples. In the succeeding centuries the civilization that Islam created was as advanced as any that had existed so far, and certainly more broad-based.

The obvious question arises: could it be that the Islam we believe in and practise today is not the same Islam that raised its earlier followers to such great heights?

Islam Then and Now

For its early adherents Islam was a set of simple ideas and beliefs relating to Allah, and the relationship of human beings to Allah. This overpowering vision transformed them, and led them to transform their world. The essence of the vision was awareness of, and belief in, Allah, the creator and sustainer of the universe, and the role that Allah expected human beings to play in their world.

This original Islam had no dogma, no ritual, no complex set of do’s and don'ts, no special class of persons learned in the religion who guided and judged other believers; in short, none of the elaborate structure that now passes for Islam. This superstructure did not exist in the early centuries of Islam.3

The problem we face is that Islam today is a complex and rigid structure, frozen in time, which overlays and obscures the original and essential message that Islam brought to humanity. Further complicating the issue is the emergence of a class of self-styled religious authorities and “guardians”, so that there is now a virtual priestly class in Islam, where there was no place for one in its original version.

What has happened to Islam is not unique; in fact, this has been the trajectory followed by all the major religions. Each of them started off as a simple message of such power and relevance that it attracted significant numbers of adherents, whose lives were deeply affected and changed by their belief in this new vision. Over time, these numbers grew greatly, but also, gradually, the simple, original message was overlaid by dogma, ritual and hierarchical structures, directed and controlled by a priestly class (which usually allied itself to the secular authority in power in a mutually beneficial arrangement). Thus, the revolutionary vision that gave birth to this transforming movement became a static, institutionalized religion. That is what has occurred with Islam: it has become just another religion4.

If we Muslims wish to rediscover the original essence of Islam, we must seek it in the Quran. All else that goes by the name of Islam today is superstructure created later by humans. The original message that Allah named Islam and conveyed to humanity through his Messenger (Rasul Allah) is now to be found only in the Quran, and nowhere else.

Understanding the Quran

The Quran is a record of the divinely inspired5 utterances of Rasul Allah over a period of about 23 years; these were recorded and memorized at the time of occurrence and compiled in the Quran, though not in chronological sequence.6 Because of this, and the long period over which the text gradually came into being, the Quran’s message cannot be understood by reading it as we would any other book. To understand its real message today we have to adopt a different method.

The first step is to discover the correct meaning of the terms and concepts that occur in it. To do this we need to take their meaning as it was understood in the Arabic of that time, which may not necessarily be the meaning developed for them later on. In the case of an important or ambiguous term or concept, we should put together all its usages in the text, and then deduce what meaning or meanings the Quran assigns to it.7

Secondly, since various subjects and issues are dealt with in the Quran at many different places, to discover the Quran’s position on any topic we must put together all the Quranic references to it and then study the coherent picture that emerges. (It is the failure to do this that often results in Muslims, who hold differing views on some subject, to claim that the Quran supports their particular position, quoting one or two verses in proof thereof).

The third step is to deduce the overall ideology that the Quran teaches, within which its positions on all the major issues that it covers fit in a consistent, logical manner. This process also requires revisiting the conclusions arrived at earlier in the second, and even the first, stage, to see if a modification (text-supported, of course) would enable them to fit better into the total picture.

However, merely understanding the meaning of the different portions of the Quranic text is not enough, we also need to understand the significance and relevance of these meanings for us today. The Quran deals with many different types of topics: some are about the fundamental issues affecting human beings, others deal with matters of contemporary daily life, while still others refer to other-worldly issues in metaphorical language, stories of earlier times, and allegories and parables. What should these various elements of the Quran mean to us? How do they apply to us? The answer to these questions is to be found in the Quran’s teaching on the system of divine guidance for humanity through wahy, which we shall consider next.

The discussion in this paper is based on a detailed analysis and study of the Quran using this method of interpretation and understanding, and on the resulting view of the comprehensive system propounded by it. References to Quranic passages are given below for many of the arguments made, but these are mainly for purposes of illustration, and are not the only basis for the positions adopted, which are based on the detailed study, and the complete picture that emerges from it.8

The System of Wahy

The Quran says that a particular human mind, in some fashion, is inspired with a consciousness of Ultimate Reality and Eternal Truth.9 This can be understood as a direct, intuitive comprehension of Allah, and of the relationship of the universe, including humans, to Allah. This person is also imbued with an imperative urge to formulate this vision in words, and convey it to his fellow beings.10 The Quran refers to this individual as a messenger.11

However, this messenger is no more than a human being,12 and the mind through which this vision is given form and expression is only a human mind.13 This mind is confined within the limits of its own specific knowledge as well as the general level of contemporary knowledge and thought. Thus, when it puts into words the consciousness of Ultimate Reality and Eternal Truth that it has acquired, this is inevitably in contemporary terms, which would also enable the message to be comprehensible and relevant to its immediate audience. Similarly, the application of this consciousness to practical affairs can only deal with the actual circumstances then prevailing.

The divine message conveyed by a messenger is a contemporary expression of Ultimate Reality and Eternal Truth. While confined within the limits of prevailing knowledge and comprehension, and dealing with existing circumstances, the details of the message conform completely to the initiating consciousness, and the truths and realities comprehended by the latter underlie everything it contains. In other words, where the message deals with abstract matters (e.g., the reality of Allah, the divine system, the Hereafter, etc.) it does so in terms which can be understood by its immediate audience, but this is nevertheless an expression of the reality of these matters insofar as the human mind (at that stage) can grasp them. Where the message deals with practical injunctions, these relate to contemporary matters, but conform to the fundamental principles and values that should govern all human conduct, anywhere, anytime.

For its own time and place such a message is completely true and valid, and applicable in all its detail. But in places where circumstances differ materially, and even in the same area after the passage of time, the message becomes of limited validity and applicability. The practical injunctions are no longer fully relevant since people's ways of living and their social structures have changed, while the descriptions of abstract matters no longer satisfy since human knowledge and modes of thought have advanced. Meanwhile, another messenger is inspired with wahy,14 and conveys to his fellow-beings another message, which is an expression the consciousness he has acquired of the same Ultimate Reality and Eternal Truth, but one dealing with the issues of that time and place, and appropriate to the then prevailing level of human knowledge. Since this new message, though it differs in its details, is still based on the original truths and realities, it preserves and verifies them.15 In turn, this message also becomes out-of-date, and is replaced by one more pertinent to the new human situation.16

This system of wahy has gone on throughout human history, with numerous messengers arising in different times and places. It came to an end with the message inspired to Rasul Allah in the 7th century A.D. (or the 1st century A.H.). The record of this wahy is now available to us in the Quran. This message is of the same type as all earlier wahy in that its expression is in terms appropriate to its own time and place, and its practical injunctions relate to the circumstances then prevailing. But underlying these surface forms is the same Ultimate Reality and Eternal Truth that has been the basis of all previous wahy. There is, however, one major difference between the Quran and earlier messages: it is the last of the series and no more wahy will occur to take its place. This means that for us, and for succeeding generations, the fundamental truths and realities that have always been conveyed through wahy can be discovered only through the Quran.

This aspect led some Muslim theologians to advance the view that every word of the Quran is applicable for all time to come, and this proposition has become a dogma among most Muslims. This is unfortunate, since not only is it impossible to implement this in practice, but it also contradicts the Quran's own teaching on the subject. What are valid and applicable for all time to come are not the words of the Quran but the truths, realities, principles, values, concepts, etc. that lie behind, and are the basis of, these words. It is these that mirror the Ultimate Reality and Eternal Truth (al-Kitab and al-Haqq) that were the initiating source of the Quranic wahy, and not the verbal constructions which had to be formulated within the limits of contemporary comprehension and knowledge, and mostly dealt with contemporary concerns in a manner appropriate to the immediate audience and their circumstances.

To take one example,17 the Quran makes a few references to the slaves then existing in society in its time, usually in the context of prescribing measures to ameliorate their condition, or to urge their freeing. However, nowhere does it call unequivocally for the abolition of slavery. It is obvious that the Quran, while disapproving of the institution, tolerated it in the then prevailing form and circumstances.18 On the other hand, the principles and values underlying the Quran (e.g., human freedom, the equality of all human beings) are totally opposed to slavery. Which, then, of these two opposite positions (one derived from its words, the other from its underlying principles) should one regard as the Quranic injunction valid for all time to come? The answer is obvious, and applies generally to the issue of which element of the message of the Quran is valid for us today (and for succeeding generations): its words, or its underlying principles, values and truths.

The Quran itself makes this explicit. There is a set of three passages19 that introduce the term umm al-Kitab (the essence or core of the divine message), the only such usage of this term in the whole Quran. Read together, these passages say, in summary, that for every period there is a divinely inspired message and, when this period ends, the fundamentals of the message remain permanently applicable while the rest becomes nullified. These fundamentals are made clear in the Quran, and they are the permanent parts of the divinely inspired message, the rest is similar to the transitory elements of the earlier messages, as those with knowledge and understanding can discern. In several other passages20 this basic concept of certain aspects of the Quran having lasting significance (as distinct from others) is expressed using the term ahsana (the best).

What, then, are these fundamentals, the essence of the message that the Quran brought into the world, which remain valid and applicable for us and for succeeding generations?21 We can usefully consider this in three parts: the fundamental truths underlying the system within which we exist; the basic rule governing human conduct; and the permanent values which we should adopt and uphold. These are the foundations and the fundamentals of Islam.

The Quran’s Fundamental Truths

These relate to the reality that underlies the universe, life and our humanity (issues such as Allah, Allah’s interaction with human beings, the system of the universe, the role of human beings, human accountability, human immortality). In a short treatment such as this we shall only highlight two of the most relevant and important ones: Allah, and the purpose of human life on earth.

Allah : The primary message of the Quran relates to the fact of Allah, and the need for human beings to believe in this fact, and thus accept Allah as the creator and sustainer of the universe and all that is in it, including themselves. But this belief and acceptance has to be an act of free will.22

The starting point of the Quran’s treatment of this subject is that there is (and can be) no proof of Allah’s existence; that is why it urges human beings to believe in it with such urgency and force, and at such considerable length. It urges us to study the universe around us, to look within ourselves, to ponder the consequences of our decision, and then, as free and rational beings, decide whether we should make the assumption that Allah exists, and believe in this. As part of this discourse the Quran seeks to convey to us a concept of Allah through His attributes (the asma al-husna) and “actions”.23

The Role of Human Beings : The Quran puts it thus :

And when your Rabb said to the malaika, “I am going to place in the earth a khalifa.....”.24

This passage (and similar ones25 narrating the allegorical story of Adam) deal with a central theme of the Quran: the emergence of human beings on earth, and the special position and role that they have in their world. The message that this allegory conveys is that we achieved our human status when our minds reached a certain stage of development, and with these we acquired the potential to control and harness all the forces of nature. We were also endowed with free will, which enables us to use these great powers that we possess for any purpose we choose. However, the Quran reminds us that these potentialities and powers were given to us so that we could perform the special role of khalifa that Allah assigns us in our world, which requires us to use them on His behalf. To do this we will have to resist the constant temptation to use these capabilities for our own ends.26 To assist us in this ongoing struggle, Allah will periodically send us guidance.

The basic meaning of khalifa is one who takes the place of another;27 that is why it is used to signify a surrogate or substitute,28 and also a successor. The key component of the term’s meaning is that the surrogate or successor functions in the other’s place, and on his behalf. This is the special role that the Quran says human beings are capable of, and which we are offered: of acting in Allah’s place in our world.

The Quran bases its doctrine of the khilafat f’il ard on, firstly, the proposition that Allah created our universe, and it, and all things in it, exist and function according to His laws.29 Beyond this, however, He has chosen not to intervene; He withholds Himself from acting in this world as a causative agent, and does not interfere in the operation of His natural laws.

If we pause and think about this for a minute, we can see that this, in fact, is how things actually are in our world.30 Everything in the universe is bound in a certain mode of existence and behaviour (with one notable exception). The mighty galaxies travel in pre-determined paths and speeds; the huge stars follow ordained life cycles; the planets move unwaveringly in their orbits. The microcosm is no less firmly determined than the macrocosm; each particle has its assigned properties and must conform to them; the sub-atomic universe appears to be as orderly and predictable as the wider universe. Life itself comes into being and develops according to evolutionary laws. Plants live and die in the established rotation of the seasons. Animals exist bound in the iron bands of instinct, their behaviour fixed within very narrow limits (the minor variations being determined solely by external circumstance rather than internal volition).

Nowhere in this orderly universe do we see a “divine hand” intervening to alter the operation of the system. As human knowledge has increased, the many inexplicable and seemingly random natural events that occur, which were once ascribed to God’s doing, can no longer be so considered. It is now known31 that they all have natural causes, and occur according to natural laws.32 The whole edifice of science and technology is based on this reality.

The second basis of the doctrine of the khilafat f’il ard is that the only entity in the world with complete freedom to act in any way it chooses is the human being; we have total freedom of choice, so much so that we even have the choice of refusing to believe in or acknowledge Allah.33 Here again, as in the natural world, Allah does not intervene in or direct human affairs,34 nor does He affect the outcome of human actions and choices.

This is also what we actually observe. Human beings, in contrast to everything else, appear free to order their lives and determine their behaviour in any way they choose. Recorded history and our own observation disclose human beings living, individually and collectively, in many different modes, according to the highest standards conceivable as well as the lowest, in pursuit of all kinds of aims and goals as well as none at all, performing actions which we can term superhuman or almost divine, and also those from which even the most brutish beasts refrain. This vast variety is proof enough that neither our inner nature nor any external directive compels human beings to live and act in any particular pattern or mode. How they live or what they do is for them to decide. It is true that not many of us are able, in practice, to make such free choices, but, in principle, there is no insurmountable barrier to prevent us from doing so. What any human has done, it is possible for other humans to also do.

We also see that the outcomes of human actions and choices follow no discernible pattern relating to their ethical or moral quality, or their conformity or otherwise to any divine or religious directives. However, influenced by religious teaching, many people still consider occurrences affecting humans and human societies to be due to specific decisions by God. When, as often happens, good deeds have bad outcomes while evil actions result in gains, the wicked prosper and the virtuous or innocent suffer, such believers are forced to resort to implausible excuses and arguments, ignoring the implications for the kind of God who would act thus, and for the omnipotence and justice of the divine system that they claim is operating in human affairs. Such a claim is neither supported by the Quran nor by our own experience.

The third basis of this doctrine is that Allah acts in our world through the agency of humans.35

Based on these premises the Quran expounds the doctrine of the khilafat f’il ard. Affirming that Allah withholds Himself from acting as a causative agent in our world, and acknowledging the freedom of choice and action that humans possess, the Quran offers human beings the role of Allah’s khulafa f’il ard. It urges us to assume the responsibility of acting as Allah’s surrogates, to act in His place as causative beings in our world, to work towards His goals, to do all that He would have done in our world if He had so chosen. Apart from the pivotal allegory of Adam, the Quran refers to this task, this role, this Allah-human relationship, repeatedly and in many different ways.36

The khilafat f’il ard is indeed a heavy burden for human beings to assume. In accepting it we agree to live our lives for Him, and not for ourselves. Whatever obligations He has assumed in our world, we undertake to fulfil. (For example, when the Quran says (6:11) that the provision of sustenance to every living creature is Allah’s responsibility, this is an obligation that we are required to discharge on His behalf). To be able to fulfil all these responsibilities we have to first develop the great potentialities with which He has endowed us, so as to achieve as many of His powers and qualities as apply to our world. With these we must strive, individually and collectively, to further His goals, not our own. We stand for Allah in our world, and must fashion ourselves and our actions accordingly.37

Basis of Conduct

The Quran uses the term amal as-salihat to prescribe the essential basis of conduct for human beings. The primary meaning of the root for salih is to remove a shortcoming, defect or handicap and bring something to its proper and rightful state. In the context of the khilafat f’il ard, this basic rule requires us to make good the deficiencies and limitations in human beings, internal and external, in ourselves and others, so that we can achieve the stature and capability necessary for beings who must act on behalf of Allah in our world. It requires us to act, individually and collectively, to make this world into its rightful condition, and thus, through human instrumentality, to restore Allah as a causative agent to a world within which He has chosen not to act as one.

The overriding importance that the Quran attaches to this rule of action is shown by its linking of this conduct with the essential requirement to being a Muslim: iman (belief), and the frequent use of this formula as the conduct for which Allah promises the ultimate reward.38

Permanent Values

The values that should permeate our lives and govern our actions can be derived from the Quran, many of them from the attributes of Allah (of course, not all of the attributes are applicable to human beings). The most important of these are :

Freedom: This, according to the Quran, is the essential and distinguishing quality of human beings. Thus, maintaining our humanity requires us to promote and preserve this value for each and every human being.

Love: The love which the Quran extols is the one based on the term rahma. The root for this term is a name for the womb, and the term refers primarily to the nurturing, compassionate love that a mother has for her child. Maternal love is the foundation for our humanity; it is this (and the response it elicits in every human being: love of the mother) that enabled (even propelled) us to evolve to the human stage. Perhaps the most frequently used names for Allah in the Quran are ar-Rahman and ar-Rahim, signifying the nurturing love that the Creator has for his creation. (Unfortunately, when Islam became a religion, the concept of Allah was derived from the most powerful being then on earth, the absolute ruler who wielded his power according to his whims, unconstrained by any rule or law or other consideration. For his helpless subjects, the highest and most desirable virtue in such a ruler would be mercy, and that is what rahma came to mean, and has since remained).

Justice: In the Quran’s references to Allah’s dealings with humans the constant theme is that of justice. In our dealings with each other, and in the societies we establish, this is a value that should figure prominently.

The Final Word

The final word must remain, as always, with the Quran. And the Quran’s final words could not be clearer on this issue. Based on both external39 and internal evidence, the final substantive portion of the Quran received by Rasul Allah was :

For you this day have I brought to its culmination your way of life,40 and bestowed upon you My final favour, and approved for you Islam as a way of life (5:3). 41

What this passage tells us is that the way of life that the unfolding Quran and Rasul Allah were teaching evolved during that period, and reached its final form towards the end of Rasul Allah’s life. The Quran gives this way of life the name Islam. The root for this term has many different meanings, but most of these relate to conditions or states (e.g., perfection, security, peace, beauty). Among those that refer to actions the primary sense is to give or relinquish oneself to someone or something.42 Thus, Islam means that way of life in which one is required to hand oneself over to Allah, to commit one’s being to Allah. This is precisely what the khilafat f’il ard requires: that we commit ourselves and our lives to fulfilling Allah’s purposes and obligations.

Incorporating the various meanings of the root for this word, we can define Islam as that way of life in which human beings surrender themselves to the role that Allah has given them, of being His khulafa in our world. Thereby we preserve Him in a world in which He has chosen not to act, and thus, preserving Him, we preserve both ourselves and the world. In this effort we climb upwards, shedding our inherited flaws, towards perfection and completion, and our world moves thus with us. It is in this way of life that we and our world can find peace, security and tranquility, and through it alone that human striving can be truly productive. A person who walks in this way is a Muslim (one who has committed himself or herself to Allah).

This is the Islam that the Quran offers all human beings. It urges us, as free and rational persons, to recognize the Supreme Being who is the creator and sustainer of our universe, and whose laws govern it. It tells us that we possess the potentiality to become the surrogates, the representatives, of Allah in our world, and offers us this role. To undertake this responsibility, to act for Allah in our world and fulfil His purposes and obligations in it, this is the way of life that is Islam.

For those of us who call ourselves Muslims today, this is the Islam that we have to rediscover from the Quran. But before we can do that we have to realize that the religion that we profess and practise is a far cry from the Islam that the Quran brought into the world some 1500 years ago. Until we recognize this undoubtedly painful reality, and return to the original guidance we received, we cannot hope to garner the rich harvest that our early forbears reaped so abundantly, so different from our fallen state today.

It is fitting to end this paper with two passages from the Quran, the first being one of its most powerful verses. Referring to the role offered to human beings, it says :

We did offer the Trust to the heavens and the earth and the mountains, but they were afraid to accept it. Human beings, however, undertook to bear it, but surely they have ignored it, and indeed they have failed to accord it its rightful due (33:72).

However, in the second passage we can discern a message of hope – if we can retrace our steps and rediscover the original message that was given to us :

Those who obscure the clear message and guidance that We have sent down, when We have made it so explicit in the Book, it is they who are banished (from Allah’s guidance), and deservedly so. But those who turn back and remedy this error, and make manifest (the clear message sent down), it is to them that I return; and I am oft-returning, compassionate (2:159-160).

Footnotes

1 In the latest (2003) ranking of countries of the world on the Human Development Index by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the first Muslim country (excluding the special case of Brunei) occurs at No. 40. Excluding also the small but rich Gulf sheikhdoms, the first Muslim country (oil-rich but socialist Libya) comes at No. 58. Saudi Arabia, the richest and most religious Muslim country, comes at No. 77. The Arab Human Development reports (prepared by Arab scholars and issued by the UNDP) paint a sobering picture of the human condition in these societies. A telling statistic: the 2002 AHD report says that half of the young Arabs polled wanted to emigrate from their countries! In the latest Transparency International Corruption Index (for 2005), 13 of the 23 countries at the bottom of the list (most corrupt) are Muslim countries. From the top, the first Muslim country is at No. 28 (www.transparency.org).

2 Since this article is for the general reader, I am not adopting fully the usual transliteration system for Arabic.

3 The raw material and the tools with which this superstructure was later gradually constructed (the standard hadith collections and the doctrines of the fiqh schools) did not begin to be assembled and formalized until the third century A.H.

4 The major religions have played a useful role in history, and still do in many respects. They promoted social cohesion, developed cultures, fostered ethical systems, sometimes resisted tyranny, and provided human beings with a strong faith to deal with the vicissitudes of life. But they also developed into institutions of control, often exercising their power in reactionary and negative ways, stifling freedom and progress. Even though the dogmas they profess enable many individuals to acquire a faith that enables them to become better persons and lead better lives, overall they are often an obstacle to human progress and development.

5 The most accurate translation of the term wahy is “inspiration”, and not the commonly used “revelation”, which is a term borrowed from other religions. The primary meaning of the root for wahy is a swift signal, conveying some meaning or giving some indication.

6 The placing of verses in the text was directed by Rasul Allah; this would have been necessary to enable the suras to be memorized in a standard format (also see Quran 75:17). Thus, their mixing up was deliberate, perhaps to break for future readers any link to particular events or circumstances, and thus generalize the message.

7 For an example of how this method can reveal meanings quite different from those commonly accepted, see the discussion on the term fath in the author’s article, Al-Hudaybiya: An Alternative Version (The Muslim World, Jan. 1981: 47) [Reprinted in Uri Rubin, ed., The Life of Muhammad (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate Publishing, 1998)].

8 The author hopes to publish the results of this study in due course.

9 The Quran uses the terms al-Kitab and al-Haqq to represent these concepts in the context of wahy. Among many references in the Quran, typical are 2:213; 3:78; 10:37; 22:54; 35:31.

10 The phenomenon can be understood as somewhat similar (though of far greater depth and complexity, and, of course, significance) to that of the genius inspired by a vision and impelled to express it in great art or music.

11 The common usage in English of the term “prophet” is incorrect. The Quran uses the terms rasul and nabi, both of which mean a conveyor of a message or information.

12 See, for example, Quran 12:109; 14:11; 16:43; 17:93, 95; 21:7; 23:23-50; 25:20; 41:6.

13 There are many indications of this in the Quran, but the defining verse is 22:52. The term shaytan is used in the Quran for negative impulses, attitudes, thoughts, and other failings of the human mind.

14 On the series of messengers, see, for example, Quran 2:213; 10:47; 16:36; 23:44; 35:24.

15 On the preservation and verification of earlier wahy, see, for example, Quran 2:89, 97, 101; 4:47; 5:15, 46, 48; 6:93; 10:37; 35:31.

16 On the replacement of an earlier wahy by a later one, see, for example, Quran 2:106; 5:44-48; 13:38-39; 16:101; 98:3.

17 Other examples, to which the same argument applies, are the injunctions regarding the punishments for various offences, retaliation or qisas (2:178-179), polygamy, concubinage, women witnesses, etc.

18 It was a relatively benign form of slavery, more akin to indentured service, and was an integral part of the social and economic systems. Slaves were lower status members of the families, clans and tribes that constituted Arab society. Most of them would have lost both livelihood and protection if suddenly freed.

19 Quran 13:38-39; 43:2-5; and 3:6. Linked to these is 39:23.

20 See, for example, Quran 29:46; 39:18, 55; 92:6-7, 9-10. 7:145 applies the same concept to Moses’ time. Also see 98:2-3 for the same meaning conveyed in a different form.

21 Future generations will need to keep going back to the Quran to see if it provides any new guidance for their times and circumstances.

22 See, for example, Quran 2:256; 10:99; 13:31; 18:29; 32:13; 43:20; 74:55; 76:3.

23 The concept given in the Quran is one our minds can understand and relate to. It cannot convey the “reality” of Allah, since this is beyond the limits of finite human understanding.

24 Commenting on this verse (2:30) Ibn Khaldun wrote in his great treatise on human history: This is the meaning of civilization (Al-Muqaddimah, trans. F. Rosenthal (New York, 1958), vol. I, 85).

25 2:30-38; 7:11-25; 15:28-42; 17:61-64; 18:50; 20:115-126; 38:71-85.

26 The Quran uses the term malaika to represent the forces of nature, and the term Iblis to represent those elements of human nature that tend to lead humans away from Allah’s path.

27 See, for example, Quran 7:69, 74, 142; 11:57; 19:59; 25:62.

28 “An inscription from South Arabia (in a language cognate with classical Arabic) shows that the corresponding word was there used about AD 543 in the sense of ‘viceroy’ and this usage may have affected that in classical Arabic....” W. Montgomery Watt, Islamic Political Thought (Edinburgh: The University Press, 1968), 33. This usage is confirmed in Quran 7:142.

29 See, for example, Quran 13:15; 16:49; 21:33; 30:25-26; 65:12.

30 This, surely, is the primary test for the validity of a belief: that it is consistent with our observation and experience of the real world. It is to avoid this test that religions seek to distract and over-awe their followers through their otherworldly and supernatural dogmas and beliefs, which they are required to accept blindly.

31 Of course, many still don’t know this, or refuse to acknowledge it. After the Katrina hurricane and the South Asian earthquake in 2005, some Christian and Muslim religious figures, respectively, claimed that this was God’s punishment on sinners. They blissfully ignored what kind of God it was (on whose behalf they were so smugly claiming to speak) whose wrath fell mainly on the poor, the helpless, and innocent children.

32 We should remember that chance and randomness are part of the natural system. See, for example, Quran 3:139; 7:94-95; 10:24; 11:9-11; 21:35; 30:36-37; 53:43; 89:15-16.

33 See, for example, Quran 10:108; 13:31; 18:29; 43:40; 74:55; 76:3.

34 Even Rasul Allah is told that there is no guarantee that he will see the defeat of those opposing him, or that he will not die before the success of his mission (Quran 10:46; 13:40; 40:77; 43:41-42).

35 See, for example, Quran 2:251; 4:75; 22:40; 36:47; 47:7.

36 Some of the concepts the Quran uses are ahd Allah, auliya Allah, ansar Allah, shuhada l’illah, amana b’illah, dhikr Allah, sabil Allah, and others. It is not possible to discuss these in this paper.

37 We have forgotten the real significance of the tradition followed from the earliest days of Islam whereby a Muslim commences every action with a bismillah: in the name of Allah.

38 There are 25 references relating to the reward of al-janna (e.g., 2:25; 18:30; 22:14; 32:19; 45:30; 84:25) and another 24 speaking of reward generally (e.g., 2:277; 3:56; 35:7; 41:8; 103:3).

39 This wahy occurred during Rasul Allah’s final Hajj, according to a hadith from Umar b.al-Khattab (Bukhari 2:34; also reported in other collections). He fell ill two to three months later, and died soon after.

40 The term used is din, which properly has this broad significance. When Islam became a religion, this term was limited to mean religious dogma and practice.

41 One reason, perhaps, why this passage has not received the attention it merits is that it has been placed in the middle of verse 3, which belongs to a much earlier period, even though the context is quite different. It is possible that, in those final days, Rasul Allah did not get an opportunity to designate the appropriate placing of this passage.

42 When Islam became a religion, and the concept of Allah became that of an omnipotent ruler, the meaning adopted for this term was “submission”, the most appropriate attitude of a subject in a kingdom. It has so remained, allowing the many self-styled intermediaries to demand absolute obedience to their version of the “king’s” commands.


* * *

The Issue of God

[ Note: I wrote this article in 2007 ]

Does God Exist?

For humans, the relationship with God commenced when they began to personify as gods and goddesses the powerful, awe-inspiring forces of nature that surrounded them, sometimes benign, often threatening, always mysterious. There followed a long and diverse succession of tribal deities, divine rulers, the Greek Olympians and their many offshoots. Finally, there appeared the one God of the monotheistic religions, who gradually displaced the others among a large portion of humanity.1

Each of these later versions of God was soon surrounded by an elaborate web of dogma and ritual, presided over by a layer of clergy and theologians who became the guardians of the religion (often in a mutually beneficial alliance with the secular authority). These religions maintained that God created the universe and all that is in it, and controls and directs everything. They also taught that God directs and controls human affairs, and rewards and punishes human beings according to their compliance with His wishes.

God’s wishes, it was claimed, were enshrined in the religion’s scriptures and laws, which were developed, interpreted and expounded by the religious establishment. For a long time religions maintained their hold on their followers by investing their lives with meaning and purpose, and through the promise of divine rewards and the threat of divine punishment. But, in modern times, as knowledge and information have increased and superstition has faded, the hold of religion has weakened and with it the belief in God, so that for increasing numbers of people He has become a polite fiction and plays no real role in their everyday lives. Even for many of those still caught up in religious ritual and dogma God is a distant presence, obscured by all the clutter; they may have belief in Him, but not faith.2

More recently, a religious phenomenon that has surfaced from time to time has once again risen to prominence – the God fanatic. These fundamentalists (to be found in all religions) claim a direct connection to God, and zealously adopt the mission of implementing His will (usually some simplistic but grandiose formulation, bolstered by selective reading of scripture). This pits them not only against outsiders but also against their co-religionists, whom they declare to be lacking in the true faith. The crisis affecting the human relationship with God today is that while too many believe too little in Him, an aggressive minority believes too much.

Lately, into this flux has come a spate of books attacking the concept of the God of religion.3 The essence of their case is that the various “proofs” or arguments4 usually advanced for the existence of God can all be shown to be fallacious, and that the concept of God proposed and taught by religion is not supported by any evidence; in fact, that there is much evidence and logic to contradict it.

Science has shown that the universe, life, and human beings could all have developed through natural processes, without the intervention of God. Similarly, whatever goes on in the natural world can be shown to occur according to natural processes and laws.5 One would have to shut one’s eyes and close one’s mind to deny all this evidence.

Human societies and individuals live in many different modes and forms, their natures and shapes due largely to the dictates of history, geography, economics and politics. There is no evidence to show that the God of religion plays any part in determining these. We also see that the outcomes of human choices and actions follow no discernible pattern relating to their ethical or moral quality, or their conformity or otherwise to any divine or religious injunctions. Often, good deeds have bad outcomes while evil actions result in gains, the wicked prosper and the virtuous or innocent suffer.

An open-minded, unbiased examination of the evidence of science, as well as an honest assessment of human affairs, show that there is no convincing proof of the existence of the God of religion. Nor is there any necessity to postulate such an entity to explain what happens in our world. However, it does not automatically follow from the demolishing of this concept of the God of religion that it is not possible to formulate a tenable concept of the entity that we generally think of as God. All that these contrary arguments and evidence show is that the God of religion is not a concept that an informed and intellectually honest person can accept as sustainable.

A viable and tenable concept of God would have to meet two basic conditions :

Externally, it must conform to our observation and experience of the physical world (i.e., our science).

Internally, it must be logical and self-consistent.

Another obvious requirement is that the concept must have some relevance for us (otherwise the whole exercise becomes pointless).

In studying and exploring our universe science has established that it is a unitary system. All matter is composed of various combinations of the same fundamental particles. The forces that operate in the universe are all interrelated.6 The laws that we observe functioning on earth appear to govern the entire universe; they are also all coherent and compatible with each other as part of a single system. It is thus not surprising that, in its search for the origin of our universe, cosmology is discovering that it appears to be of a single origin, a singular event or process that caused it all to come into existence.

Science is coming up with ever more refined (and elegant) hypotheses7 for how our universe came into existence, and its resulting structure and composition (in the process even postulating the possibility of the existence of many other such universes). But, even as the originating event keeps getting pushed further and further back, there always remains the question : what brought this into being? (As Leibnitz asked : why is there something rather than nothing?). This conundrum cannot be resolved in the physical sphere since, in it, something cannot come into existence from nothing (just as, in reverse, it is not possible for matter or energy to disappear into nothing).

We are thus left with two options : to either accept that there will always be a grey area around this origin, however far back science pushes it, or to assume that the first physical entity or event was caused by something outside the physical sphere. It then becomes a matter of choice which position one adopts. But the belief in a non-physical causality would be just that – an assumption; no physical proof will ever be possible since we are considering an entity that transcends the physical.

If we choose to believe in this higher causality we could define it thus :

"That entity which, while existing independently of our universe, is its ultimate cause; which, while existing outside the space-time framework and energy-matter structure of our universe, imposes on it a systemizing unity and direction; and which, as a result, is connected to everything in the universe in a benign and constructive way".

This concept conforms to what we know of our world. It is in accord with the hypotheses of science regarding the origin of our universe, and with its functioning as a symmetrical system working in conformity with natural laws. It is logically consistent, and also postulates an underlying connection between this entity and us. It would be appropriate for us to call this entity God, since this is the name we use for a concept of this nature.

As was stated earlier, believing in such a concept of God is purely a matter of belief. It involves making a conscious choice to assume the fact of an external causality for the universe instead of being content with accepting a purely physical universe, created (in some unknowable fashion) through natural processes and physical laws, and running according to them. The question arises: why would we want to do that? Why should we try to go beyond the facts of science to a belief in the fact of God?

The main reason is that certain logical implications follow from whichever assumption we make about the existence or non-existence of God (the latter is as much an assumption as the former, since it is not possible to prove this negative proposition). These implications are not just of academic or philosophic interest but have far-reaching significance for the way in which we live our individual and collective lives.

Foremost is the issue of what, if any, is the significance and purpose of human life on earth. As we stand at the edge of an increasingly fragile world and look out at the vast, empty darkness of the cosmos, aware that each of us may be but a tiny spark of consciousness born of a freak combination of cosmic circumstances that, after a short while, winks out for ever, this is not a question we can easily avoid.

Ever since humans could think beyond the needs of daily sustenance and survival, they have wondered about this. With religion came an answer that sufficed for centuries, but as religious faith has waned so has its power to answer this conundrum. Materialistic doctrines and systems such as capitalism, socialism and communism have all, despite initial bursts of enthusiasm, failed to provide a satisfactory alternative meaning and purpose to human life. In recent times, increasing numbers of people are turning to religious fundamentalism to fill this void.

Apart from its existential significance, this issue is becoming one of critical importance as our power and efficacy grow exponentially. Already we are reaching out to the planets and the stars; we are probing into the central mysteries of life and matter; we have the potential to alter the face of the earth; we have the means to reorder life on this planet. There seem to be few limits to how much more we can acquire in this direction. The critical question is : to what aims and purposes will human beings put this vast reach and capacity? So far it has been mostly used for parochial profit and power, and often put to destructive purposes. A rational belief in God, and its resulting implications, could provide us with a common set of goals towards which we should use this great power and capability that we are acquiring, goals which serve all humanity and are in harmony with nature.

A darker side of this great progress in science and technology, and the uses to which we have been and are putting it, is its impact on the natural world. As we are beginning to realize, from a nurturing habitat we have transformed it into a polluted, dysfunctional environment that is threatening to severely disrupt life on earth. The most effective way of dealing with this looming crisis is through a united response by all of humanity. A common, rationally tenable belief in God, and the acknowledgement of its implications, can provide us with the basis for the tremendous joint effort that we all need to make to deal with this threat to human welfare and, possibly, even our existence on earth.

A tenable belief in God can also have an important effect on our everyday life. Human societies have constructed elaborate systems of laws and institutions to control and channel the many human tendencies that are a legacy of our evolutionary past (in which the ‘law of the jungle’ generally prevailed). However, the success of these measures depended to a great extent on the ethical and moral codes that religion taught, and which became embedded in the cultures it fostered. With the decline of religious belief these codes have lost much of their power; we need a new basis on which to revitalize the system of human values which govern our individual and collective lives. A rational belief in God, and on the implications that follow from it, can provide such a basis.8

Another consideration relates to our human individuality and its subsistence. The observable fact is that each human being lives for a certain period and then dies; as far as we know he or she then ceases to exist. Yet, from the earliest times, humans have conceived of the idea that what dies is only the person's body, and that the person can continue or resume their existence on a different plane. It is easy to see how radically the whole perspective embracing our life on this earth changes if we believe that this is in fact what happens.

There is no way in which we can prove that human beings can live again after death; we can only make an assumption that this may be so. It is an assumption that most of us would like to make, not least because the alternative robs human life and human individuality of much significance. To make such an assumption is, of course, to postulate a whole order of existence outside or beyond the framework of this universe. This assumption becomes logically possible if we first assume the existence of an entity that created this framework, and is thus capable of creating other frameworks of existence. Logic apart, it is also almost impossible to believe in a life beyond death without a prior belief in God.

To sum up, the God of religion is fading away. The mists of awe and incense within which He thrived are being dispersed by the cold, hard light of science. Even most of those who still mumble the old formulas probably know in their hearts that He is a dying fiction. So do many of those who cling with increasing desperation to His waning presence, waving His flag and fighting against the rising godless tide, some with strident faith and strange crusades, others with guns and bombs, all the while assuaging their mounting fear with comforting reports of His imminent arrival on earth.

Those of us who are prepared to face this hard truth find ourselves in an empty landscape, bereft of the many comforting props and shelters we have come to rely upon. Some declaim that the brightness of the new light will suffice, but for the many others who recoil from the barren hardness of a purely material existence, there is another choice. We can choose to believe in a God who can withstand the bright light of science. Such a belief could invest our lives with true significance and purpose, determine how we will use the great powers and capability that we are acquiring, provide a common basis for us to jointly deal with the many dangers that threaten humanity, underpin our societal structures with a moral basis, and give hope that death is not the end for us.

To establish whether believing in such a God can lead to these results, and therefore this is a choice worth making, we need to examine what would be the implications of this belief.

What Does God Want of Us?

Having assumed the fact of God, a transcendent entity that is, in some fashion, connected to everything in our world, the next issue that faces us is the nature of our relationship with God. What does he want of us? What can we expect of him?9

In seeking answers to these and similar questions the first thing we observe is that there exist certain fundamental differences between human beings and everything else that we know of. Everything else in the universe is bound in a certain mode of existence and behaviour. The mighty galaxies travel in pre-determined paths and speeds; the huge stars follow ordained life cycles; the planets move unwaveringly in their orbits. The microcosm is no less firmly regulated than the macrocosm; each particle has its inherent properties and must conform to them; the sub-atomic universe appears to be as bound in a unitary system as the wider universe. Life itself comes into being and develops according to evolutionary laws. Plants live and die in the established rotation of the seasons. Animals exist bound in the iron bands of instinct, their behaviour fixed within narrow limits.10

On the other hand, human beings, in contrast to everything else, appear free to order their lives and determine their behaviour in any way they choose. Recorded history and our own observation disclose human beings living, individually and collectively, in many different modes, according to the highest standards conceivable as well as the lowest, in pursuit of all kinds of aims and goals as well as none at all, performing actions that we would call saintly, and also those of the utmost depravity. This vast variety is proof enough that neither our inner nature nor any external constraint compels human beings to live and act in any particular pattern or mode. How they live or what they do is for them to decide. It is true that not many of us are able, in practice, to make such free choices, but, in principle, there is no insurmountable barrier to prevent us from doing so. What any human has done, it is possible for other humans to also do.

It appears, therefore, that there is a radical difference in the relationship between God and humans, and between God and everything else we know of. The systemization and orientation that binds the latter does not extend to human beings. Whatever God may want of other things and beings is inherent in their natures or properties, and in the laws that govern them, but this is not so in the case of human beings. Everything else perforce lives out its relationship with God; human beings alone can live and act in any fashion they please.

This crucial difference between us and other living things is due to the evolution of our minds into this powerful instrument that gives us the capacity to chart our course as we will, to bend our environment to our purposes, and to think conceptually, imagine, analyze and speculate. If our relationship to God is not implanted within us or imposed upon us from without, then perhaps the only way in which we can discover it is through our minds.

The human mind, on its own, has tried two methods of discovering this relationship : rational speculation and mystical intuition. Neither of these has produced any answer which has commanded acceptance either from most other minds similarly engaged or from large numbers of other people. Since this relationship is not between God and some humans but between God and the totality of humanity, any valid answer must, over a period of time, appeal to and be found satisfying by a large proportion of human beings. The only answers which have, historically, met this test are those provided by religions based on “revelation” or “inspiration”.

However, that does not solve the problem. We find that there are many major religions in the world that have held the allegiance of vast multitudes over centuries, and still number their adherents in the hundreds of millions. Each one of them claims to be based on “revelation”, and each asserts, whether overtly or implicitly, that it alone possesses the truth while all others are false. Whose claim should one accept? It is not good enough to accept a religion as true just because one happens to have been born to parents who professed it. As rational, thinking beings it is fitting that we cast aside all preconceptions and use our minds as best we can in arriving at such a decision.

When we approach this issue in such a manner, certain factors strike us straightaway. The most recent serious claim of “revelation” or “inspiration” is that of the Quran. Even though there have been a number of prior “revelations”, logically we should first examine the latest one, which should be the one most relevant to us and our circumstances. Secondly, it is an established historical fact, generally accepted, that the Quran we have today contains in its original form (practically, if not totally) the record of the “inspiration” that occurred some 1500 years ago. No other religion can make a similar claim; in none of them is it possible to disentangle the pure, original “revelation” from later accretions of human inception.

Thirdly, the Quran is the only self-claimed “inspiration” which does not reject the similar claims of others. It affirms a whole system of periodic “inspiration” which culminated in itself; all of them, it says, had the same source, and the same fundamentals have underlain each one of them. Thus, it does not reject previous “revelations”, but claims to incorporate them all within itself.

The above factors all point to the conclusion that, in seeking to discover the true relationship between God and humanity through “inspiration” or “revelation”, logically we should turn first to the Quran.11 (Whether the answer it provides is worthy of acceptance will, of course, depend solely on our evaluation of it and not on the source).

What Does God Say to Us?

The Quran claims that the essentials of the message it brings to humanity are the same as those perceived and transmitted by earlier messengers over the course of human history, including the “revelations” on which the major religions were based. Unfortunately, these essentials have to a large degree been lost or distorted under layers of later constructions and elaborations. (The same fate has befallen the essential message contained in the Quran, but it is possible for us to rediscover it).12

Summarized below are the main elements of this message :

The origin of our universe is due to God, and he is connected to everything in it. The universe, and all that it contains, is bound by the laws that he has embedded in it but, beyond that, he does not intervene. Humans, as physical beings, are also so bound, but otherwise possess complete freedom of choice and action. In addition to this freedom, God has given us great powers and capacity, and, by virtue of these, offered us a special role – stewardship of our world on his behalf. He urges us to assume the responsibility of acting as his surrogates, to act in his place as causative beings in our world, to work towards his goals and purposes, to do all that he would have done in our world if he had chosen to act in it.

In accepting this role we would live our lives for God, and not for ourselves. Whatever responsibilities and obligations he has in our world as its creator, we would undertake to fulfil. To be able to do this we have to develop the great potentialities with which he has endowed us; with these we must strive, individually and collectively, to move this world towards its rightful condition, and thus, through human instrumentality, to restore God as a causative agent to a world within which he has chosen not to act as one. We stand for God in our world, and must fashion ourselves and our actions accordingly.

The message also tells us that the principal values that should govern our lives and our actions should be freedom, love and compassion, justice, the sanctity of human life, and beauty and harmony.

This is the essence of what God has to say to us, according to the Quran. This is what he has said to human beings through all the prophets and seers who have perceived his message, enshrined now in the many religions that have held the allegiance of countless millions over the centuries, in spite of this message being largely concealed under the later additions and interpretations of men.

Conclusion

We started off by seeing that it is not possible for an informed, intellectually honest person to believe in the existence of the God of religion. A tenable concept of such a transcendent entity that created and “governs” our world must conform to what science has discovered about the physical world, and what we know of human history and human affairs. We formulated such a definition of the concept and called it God, because that is the name most familiar to human beings for such an entity.

However, the concept we have defined here, and refer to as God, is not the God of religion. We could give it another appropriate name; for example, we could call it the Cosmic Principle, or the Primal Cause, or Ultimate Reality. We can then visualize this entity actualizing its intent in the first physical form or event, which then led to the evolution of our universe, a gradual process that is still ongoing. This has resulted in the entity’s intent and impetus becoming, in some fashion, immanent in this creation, as we can observe in the consistent, symmetrical and all-pervasive laws of nature, and the way in which the universe has evolved. Its directing impulse caused the creation of life in inanimate matter, and then propelled its evolution into increasingly complex life-forms, culminating in humans with minds capable of self-awareness, abstract thought and volition. We can conceive that, since humans have broken free of the determinism of the natural world, this Cosmic Principle now also seeks to express its impulse through us, trying to make us aware of our responsibility to use the tremendous capability that we already have, and can increasingly acquire in the future, to move our world towards a more perfect state.

It is also quite possible that the working of the Principle has resulted in life developing in other parts of our universe, where it may well have gone through an evolutionary process similar to ours to create intelligent beings who, though their form might differ from ours (due to the differing physical characteristics of their environment), share with us a kinship (and an orientation) through the working of the same originating entity within them and ourselves. We can also imagine this actualization of the entity’s intent occurring on other occasions and creating other universes, which may be quite different from ours in their characteristics, but would share with us the systemizing and directional impulse of our common creator.

Whether we call this transcendent, systemizing and orienting entity God (or some other appropriate name) the basic human predicament remains the same. Our science, the tool constructed by our analytical and visionary minds, indicates to us an origin of our universe (and ourselves) where the physical processes that created it can be traced back only so far. Beyond this point, science can offer us no answer, no solution to the riddle of how something came to be from nothing.

We have the choice of stopping there and being content to be merely physical creatures in a physical world, or we can choose to believe that a non-physical cause started the physical process of creation, and that this transcendent entity not only caused our universe to come into being but also works within it (through the laws of nature and evolution) so that, instead of chaos, we live in a symmetrical, coherent, dynamic system, whose progression led to the creation of life, which finally evolved into human beings. Making this choice also entails the onus of recognizing and accepting the task that our evolution into humans implicitly imposes upon us, the task for which God (or whatever else we call this entity), has, in this manner, created us, the task that is revealed through a true reading of these many messages that have been perceived by humanity through the ages; namely, to assume responsibility for our world and ourselves, and to respond to the Creator’s call to shape our world into one of peace and plenty, beauty and harmony, freedom and justice.

In the final analysis, for us, the issue of God is really the issue of humanity. Accepting and acknowledging the fact of God is to accept and acknowledge our place in a universe that did not come into being by happenstance but through the purposeful unfolding of a measured intent; a cosmos with a thrust and direction which finally brought us into being in one of its far corners through a long evolution from inanimate matter into beings capable of unmatched thought, feeling and action. No longer, then, need we feel we stand on a flimsy perch looking out at the empty, meaningless darkness of unending space, but instead, from this azure orb, we can see unfolding before us the majestic handiwork of the Creator, a process of which we are a part and in which we have a role to play. Filled with grace and awe and reverence, we can raise our voices in praise and gratitude at the nurturing love the Creator showers upon his creation, not as acts of bestowal but as expressions of his very being.

We are called upon to express this gratitude by assuming the role that our human status offers us, by accepting and undertaking the task of stewardship in our world on behalf of God. Not only to preserve it but to continue to make it a better world, ever closer to what it would have been had its creator chosen to act in it. A task that we have so far not undertaken in a manner befitting its critical importance, since failure on our part could result in the destruction of human civilization and perhaps even the end of human life on earth.

In its picturesque language, the Quran puts it thus :

"We did offer the Trust to the skies and the earth and the mountains, but they were afraid to accept it. Human beings, however, undertook to bear it, but surely they have ignored it, and indeed they have failed to accord it its rightful due" (33:72).


Footnotes

1 The major non-monotheistic religions existing today also have various concepts of deity, e.g., a Supreme Being whose different aspects are the many gods (Hinduism), or a universal force, soul or reality (Shintoism, Taoism). Even one form of the most “god-less” religion (Buddhism) considers the Buddha to be the earthly projection of an Ultimate Being. Like the monotheistic ones, all these religions have also developed elaborate dogma and ritual presided over and directed by a religious establishment.

2 A distinction noted by Karen Armstrong in her A History of God (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1994), xvii.

3 Notably Daniel C. Dennett, Breaking the Spell (New York: Viking, 2006) and Richard Dawkins, The God Delusion (New York: Houghton Mifflin Co., 2006).

4 Such as the traditional Argument from Design, the Ontological Argument, the Cosmological Argument. Richard Dawkins also deals with a few more : the argument from beauty, the argument from personal ‘experience’, the argument from scripture, the argument from admired religious scientists, Bayesian arguments and Pascal’s wager.

5 Believers often pick on chance or random occurrences as proof of God’s handiwork. However, chance and randomness are part of the natural system.

6 String theory goes one step further : in it the fundamental particles are all merely different patterns of vibration of the one string. This theory also merges all the forces (reconciling general relativity with quantum mechanics), something that other theories accept as probable, though some are still wrestling with gravity.

7 Such as the Big Bang theory, inflationary theory, string theory, superstring theory, M-theory, the braneworld cyclic model.

8 Many individuals live virtuous, upright and humane lives without having a belief in God, but, for the great majority of people, and thus for human societies in general, such a belief, sincerely held, provides a strong foundation for organizing life on a moral basis.

9 The God of religion is personified, and it is customary to use a capitalized pronoun in referring to Him (thereby also assigning Him a gender). The entity we have called God is neither a person nor has a gender. We are merely following linguistic convention in using such pronouns, but there is neither need nor justification for capitalizing them.

10 Some recent research indicates that higher mammals may display some rudimentary volition. This would be entirely consistent with the evolution of the animal brain into the human one.

11 The usual conception of “revelation” is that God reveals something to the chosen prophet. This sense does not apply within the concept of God that has been developed here. This God does not intervene in our world, and thus does not reveal or send anything to anyone. The “inspiration” that we are referring to is the direct, intuitive perception by a special human mind of the reality underlying God, the universe and our place in it. It is a human act (albeit of a very special human), of seeking and finding, not a specific divine bestowal.

12 For an outline of the appropriate method of understanding the message of the Quran, see the author’s Rediscovering Islam.


* * *

The Treaty of Al-Hudaibiya (1)

[ Note: This article was written in 1980. I had recently come out of prison after my incarceration for over 5 years, and it was based on my study of the Qur'an and Islam during my imprisonment. It represents the views held by me at the time (for my current beliefs, see the Beliefs section of this Website). I showed it to GA Parwez, who, after reading it, commented in his inimitable style (in Urdu): "The doors of heaven will be flung wide open for anyone who removes even a small stain from the Prophet's cloak." Its publication history is contained in footnote #1. ]

Introduction

The Treaty of al-Hudaybiya and the events leading up to it, as reported in the history books, constitute a strange chapter in the history of Islam and the life of the Prophet2 Muhammad. The accepted version of these events and the terms of the treaty raise many questions and create many difficulties. The Prophet's acceptance of the humiliating terms imposed by the Meccans (which he is alleged to have then violated later) appears to be both pusillanimous and dishonourable.

Muslims overcome these implications by stating that he acted thus under divine inspiration, and that the ultimate outcome proved that the ostensible defeat at al-Hudaybiya was in fact the "victory" predicted in the Qur'an in Surat al-Fath3. Non-Muslim writers generally take this version of events as supporting their contention that the Prophet was a practical man of affairs who did not always let such intangibles as principles or values affect his decisions. While some of them hold that his action at al-Hudaybiya was dictated by expediency, others believe that it could well have been an act of far-sighted statesmanship. All, Muslims and non-Muslims alike, seem to agree, whether tacitly or explicitly, that the Prophet's actions at al-Hudaybiya, whatever their motivation, fell short of the standards of honour, valour, and adherence to principle that one would expect from a Prophet of God imbued with a divine mission.

It is even stranger that this version of the al-Hudaybiya events has not been seriously questioned thus far. Without even looking at the historical evidence upon which it is based, it appears suspect in itself, and in the context in which these events occurred. The Prophet, as the result of a dream, left Medina in Dhu’l-Qa'da 6 A.H. to visit al-Masjid al-Haram, accompanied by 1400-1500 Muslims. The Quraysh refused to permit them to enter Mecca, and said they would forcefully oppose any such attempt; however, they were willing to parley. The Muslims were all for fighting it out, and renewed their pledge of allegiance and commitment to the Prophet in token of their resolve.

This was the immediate context in which the treaty took place. The wider context encompassed the defeat of the Meccans at the Battle of the Ditch two years earlier, the increasing strangulation of their foreign trade, and the wider support being won by the Muslims among the tribes of Arabia through conversions and alliances. What was there in this situation to tempt or compel the Prophet to agree to a ten-year truce with the Meccans under such humiliating terms (e.g., that the Muslims would return to Medina without performing their intended ‘umra; and that, during the 10-year truce, if anyone, even a Muslim, came to the Prophet from Mecca he was to be sent back, but if a Muslim defected to the Quraysh he would not be returned)? If, for reasons of prudence or far-sightedness, he did not wish to fight the Meccans, all he had to do was return to Medina. Admittedly, this would have been a blow to the prestige of Islam and the morale of the Muslims, but, if the accepted version were true, nothing as bad as that which would have been actually inflicted as a result of the treaty. There is no suggestion in any of the reports that the Muslims were surrounded and in danger of annihilation, and that this was, therefore, the only way to save their lives. (Saving their lives was not of great importance to most of these Muslims while defending their faith, anyway). Besides, if the Quraysh had the Muslims at their mercy it is most unlikely that they would have agreed to a truce rather than destroying their mortal enemy once and for all.

The terms that the Prophet is said to have accepted at al-Hudaybiya bear no logical relationship to the general situation prevailing in Arabia at the time, or to the particular situation existing at al-Hudaybiya on that occasion. It defies logic and understanding why he would have agreed to such a treaty. However, it is when one examines the historical evidence relating to these events that it becomes quite clear that the accepted version of al-Hudaybiya is based on flimsy and suspect foundations and is not worthy of credence.

The Accepted Version

The accepted version of the events of al-Hudaybiya is based mainly on a hadith of Miswar b. Makhrama and Marwan b. al-Hakam. Ibn Ishaq quotes it as the source for his detailed account of the event4. Al-Tabari gives this hadith (as well as Ibn Ishaq) as his source5. Al-Waqidi quotes different authorities for different incidents, but the account he gives shows that the ultimate source is mainly this same hadith, since most of the details are identical. That he was aware of this tradition is shown by a reference he makes to it6. Ibn Sa'd first gives a coherent account of the whole event without specifying any source; this account conforms to the details of the Miswar-Marwan hadith. He then gives the sources for various incidents, but none are quoted for many of the main events he has recounted earlier; it would appear that he has taken these from the Miswar-Marwan hadith but chosen not to quote this as his source7.

To assess the worth of this hadith, let us examine it as given in the Sahih of al-Bukhari. The first point to note is that, in al-Bukhari also, the originators of this hadith are Miswar and Marwan, an indication that al-Bukhari could not find any hadith providing a better original narrator for this particular version of events. This is significant because Miswar and Marwan were not eyewitnesses to the events described, and were not even in a position to learn of the events second-hand at the time they took place. Miswar b. Makhrama was born in Mecca in 2 A.H. and was brought to Medina a year later8. He was thus four years old at the time of al-Hudaybiya. Assuming that he would have to be in his teens to have started taking a serious interest in what transpired at al-Hudaybiya, he obtained his version from other informants at least ten years after the event. Marwan b. al-Hakam was born even later9.

It is perhaps a sign of their awareness of the problems involved that they (or the fabricators10 who picked them as the convenient originators of their tale), in the words of the hadith, "both testified to the truth of each other's hadith" (al-Bukhari, Shurut[54]:15). It is also noteworthy that they do not name any of their informants, but merely state, in another version11 of the hadith in al-Bukhari (54:1), that they were so informed by "ashab of the Prophet," while in still other versions there is no mention of informants at all.

Also worth considering is the fact that this hadith is not found in the Sahih of Muslim. Its inclusion in al-Bukhari, therefore, appears strange (and raises the suspicion of later interpolation) since, generally, al-Bukhari's shurut are more stringent than Muslim's12. Muslim also does not contain any other hadith giving the accepted version of the events at al-Hudaybiya.

On examining the text of this Miswar-Marwan hadith in al-Bukhari, one gets the strong impression that we are dealing here not with a factual account of actual events (which is what a hadith is supposed to be) but rather with an interesting tale. Throughout it one glimpses the handiwork of the qussas, the storytellers13. Some of the highlights of this story (as given in 54:15) are:

(a) When approaching al-Hudaybiya the Prophet's camel suddenly sits down and refuses to move. He takes this as Allah's doing and swears that he will accept whatever conditions the Meccans impose (even though, at this time, he does not know whether the Meccans will oppose his entry into the Ka'ba or impose any conditions). At this, the camel gets up and moves on.

(b) On arrival at al-Hudaybiya, the water in the pond there soon finishes. The Prophet takes an arrow from his quiver and tells someone to stick it in the dried-up pond. So much water appears that everyone, men and animals, are sated. (Al-Bukhari has two other hadith on this incident, from different reporters, in Manaqib[61]:25. In one, the pond is a well, and the Prophet rinses his mouth and spits the water out into the well, which then fills up. In the other there is neither pond nor well, but he puts his hand into a small pitcher and springs of water burst forth from it).

(c) Four representatives of the Quraysh come successively to the Muslim camp. Conversations with each of them are recounted and some interesting incidents are reported. Surprisingly, all the concurrent proceedings in the Meccan camp are also described in colourful detail.

(d) During one of these visits, it is narrated, the Prophet keeps spitting around, and whenever his spit falls on any of his companions they quickly rub it on their faces and bodies. Then the Prophet performs ablutions and his companions "nearly kill each other" struggling for the used water.

(e) The treaty is being dictated by the Prophet and the Meccan, Suhayl b. 'Amr, and just as the latter finishes dictating that the Muslims would return anyone coming to them from Mecca, even if he be a Muslim, who should turn up, dragging his clanking chains and fetters, but Abu Jandal, son of the selfsame Suhayl!

(f) The treaty is not yet finalized, the Muslims are protesting against this condition, Abu Jandal is haranguing the crowd asking them not to send him back as he was a Muslim, but still the Prophet hands him back to his father.

(g) After the writing down of the treaty the Prophet orders his followers three times to cut their hair and sacrifice the animals they had brought, but not one of them heeds him; they refuse to get up (even though, a short while ago, they were rubbing his spit on their faces, and drinking his ablution water!). The Prophet reports this to his wife, Umm Salama, and she suggests that he perform his own sacrifice and not say anything to them. He acts thus, and finally they follow his example, but "almost kill each other" in their grief and vexation.

(h) Then, suddenly, women start arriving from Mecca and part of Surah 60:10 is revealed, so they are tested. Because of this verse, the same day 'Umar divorced two of his wives who were non-Muslims, and who, it is said, later married Meccans. This is mentioned twice in the hadith: at one place one of them is said to have married Safwan b. Umayya, and at the other the same woman is married off to Abu Jahm.

(i) The hadith then does a time-jump and describes some colourful adventures befalling other Muslim escapees from Mecca who came to Medina after these events but were denied refuge by the Prophet, and finally how all turned out for the best.

(j) Various bits and pieces are tagged on at the end, some introducing the Quran’s v. 60:11 and incidents related thereto.

It is noteworthy that this long hadith, full of trivial detail, and describing all the events that took place from the Prophet's departure from Medina to his return there as well as some subsequent incidents, contains no mention of the oath of allegiance sworn to the Prophet by the Muslims at al-Hudaybiya, the bay'at al-ridwan. This important incident in the Prophet's history finds mention in the Qur'an, and the great majority of hadith in al-Bukhari's chapter on al-Hudaybiya deal with it, but this particular tradition omits it altogether.

Though this hadith mentions that the treaty required the Muslims to return to Medina without performing the 'umra, it does not state that a truce for ten years was also included in the treaty, an element which is part of the accepted version and is mentioned in, among others, Ibn Ishaq and al-Tabari.

It is instructive to examine also the three other versions of this hadith (via different intermediate transmitters) that al-Bukhari cites. One version, in Maghazi[64]:35, deals with the Muslims encountering a force of tribesmen before reaching al-Hudaybiya; the Prophet's expression of a desire to avoid fighting; Abu Bakr's advice to proceed towards Mecca and to fight anyone who stops them, and the Prophet's agreement to this. This hadith makes sense, sounds factual, and is probably true. Not one bit of it is contained in the long tale (54:15) described above, though both have the same original narrators. A second version (54:1) is very brief; it deals primarily with the return clause in the treaty and the handing back of Abu Jandal, then switches to the coming of the women and the revelation of Surah 60:10. A third version, also in 64:35, starts off like the long one but, where the writing of the agreement comes in, suddenly switches to the terse style of the second version and ends in a similar manner.

Al-Bukhari also gives (in Manasik[2]:106 and Maghazi[6]:35) two versions of a hadith by Miswar and Marwan relating to al-Hudaybiya14. These relate to the Prophet setting out from Medina, putting on the ihram and marking the sacrificial animals at Dhu’l-Hulayfa. In the version in 64:35, the second to last narrator, after having repeated the hadith countless times, admits at the end that he does not quite remember what his informant told him. Neither of these versions figures in the long hadith in 54:15 described above.

It is truly astonishing that the main basis for the accepted version of the al-Hudaybiya events is just a single hadith whose credentials are minimal, if not non-existent. It fails the basic, commonsense test that requires a hadith, by definition, to be a factual narration of something specific that the originator saw or heard, not a long, fanciful tale reciting happenings in multiple locations over many years. It also fails most tests in the formal criteria used for authenticating the veracity of a hadith15, since it consists of accounts attributed to two persons who were not eyewitnesses, but are said to have collected their facts second- or third-hand from unnamed informants about ten years or more after the event. It should not figure in any reputable Hadith collection, much less the Sahih of al-Bukhari, thus raising the strong suspicion that it was inserted into the latter surreptitiously later on. It is not worthy of being accorded any credence at all.

What makes it even more astonishing is the fact that there exists an alternative version of these events which is not only based on much firmer historical evidence, but also makes good sense in light of the situation prevailing at the time, and is fully in line with the Prophet's character and personality as displayed consistently throughout his life.

The Alternative Version

This alternative version of al-Hudaybiya is an eyewitness account of these events, and is to be found in a hadith of Bara' b. 'Azib, a companion of the Prophet, who accompanied him on the al-Hudaybiya expedition in 6 A.H. It is found in both the Sahih of al-Bukhari and that of Muslim16, and is quoted by al-Tabari17.

As given by al-Bukhari (Sulh[53]:6), the text of the hadith runs as follows:

The Nabi went to perform the 'umra in Dhu’l-Qa'da, but the Meccans would not let him enter Mecca until he agreed that he would stay for three days only. When the agreement was being written it was thus, “This is the agreement upon which Muhammad, Rasul Allah...” They said, “We do not acknowledge this. If we knew that you were Rasul Allah we would not have stopped you. However, you are Muhammad b. 'Abd Allah”. He said, “I am Rasul Allah, and I am also Muhammad b. 'Abd Allah”. Then he said to 'Ali, “Delete Rasul Allah”. He said, “No, by Allah, I will never delete your name”. Then Rasul Allah took the parchment18 and wrote, “This is that upon which agrees Muhammad b. 'Abd Allah. No weapon will enter Mecca unless it is sheathed. They will not take away any inhabitant of it even if anyone wishes to follow them. They will not prevent any of their companions if he wishes to stay behind”. Then when he entered it and the period expired they came to 'Ali and asked him to tell his companion to depart since the period had ended. So the Nabi left. After them came the daughter of Hamza (crying), “Uncle! Uncle!” 'Ali reached out to her and caught her by the hand, and said to Fatima, “Take up your uncle's daughter”, so she took her up on to her mount.... (The rest of the hadith deals with a dispute between various relations over the custody of this girl, and is irrelevant to our purpose here).

AI-Bukhari gives four other versions of this hadith. The one in Maghazi[64]:43 is almost identical to the above, except for the addition of a phrase to say that the Prophet did not know how to write! Another, in Jizya[58]:19, has a completely different order and uses different words, but conveys the same sense. A third one, also in Sulh[53]:6, is a shorter version. It does not contain anything that contradicts the longer version, and clearly states that the agreement was for a three-day stay in Mecca.

A fourth version, in 53:7, comprises a summary of the three conditions of the agreement, but states that the entry into Mecca was to take place the following year. It then adds, in just one sentence, the information that Abu Jandal came but was returned. Al-Bukhari inserts a note to the effect that one of the transmitters in the chain did not say anything about Abu Jandal. It would appear that this fourth version has been tampered with, and that insertions were introduced to make it conform to the accepted version of events. This is supported by the fact that al-Bukhari does not give it as a separate hadith but includes it in the bab heading, which means that he could not find a genuine or complete isnad for it19.

This hadith of Bara' is clearly a much sounder and more reliable tradition than that of Miswar-Marwan. It appears to be a factual account provided by an eyewitness, rather than a gaudy tale that claims to be years-old hearsay from unnamed informants. Moreover, it is much more believable since the version of events that it gives conforms to whatever we know of the prevailing situation, in marked contrast to the Miswar-Marwan account.

The Bara' account of what happened at al-Hudaybiya in 6 A.H. can be summarized as follows:

(a) The agreement concluded between the Prophet and the Quraysh related to the terms under which the Muslims were to be permitted to enter Mecca immediately thereafter.

(b) The Muslims did actually enter Mecca immediately following the agreement and stayed there for three days.

(c) The condition about returning non-Muslims to the Meccans ‒ while defecting Muslims were not to be returned to the Prophet's company ‒ applied only to the three-day sojourn in Mecca.

(d) There was nothing in the agreement about a general cessation of hostilities for ten years.

An agreement with these terms makes sense in light of the circumstances prevailing at that time in Arabia and, in particular, at al-Hudaybiya. The Prophet attained his goal of visiting al-Masjid al-Haram; a battle involving pointless bloodshed was avoided; and nothing that the Prophet agreed to was in any way derogatory to the Muslim cause or humiliating for him personally.

The Evidence of the Qur’an

The Qur'an is the primary and most reliable source for any event in the Prophet's life to which it makes reference, since it is a contemporaneous record, transmitted through the centuries in essentially unchanged form. It is universally accepted that Surat al-Fath [48] refers to the al-Hudaybiya events, and was revealed soon afterwards.

It is, therefore, significant that this section of the Qur'an does not accord with the accepted version of the al-Hudaybiya episode, and Qur'anic commentators have had to resort to far-fetched interpretations to reconcile the two. (Historians, on the other hand, have generally tended to ignore those verses that presented problems with regard to the standard account). The Qur’anic references create two main problems for the accepted version. The first is the use of the past tense in verse 27. This indicates that the Prophet's dream of visiting Mecca had already been fulfilled by the time this verse was revealed. This has forced some commentators to claim that this verse was revealed later (after the 'umra of 7 A.H., or after the conquest of Mecca in 8 A.H.), while others see it as a perfectum propheticum20.

The second difficulty raised by S. 48 is related to the use of the words fath and azfar, taken to mean "victory" or "conquest," terms difficult to apply to what occurred at al-Hudaybiya according to the accepted version. This has led some commentators to see these statements as references to the conquest of Khaybar in 7 A.H. or that of Mecca in 8 A.H., but these attempts are not very plausible since the past tense is used in all these phrases. Rather than containing a prophecy or a promise, these verses seem to be stating an accomplished fact that was fully known to the audience. If the accepted version of al-Hudaybiya be true, there was nothing in it which the participants could construe as a victory or conquest, and as unconvincing as a 'futuristic' interpretation are the various attempts to resolve the difficulty by suggesting that, whatever the immediate setback and humiliation, the treaty ultimately proved of great benefit to the Muslims and could therefore justly be described as a victory.

This second problem of the commentators is, in a sense, self-imposed. The root FTH means "to open", while a secondary derivation is "to decide, judge", i.e., to 'open' the issue between two parties. The sense of "victory, conquest", is either a tertiary derivation (a decision or judgment giving one party victory over the other), or, more likely, is a later usage arising from its occurrence in S. 57:10, generally taken to refer to the capture of Mecca by the Prophet in 8 A.H21.

The twenty-nine Qur'anic passages in which derivatives of FTH occur (in addition to S. 48:1, 18 and 27) can be arranged as follows. In fourteen verses a form of the verb is used in the sense of "to open", "to release" or "to disclose"22. There are three occurrences of mafatih (“keys”)23. In one instance, fath can be understood either as "opening" or "judgment"24. Nine times either the verb or the noun fath (and once: al-Fattah) is used in the sense of (making a) "judgment" or "decision"25. Finally, fath appears in two instances to refer to the submission and occupation of Mecca as "the Opening"26.

Thus, neither the etymology of the word nor its usage in the Qur’an lends support to the understanding of fath in Surat al-Fath in the sense of "victory". The two possible meanings are "opening" or "judgment, decision". Nothing in the events at al-Hudaybiya suits the latter sense, whereas the former fits perfectly in the context of the hadith of Bara' discussed above. The fath referred to by the Qur'an in relation to al-Hudaybiya appears to be the re-opening of the way to Mecca (which had been blocked by the Quraysh) as a result of the agreement described by Bara'. Understood in this way, the word creates no difficulties, and the passages in which it occurs indicate clearly what actually transpired at al-Hudaybiya:

Vv. 1-2: Indeed we opened for you a clear, unobstructed passage, that Allah may cover for you the past and future of your error.....27

V.18: Allah certainly approved of the believers when they swore allegiance to you under the tree, and He knew what was in their hearts. So He bestowed tranquility upon them, and restored to them an early passage28.

V. 27: Surely Allah has in truth fulfilled His Rasul's dream: ‘You shall enter al-Masjid al-Haram, if Allah so wills, in peace and security, with heads shaved or hair cropped, not fearing’. But He knew what you could not know, and so He (also) arranged before that a quick passage29.

This last verse is conclusive evidence of the fact that the Muslims did visit al-Masjid al-Haram immediately after the al-Hudaybiya agreement.

The word "azfar" in v. 24 is from the root ZFR which relates to 'nails' or 'claws'. The derivatives are "to be successful" and "to achieve one's desire". It is obvious from the verse that the sense of "victory" is totally inappropriate. The correct rendering of this verse would appear to be:

V. 24: He it is who withheld their hands from you, and your hands from them, in the valley of Mecca, after He had enabled you to achieve your desire against them. And Allah was watching your actions30.

This verse seems to imply that the truce related only to the Mecca valley. This is confirmed by the next verse, v. 25, since the reasons given for the truce apply only to Mecca and cannot be the basis for a general cessation of hostilities. Moreover, v. 20 relates the truce to "this", i.e., the immediate opening of the way into Mecca mentioned in verse 18. Rather than envisaging a long-term truce, vv. 22 and 23 (and also perhaps vv. 6 and 7) envisage further hostilities between the Muslims and the Meccans31.

Supporting Evidence from the Hadith

The alternative version given by Bara' is also supported by further evidence from the Hadith. Some of these indications are indirect, but taken together they add up to a substantial corroboration.

AI-Bukhari quotes a hadith of Anas (in four versions, in 'Umra[26]:3 and Maghazi[64]:35) which states that the Prophet performed the 'umra four times, and lists among them one as the 'umrat al-Hudaybiya, specifying that this was on the occasion when he was stopped by the Quraysh32. (This is usually explained away by saying that, since the Prophet sacrificed at al-Hudaybiya before returning, this is counted as one 'umra).

AI-Bukhari gives in his chapter on al-Hudaybiya a hadith of 'Abd Allah b. Abi Awfa (Maghazi[64]:3) which states that the narrator performed the 'umra with the Prophet, including prayer, tawaf and the sa'y between Safa and Marwa, and that the companions protected the Prophet against any possible harm from the Meccans. Other versions of the hadith (in Manasik[25]:53 and 'Umra[26]:11) specifically state that they entered Mecca and went round the Ka'ba.

It is true that al-Bukhari puts one version of this last hadith in his bab on the ‘Umrat al-Qada (Maghazi[64]:43), the 'umra performed by the Prophet in 7 A.H., the year after al-Hudaybiya. This is not surprising considering that even in al-Bukhari's time the accepted version of al-Hudaybiya held the field, and, according to it, the Ibn Abi Awfa hadith could only refer to the 'umra in 7 A.H. and not to the events of 6 A.H. What is really significant is that al-Bukhari, having made this concession to prevailing belief33, expresses his own view (or at least his doubts about the veracity of the accepted version) by putting one version of this hadith in his bab on al-Hudaybiya. His own views on the subject are also reflected in the heading he gave to a bab in which he places another version of the Bara' hadith (Jizya[58]:19): "A truce for three days or a fixed term".

In Muhsar[27]:2 al-Bukhari gives a hadith of Salim (son of Ibn 'Umar) which deserves to be quoted:

Ibn 'Umar used to say: "Is not the sunna of Rasul Allah good enough for you? If anyone of you is stopped from the Hajj, he should perform the tawaf of the Bayt and of Safa and Marwa; then everything becomes permissible until the Hajj next year; then he should sacrifice or, if he cannot find a sacrifice, fast".

This hadith clearly indicates that, according to Ibn 'Umar, the Prophet, after being stopped at al-Hudaybiya, entered Mecca and performed the tawaf. It also clarifies a hadith of Nafi' (given by al-Bukhari in nine versions, in Manasik[25]:114; Muhsar[27]:1, 3, and 4, and Maghazi[64]:35) recounting how Ibn 'Umar undertook a journey to Mecca with the intention of performing the 'umra and Hajj in the year when al-Hajjaj was attacking Ibn Zubayr in Mecca. In the most complete version (25:114) it is reported that Ibn 'Umar, when requested not to go because of the fighting, answered that the Prophet's example was the best one, and that, if stopped, he would do what the Prophet did. The hadith ends with Ibn 'Umar performing the tawaf and saying that this was what the Prophet did. The unsettling implications of this appear to have led to attempts at 'improvement', and other versions of the hadith have Ibn 'Umar implying (but not specifically saying) that the Prophet sacrificed at al-Hudaybiya and that he would do the same. Other attempts at explaining away the difficulty take the form of relating Ibn 'Umar's concluding words to the question of whether one tawaf was sufficient for both Hajj and 'umra. But Salim's hadith quoted above shows what Ibn 'Umar meant by saying that he would follow, or had followed, the Prophet's example: if stopped, he would obtain safe-conduct into Mecca and, if necessary, shorten the ceremony.

Al-Azraqi quotes the following hadith from Ibn 'Abbas:

The year of al-Hudaybiya the Nabi entered his house. One of the Ansar was with him and he stopped at the door, explaining that he was an Ahmasi. The Rasul said, "I am an Ahmasi too. My religion and yours are the same," so the Ansar went into the house by the door as he saw the Rasul do34.

In this report the house referred to has to be in Mecca, and could not be the Medina one, since (according to the same report) the Hums would not enter dwellings by the door, or leave the sacred area, while in a state of ihram. According to the accepted version the Prophet and the Muslims came out of that state at al-Hudaybiya, before returning to Medina.

The only evidence found in the Hadith which lends support to the accepted version of al-Hudaybiya is a hadith going back to Ibn 'Umar, and in another version to Ibn 'Abbas35 (al-Bukhari, in Maghazi[64]:43 and Muhsar[27]:1) which states that, when stopped, the Prophet sacrificed at al-Hudaybiya and agreed to come the following year, which he did, staying there for three days.

Two other hadith in al-Bukhari appear, at first sight, to support the accepted version but, on closer examination, show evidence of deliberate attempts to make them conform to the accepted version of al-Hudaybiya.

These two hadith relate to an occasion after the Battle of Siffin between 'Ali and Mu'awiya, when there was unhappiness in the former's camp over stopping the fighting. Sahl b. Hunayf made a speech quoting his experience at al-Hudaybiya. In the hadith of Abu Wa'il (Jizya[58]:18) Sahl is reported as referring to the yawm al-Hudaybiya and saying, "If we had thought it better to fight we would certainly have fought." He then narrates 'Umar's complaint to the Prophet, and it is plain that it is only about going back without seeking Allah's decision through battle with the enemy. (This was the demand of those supporters of 'Ali who opposed the cessation of hostilities.) Another version, in Tafsir[65]:48, uses very similar terms.

However, in a third version of this hadith (58:18), the day becomes yawm Abu Jandal and Sahl is reported to have said, "If I could have rejected the Prophet's order I would have done so." This order obviously is to return Abu Jandal to the Quraysh. There is no mention of a dispute about fighting or of ‘Umar’s complaint about not seeking Allah’s decision through battle. Another hadith of Abu Hasin (Maghazi[64]:35) repeats this latter version of the speech of Sahl.

These latter two versions are obviously fabrications. The dispute at Siffin, in which Sahl intervened, was about seeking Allah's decision between the two sides through battle. Thus, Sahl's words as reported in the first two versions are fully pertinent. But what possible relevance could the return of Abu Jandal have to this dispute? The latter two versions mention only this, and make no reference to the issue of fighting. It is inconceivable that Sahl could have said this in that particular situation, and the first version is obviously the correct one. But since this report did not conform to the accepted version of al-Hudaybiya, the fabricators modified it by introducing the drama of Abu Jandal, totally irrelevant to the setting of this particular hadith36.

Surveying all the related references in the Hadith, the conclusion reached on the basis of the Qur'anic evidence appears to be confirmed, namely, that the version of the al-Hudaybiya events given by Bara' is much more credible than that in the Miswar-Marwan hadith, and is, in all probability, what actually transpired.

The al-Hudaybiya Episode in Outline

Although most of the following items have been referred to in the course of the foregoing discussion, it would be appropriate to offer, in conclusion, a coherent outline of the main events related to al-Hudaybiya in 6 A.H., as far as we can reconstruct them.

The Prophet, in a dream, saw himself and other Muslims entering al-Masjid al-Haram in the garb of pilgrims. Taking this as a sign from Allah he set out from Medina in Dhu’l-Qa'da 6 A.H. along with 1400-1500 companions, including some women. Though the Muslims went armed and prepared to fight off any attack, the Prophet presumably thought that the dream meant that the Quraysh would allow them to enter Mecca peacefully. This was one of the months in which fighting was traditionally forbidden, and this may have reinforced the Prophet's expectation. The number of men with him, and the manner in which they set out, indicate that he had no intention of attacking the Quraysh himself.

On arrival at al-Hudaybiya the Muslims learnt that the Quraysh were prepared to oppose their entry by force, if necessary. The immediate choice facing them now was either to fight or to return to Medina without visiting al-Masjid al-Haram. Most of the Muslims were in favour of fighting. The Prophet, however, thought otherwise, and chose the via media of negotiating his peaceful entry into Mecca. He sent word to this effect to the Quraysh. The reasons for this decision of the Prophet can only be conjectured. While any good general would avoid battle under unfavourable conditions, it is also likely that the Prophet was already looking ahead to the need for bringing the Meccans into the fold of Islam to promote its further spread37. A battle here would have dealt such prospects a grave blow. There was, of course, no question of just returning. This would have severely damaged the morale of the Muslims, and their standing and that of Islam in the eyes of the Arabs. The only alternative left was an entry into Mecca under a truce.

At this initial stage, while the Prophet was communicating his peaceful intentions to the Meccans, it suddenly appeared to the Muslims that the Quraysh had rejected their overtures and were determined to fight. (This may well have been due to the reported rumour of the murder of the Prophet's emissary, ‘Uthman.) To the Muslims, the moment must have seemed a grave one. Far from their home base, in hostile territory, they thought they were about to be attacked in the open plain by an enemy superior in numbers and more heavily armed. In this setting the very existence of Islam must have seemed at stake. It was in this critical situation that the Prophet obtained from his companions a pledge to fight to the bitter end, the bay'at al-ridwan.

However, the alarm proved a false one. The Quraysh indicated that they were ready to negotiate, and an agreement was soon arrived at. Its terms permitted the Muslims to enter Mecca for three days to perform the pilgrimage to al-Masjid al-Haram. They were to carry only sheathed swords or riders' weapons under cover. If any Meccan sought to accompany them out of Mecca he was to be returned, but if any Muslim desired to remain behind he would be permitted to do so. (It will be seen that this condition, disgraceful in the context of the accepted version, is in reality a mere face-saving device for the Quraysh, and is meaningless as far as the Muslims were concerned).

Some Muslims, notably 'Umar, were unhappy at the idea of agreeing to a truce with the enemy. Their argument was that, since the Muslims were in the right and their cause just, they should seek Allah's decision or judgment between themselves and the infidels by resorting to battle with them. The Prophet, however, acted on his belief, displayed on so many occasions throughout his life, that the way to obtain Allah's favourable decision is not only through a just cause, but also through wisdom and sagacity, courage and perseverance.

As a result of the truce the Muslims entered Mecca, performed the 'umra, and left after three days. On the return journey those portions of Surat al-Fath that deal with the al-Hudaybiya events were revealed. The agreement with the Quraysh probably stipulated that the Muslims could perform the 'umra in subsequent years under the same conditions. Consequently, in 7 A. H. the Prophet again visited Mecca with his companions ‒ the ‘Umrat al-Qada' (the Pilgrimage of the Agreement).

The truce agreed upon at al-Hudaybiya was only for three days; there was no stipulation about a ten-year cessation of hostilities. Thus, after his return to Medina, the Prophet soon resumed the economic blockade of Mecca. (This may well be the basis of the colourful tale of Abu Basir38). In 8 A. H., when the Quraysh aided and abetted the attack on the Prophet's allies, the Khuza'a, he moved directly against them, and Mecca surrendered. There is no basis for the charge sometimes made against him of treachery in thus scrapping the ten-year treaty39; there never was such a treaty.

The ongoing acceptance of the standard version of this significant episode ‒ a version that, on the face of it, is beset with questions, difficulties and ambiguities ‒ illustrates how continued repetition can establish a flimsy, implausible fable as established, historical fact. Especially if the repetition is cloaked in the sanctity of religious authority – in this case, that of the Hadith.

This examination of the truth about the al-Hudaybiya episode also highlights the problems that afflict the Hadith literature, and proves why the veracity of any particular hadith should never be accepted merely because it happens to be included in one of the canonical collections, even the most highly regarded of them all, the Sahih of al-Bukhari. These collections purport to be historical records, and attaching religious sanctity to them should not shield them from the tests that need to be applied to such records. Every hadith should be subjected to objective scrutiny and analysis, and should only be taken as possibly true if it appears to be factually plausible, and is also supported by a number of other verifiable hadith and other historical evidence. The failure to do so in this case has resulted in the ridiculous situation whereby Muslims have continued to uphold the unquestionable authenticity of the Hadith even at the cost of the reputation of the founder of their faith.


Footnotes

1 This paper was originally published in The Muslim World in January 1981 (Volume LXXI, No.1, 47) under the title Al-Hudaybiya : An Alternative Version. It was also reprinted in Uri Rubin, ed., The Life of Muhammad (Aldershot, UK and Brookfield, USA: Ashgate Publishing, 1998). It is reproduced here in essentially the same form with some editorial amendments (designed to improve readability, and sharpen the points made).

2 This title is the one commonly used in English for the founder of Islam, even though it is an incorrect rendering of the terms used in the Qur’an for him (Nabi and Rasul, whose correct translation is Messenger). To avoid confusion I have continued this dubious practice here.

3 In this version the marks used in the transliteration of Arabic text have not been reproduced from the original. It is hoped that this will not prove a handicap to the reader conversant with Arabic.

4.Ibn Ishaq, Sirat Rasul Allah, trans. A. Guillaume, The Life of Muhammad (London: Oxford University Press, 1955), p. 500.

5 Annales al-Tabari, ed. J. de Goeje (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1964), Prima Series, III, 1528.

6 The Kitab al-Maghazi of al-Waqidi, ed. Marsden Jones (London: Oxford University Press, 1966), II, 586.

7Ibn Sa'd, Al-Tabaqat al-Kubra (Beirut, 1957), II, 95. He gives a hadith ascribed to Sufyan b. Harb that supports the alternative version of al-Hudaybiya.

8 Ibn Hajar al-'Asqalani, Tahdhib al-Tahdhib (Hyderabad, 1327 A.H.) X, 151.

9 Ibid. 91.

10 As for motivation, it is quite conceivable that there were Meccans who remained upset at the submission of their forbears to Islam in 8 A.H, and may have attempted to even the score somewhat. The qussas (the storytellers) may then have added their handiwork (see fn. 13 below)

11 Other “versions” refer to other hadith (on the same event) with the same original narrator(s) but each with a different set of intermediate transmitters.

12 See Ignaz Goldziher, Muslim Studies, trans. C.R. Barber and S.M. Stern (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1971), II, 227-29. But Goldziher also believes that Muslim was more concerned about purifying the hadith material, in contrast to al-Bukhari’s interest in its practical application (p. 227).

13 On the storytellers and hadith as a means of edification, see Ibid, 149-59.

14 This is often taken to refer to the Prophet's 'umra in 7 A.H., the year after al-Hudaybiya. But al-Bukhari has placed this hadith in his bab relating to al-Hudaybiya and has a separate chapter covering the 'umra of 7 A.H. See below, pp. 10-11.

15 Goldziher, pp. 218ff.

16 Muslim gives three versions of the hadith of Bara’ b. ‘Azib, all conforming to each other, in his chapter on al-Hudaybiya

(Kitab al-Jihad wa’l-Sayr, Bab 290).

17 al-Tabari, Annales. III, 1548.

18 For someone who has studied the life of Rasul Allah, the description of his reaction to the Meccan objection would, in itself, be a strong indication of the authenticity of Bara’s hadith.

19 See Alfred Guillaume, The Traditions of Islam (reprint, Beirut, 1966), p.26.

20 The prophetic use of the perfect tense describing a future event as if it had occurred already, a style form found in various sacred scriptures.

21 See W. Montgomery Watt. Muhammad at Medina (Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1956) p. 67.

22 S. 2:76; 6:44; 7:40; 7:96; 12:66; 15:14; 21:96; 23:77; 35:2; 38:50; 39:71; 39:73; 54:11; 78:19.

23 S. 6:59; 24:61; 28:76.

24 S. 32:28-29 ("opening" in the sense of "opening of the graves"; v. 25 refers to the yawm al-qiyama in the same context).

25 S. 7:89; 8:19; 14:16; 26:118; 34:26; 61:13; 2:89; 4:141; 5:52.

26 S. 57:10 and 110:1-2 ("the Opening" that resulted in people “entering the din Allah in multitudes", 110:2).

27 The Prophet's dhanb or error referred to here was his taking the dream as a directive from Allah. What were “covered” or nullified were any possible harmful effects of this mistake, both in the events already transpired as well as in the future.

28 The last phrase is athabahum fathan qariban. Athab means to restore or give back something gone or taken away. For the use of qarib in the sense of "early, soon, immediate, quick" cf.: S. 4:17; 9:42; 14:44; 16:77.

29 An alternative rendering of min duni is "besides".

30 An alternative rendering of azfarakum 'alayhim could be, "you were on the point of fighting them", i.e., "you had your claws upon them".

31 Verses 11-17 probably do not relate to al-Hudaybiya at all. They appear to refer to the Tabuk expedition of 9 A.H., and thus must have been revealed after it. See S. 9, especially verses 83, 90, 81, and 120, and S. 49:14.

32 The phrase haythu saddahu’l-mushrikun (in a version at 26:3) should be rendered as above, and not with "where," as is clear from other usages of haythu in this and other versions of the hadith.

33 He makes another similar concession by including the Bara' hadith also in the bab on the 'Umrat al-Qada'.

34 Al-Azraqi. Akhbar Makka. I, 115f. Also quoted in Guillaume, The Life of Muhammad. p. 89.

35 Ibn Abbas himself was a child at the time of al-Hudaybiya.

36 Muslim gives two hadith on the subject. One is from ‘Abd Allah b. Numayr and conforms to the first version of Sahl’s speech given above. The second one, from Shaqiq, is also about the decision not to fight, but changes the reference to the day to yawm Abu Jandal. It appears that the attempt to tamper with it was rather crude. (Kitab al-Jih’ad wa’l Sayr, Bab 290).

37 See Watt, Muhammad at Medina, p. 49.

38 Guillaume, Life of Muhammad, p. 507.

39 See Watt, Muhammad at Medina, p. 327.


* * *

The Human Predicament

[ Note: I wrote this piece in 2010 ]


We did offer the Trust to the skies and the earth and the mountains,

but they were afraid to accept it. Human beings, however, undertook

to bear it, but surely they have ignored it, and indeed they have failed

to accord it its rightful due.

– Al-Quran, 33:72.


What a terrible thing is this that Allah has done!

To take this near-ape, but newly emerged from the dark forest, within whose benighted mind course the terrors and rages, the treacheries and vilenesses, of the struggle for survival; within whose blood boil strange lusts and passions; whose animal heart had never known either love or pity; to take this almost-animal and give him the powers of a god, the freedom of a god!

Terrible in the potentiality for evil that was created. A potentiality fully realized in human history. The animal hunts from necessity; he kills to eat, or to preserve himself. But this animal-god hunts for pleasure; the deep, orgasmic satisfaction in the last despairing cry, the hot gush of the despoiled blood. The victims his own kind. His drives to power are punctuated by the crack of whips, the clanking of chains, the crackle of fire, the clang of steel. The stairs to his thrones are built on the skulls of his fellow-beings; the supports rest on their sweating backs. Even when the deluded multitudes chase after such chimeras as Freedom, Peace, Happiness, Prosperity, all they do is spill more blood, rend more flesh, destroy the work of generations. Human blood, human flesh, human effort. Given the power and the freedom to create evil if he so chose, the human, this animal made god, has plumbed the depths of the pit.

Terrible in the potentiality of suffering created within each human being. For with the power to do evil, he was also given a vision of the good. In generation after generation this vision, by many but dimly seen, by others viewed in its full, resplendent glory, has tortured humankind. The unspeakable agony of seeing “what-could-be”, and knowing “what-is”. From the masses of slaves, conscious of the weight of their shackles, their glimpse of the vision draws but a hopeless groan. From the few who see it full-blown, the vision often wrenches out a cry that echoes down the ages. Such as al-Hallaj, calling out in agony:

God cast him into the sea,

his arms tied behind his back.

And said, ‘Take care, take care,

lest thou be wetted by the water’.

For some, to see the vision is to attempt, shackles and all, to bring it into being. An enterprise as futile as clawing up the face of a granite cliff with one’s nails. All it amounts to is a gesture, a gesture made with one’s life, but, in its effects, still only a gesture. Laced with a bitterness of suffering beyond expression.

Terrible, indeed, is it to give this creature, stuck in the quagmire of his own animality, the visions of a god, and the capacity to suffer of a god.

Terrible, also, in the responsibility placed upon him. Not just to resist and overcome the capacity for evil inherent in him. Not merely to develop the potentiality for good also given to him. Not even to act like a god. Much more, much worse. What Allah has said to him is, “I have made you a god, now act on earth as I would!” It is a burden not to be borne. And yet it needs must.

Terrible, indeed, is this thing that has been given to humankind ‒ the power and the freedom, with their potentiality for evil, the capacity for suffering, the unbearable responsibility. He calls all this a Trust from him, a Trust that the heavens and the earth and the mountains refused to bear.

Was there a choice? Was there a moment in time when the ape-man, more ape than man, stood at the edge of the forest and looked out at the vastness of the universe spread out before him, and the urge to venture out into the unknown struggled with the desire to retreat back into the safety and security of his dark jungle? Sometimes one wishes he had turned back.

Terrible as this human predicament is, there are some saving graces. A life mercifully short. For those who tried, some recompense at the end. (No, more than that, much more than that!) And, perhaps, some day someone, maybe a few, will make it up that cliff-face, and, who knows, ‘what-could-be’ may become ‘what-is’.

But if things go on as they have been in human history, there is some consolation in His promise that He will take away humans and bring some other beings in their place. Perhaps they will fare better in bearing the burden we found unbearable.

* * *

Miscellaneous

Sic Semper Tyrannis

This is the title chosen by Colonel W. Patrick Lang for his blog (it is also the motto of the Virginia Military Institute, his alma mater). He is a distinguished retired officer of the United States Army, having served in U.S. Military Intelligence and U.S. Army Special Forces (The Green Berets), including several tours in Vietnam during the war there. He has frequently written, movingly and often humorously, about his war experience (for an example see his tale of Ap Bu Nho).

He was subsequently in the Department of Defense for many years, both as a serving officer and then as a member of the Defense Senior Executive Service. During this period he spent a considerable amount of time in the Middle East (mainly Israel and Jordan). After retirement, he set up this highly respected blog, on which he writes frequently about current events, especially in the Middle East, on which he is considered an expert.

He has studied the history of the American Civil War (which he refers to as The War Between the States), and has written three novels featuring the Confederate Secret Services. Even though some of his early ancestors immigrated to New England, he settled in Virginia. His mother was a Canadian, and he has dual Canadian-US citizenship.

I came across his blog after seeing a TV discussion on the Middle East in which he was a participant (this was before his balanced views on that subject got him banned from PBS, the US public broadcast channel). His knowledgeable stance caught my attention, and I made it a practice to try and watch him whenever he appeared on TV.

Subsequently, I sent him my paper on Rediscovering Islam, and he published it on his second blog, The Athenium, in 2007. Later on, we corresponded, and became friends, and many of my articles were published on his blogs (as well as my comments on pieces by other authors).

This is an archive of my articles and other pieces published in the last few years on SST. Some of these are reproduced here in this weblog.


* * *

Does history repeat itself?

[ Written in 2017 and published on SST ]

Does History repeat itself? Many thinkers, from ancient times to modern, from Polybius to Hegel and Santayana, have thought so. Karl Marx, alluding to Hegel’s formulation, sarcastically added the well-known bit about “the first time as tragedy, the second time as farce”. Whether one believes in this theory or not, it is interesting to look at the many parallels that exist between Ancient Rome and the United States of America today.

Both were republics, governed by elected representatives. Their involvement in wars gradually changed this into rule by monarchs. Their early rulers, tempered by their wartime experiences, generally governed wisely – Octavius/Augustus on the one hand, Roosevelt/Truman/Eisenhower on the other. However, they were followed by others of a different type, the successors becoming increasingly warped as time passed, and more and more power seeped into their hands. As power accumulated with the monarchs, conspiracies and coups multiplied. Emperors were assassinated, presidents were forced from office.

As the powers of the monarchs increased, and their quality deteriorated, the weirdness of their antics manifested themselves more and more. There was Tiberius and his ‘minnows’ in the Blue Grotto; and Clinton sporting with Monica in the Oval Office. Caligula made his horse a Consul; Trump makes his son-in-law his policy chief. Nero fiddled while Rome burned; Trump tweets all the time. Clumsy Claudius was a figure of fun for many in Rome; George Bush Junior was (and is) the same for many in the USA (for example, see David Letterman). But the snickering of their people did not stop either of them from launching wars and bringing death and destruction to many lands.

The early rulers shared power with the elected representatives, but gradually all power passed into the hands of the monarchs. As this process occurred, more and more of this power seeped down into the hands that carried the weapons, and they began to play an increasing role in affairs of state. In Rome it was the Praetorian Guard, in the USA it is the Pentagon and the Deep State. With this power these entities began to interfere in government, even to the extent of enthroning and removing monarchs.

As conditions deteriorated in the country, and its entanglements abroad increased, the need arose to keep people amused (though perhaps bemused would be the more accurate term). Bread and circuses in one case; cheap junk food and 24-hour TV in the other (as William Astore notes in the Huffington Post). Such times also bring forth the critics and warners. In Rome there were Tacitus, Cicero and Seneca; today the USA has its Patrick Lang, Andrew Bacevich and Tom Engelhardt (we even have a 'Publius Tacitus' on this blog, sounding much the same warnings). Unfortunately, then as now, they are largely voices crying out in vain, drowned out by the noise of heedless revelry, and the beating of the drums of war.

For the rest of the world, in both ancient times and now, the mark of the imperial power is the wars being waged in their midst or around them, or the imperial soldiers in their camps and cantonments around the world. The people see their governments bow and scrape before this imperial power; those that dare to stand up to it either lie shattered (as does Libya) or are hemmed in on all sides and under imminent threat of attack (as in Iran’s case). But, while rulers and governments tremble, on the fringes of the empire the “barbarians” muster and rise up, and push back against the relentless outward pressure of the empire.

In Rome’s case, the “barbarians” finally beat the legions and conquered Rome. How will they fare this time?

One big difference now is that, if it goes down, the empire has the power to take the world down with it.

Will the end of the American empire signal the demise of our world?


* * *

[ Note: Written in 2018. Published on SST ]

Razan al-Najjar died on Friday, June 1st.

She was a 21-year old Palestinian nurse and paramedic. And a mother.

She was killed while running (along with other paramedics) towards the Gaza border fence with Israel.

They were running to treat some Palestinian protesters who had been wounded by shots fired from across the border.

Like the others with her, she was wearing her white paramedic uniform and waving her arms above her head as she ran towards the fence.

An Israeli sniper on the other side of the fence aimed at her, and put a bullet in her chest.

Razan al-Najjar is dead. Like the 120 or so others killed at the fence in the last couple of months.

Razan al-Najjar is dead. The Israeli military says it will investigate.

Razan al-Najjar is dead. Is there anything further to say?

Oh! yes, one thing: I prefer this picture (below) of hers to the other one (on top).

* * *

Marching to the Edge - Eyes Wide Shut

[ Note: I wrote this piece in 2009; it was published on Sic Semper Tyrannis (Col Lang's weblog) in 2010 ]


The United States is pursuing a policy in the Afghanistan-Pakistan theatre that risks an outcome that would combine the fiascos of Vietnam and the Shah’s Iran. It could lead not only to the loss of Afghanistan but also that of Pakistan, with consequences that are frightening to contemplate. What underlies this disaster in the making is a failure to comprehend the real problem the US faces in the region, and the resulting pursuit of solutions that not only do no good but instead make matters worse.

Understanding the Enemy

The first failure lies in misunderstanding the nature of the enemy confronting the US, and the goals that enemy is pursuing. The enemy is not al-Qaeda “terrorists” hiding in the mountains, plotting terror attacks on the US and the West. The Bush administration propagated this notion (of a worldwide Islamist terror network, led by al-Qaeda, forever planning attacks on the US and the West) in order to win support for its scheme to wage unending war, at home and abroad, on whomever it chose to designate as an enemy. Even though the new administration has dropped the use of the GWOT term, the false concepts underlying it continue to seriously contaminate US policy discourse and thinking.

The enemy the US faces in the ‘Af-Pak’ theatre is a grouping of Islamists with different agendas that happen to coincide for the time being. Al-Qaeda and its associates (including the Haqqanis and Hikmatyar) are political Islamists, whose aim is to establish the political, economic and military power of Islam – by repelling Western encroachments on Muslim countries and ultimately taking them over. Political Islamists also exist in Pakistani society and state structures (as they do in every Muslim country). The majority of the groups that are collectively known as the Taliban are religious Islamists, whose primary aim is to establish their brand of orthodoxy among Muslim populations; they are not too concerned about political and economic issues. (“Terrorists”, who blow themselves and others up, are brainwashed unfortunates used by both the other groups; they are low-rent cannon fodder, not the enemy).

The principal foe the US faces is the political Islamists, because it is their goals (not the Taliban’s) that clash with vital US interests. The Western military presence and operations in the area have led to the goals of both types of Islamists converging, and this has enabled the political Islamists to use the Taliban as foot soldiers in their campaign to defeat the West in Afghanistan. But the missteps of US foreign and military policy have suddenly opened up for them the prospect of a takeover in Pakistan. The strategy they are now pursuing is to use the Pakistani Taliban to exert sufficient pressure on Pakistan to fracture the state structure and provide an opportunity for the internal political Islamists to take over the country. Most of the Pakistani Taliban are mainly interested in imposing religious orthodoxy, not achieving political power (their Afghani counterparts share this aim, but are also interested in regaining the political power that they lost due to the US invasion).

Though the military objectives of both religious and political Islamists happen to coincide at the moment, their long-term aims are different and could diverge under appropriate circumstances. If the Taliban could achieve their goal of establishing their religious system in some areas, they may well lose their appetite for protracted warfare against superior military forces.

Understanding the Threat

The combined Islamist militants that the US and the West face in the Af-Pak theatre are now threatening both Pakistan and Afghanistan. The focus of US-NATO policy is Afghanistan; because this is where the militant threat existed at the time the policy was originally fashioned. The second grave conceptual error has been the failure to recognize that the nature of the threat in the theatre has significantly changed. This has happened because of a flawed planning process that the present administration inherited, and which it has allowed to continue.

The Bush administration allowed the Pentagon to fashion both policy and strategy in its war theatres. The Pentagon and the generals have been and still are fighting a war in Afghanistan; this is their main focus. In this view, Pakistan was merely a problem that was making victory in Afghanistan more difficult. That is why the US compelled Pakistan to conduct military operations against the Taliban in its border areas, while also subjecting the area to drone attacks. This caused (and continues to cause) significant strains within Pakistan, including on its government and military, and has resulted in the creation of an indigenous Taliban movement that is now attacking parts of the country. There is now a tangible risk of a takeover of Pakistan by political Islamists.

The Obama administration’s new policy talks a lot about the critical importance of Pakistan – but it is still with reference to winning the war in Afghanistan. Thus, the policy and resulting strategy concentrate on the battle in Afghanistan, with Pakistan continuing in its role of the necessary adjunct, subject to the same extreme US pressure (ostensibly sweetened with promises of financial largesse soon to come) and drone attacks (with their inevitable civilian casualties). This is the military tail wagging the policy dog; this is generals choosing not only how they will fight, but also whom. This is the military marching to the edge of the cliff, eyes wide shut, with no control or guidance by the nation’s policy makers and leaders.

The recent scare in Washington caused by the Taliban incursions into areas adjoining Swat has led to concern over the vulnerability of Pakistan, and also emphasized its criticality. However, the Pakistan military response is allaying these fears, and soon Pakistan is likely to be seen again as merely a supporting player in the Afghan campaign, important but secondary. What will not be understood is that what the Pakistan military has been compelled by US pressure to do in Malakand is a repeat of their Bajaur operation – treating the area as a free fire zone and subjecting it to intense air and artillery bombardment, the brunt of which is borne by the local population, causing significant casualties and large-scale displacements, while most of the Taliban slip away into surrounding areas without suffering much loss. Such operations may satisfy the US, but add to the unpopularity of the government and the military while driving more recruits into the ranks of the insurgents. They don’t make Pakistan more secure, they make it much more vulnerable.

The United States needs to recognize that the main threat it faces in this region is a takeover in Pakistan by political Islamists (the Taliban cannot do so), as a result of the internal and external strains to which the country is being subjected. That Pakistan is the main battleground, not Afghanistan. That if Pakistan goes, it does not matter what happens in Afghanistan (what is most likely, of course, is the same outcome there soon after). To develop a rational policy and strategy to counter this danger to Pakistan (and its own vital interests), the US must understand the situation that actually exists in Pakistan today, not what its clients and other vested interests feed it.

Understanding the Battleground

Pakistan is a dysfunctional country. The economy is in dire straits, outside assistance alone prevents the country from going bankrupt, government is not functioning, politicians are lining their own pockets when they are not undermining each other, the bureaucracy is paralysed due to political meddling, corruption is massive and all-pervasive, civil society is in disarray, the military is under considerable stress, while ordinary people are facing severe hardships in their daily lives.

Beset by these numerous problems, Pakistanis have watched their government and military, pressured by the US, wage war on their own people in the tribal areas and Malakand. Neither equipped nor trained to deal with an insurgency, the military’s heavy-handed tactics have added to the strains already existing within the country, deepening the alienation of the people from the ruling elites, and increasing the hostility that they feel towards the US and its policies (which, it is widely believed, serve US geopolitical aims in the region, and are inimical to Pakistan’s own national interests).

Locked in these oppressive circumstances, the people of Pakistan do not see Islamists as their enemy (even though many feel disdain for the Taliban, and revulsion at their tactics). Vested interests have sold to the US the idea that the way to win the friendship and support of the people is to provide massive amounts of financial aid. The administrative structure that can ensure that these funds serve the purpose for which they are meant – improving the lot of ordinary Pakistanis and strengthening the institutions that serve the people – does not exist, nor are there any effective mechanisms for oversight or audit. These funds will line the pockets of those who will handle them: politicians, officials, and their cronies. Very little of the aid will benefit the people, and, instead of it winning their goodwill, the result will be the exact opposite: it will be seen as the US bribing the ruling elite to carry out its wishes, even at the cost of Pakistan’s own interests.

The people of Pakistan will not fight to protect, or even stand up for, a system in which they have no stake, a system that only oppresses and loots them. A significant proportion of them see the Islamist ideology propagated by al-Qaeda and the Taliban as providing a solution to their problems rather than a threat to their non-existent well-being. Only when a reasonable level of governance prevails in Pakistan is it likely that people will feel that they have a stake in the system, and thus some incentive to stand up in its defence.

Pakistan is dysfunctional, but it is not a primitive state or society. It possesses all the structures and systems needed by a modern country to function, but they are unable to work as they should. Years of misrule by both politicians and generals, massive and pervasive corruption, the sabotage of institutions that might resist corrupt rulers and their minions, the breakdown of civic responsibility, have all led to these structures and systems becoming broken, rusted, misaligned, dysfunctional.

Selecting a Rational Aim and Policies

A realistic assessment and understanding of the enemy the US faces in the Af-Pak theatre, and the most dangerous threat that this enemy poses to US vital interests, as well as of the battleground the US is engaged in, should lead to the conclusion that the only rational aim for the US in that theatre is to ensure, as its first priority, that Pakistan is not taken over by Islamists. All else, including the war in Afghanistan, is secondary (and subordinate) to achieving this aim.

This aim cannot be achieved by forcing the Pakistan government and military to wage brutal military operations against its own people. It requires the US to follow a policy that assists Pakistan in immediately making the necessary structural changes that would enable it to become functional enough to stop further Islamist encroachments, and utilise effectively the nation-building aid that the US and the international community are prepared to provide it.

This aim also requires the US to revise its goals in Afghanistan. It cannot pursue there a military campaign that is dependent on Pakistan carrying out major operations in its tribal areas against the Afghan Taliban and their allies (which impose considerable strain on Pakistan’s stability).

Shoring up Pakistan

As an immediate measure, the US should concentrate on helping Pakistan deal effectively with the serious problem posed by the large-scale displacement of people from Swat and surrounding areas. This should include bringing in US disaster-relief resources and expertise (the US won a lot of goodwill when it came to the aid of earthquake survivors in 2005). The negative impact on public opinion of the effects of the military operations in these areas could be blunted if the refugees are well looked after.

The structural changes that need to be made in Pakistan will have to be carried out by Pakistanis. There is a wide constituency for them in the country; powerful elements of state and society would be ready to support and advance them. However, what has prevented them from being instituted are equally powerful vested interests, as well as the inertia of a complex but broken-down system. What is required to get the process moving is for the United States to put its weight behind such change. Such a move would mobilize the many forces in the country that favour them, and also effectively neutralize the opposition.

A package of measures needs to be implemented immediately to stabilize Pakistan and enable it to resist and overcome the threat it faces of an Islamist takeover. Apart from repairing the broken and paralysed governmental machinery, they would provide hope to ordinary people and give them a stake in the future of the country. These measures are:

Administration: To ensure the provision of services and protection to the people by an administrative machinery that is efficient, not corrupt, and which is not manipulated by politicians or other special interests, the civil service and the police should be placed under the control of independent Public Service Commissions, comprising retired senior administrators and judges. These commissions should control and manage the hiring, appointments and promotions of all managerial and executive level public servants. The government Rules of Business should clearly prescribe and require that ministers lay down policies but cannot interfere in their detailed implementation by public servants. Government fiscal auditors should be made independent, and should carry out their duties on a real-time basis.

Controlling Corruption: This cancer that is eating away at every organ of the state, and polluting every aspect of life in the country, has to be checked and beaten back. There are a sufficient number of honest and able persons available in the country to staff an organization to begin this task. This cleansing operation has to start from the top; no one should have immunity from scrutiny and accountability, neither politicians nor generals, nor judges or high officials.

Security: Until the military has developed an effective counter-insurgency capability (and the country is sufficiently stabilized) it should block any organized insurgent threats in the border areas (instead of waging Bajaur and Swat type operations). Public security should be established by rapidly increasing the anti-terrorist capabilities of the various police forces. A concerted effort should be made to root out groups known to have insurgent affiliations, including shutting down madrassahs with such links or sponsorship.

Rule of Law: To re-establish the rule of law the superior judiciary should be purged of the corrupt, inefficient and partial judges with whom it has been packed over the years. There exist a number of capable and upright former judges who gave up their posts rather than violate their oath of office to uphold the constitution. A commission comprising some of these judges should be set up to scrutinize the qualifications and performance record of all sitting judges of the Supreme and High Courts, and those who are found to be unfit should be removed. This commission should also fill the resulting vacancies. Future appointments to these courts should be made through a process in which the judiciary and the legal profession have a major voice, not politicians.

The Constitution: There exists a political consensus that the 1973 constitution be restored, purged of all later amendments. It should be so restored, followed by a process of mature examination of the issue of appropriate checks and balances between the various state and territorial entities of the country, so as to avoid some of the problems that have arisen since its promulgation.

Free Media: The media in Pakistan is fairly free, though off and on it is subjected to pressure by powerful people. This freedom should be ensured for the future so that it can monitor and report lapses before they become major problems.

Bolstering the Economy: As soon as these basic measures are starting to become effective, the economic aid that the US and other donors have promised should begin to flow in a planned and controlled manner.

Elections: Mid-term elections should be held in early 2010 under a reconstituted, impartial Election Commission, which should be able to call upon the military to provide whatever assistance is needed to ensure that the elections are free and fair. This will restore legitimate political leadership to the country.

To someone who does not know much about Pakistan this will seem a formidable list of tasks, requiring years to implement. But the necessary pre-requisites are all there – a strong desire for such change prevails among influential groups; an elaborate, sophisticated administrative structure exists (even though it doesn’t function properly at present), with many conscientious and capable civil servants; the Chief Justice wants to clean up the judiciary; the media is free and vibrant; files exist on high level corruption. All that is required is a catalyst to start the process and release the potential synergy, and within one year most of these measures should be well-advanced and producing results.

The United States carries tremendous clout with the key players in Pakistan; the country is dependent on US aid and international support to remain viable. Once the United States indicates that the institution of such an immediate reform program is a pre-requisite for it to prop up, and later rebuild, the country, it will immediately mobilize and energize a strong internal coalition of forces to carry it out. These allies are likely to include the military, the Supreme Court, the PML-N (which rules in the Punjab) and some other political parties, large sections of the bureaucracy, civil society, and the mass of ordinary people, who will see the prospect of a better life opening up. Those vested interests that have a stake in the continuation of the present state of affairs will not be able to resist this coalition.

A Pakistan so reformed will prove to be impregnable to the blandishments, inroads and assaults of the Islamists. The goodwill that the US will gain in backing and supporting such a program would be of far greater significance and permanence than the influence it now wields through its clients among the ruling elite. Pakistan would become a stable friend and ally in this volatile region.

Neutralizing Afghanistan

In recognizing Pakistan as the main focus of its strategy in the Af-Pak theatre the United States will need to change its strategy in Afghanistan. It can no longer afford to call upon Pakistan to conduct large-scale military operations in its tribal areas in order to neutralize the Afghan Taliban and prevent them from attacking its forces in Afghanistan. Nor can it afford to continue drone attacks in these areas. With such operations off the table, the US and NATO cannot hope to achieve a solution in Afghanistan based on their present military strategy.

The US’s main aim in Afghanistan is that, in the future, it does not again become a haven and launching pad for attacks by al-Qaeda and its allies. This should be achievable through a political solution that exploits the differing aims of the Taliban and al-Qaeda, and results in the setting up of a loose federal system that includes the Taliban, but ensures that they cannot create a unitary state in which they achieve dominance, and gives other ethnic groups, and other Pashtun leaders, room to establish their own power centres. Even though such a political solution would require the departure of Western military forces, the US, with the help of the ‘Northern Alliance’ provinces, a revitalized Pakistan, Iran and Saudi Arabia, and its own proximate military power, can ensure that al-Qaeda does not again establish bases in Afghanistan.

Should a political solution not to be possible immediately, the US will have to conduct a holding operation there until Pakistan has been stabilized sufficiently to re-establish control over its border areas, and is in a position to assist in achieving a satisfactory resolution in Afghanistan.

Conclusion

The flawed conceptual legacy left behind by the Bush administration has contaminated the Obama administration’s aims and policies in Afghanistan and Pakistan. This has been compounded by a continuation of the defective planning process of allowing the military too much say in policy-making, so that they not only decide how to fight but also pick the enemy the US will fight. As a result the United States is pursuing a wrong policy in this theatre: fighting the wrong enemy on the wrong battlefield. Unless it realizes this, and makes the necessary corrections soon, it risks losing both Afghanistan and Pakistan to the Islamists.

* * *

Postings on the Shaheryar Forum

[ Note: Written in 2007 and 2008 ]

Re: Let's Think Again About the Burqa by Taslima Nasrin, Outlook India

From: FB Ali <fbali@sympatico.ca>

To: Shaheryar Azhar <sazhar@nyc.rr.com>

Date: Jan 22 2007 - 4:21pm

Taslima Nasrin ostensibly attacks purdah and the burqa, but the route is via an attack on the Quran and Islam. I doubt if she expects many Muslim women to rally to her battle cry, but it does remind people that she is a rebel, and that is a cachet in some circles.

She does, however, raise a valid point : the purdah injunctions are clearly discriminatory against women (as are several other injunctions of the Quran). For those who are troubled by these (and similar) problems, I would suggest that there is an approach to the Quran which satisfactorily deals with them. I discussed this in my papaer "Rediscovering Islam", which was posted some time ago on this forum.

She liberally quotes from the "Hadis" (Hadith). I believe that there is a consensus among impartial scholars that the Hadith are riddled with false sayings and actions attributed to Rasul Allah. No Hadith can be accepted at face value; it needs to be subjected to critical evaluation and corroboration. Muslims put themselves into unnecessary difficulties by blindly believing that every Hadith is accurate, historical fact.

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February 15, 2007

The point I was making when I posted Haroon Siddiqui's article on the Sachar Report seems to have got lost in the deluge of comments it elicited. I think the point is still worth repeating, because my generation, which waged the successful struggle for the creation of Pakistan, is fading away, and later ones seem to be often misled by all the propaganda put out by vested interests.

The point relates to the basis for the creation of Pakistan. Essentially, the two main motivations that caused millions upon millions of Muslims to rise up in an unstoppable mass movement were :

The realization that in a united India they would forever remain second-class citizens. (This was the lesson learned by the Muslims in what is now India when they lived under Congress rule in the late 1930s. That is why the Pakistan movement started in this part of India, and why it was these Muslims who were its main driving force for so long).

The desire of Muslims to live in a country founded upon the values and ideals of Islam, which we believed to be universal. (Not a religious state, as Vasant Dhar alleges. That is why the most virulent opponents of the Pakistan movement were the Muslim religious parties - the Jamaat Islami, the Ahrar, the Deobandis, the various Jamiats. They fought against it to the bitter end).

The Sachar Report proves that the former was a correct assessment. The latter was an aspiration which did not materialize, not because there was anything wrong with the idea, but because fate robbed us of the steady hand of Jinnah on the rudder of the ship of state, and crooks and charlatans then robbed us of our patrimony.

Judge the Pakistan movement on the situation that faced the Muslims of that time, and the basis for their epic struggle. Did they misread the political and economic dynamics of the sub-continent? Were their dreams and hopes unworthy? What happened afterwards is not a fair measure. Nor is it relevant whether India i

As to what might have been, here are some extracts from the first speech of MA Jinnah to the Pakistan Constituent Assembly on August, if we want to make this great State of Pakistan happy and prosperous, we should wholly and solely concentrate on the well-being of the people, and especially of the masses and the poor...... If you change your past and work together in a spirit that everyone of you, no matter to what community he belongs, no matter what relations he had with you in the past, no matter what is his colour, caste or creed, is first, second and last a citizen of this State with equal rights, privileges, and obligations, there will be no end to the progress you will make.

You are free; you are free to go to your temples, you are free to go to your mosques or to any other place of worship in this State of Pakistan. You may belong to any religion or caste or creed; that has nothing to do with the business of the State...... We are starting in the days where there is no discrimination, no distinction between one community and another, no discrimination between one caste or creed and another.

Now I think we should keep that in front of us as our ideal and you will find that in course of time Hindus would cease to be Hindus and Muslims would cease to be Muslims, not in the religious sense, because that is the personal faith of each individual, but in the political sense as citizens of the State.

This is the Pakistan that we struggled for, and created. It was a noble ideal, and a historic struggle, under a leader who was one of the great men of human history. The anger, sorrow and bitterness that filled our hearts afterwards cannot take away what we felt on that 14th of August in 1947.

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From: FB Ali

Date: March 18, 2007 1:37:19 PM EDT

Subject: Musharraf and the PPP by Khaled Ahmed, The Friday Times

Shaheryar,

I would like to comment on your reference to ZA Bhutto's "legacy" in your comments on Khalid Ahmed's article. This legacy is not the simple entity you make it out to be.

ZA Bhutto was a complex, brilliant yet deeply-flawed person. I did not know him personally, even though our paths crossed at fateful occasions in both our lives. He has left several legacies, and these play different roles in Pakistan's politics.

There is the impact he left on the ordinary people of Pakistan; this is the "vote bank" that Hussain Haqqani refers to. I have no idea how big it still is.

There is the legacy of Bhutto, the modern wadera, who believed in his God-given right to rule and be obeyed and served. This is the legacy assumed by Benazir, and displayed during the two occasions she was in power. It is what is now driving her to achieve power again by whatever means are necessary. I doubt if she will let such nebulous considerations as democracy and liberalism stand in the way of pursuing her goal.

There is the legacy of Bhutto, the romantic, who believed in democracy, socialism, liberalism, the rights of the people, the welfare of the poor. This is the legacy that was assumed by people like Mubashir Hassan, JA Rahim, Hanif Ramay, Miraj Muhammad Khan. Where do these people and other like-minded ones figure in the PPP of today? And, if there is such a constituency in the PPP today, how much of a say will it have if the party does ever achieve power with BB at its head.

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From: FB Ali

Date: March 20, 2007 7:18:55 PM EDT

Subject: Re: Editorial: Bhutto and Musharraf Should Think Long and Hard, Daily Times

Najam Sethi appears to have a fairly low opinion of his readers if he expects any but unthinking PPP supporters to buy the line he is trying to feed them. What Benazir Bhutto said in New York was aimed directly at the US, and was an unsubtle attempt to win their support. This is what the Americans want to hear, not anti-Musharraf rhetoric, as Mr Sethi tries to spin. He also tries to confuse the Taliban with Muslim religious parties in Pakistan.

The reality is :

- Ms Bhutto talked about suppressing the Taliban in the tribal areas, as they might try to take over Pakistan. This is patently false; the Taliban support in the tribal areas is a threat to Karzai, not to Pakistan - unless Pakistan tries to fight them.

- If somehow Ms Bhutto came to power and, in order to fulfil her promises to the US, told the army to take control of the tribal areas, she would be told to go fly a kite. The US probably knows this.

- The religious parties in Pakistan may sympathise with, and some may even support, the Taliban, but they are not part of one grouping.

- The fundamentalists inside Pakistan are undoubtedly a threat to what many of us wish for the country, but to the US they are not a big worry at this time. They will have to be countered by Pakistanis on their own.

Mr Sethi's own unsubtle message to Ms Bhutto is : Support Gen Musharraf, and try to get a share in the power structure. It makes sense if power is her only aim, otherwise it would be a gross betrayal of all the high-sounding slogans that the PPP keeps shouting.

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From: FB Ali

Date: March 31, 2007 12:43:29 PM EDT

Subject: Re: Benazir Bhutto As Mother Courage, The Guardian

It is true that Benazir Bhutto is a tough and courageous woman, who has undergone much hardship in her quest for power. But that is only part of the story. The other side is what she did as prime minister. She and her husband looted Pakistan with both hands. She also once used to proudly claim that she was the "mother" of the Taliban (it is often forgotten that Islamicization was started in Pakistan by her father, before Zia came to complete it; at least the latter acted from conviction). Let us not ignore the other side and lose ourselves in some romantic illusion.

F. B. Ali

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From: FB Ali

Date: April 10, 2007 3:02:38 PM EDT

Subject: Re: Forum Comments and Debates

Shaheryar,

It is with alternating amusement and sadness that I read the debate in your forum on the desirability or otherwise of Benazir Bhutto coming back to power in Pakistan. Some of the correspondents are obviously pushing a partisan agenda (Yes, Mr Haqqani, Benazir and Zardari have never been convicted of corruption in a Pakistani court - who has? - but wasn't there a proceeding in a British court in which some interesting details came out about a rather large estate in Surrey? And what about that Swiss court case? You must also have read the report submitted by Citibank to the US Senate Sub-committee about the case of the $500 million gold import by ARY on an exclusive licence issued by Ms Bhutto. There is no statute of limitations in the court of public accountability!).

The sadness arises from seeing all those who are so disheartened by what Musharraf is doing to Pakistan that they are prepared to hope that maybe this time she might be different. So, is there no alternative between a bumbling Musharraf reducing the country to a police state, and a rejuvenated Benazir (with hubby in tow) taking up where she left off? In theory, yes. For example :

An open and free election under caretaker governments (federal and provincial) of technocrats, run by an Election Commission under someone like Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry. Give the commission teeth by giving it a Monitoring and Enforcement Unit staffed by personnel seconded from the military, and headed by a "clean" and upright retired general (someone like Waheed Kakar, Jahangir Karamat or Amjad). Repeat the election, under the same arrangements, every 2 or 3 years for the next 10 years. This last bit is the critical factor for the solution to work. Look at India : it had worse problems than Pakistan did, but is now a working democracy well on its way to developed status. Their secret was regular, relatively free elections. Pakistan has a lot of catching up to do; that's why elections have to be repeated at shorter intervals. Through them the people will realize that power ultimately resides in their hands, and politicians will know they will have to face an increasingly empowered electorate in a couple of years or less.

Will it happen? I greatly doubt it. But it can be done. We have done some of this before. Bangladesh is doing bits of it right now. For those of us out of the fray, and the fallout, dreams are all that we have left.

FB Ali

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From: FB Ali

Date: May 17, 2007 11:23:43 AM EDT

Subject: Re: Rising, Uprising Pakistan by Maruf Khwaja, openDemocracy

These days there is much commentary and analysis in the media on the fallen state of Pakistan. For me, a telling sign of how far the rot has gone is how persons like Shaukat Aziz and Khurshid Kasuri have behaved when it should have become blindingly obvious to them that all they were doing is serving a shallow adventurer who was quite prepared, in order to retain his position, to play the pimp and prostitute this unfortunate country that has fallen into his clutches to all comers - whether they be a moronic US president waging an unending crusade against "terror", or crafty, bearded mullahs fielding hordes of sharia-crazed, ninja-clad women, or the murderous thugs of a fascist mafioso sitting in London. This general, who likes to strut around calling himself a commando, but whose true level is that of a pan-chewing, street-corner gambler.

At least, Kasuri had the wit to keep his mouth shut, but Aziz goes around muttering darkly of emergency rule. They see themselves at the pinnacle of success, but do not smell the stench rising from their rotting psyches, nor feel the contempt of their countrymen beating upon them from all sides. Meanwhile, a truly admirable son of this soil, Hamad Raza, is gunned down in his home like a dog.

That is Pakistan today.

**********************************

From: FB Ali

Date: May 17, 2007 3:11:35 PM EDT

To: Shaheryar Azhar < sazhar@nyc.rr.com>

Subject: Re: Rising, Uprising Pakistan by Maruf Khwaja, openDemocracy

Dear Shaheryar,

I'm afraid I am almost completely out of touch with the situation in the army these days. I do hear that Musharraf has made a concerted effort to fill the top ranks with his own loyalists, but such "loyalties" only go so far, as his predecessors found out. They all tried to do this, and they all created the same problem for themselves - no one told them the truth about the situation, until it was too late.

owever, it is very difficult for anyone below the very top ranks to act on their own. Even for them, the situation in the country has to get quite bad and start impacting on the army before they will contemplate such action, eg, in Ayub's case, the prospect of E Pak dominating the country or breaking away; in Yahya's case, the '71 defeat; in Bhutto's case, the precipitating event was the refusal of two (three?) Brigs in Lahore to fire on the demonstrators; in Nawaz Sharif's case, his attempt to arbitrarily impose his own chief on the army.

If you are interested, I would suggest you pose this question to Saeed Malik. He is currently in Pakistan, and probably knows how things are in the army. Regards,

FB Ali

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From: FB Ali

Date: August 2, 2007 12:45:27 PM EDT

Subject: U.S. Attacking Pakistan Will be Playing With Fire by Eric Margolis

Shaheryar, I am puzzled and disturbed by your statement that, under certain circumstances, the US will be justified in attacking Pakistan. Yes, there are problems in Pakistan (governance, religious extremism, etc), but to say that they justify an attack by any outside power (much less by a rogue state that the US has become under a bunch of neocon fascists) is odd, to say the least. It displays the same type of fanaticism that the jihadis show, where all that matters is to attack and destroy the "enemy", irrespective of how much damage that inflicts on the innocent.

An attack by the US on Pakistan will create far more problems for its people than anything that you believe would justify it. And also for the US.

FB Ali

MODERATOR'S COMMENT: My exact comment was: "Only if Pakistan loses its will or its capability to contain the rising religious extremism on its Western border will U.S. attack Pakistan and then it will be justified in doing it." Al-Qaeda is a sworn enemy of the United States. If al-Qaeda is ascendant in Pakistan and its government has lost its will or capability to defeat it then for both Pakistan's survival as a state and for U.S's security, its intervention would be absolutely necessary. Yes, it will be disastrous for everyone involved. But so would be the alternative. It is, therefore, a serious warning for Pakistan to put its house in order before it is too late! Shaheryar Azhar, moderator, The Forum

From: FB Ali

Date: August 5, 2007 1:21:30 PM EDT

To: Shaheryar Azhar <sazhar@nyc.rr.com>

Subject: US Attack on Pakistan

With respect, this is strange logic. The US should attack Pakistan to ensure its "survival as a state", even though this would be "disastrous for everyone involved". There are no grounds for considering the Pashtun tribesmen who support their Taliban kin to be al-Qaeda. They are both currently fighting the US, but they have different aims - one wishes to regain control of Afghanistan, the other to wage world-wide jihad against all non-Muslim powers. Similarly, the Islamic parties and movements in Pakistan believe in a version of Islam which al-Qaeda may also espouse, but their respective aims are quite different. If these parties become ascendant in Pakistan, it will not be al-Qaeda which rules, but Pakistanis. The erroneous view that holds otherwise is that of the neo-cons and religious fundamentalists that have dominated policy-making in the US.

It is not clear from what point of view you are writing. As a Pakistani, there is absolutely no justification for condoning an attack by any foreign power on Pakistan or any part of it. Whatever problems there are in Pakistan have to be solved by Pakistanis themselves. It is a dangerous position to take that the solution to Islamist extremism in Pakistan is to be found through the use of force. Such an approach would be self-defeating, since it would merely drive the Islamists underground temporarily while tearing the country apart permanently. It is a strange position to hold : the country destroyed is better than Islamists ascendant.

I found it depressing that, for many in this forum, the Lal Masjid massacre was a cause for celebration rather than regret. The killing of your own young people, however misguided you think them to be, is a matter of sorrow and shame, not mutual congratulations.

FB Ali

MODERATOR'S COMMENT: Mr. F.B. Ali's comments raise a large number of fundamental issues and I would like to address them briefly.

1. The distinction between al-Qaeda and Taliban that Mr. F.B. Ali makes doesn't hold water. It was Taliban that gave sanctuary to al-Qaeda and it was Taliban after 9/11 that refused to hand over Bin Laden leading to war. Even now Taliban continue to give protection to al-Qaeda. Taliban's view of an Islamic government and their strategy and tactics to implement it is quite well documented and it is exactly the same or very similar to that of al-Qaeda.

2. I write from the point of view of a Pakistani and I do not believe that foreign intervention or attack in all circumstances is out of bounds. If that was the case I would not have agitated for American and European intervention in former Yugoslavia. There are many scenarios where I can not see Pakistanis solving their own problems that could trigger, whether all of us like it or not, foreign intervention. If a civil war starts in Pakistan, God forbid - Iran, Afghanistan and India will all intervene. If al-Qaeda/Taliban begin to grow in strength and threat, America will intervene. Nation-state sovereignty is proscribed by several practical limitations.

3. America had a civil war on slavery, Britain on issue of who had the right to govern, Spain ditto and so on. Somalia got blown out because it couldn't resolve its internal conflicts. Pakistan is not immune from similar historical forces if it fails to manage them. And yes those who will wage a war on their own citizens to impose an totalitarian religious ideology must be dealt with full force of the State but to deal effectively with them other measures - political, social and economic must also be brought to bear equally.

4. I don't believe Lal Masjid was a cause of celebration. It was a tragedy. What was, however, unequivocally correct was finally the resolve of the government to go after extremists like Ghazi who were defying the writ of the State. People supported the move and heaved a sigh of relief because further dithering by the government would have been infinitely more bloody and dangerous for public peace. Appeasement of a violently inclined is never a successful policy. Shaheryar Azhar, moderator, The Forum

From: Shafqat Mahmood

Date: August 8, 2007 4:15:29 AM EDT

Subject: Discussion on When America Can Intervene in Pakistan

Shaheryar

I am more than a little shocked by your arguments. Nothing can justify a direct US attack on Pakistani soil and it requires a huge amount of rhetorical contortion to find reasons for it. It reminds me of that odd justification during the Vietnam war that a village had to be destroyed to save it.

The sad fact is that some of us have allowed the extremist/liberal contradiction to cloud our thinking to an extent that it makes us condone all manner of sins including naked used of state power, foreign intervention, extra judicial killings, torture cells, secret prisons, making people disappear etc. It has also made well meaning people push the democracy dictatorship contradiction aside so that the greater threat of extremism can be combated. Suits the likes of General Musharraf to a tee.

There is also a fundamental difference between Al Qaeda and Taliban although I find both their ideologies reprehensible. Al Qaeda is a foreign body in Afghanistan/Pakistan. Taliban, whoever misguided they are, are virtually the Pushtun national army in the ethnic riven Afghanistan. It is for this reason that they are managing to survive and even prosper despite being under attack from the most formidable military might in the world. This is also the reason why their struggle finds so much support in the Pushtun areas of Pakistan. Without bringing them on as a party to the negotiating table there will be no end to US problems in Afghanistan and to our problems in the tribal areas. For them to disappear completely in a military conflict would require a virtual genocide of the Pushtuns in Afghanistan and Pakistan. I am sure you would not advocate that.

Fighting extremism in Pakistan is a complex issue and reducing it certain black and white nostrums is not very helpful. Shafqat

Begin forwarded message:

From: Arshed Saeed

Date: August 8, 2007 1:14:31 AM EDT

Subject: Discussion on When America Can Intervene in Pakistan

Shaheryar,

I think your views are more of an American-Pakistani than that of a Pakistani! I do not believe that US is justified in attacking Pakistan under any circumstances (except, of course, if Pakistan was to attack US mainland!).

What is happening in Northern areas of Pakistan, Taliban and all, is not palatable to me but Pakistan itself will have to sort it out! A direct attack by US will produce such a backlash that will make Iraq look like an oasis of peace! I cannot believe any Pakistani, from any side of political or religious divide, will agree with you on this issue!

You have given the examples of US civil war and wars in Britain and Spain. They were sorted out by themselves without any outside intervention! That is how a stable country emerged. Outside interventions, like the ones in Afghanistan and Iraq, have produced disasters! And you are advocating an even bigger one!! Arshed Saeed

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From: FB Ali

Date: September 7, 2007 7:31:08 AM EDT

Subject: IJI Deja Vu? By Husain Haqqani, The Nation

Husain Haqqani and other Benazir Bhutto supporters, both open and covert, are either confused themselves or seek to delude others. They set up this stark choice between a peaceful "transition" to democracy and an attempt at violent "transformation" of the system (which is likely to fail), and tout Benazir's "deal" as leading to the former. They omit to mention that this choice has arisen only because Benazir reneged from the pact (for the restoration of democracy) that she signed with other opposition leaders only a few weeks ago.

Had she stood by her word, a weakened Musharraf would have had to negotiate with a united opposition. It is this that could have led to the "negotiated settlement that enables both Mr. Sharif and Ms Bhutto to return to Pakistani politics while at the same time addressing the systemic and institutional problems that have blocked Pakistan's path to democracy" that Mr Haqqani speaks of, and which everyone wants. This is not the settlement likely to emerge from Benazir's deal. Whatever the spin being put on it, this deal is mainly about items that benefit Benazir personally - withdrawing the corruption cases against her, removing the bar to her becoming PM again, making her the interim PM, etc.

It is Benazir's breaking her pledged word to the other opposition leaders, and her attempt to cut her own side-deal with Musharraf, that has forced them to adopt such a confrontational stand, which is likely to plunge the country into further turmoil and further set back the possibility of a real transition to democracy and reform.

Benazir has never explained why she broke the united stand of the opposition for the retoration of democracy, and neither do her supporters, busily raising smokescreens to hide the fact that it is Benazir who has, once again, sacrificed the interests of Pakistan for her own gain.

FB Ali

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From: FB Ali

Sent: Sunday, September 16, 2007 12:27 PM

Subject: Sehba Covering Musharraf, The News

Shaheryar, with reference to your outburst on the news that Ch Shujaat had said that President Musharraf's wife would stand, if necessary, in the presidential election, I would submit that it is an over-reaction. After all, if Caligula could make his favourite horse the First Consul of Rome, why can't our Caesar make his favourite First Lady the President. I think she would provide a worthy match in reconstructed beauty to the future Prime Minister or Leader of the Opposition (which will it be is still unknown, as the tantalising deal remains up in the air, like a fickle bee hovering over two flowers, undecided on which one to land). She has also displayed much tact and wisdom in the past, choosing to turn the Nelsonian blind eye on the reputed wandering eye of her dashing commando.

As for the doughty Chaudhry, his statement lends credence to the rumour that he and his clan are direct descendents of the renowned courtier of the Emperor Akbar who was the once and future admirer of the lowly bengan (eggplant).

To avoid all misunderstanding, and malicious misrepresentation, let me say openly and unequivocally that my reference to Caligula in no way, shape or form carries any allusion, direct or indirect, to the unfortunate fate that befell that great Roman Emperor.

F.B. Ali

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From: FB Ali

Date: October 7, 2007 6:46:10 PM EDT

Subject: Re: Celebration Time by Farrukh Saleem, The News

Allow me to celebrate Dr Farrukh Saleem. So long as we have persons like him to sing songs of rejoicing, our military dictators, crooked politicians and their self-serving henchmen will never lack for an accompanying chorus to celebrate their glorious victories over the poor people of this benighted country. (Incidentally, I still prefer Faiz!).

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From: FB Ali <fbali@sympatico.ca>

Date: October 10, 2007 3:24:48 PM EDT

To: Shaheryar Azhar < sazhar@nyc.rr.com>

Subject: A Bloody Crime

While many on this forum rejoice in the phony "transition to democracy" (and the impending return of their heroine to her land of milk and honey) a bloody crime is being committed. The government of Pakistan is bombing and shooting its own people, killing hundreds of innocent men, women and children. This is happening because this government is in the hands of a mafia - the generals of the Pakistan army. Their only motivation is their own interest and gain.

Once before they waged a war against their own people, killing tens of thousands and committing shameful atrocities. And, as a result, lost half of Pakistan. Now, once again, they are committing the same criminal folly, and will further fracture the army and the country, and thus risk losing it to the religious fundamentalists who are gaining strength day by day.

This is the gang about whom Saeed Akhtar Malik said in 1973 to the court-martial trying him for his life, "What about these men? What were some of these men - these callous, inhuman degenerates - doing when their only job was to prepare this Army for war? Were these men not grabbing lands and building houses? Did it not appear in foreign magazines that some of them were pimping for their bloated grandmaster? Yes, Generals, wearing that uniform (he pointed at the bemedalled General Zia ul Haq, presiding over the court on his high dais) pimping and whoremongering!"

Who will rid Pakistan of this mafia? The politicians cannot, because they are all corrupt and weak, and feather their own nests by allying themselves to the generals. The people are never given a chance to express their will. Who will cut out this cancer that is eating our country away?

I do not write with hot emotion, but in a cold fury. I write as someone who struggled to create this country, as one who proudly wore its uniform, now being disgraced. As someone who risked his life to once remove the grip of this mafia from the throat of the country, only to see a vain and foolish politician throw away perhaps the only chance we had had till then to finally bring them under control.

This forum has a far reach through its members. I would hope that those of them who see the danger and feel the pain that I do will pass my words on to others.

FB Ali

MODERATOR'S COMMENT: Undoubtedly, the situation in the tribal areas is the number one national problem facing the country. If Musharraf has agreed to take off the uniform, it is because of the internal and external pressure related primarily to this situation and how explosive it has become. However, there is a fundamental difference between this and East Pakistan. In the latter case, General Yahya went after representatives elected directly and fairly by the people and in contravention of the democratic rules of the game (he should have called the assembly to meet). Here we are dealing with blow back of decades of faulty, opaque and secretive policies of the military establishment, namely, supporting, training and building religious fundamentalists in its jihad in Afghanistan and the covert war in Kashmir. The genie is now out of the bottle, threatening to engulf its 'master'. The choice, therefore, is simple - either cave in to them and see the entire country taken over by their likes or reverse the failed policy with absolute and iron determination - militarily, economically and politically. The problem is not with the policy of taking on the Taliban and their foreign backers till they are neutralized but that this policy is being executed by a military dictator and, therefore, ineffectively. An elected representative government should be allowed to manage this. Shaheryar Azhar, moderator, The Forum

From: FB Ali

Date: October 14, 2007 3:35:27 PM EDT

Subject: A Bloody Crime

Shaheryar,

Your comments on my piece on the crime being committed in the tribal areas indicates that you are, regrettably, deluding yourself - and in the process likely to mislead others. That is why I am writing this reply; normally I prefer not to get into pointless and empty debates.

I had expressed my anger and disgust at the killing, maiming and uprooting of innocent men, women and children in the tribal areas by the Pakistan army, and had compared it to the earlier war the army had waged on Pakistanis in East Pakistan. You say this latter operation was wrong because it was an action against representatives elected by the people! Is that all it was? Is all that Yahya did in East Pakistan amount to rounding up the elected MNAs? What kind of repressed memory is this? Much of international opinion holds that what occurred was attempted genocide against the people of East Pakistan. There is overwhelming evidence of atrocities and mass killings by the army. This is what was wrong, this is what was the crime. Not some make-believe conception of anti-democratic behaviour.

This is the crime being committed again in the tribal areas. You are again displaying a remarkable flight from reality by regarding this as just "taking on the Taliban". The people being bombed and shelled are not just "Taliban and their foreign backers", but also poor, innocent Pakistanis.

If you believe in the US neo-con mantra that a "worthy goal" justifies everything, including "collateral damage", you should say so upfront. I am frankly apalled to see you use the same rhetoric as Strauss, Podhoretz, Kristol and their hardright neo-con brethren, advocating the use of even bloody force (as you put it, "with absolute and iron determination") to pursue policy goals. Earlier, you even supported US attacks on Pakistan territory, if required. You do not like the generals, but would like their democratic replacements to follow the same policies.

I do not wish to sound disrespectful, but you do not know war and fighting and killing, I do. It looks very different from ground zero than from an ivory tower in New York. The only valid justification a country has for using armed force is in self-defence. To use it to advance policies, however high-sounding, is a war crime. Within a country the state has the right to use force, police and military, against its citizens, but only according to the law and not selectively (the validity of such action also depends on the moral and legal validity of those laws).

The autonomy enjoyed by the people in the tribal areas is given to them by the constitution. In the 1980s the state not only allowed but actively encouraged them to support the struggle of their brethren in Afghanistan against the Soviet occupation, which included providing safe havens and bases in these areas. Now, when they are doing exactly the same thing to help the same people resist the US occupation, Pakistan is bombing and killing them. The tribesmen, the Taliban and their foreign supporters only turned on Pakistani forces after they were thus attacked, in self-defence. The generals and the politicians who support this policy at least, have the justification, however unethical, even traitorous, that the US is their paymaster.

I do not see what your justification is.

FB Ali

MODERATOR'S COMMENT: This is a response on merit and substance of the comment and not to the personal attacks, well-intentioned or not. This moderator's comment on East Pakistan was not all-encompassing (space and consideration for forum members' time mean that we must necessarily be short); it was limited to comparing the nature of the two conflicts. Whether there was a 9/11 or not, Talibanization had already become a domestic problem for Pakistan - sectarianism and struggle to impose religious ideology on the state were in advanced stages. Sooner or later, Pakistan would have had to either go to war alone with the Talibanized Afghanistan and the Islamists within or succumb to the pressure being exerted by the these forces. Those of us who want to see Pakistan as a modern pluralistic democracy as Jinnah and other founding fathers envisaged have no illusion about the bloody nature of the struggle the state of Pakistan is involved in the tribal areas. To the extent Pakistani armed forces and its generals see it that way, they are national heroes and deserve our full support. Ultimately, Pakistan must use all means - military, economic and foreign-assistance under a democratic and legitimate government to defeat this insurgency decisively. This is a long-term struggle - it will take, at least, 3-5 years or perhaps 10 years. But like India's fight against its own insurgencies, there can not be any ambiguity or let up. If the insurgents will use local population as shields as they callously do, civilians will be killed. The government of Pakistan will need to be smart in trying to both reduce these casualties and at the same time win the public relations war that is integral to fighting all insurgencies. There cannot a territory within Pakistan - tribal or otherwise that harbors criminals who are dead set on targeting our armed forces, challenging the writ of the state and attacking foreign countries. U.S. occupation of Afghanistan is the natural and justified consequence of an attack on it that was planned, funded, executed and facilitated from Afghanistan. Afghanistan's government of the time were given ample opportunity to make amends before the U.S. attacked it. The Taliban government instead chose to betray its own people for its own medieval ideology and traitorous loyalty to foreign masters - the al-Qaeda. Shaheryar Azhar, moderator, The Forum

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October 22, 2007

Article by forum member F. B. Ali posted by forum member Saeed Malik. Mr. Ali has quite accurately described Pakistan's situation but failed to provide his preferred solution. If the implied solution is to open up the political system (with full participation by all political forces, including the Sharifs), we are in agreement. Let then the government that is thrown up in such a process determine how they want to tackle the menace of talibanization. But if it is somehting else, then may we know what it is!! Shaheryar Azhar, moderator, The Forum

(Pakistan on the Brink – see Own Writings)

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From: FB Ali

Date: October 24, 2007 9:44:57 AM EDT

Subject: while Pakistan Burns by Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, The Weekly Standard

The "solutions" that Daveed Gartenstein-Ross proposes are measures to better prosecute the US war on terror, also called the war on Islamo-fascism but seen by many, especially at the receiving end, as just a war on Muslims. They are not solutions to the acute problems that Pakistan is facing. Considering extremism as the main problem in Pakistan is the US point of view, not the Pakistani. It is quite appropriate for US observers to hold this view, but rather strange when persons like Mr Haqqani and you also push it.

Gartenstein-Ross is a warrior in the US war on terror; The Weekly Standard is William Kristol's paper. Kristol is in the innermost circle of the neocons who pushed the US into the Iraq invasion and are now clamouring for it to strike Iran. More and more thinking people in the US have come to the conclusion that the neocon agenda has proven a bad thing for their country. Perhaps Mr Haqqani and you should also consider whether it may be bad for Pakistan, too.

In posting my recent piece on the crisis in Pakistan you challenged me to also give a solution. In posting this piece you perhaps make another reference to that. I have sent you separately some ideas on the makings of a solution for Pakistan's problems. I hope you will post them, too, on the Forum.

FB Ali

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From: FB Ali

Date: October 24, 2007 7:27:44 AM EDT

To: Shaheryar Azhar <sazhar@nyc.rr.com>

Subject: Pakistan - A Solution

(See in Own Writings)

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October 30, 2007

Posted by forum member F.B. Ali. This paper (The Issue of God) by him presents the same thesis as the one posted earlier on the Forum (Rediscovering Islam) by the same author, but for a non-Muslim audience. Shaheryar Azhar, moderator, The Forum

To: FB Ali

Sent: Monday, October 15, 2007 5:03 PM

Subject: Paper

Dear Farrukh, I finally got through your paper and enjoyed reading it. Its merit is its rationality. However, the proposition that human beings need a priori purpose and meaning in life needs to be re-examined. Essential human reality, we all observe, is impermanence. Essential human response to this is either to avoid (deny) it altogether (i.e. pretend one is impervious to it) or to compensate for it by attaching oneself to material things or immaterial explanations. In either case, however, it is not the fact of impermanence by itself that causes suffering but our attempt in trying hard to run away from it! Or to put it another way: when we refuse to stay or practice with the pain of impermanence that we cause the extra need for immaterial explanations. Yes, in a general way 'belief in God' is utilitarian and can be a fountain for 'moral' behavior but by way of a palliative, not a cure. Irrespective, this is a very interesting paper. All best! Shaheryar

From: FB Ali

Date: October 17, 2007 5:24:32 PM EDT

To: Shaheryar Azhar <sazhar@nyc.rr.com>

Subject: Re: Paper

Shaheryar, I am glad you enjoyed the paper. Yes, the finiteness of human life on earth is what we observe. It is a big jump from there to say that that really is all. It may be, but it may not. The limitations of human knowledge and the human mind should impose some caution - and, indeed, modesty.

As for the issue of some purpose and meaning to human life, as I say in the paper, it is a matter of choice whether one adopts this proposition or not. I personally prefer to do so, mainly because it seems to me more consistent (than the opposite belief) with the capabilities and potential that human beings possess.

It seems to me that this paper would really not match the interests of the members of the Forum. Of course, there would be a few exceptions. For them, I would suggest one of two ways : if you knew some you could directly forward it to them; another alternative is to post a link to the paper on the Forum so that anyone interested could access it there. The paper is available at :

Best wishes, Furrukh

From: FB Ali

Date: November 4, 2007 3:26:20 PM EST

Subject: Musharraf Must Go - Forum Comments

The supporters of Ms Bhutto, who till recently applauded the Musharraf-BB deal, are now crying out for Musharraf to go. The unsaid subtext is that the next US-approved general should step forward and implement the US-brokered deal. This may be very good for Ms Bhutto and her acolytes, but does nothing for the country. For Pakistan it is necessary that the generals learn that playing football with the country's constitution is high treason, for which people end up either dangling at the end of a rope or behind high walls for a couple of decades.

But no political leader, on assuming office after such an event, has held anyone to account; instead they have rushed to give the criminals immunity. The only punishment meted out to anyone was once by ZA Bhutto. On assuming power in 1971 he did not take any action against Gen Yahya Khan for his high treason in 1969, but instead forced out of the army six senior officers who had compelled Yahya to return to the constitutional path by handing over power to elected representatives of the people! That was a golden opportunity missed to teach the generals that high treason does not pay.

It seems the country is now going to pay the price for this unholy collusion between the generals and the politicians. Since the political leaders won't curb the generals, the people now seem set to unravel the tool the generals use - the army. Unfortunately, the country will likely unravel with it.

FB Ali

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From: FB Ali

Date: November 12, 2007 11:23:02 PM EST

To: Shaheryar Azhar < sazhar@nyc.rr.com>

Subject: A Pakistan Without Musharraf by Kashif Zafar

The writer is so busy playing imaginary future scenarios that he has completely overlooked the reality already being created in front of his eyes, which makes his scenarios mere pie-in-the-sky. Musharraf isn't very bright but seems to have clever advisers; they have checkmated both the US's and BB's plans.

By deploying massive police power and bringing in martial law Musharraf has shown that he can crush any public protest, including any attempted by the PPP. Elections in January under the emergency will enable the MQM and PML-Q to rig them in order to win power in their provinces and also win a majority of seats at the centre. Since the MMA is likely to boycott the elections these Musharraf supporters may even win the other two provinces. With his political support in place, Musharraf can then safely take off his uniform and rule for at least another 5 years.

The US has realized the implications of these moves, and has decided to fully back Musharraf (that is what Bush is clearly indicating now). They would like to have BB somewhere in the power equation, but only as far as Musharraf agrees; for them he is now the only game in town. Musharraf has neither the intention nor the need to share power with BB. To please the US he can throw her a few crumbs, but no more.

So, BB's choice is simple : she can continue to play by the old US game plan and contest the elections; in which case Musharraf will allow her to win a few seats and thus have some representation in the National Assembly (this option will probably split the PPP). Or, she can join the opposition and boycott the elections; in which case, having abandoned the US plan and thus its protection, Musharraf will either imprison her or, more likely, exile her.

So, what lies ahead for Pakistan? With political and civil society effectively suppressed and muzzled the only opposition left to face off Musharraf is the religious extremists or Pakistani Taliban. More and more people will turn to them as the only ones fighting the oppression and corruption that will inevitably blossom under this new regime. The future is bleak indeed : an increasing insurgency with increasing repression until one wins out, ending in either a military dictatorship or a clerical one.

A Pakistan without Musharraf, indeed!

FB Ali

MODERATOR'S COMMENT: If above forum member's scenario comes to pass then yes extremism will rise. Who would sympathize in that case with the 'moderates' since they would have brought it upon themselves? No one. Not this moderator, at least. Shaheryar Azhar, moderator, The Forum

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From: FB Ali

Date: November 15, 2007 7:07:19 AM EST

Subject: Pakistan and its Army by George Friedman, Stratfor

Shaheryar,

First, one of the points you made : that the founders of Pakistan were "struggling hard to nevertheless define their community as a nation based solely on religion". That is completely wrong! Yes, the ideals, ethos and culture of Islam were to be the basis of the new country, but not the religion. This is the reason why the religious parties (the Ahrar, the Jamiats, Maududi's Jamaat, the Deobandis and Brelvis) bitterly opposed and fought against the creation of Pakistan. After it came into being they soon sought to assert their power by starting a religious agitation against the Ahmadiya community in the Punjab. This was crushed by the state. To comprehend the attitude of the intelligentsia and the ruling elite of the new country to religion read the Munir Commission report on this agitation. Very far from "accommodating the more dangerously religious elements", as you say.

The military was one of the weak institutions left behind by the British; much stronger were the civil service and the judiciary. But the chaotic manner in which Pakistan was born, and the severe trauma caused by the precipitate partition of India, never gave any of these institutions the chance to consolidate and develop in a normal manner. When parliamentary democracy broke down, these still weak institutions had to carry the burden of holding together and running the country. Later on, various rulers, military and political, destroyed the civil service and the judiciary, thus leaving the military as the only strong institution remaining in the country.

The danger to the army now arises from the war it will have to wage against the jihadi insurgency brewing in the country. With the suppression of political and civil means of dissent, and the widening gulf between a rich elite and the poor masses, support for jihadis and their ideology will grow. An increasing insurgency will bring on an increasingly brutal response. At some point the lower ranks may well refuse to kill their own countrymen and co-religionists; all it will take is one unit doing so, and the crack will propagate throughout the structure. In the 1971 war against East Pakistanis, the Bengali units of the army broke very early and joined the insurgency; the rest of the army fought on because they did not consider Bengalis to be their countrymen. That will not be the case now. If the worse happens, and the last remaining state institution breaks apart, Pakistan will descend into chaos, out of which a theocratic state may arise. That is the dark prospect before us.

FB Ali

MODERATOR'S COMMENT: Moderator's point was a simple one: Even secular leaders who create a country in the name of religion, release unintentionally the demon of religious extremism. Israel and Pakistan are two examples. The difference between these two has been one of early leadership - in one case Ben Gurion led, in the other, Jinnah couldn't because he died soon after. Shaheryar Azhar, moderator, The Forum

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From: FB Ali

Date: Dec 27, 2007 1:14 AM

Subject: Same DNA as Indians and Yet So Different! By Farrukh Saleem, The News

The true proportion of doctors of Indian origin in the USA is about 5% not 38%, as stated by Farrukh Saleem in his article (a quick check on Google will show this). According to Forbes, in 2007, Mukesh Ambani was the 14th richest person in the world (with net worth of $20 bn USD); even though the US dollar has depreciated, it is inconceivable that his net worth went up to $63 bn (as claimed by Farrukh Saleem). It is likely that many (most?) other 'facts' and figures in the article are equally fictitious. It is obvious that Farrukh Saleem believes that facts should not stand in the way of a good story.

I would suggest that to maintain the credibility of the forum articles submitted should conform to some some standards of veracity, logic and balance before they are posted. An earlier article by this gentleman, posted on the forum in October, was nauseating in its fawning flattery of Gen Musharraf, Gen Kayani and Benazir Bhutto - who had all combined to save Pakistan!

On the subject of the forum, should we expect that it will soon be renamed The Haqqani Forum? (However, it did my heart good to read Mr Haqqani's expression of undying friendship and respect for Aitzaz Ahsan. This should put to rest any rumours that his bringing up on the forum Aitzaz's recent statement was with any malicious intent, even though that was quite unthinkable in the first place!). FB Ali

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From: FURRUKH ALI

Date: Wed, Apr 2, 2008 at 6:35 PM

Subject: RE: What Went Wrong in Islam: An Excellent Analysis by Mustafa Akyol, thewhitepath.com

Recent reports about the Hadith reassessment project in Turkey have created excitement among "progressive" Muslims, and this has manifested itself in this Forum in the posting of some old articles on the same topic.

Tinkering with the Hadith is not going to solve the doctrinal problem that faces Muslims. Because the same problem arises with the Quran, namely, the occurence of injunctions which were relevant to the times in which they originated but are no longer so (for example, the hudud punishments, slavery, polygamy, concubinage, the status of women, etc). The contortions of logic and argument that the progressives have to undertake to avoid facing these problems is not intellectually honest, and hardly a basis for genuine belief.

As I had argued in my paper, Rediscovering Islam (posted on this forum in Nov 2006), the solution to this problem is provided by the Quran itself. It conveys clearly that it is not a"revelation" of God's word (a concept borrowed from other religions) but was the product of an intuitive comprehension of Truth and Reality (al-Haqq and al-Kitab) inspired to Rasul Allah. The expression of this vision in words had to be in contemporary terms since the human mind that formulated the concepts and words was inevitably confined within the limits of its own specific knowledge and circumstances, as well as the general level of contemporary knowledge and thought.

However, the Quran also says that, though the specifics and particulars are limited in relevance and validity to their own time and place, the truths, principles and values that underlie the words of the Quran remain valid and applicable forever. It also provides guidance on the way to discover these from the text of the Quran (as I briefly explained in the paper). FB Ali

MODERATOR'S COMMENT: Wonder which side of the historical debate: Is Quran created or uncreated? would this argument land us in? Shaheryar Azhar, moderator, The Forum

From: FURRUKH ALI

Date: Fri, Apr 11, 2008 at 6:49 PM

Subject: RE: CONSPIRACIES AGAINST DEMOCRACY? By Shafqat Mahmood, The News

Shafqat Mahmood has written a perceptive analysis of the events of the last few days. No objective observer of the unfolding situation in Pakistan can doubt that his analysis is sound, and his conclusion inescapable: Musharraf is fighting for his survival, and is using every means to hang on (especially through his henchmen in the MQM and PML-Q), whatever the cost to the country.

This forum's moderator has every right to express disagreement with Shafqat Mahmood's view, but the reasons he gives for it are flimsy - Justice Tariq's point in no way contradicts Shafqat's argument. If emotional lawyers unwittingly become tools of a conspiracy, how does that prove there wasn't a conspiracy?

I find it interesting that the moderator (and his friend, Mr Haqqani) were fervent supporters of Ms. Bhutto when she was being pushed onto the stage by the US, but now that Mr Musharraf is the only US asset in Pakistan they are both urging that everyone compromise with him and let him stay in office. Perhaps living too long in a country unduly colours one's views.

Shafqat is absolutely correct : so long as Musharraf remains in the Presidency, Pakistan will remain subject to crisis after crisis.

FB Ali

MODERATOR'S COMMENT: Let me be blunt for a change: It seems that all those who opposed the deal between Benazir and Musharraf, which this moderator supported and for which he was greatly vilified, have had lobotomy done to their brains since the elections. They have jumped on the democratic bandwagon as if it was their idea in the first place. But that is all right, everyone is welcome on the ride. That is the beauty of the democratic process. But please check out your righteousness at the door! Also, this moderator specializes in batting for minority positions so please get used to it, not because he likes all the heat that this generates but that is how the cookie seems to always crumble: his opposition to Musharraf right after 10/12/99 coup was totally a minority view and highly vilified ("you want those crooks back?"); supporting the 'corrupt' Bhutto and Sharif brothers early on to get them an even playing field in 2002 elections was a minority view; supporting Benazir and Musharraf deal ditto; supporting operation against Lal Masjid same; supporting the Judiciary leaving Musharraf alone after they had won their historic victory in July of 2007 was also a minority view; supporting going ahead with elections both before and after Benazir's assassination didn't seem to be very popular either (Imran Khan was being held as the leading light by some!); this moderator to the horror of many stopped opposing Musharraf immediately after 2/18/08 (i.e. after having opposed him for more than eight years) because of the fair and free election that took place and the peaceful transfer of power that followed (that didn't go down well, particularly with his erstwhile supporters, who now can not seems to stand him!). The fact that today bitter enemies sit together in the same government, that those who have relinquished power are not hounded out, that there is no Exit Control List is a great testimony to the magnitude of the change that has taken place. Let me state another minority view equally bluntly: that current Bush administration and perhaps its close ally Pakistan's army gets a lot of credit, if not the major credit, for publicly supporting Musharraf but privately twisting his arm to ensure this outcome - for a people who specialize in thinking with their blood, it seems we can do with cool advice and support from unpopular quarters!! LOL = Lots of Laughter! Shaheryar Azhar, moderator, The Forum

P.S. There is one other minority view that does not go down well either (particularly with my wife) i.e. supporting Hillary against Obama and if Obama is the Democratic nominee then my stated position that I will go down the wire in deciding between McCain and him. I have to admit, McCain starts out as the favorite at this time in that contest for me (after all I supported him against Bush in 2000 and would have voted for him than for Gore had he been the Republican nominees)! Is that too much to take?


* * *

Letters


(To a Young Muslim Friend studying in a North American University - 2007)

Dear Hassan,

I applaud your desire to ensure that your view of Islam, and the beliefs you hold, are the right ones. However, I would suggest that it is not enough to look for good books to read on the subject, or to find out which learned authorities are reliable guides. All you would end up achieving this way would be accepting someone’s views on trust. How can you be sure that these views are in fact right?

The only correct way to approach this issue is to use your own mind to arrive at conclusions that conform to logic, and to your observations of the world around you. No belief can be sound unless it meets these basic, essential requirements.

One has to start right at the beginning, and ask oneself : Why am I a Muslim? The honest answer would be : Because I was born into a Muslim family, and grew up in a Muslim culture. If you look around you at your fellow-students, you will observe that many of them follow different religions – Christianity, Judaism, possibly others. If you were to ask them why they believed in their religion, their answer would be the same as yours, namely, that they were born into, and grew up in, their religion. You also know that many of them are as intelligent and well-read as you, some even more so. Many of them must also have studied and examined their religions, as you are doing.

Look dispassionately, without emotion, at this picture : two young men, equally intelligent, equally well-read, equally thoughtful, both believing firmly in a set of religious beliefs, which they are convinced are true and right. The problem is that these two beliefs differ significantly from each other. Both of them can’t possibly be right. To establish which one is correct, if one investigates the basis of each person’s beliefs, one finds that they are the same – faith. This provides no grounds for deciding whether either one is correct. Both could be wrong (though both can’t be right).

This situation does not change if the perspective is widened, i.e., millions of people firmly believing in one set of beliefs, while millions of others believe equally firmly in other such beliefs. It is not logical or reasonable to think that those who believe in Islam are right, while all these other people are wrong and deluded.

Conscious of this problem, vested interests in each religion have spent a lot of effort in criticizing and finding faults in the beliefs and practices of other religions. There are many writings in the literature of Islam that point out problems and weaknesses in other religions; you may have read some of them. This is mirrored in the literature of these other religions, highlighting problems and weaknesses in Islam. An impartial assessment of all these writings would show that much of the criticism is valid; there are significant problems in the beliefs and practices of all these religions, including the religion of Islam. Denying this is to shut one’s mind and close one’s eyes.

Another method employed by Muslims to bolster faith in their religion is to point to the many “miracles” that are associated with Islam. What makes this argument ineffective is the fact that all religions claim similar or even mor spectacular miracles. Since the proof that the “Islamic miracles” occurred is no weightier than that regarding the occurrence of the other miracles claimed by other religions (they all have to be taken on trust), this does not advance the claim that Islam is the only true religion.

I would suggest that you need to examine this issue starting from first principles. In matters of religious belief the starting point has to be the issue of God, because all religions claim to come from God, and define themselves as containing God’s injunctions for human beings. If you ask yourself the question, why do I believe in God? your honest answer would be, because I was told about God as a child and grew up seeing everyone around me believing in God. The fact of the matter is that there is no proof of God’s existence, and accepting it has to be an act of faith.


(To Senator Chuck Hagel, Chairman, The Atlantic Council - 2009)


Dear Senator Hagel,

I am writing to you as someone whose wise and principled stands I have admired over the years. I am also writing as someone who has spent most of his adult life in the service of Pakistan, and even, in a small way, contributed to its history.

I have read the report on Pakistan recently produced by The Atlantic Council, which you co-chaired. It is an excellent report, covering a wide field and presenting pertinent recommendations. That is why it is so unfortunate that none of them are likely to work given the condition of the country.

Any plans that the United States makes to provide assistance to Pakistan are predicated on the implicit assumption that, as a functioning state and country, it would be able to utilize this aid to solve or ameliorate the numerous problems that beset it. Unfortunately, that assumption is not a valid one. Pakistan is a dysfunctional polity; the country does not just have problems, it has multiple systems failure. Until these are tackled, no amount of outside aid, advice or assistance will achieve much beyond slowing the downward spiral.

Pakistan has the potential to mend its broken systems. For its own sake, as well as that of Pakistan, this is what the United States should first seek to aid.


(To Babar Sattar, Journalist & Columnist, Pakistan - 2010)


Within the context of the particulars of this case and the concept of Law, your arguments are impeccable. However, there are other aspects of the issue that are also relevant.

In Pakistan's short history, its Constitution has been suspended several times by dictators, and also amended by them through their tainted or tame parliaments. Even elected politicians, carried away by their "heavy mandate", have contemplated introducing radical changes in its structure, such as an Amirul Momineen. Unfortunately, there are few grounds to believe that this sorry practice will not continue in the future. How much sanctity and authority does such a Constitution, a plaything of the powerful, retain merely by virtue of being the Constitution?

Surely, the principles and practices that adhere to genuine Constitutions cannot be extended to one that has the form but not the requisite inherent attributes. In considering what can be done to deal with this state of affairs one is forced to go beyond the confines of Law, and its ordered modalities rooted in precedent.

What the people of Pakistan need in their Constitution is a fundamental base, a firm foundation upon which they can periodically realign and anchor it, whenever the opportunity arises after each period of distortion or perversion.

The Objectives Resolution, at first glance, would seem to fit this role, until one sees that its text harbours some fatal contradictions. The interpretations of the Quran and Sunnah that currently prevail do not allow "the principles of democracy, freedom, equality, tolerance and social justice" to be observed, as is also the case with many other injunctions of the Resolution. The heavy weight of the “Quran and the Sunnah” formulation completely crushes the meek “enabled” which was meant to guide it.

What is perhaps needed is an authoritative interpretation of this Resolution to reconcile these contradictions, and for this interpretation to be declared (and accepted) as the foundation of the Constitution, which none of its provisions could violate. This then would become the bedrock upon which the Constitution could be re-established whenever this became necessary.

Of course, the questions arise: Who will do this? Who should? How? And when?

And the even more basic one: Do the people of Pakistan, mired in the daily struggle for existence, really care about any of this?

But the most fundamental question of all is: Can the state of Pakistan survive without something of this nature?


(To Mustafa Akyol , Turkish Journalist - 2011)


Dear Mustafa,

I greatly enjoyed reading your book, "Islam Without Extremes". It is written in a clear and eloquent style, and keeps the reader absorbed throughout. It advances its thesis with well-reasoned argument and facts, supported by copious references.

The concise summary of the early history of Islam and the evolution of Muslim dogma was a very useful introduction to the development of the book’s main points. I also found fascinating your description of how Turkey has dealt with these issues during both Ottoman and modern times, something I was not too familiar with.

Your book concludes by laying out a liberal Muslim’s view of Islam. It is an eminently balanced and worthwhile position to adopt, which conforms to the necessities of living in the modern world. Unfortunately, the liberal Muslim position on Islam suffers from one critical problem, namely, its weak doctrinal foundations. This enables the orthodox constituency to level some strong and valid criticisms against it.

Liberal Muslims support their view of Islam by picking out certain passages in the Qur’an and Hadith and deriving generalized positions from them through a process of extrapolation (you have wisely avoided depending on the Hadith). The trouble with this approach is that opponents can cite many other contrary passages from the Qur’an (and bolster them with hadith and Hadith-based commentary). The orthodox position is also strengthened by it being a comprehensive dogma based on centuries of doctrinal writings. The liberal position, on the other hand, has very few such writings to support it.

To derive a new basis for faith, modern Muslims need to adopt a different approach, namely, to subject the founding document of Islam (the Qur’an) to fresh analysis and study, unencumbered by the weight of traditional interpretation. The orthodox position closes this door by invoking the authority of the Prophet, claiming that his interpretation of Islam and its application, as recorded in the Hadith corpus, is final. It is thus necessary for modern Muslims to deal first with the issue of the sanctity of Hadith before proceeding any further.

The reality is that the Hadith, however much sanctity be attached to it, is not a reliable record of the sayings and actions of the Prophet. In fact, it is impossible to say how much of it, or which elements of it, are authentic. One cannot depend on it even in respect of historical events. On page 60 of your book you refer to the treaty of al-Hudaybiyah, a controversial episode in the life of the Prophet. I had occasion once to examine the hadith that form the basis for the generally accepted account of this event, and discovered that they could be shown to be clearly false. (You may find of interest my paper on the subject, which was published at the time, and which I attach).

With the authenticity of the Hadith in doubt, the basis for much of the theology and commentary upon which current Islamic doctrine is founded also loses its authority. As you have pointed out, another weakness is that it was affected by the limits of knowledge and thought in earlier times. The only certainty for Muslims today with respect to their faith is that the Qur’an they have available to them is the only authentic record of what was inspired to the Prophet. With this source document available, why do they need any other and older interpretations to discover what it has to teach them?

However, the Qur’an is not a simple book to unravel; it is not a manual of instruction. To understand what it is teaching us we need to study it in a manner appropriate to its nature, especially the manner and context of its formulation and compilation. I have spent many years in such a study. Recently I compiled a summary of this approach, and the conclusions it leads to, in a paper for publication (it has not yet been published; I attach a copy for your personal perusal).

You will note that these conclusions go even beyond the modern liberal position that you advance in your book. More importantly, they have a solid doctrinal basis since they are entirely derived from the Qur’an, taken as a complete and coherent entity, rather than through an extrapolation from a few of its verses.


* * *

Various Writings

Iraq

[ Note: An email I sent out in May 2005 ]

First, a quick review of how I see the situation as having developed. Initially, the US planned on handing Iraq over to the neo-cons' pet, Chalabi. However, when he did an 'Iran' on the US, it switched to Plan B. This was to have viceroy Bremer rule with the figleaf of the pliant Governing Council, while fighting the insurgency with US forces. But the intensifying Sunni insurgency and increasing Shia unrest and pressure forced another change.

Plan C was to transfer 'sovereignty' and instal CIA/MI6 asset Alawi as ruler, while training Iraqi forces to take over the battle against the insurgents. It soon became apparent that the latter wasn't going to work, so Alawi was given the go-ahead to co-opt former Baathists to fight the insurgency : recruit staff for the intelligence service from the old mukhabarat, and raise Special Forces from Saddam's Special Republican Guard and Uday's fedayeen thugs. These guys appear to be having some impact, though it is possible that their zeal is being directed mainly against the foreign jihadis rather than their former colleagues. As for the much ballyhooed (for PR purposes in the US) Iraqi Forces being trained, they are serving mainly as a distraction and cannon fodder for the insurgents.

The political part of the plan was to legitimize Alawi's rule by having him elected by appointed regional councils. This was effectively scuppered by Sistani, who forced the US to conduct a general election. He then ended any hopes that Alawi might yet survive by making the Shia groups form a joint electoral list. Now the military plan is under threat of unravelling because Jaafari and the Shia are insisting on purging the security apparatus of the Baathists that Alawi had brought in, who are carrying the main burden of the fight against the insurgency. (The Shia know that if these guys get entrenched in the security apparatus, one day they will turn on them). So, inexorably, the US is being pushed towards Plan D.

Plan D has for some time been the final fallback position. It involves moving the main US military force into the Kurdish area in North Iraq (though some heavily fortified bases will be maintained in Iraq proper - until an Iraqi govt has the clout to push them out). It is from this area that the US will be able to exert military pressure against Iran and Syria, but Turkey (including its powerful military) is going to be most unhappy with the US propping up a more-or-less independent Kurdistan; how they react could create significant problems. Iraqis (and Arabs generally) would be equally unhappy, and this would further fuel anti-US feelings, and quite possibly give a boost to the jihadis. So, this plan is not likely to entail smooth sailing.

Iraqis appear to have a bleak future ahead of them. If Jaafari goes through with purging the Baathists, the US military could well step down its involvement in the anti-insurgency battle. Iraqi forces are unlikely to be able to put it down, so it will go on and on. There is likely to be a constitutional deadlock; with the veto given them by Bremer's Basic Law, the Kurds could stop progress unless their demands on Kirkuk and oil are met, and it is doubtful if either the Shia or Sunnis will agree to give them what they want. Regions of Iraq will assume increasing autonomy. Another failed state will be added to the list, except that this one will be right in the middle of the volatile Middle East, an area in which jihadis are already seeking to get a foothold.

Another possible scenario involves the US engineering (or approving) a military coup which instals Alawi or someone like him (I have all along had this uneasy feeling about Muwaffak al-Rubaiee), and this is prettied up with some 'democratic' underpinning. The aim would be to make Iraq into another Egypt, or Algeria, or Tunisia (requiring minimum US military support to keep a lid on things). That would take some doing; unless the Baathists/Sunnis were bought off, the current insurgency would continue, while another one would likely start in the Shia areas. Of course, the Kurds would be allowed to remain autonomous so that Plan D could still go ahead.


* * *

Khurshid Anwar

[ Written in 2005 for Khalid Hassan, a journalist, who wrote a column on him . I have made some additions in this version. the POSTSCRIPT was added in 2020 ]

I met Khurshid Anwar in late 1946 or early 1947. He had been appointed Salar-e-Ala of the Muslim League National Guards for the “Pakistan” provinces, and arrived in Lahore to set up his HQ. I was referred to him by Mumtaz Daultana, and he made me responsible for the Student Section of the MLNG. I heard that he had been a Major in the Indian Army during the war, and had left under some kind of a cloud.

Events were moving very fast, and we did not get much opportunity to do the required organizational work. Quite unexpectedly, a massive civil disobedience movement started in the Punjab against the Unionist government of Khizar Hayat Tiwana (this was precipitated by Mian Iftikharuddin, who literally forced the Punjab ML Working Committee to get themselves arrested by blocking the police contingent trying to execute a search warrant at the PML Head Office, where the Working Committee happened to be in session). This movement soon started to get disorganized and flag, as the successive layers of leadership of the PML offered themselves for arrest, a daily occurrence. KA reacted at once : he went “underground” and took charge of the agitation. The faltering movement revived, and began to exert a sustained, powerful pressure on the government, which finally had the desired result, and Tiwana resigned.

KA then went to the NWFP, where the Khan brothers, who opposed the creation of Pakistan, were in power. Along with Khan Abdul Qaiyum Khan and other ML leaders, KA started a civil disobedience movement in that province along the lines of the Punjab one. He reprised his Punjab role there : with the political leadership in jail, he organized and led the movement while remaining “underground”. Here, too, the agitation succeeded. Because he operated in a clandestine manner, very few people know that the success of these movements in Punjab and NWFP, which smoothed the way for the creation of Pakistan, was largely the work of KA.

I think it was in June 1947 (during the NWFP plebiscite) that he talked to me about taking over Kashmir as the next item on his agenda. In the second week of August 1947, in Karachi, he told me that he had got clearance to start his Kashmir operation; I believe this was from Liaquat Ali Khan. He then proceeded to NWFP and, with the assistance of Khan Qaiyum, raised the tribal lashkar that he led into Kashmir. Later on I learnt (from two independent sources) that, when the tribesmen tried to cross the Muzaffarabad bridge, they came under heavy fire from state troops on the other bank and fell back in disorder. When KA could not persuade them to try again, he got into his jeep and charged across the bridge under fire; as he got to the other side the state troops melted away, and the advance was resumed. When the lashkar got to Baramula, the tribesmen started pillaging the town; KA could not get them to stop and move on to Srinagar. He went forward himself with a few men, and was at the airfield when the Indian troops started landing.

Khurshid Anwar was a remarkable man. Bold, brave, intelligent, resourceful, he was a born leader. Through his drive and ability, and the sheer force of his personality, he could make people follow him in dangerous and difficult enterprises. However, he was no angel; there have been rumours about his personal ethics, and some of them, especially about his relations with women, are probably true. But that does not in any way diminish his significant contribution to the creation of Pakistan, which has, unfortunately, remained largely unknown.


POSTSCRIPT

[ Written in 2020. I don't quite know why, but I have been thinking about him, and this piece on him, these last few days. As is obvious from the above, and my reference to him in my Memoir, I was rather 'star-struck' by him. Not surprising at the time, but definitely surprising now. There is no doubt that my last paragraph in the above piece about him is correct, but this picture of him needs to be balanced out. I have attempted to do that below].

Khurshid Anwar joined the Indian Army Service Corps during the Second World War. Like many others in the Corps he took money from contractors to provide supplies to the Indian Army. He must have done that on quite a large scale, because he was found out, court-martialled, and dismissed from the Army. At this time, Pakistan was created through the partition of British India in late 1947, and Khurshid Anwar offered his services to the Muslim League.

I had given a written proposal to Mumtaz Daultana, a leader of the Punjab Muslim League, on organizing and arming Muslim students for the conflict I could see clearly coming, and he took it to Delhi to a meeting of the Working Committee of the All India Muslim League. On his return he asked me to get in touch with Khurshid Anwar, who had been appointed, at the meeting to raise the Pakistan Muslim League National Guard.


I first (???????????) met him in August 1947 when I went to Karachi to witness the birth of the new state (for which so many of us, especially young Muslims, had worked so hard). I remember this was in some large guest house belonging to the . He said he had met Liaquat Ali Khan, and got his OK to organizing a lashkar of Afghan and Pathan tribesmen , which he had planned to lead into Kashmir. He asked me if I wanted to go with them, and I agreed to do so. A few days later he turned up at my father's house in Gujranwala (where he was the Superintendent of Police) to collect me on his way to Peshawar. My father gave him lunch, but told him quite clearly that I needed to look after my own future rather than continue to engage in such ventures. I then applied to join the Pakistan Army, and was selected to go to the newly formed Pakistan Military Academy.

Khurshid Anwar did lead his lashkar into Kashmir, but, as I have mentioned in my Memoir, only got as far as Baramula







* * *

Cartoons As Weapons

[ Written in 2006 ]

In the extensive commentary on the Muslim reaction to the publication of the cartoons of the Prophet Muhammad in Europe, there is much puzzlement and little understanding. Surprise is expressed at how strong the reaction has been, how widespread : it was to be expected from the orthodox religious community, but it seems to have affected all Muslims, religious and secular, governments and peoples. What is not being understood is that the issue is not one of religion, it is one of identity and, thus, of being.

Wherever in the world a Muslim may live, and in whatever type of society, whatever their station in life, their primary sense of identity is that of being a Muslim, one who conforms to Islam. Not necessarily as a religion, but as a culture, a set of core beliefs and values. This is what defines his or her being, who she or he is.

Sometimes the vicissitudes of life envelop a human being in feelings of despair and hopelessness, and lead them to question whether it is worth going on striving, or even living. What a Muslim uses to climb out of this dark pit is her or his faith in Islam. Not necessarily as a religion, but as a promise of hope and deliverance.

At one time or another most of us cannot help but contemplate the finiteness of our lives, on the one hand, and on the other, the infinity of space, the eternity of time, the infinities and eternities that may or may not lie beyond them, and one feels one’s being shrink to an insignificance bordering on nullity. A Muslim overcomes this feeling of existential irrelevance by his or her belief in Islam. Not as a religion, but as an emissary from these unknowable regions beyond, as a paradigm that masters and harnesses these mysteries, and offers the human being a recognized place in this infinite and eternal system.

A Muslim, whether black, brown or white, rich or poor, high or low, educated or illiterate, finds his or her primary sense of identity, the essence of their being, in his or her allegiance to Islam. Islam as religion or culture, beacon of hope or structure of Reality (or all or some of them). But Islam is an austere religion and culture; it has no “pegs” to which its followers can attach their emotions. Unlike other religions it has no revered saints and martyrs, no resplendent popes and bishops, no ornate churches and temples, no elaborate rituals and services, no hymns and sacred music, no pomp and ceremony, which can engage the emotions of their followers.

The one exception is the Prophet. He is the only entity in Islam that evokes an emotional response in all Muslims (the Shia extend this to one or two of his descendants). The uniqueness of this emotion ensures the strength of its power. To demean and ridicule the Prophet is to strike at the emotional core of being of every Muslim. It is an attack on his or her sense of identity, on who she or he is, on their very existence. It should not be surprising that this reaction is occurring.

What is surprising is that, in the commentary on these events, no reference is made to the issue of Holocaust denial, since this is the closest parallel to this situation. The Holocaust arouses very strong emotions among all Jews because it was an event in which the very existence of the Jewish people was threatened. Any denial of the Holocaust also produces a strong emotional reaction among them because it impacts on the issue of their existence.

Denying the Holocaust is a blow to the emotional core of being of every Jew. Defaming the Prophet is an attack on the emotional core of being of every Muslim. One cannot be an exercise of free speech, while the other is an indictable hate crime.


* * *

A Possible Solution

[ Written in 2007 ]

This article was written for a US audience, and proposed a solution for them : firstly, abandon the delusion that getting Benazir Bhutto to become prime minister will solve all your problems and give you what you want; and, secondly, stop forcing Musharraf to conquer the tribal areas, because in the process of improving your situation in Afghanistan you could lose Pakistan.

You have asked me for my solution to the problems Pakistan faces. I do not know if any solution is realistically achievable at this stage, but there are moves that can be made in the direction of one; whether the players involved will be prepared to take them is an open question. Here are some that I can visualize :

The US needs to stop forcing Pakistan to use military force to root out the Taliban and their supporters in the tribal areas. I don't see the present US administration doing this, since it will require major changes in their policy and strategy in Afghanistan. The next one may be forced to do it.

Alternatively, the main players in Pakistan (Musharraf, all the major politicians, the top generals) can adopt this policy. This will require each one of them to abandon the notion that they need US backing to maintain and improve their positions in the country. This should be easier if the next step can be taken.

These main players should agree on a basic national compact whose main features should be :

Elections will be held under a neutral caretaker administration with appropriate measures to ensure they are as free as possible.

The resulting government, whatever its political basis (majority party, coalition or compact), will follow an agreed agenda of basic policies (to be spelt out) designed to deal with the main problems the country currently faces. (If any political party does not agree to the agenda, they can stay out of the compact and fight the election on their own platform).

After the inauguration of this government, the army will return to its proper role – and stay there.

After three years, another election under similar arrangements (to ensure it is free), should take place.

Extremist views should be dealt with through debate, education and political action; extremist actions that break the law as a police matter. Because of the current situation in the tribal belt, a large military presence will need to be maintained there for some time (as the British used to have), but with no attempt to “conquer” the tribes.

This may appear utopian, but the alternatives being suggested are not going to be able to solve the terrible situation the country faces. An election by itself will not solve anything. Unless every major interest has some assurance of what policies will be followed by the government resulting from an election, they will, out of sheer self-preservation, either rig, disrupt or dispute the election. What use will an election be if, after it, there are accusations and recriminations, and refusals to accept the results? How would this induce the generals to go back to the barracks?

Another “solution” being proposed is to fight the extremists, both in the country and the tribal areas, with force. This would be crazy. Neither the country nor the army can withstand the strains this would impose. This is a foreign war which some want to fight on our soil. It would be suicidal for us to engage in it.

In a country as splintered as Pakistan, and under so many internal and external pressures, a national compact followed by a reasonably free election is not utopian, it is perhaps the only practical solution that offers some hope of a way out from the crisis the country is presently in. Is it too much to expect that the leaders of Pakistan, political and military, can put aside personal ambitions and interests and agree to work together to save the country?


* * *

Safeguarding The Nation

[ Note: Written in 2009 ]

In the perilous path along the precipice that Pakistan has pursued, almost from the day of its birth, it has just survived another lurch towards the edge. As the recent crisis worsened, eyes turned once again towards the army – some in hope, others in fear. But the army chief displayed the character, maturity and professionalism that the people have every right to expect from someone in that critical post. He did not follow the example of some of his predecessors: neither that of the servile Zia, who let the army be used against the people, nor that of adventurers like Ayub and Yahya, who took advantage of political turmoil or weak governments to seize power. (Musharraf and the later Zia were mere opportunists who, put in place by others, clung to the position until they had long outstayed their welcome).

This is an appropriate occasion to analyze and examine the issue of the military’s role, an issue that keeps coming up again and again in our troubled history. The received wisdom (from the West) is that the military has no business interfering in or usurping governance in a country. This rule has been reinforced for us by the disastrous consequences of every single episode of military rule; they have seriously damaged not only the country but also the military. Yet, the fact remains that, in spite of our bad experiences, almost every time the military has stepped in, the people have by and large welcomed it, sometimes rapturously so. This happened because the state of affairs that the military interventions ended had become unbearable for the people, and they believed that things would be improved by the military.

The rule of non-intervention by the military works in the developed countries of the First World because they have well-established laws, institutions and practices, developed over time, which prevent the kinds of crises that have led to military interventions in Pakistan (such as constitutional or political deadlock or turmoil, the manipulation of elections, serious misgovernance, and massive corruption), any of which can lead to public turmoil and unrest.

The basic structures and practices that prevent such breakdowns in the proper functioning of a country are:

A constitution that provides appropriate checks and balances between the various state organs and territorial entities of the country.

Regular free and fair elections that enable the people to choose who rules over them.

The rule of law, administered by an impartial and autonomous judiciary.

The provision of services and protection to the people by an administrative machinery that is efficient, not corrupt, and which is not manipulated by politicians or other special interests.

A free media that can monitor and report lapses before they become major problems.

Thinking people in Pakistan, including many in the military, have long realized that the country needs to establish these institutions and practices in order to provide good governance and, thus, obviate the need for the military to intervene in order to prevent a slide into chaos. Unfortunately, despite many promises by political parties and leaders, and efforts by ordinary people, this goal seems to keep receding. The recent movement by civil society, especially the legal community, in support of the rule of law was another of these efforts. However gratifying its success, it was but one step in a long uphill climb. The problems and pressures we face, both internal and external, are too severe, the people too fractured, the state too weak and distracted, for such an undertaking to succeed, or even advance, unless some powerful institution makes this a primary goal, and pushes the process forward.

It is in the vital interest of Pakistan’s military that this goal be achieved. In fact, it is essential to carrying out its mission to defend the country, because the security, even possibly the existence, of the country depends on it. The people of Pakistan are under great stress, their living conditions are deteriorating, there is economic hardship, law and order are minimal, the governmental machinery oppresses them while serving itself or the wealthy and powerful, and all the while the politicians fight each other or enrich themselves. At the same time the country is facing a growing insurgency, which is attacking with both violence and ideology. While the armed attacks of the insurgents can be countered by the security forces, the ideological attack poses a much greater danger: if the people of Pakistan lose faith in the present order, the current system of governance, the state will not survive.

In carrying out its basic mission of defending the nation, the Pakistan military has a duty and an obligation to bring about the institutional changes that would put in place the mechanisms and systems that ensure good governance and protect the people. These are arrangements for which there already exists a strong demand among our people, and it is only the resistance of vested interests and institutional inertia that have prevented their realization so far. The military should, as a matter of national security, exert its full influence, and the leverage it possesses, to overcome such resistance and enable these reforms to be achieved. It is going to be a difficult road to travel, but, if Pakistan is to survive, this journey must be undertaken by both the nation and its military.

Some of the steps that need to be urgently taken are outlined below:

The Constitution : There appears to exist a political consensus that the 1973 constitution be restored, purged of all later amendments. This could be the starting point for a process of mature consideration of the issue of adequate checks and balances to avoid some of the problems that have arisen since its promulgation.

Elections : The manipulation of elections has been a constant theme of Pakistan’s history. As a non-political, impartial organization, the military should, in future, be called upon to ensure that elections are free and fair.

Rule of Law : This depends, in the first instance, on an honest and capable superior judiciary. Unfortunately, over the years this judiciary has been packed with corrupt, inefficient and partial judges. There can be no rule of law in Pakistan unless this judiciary is purged. There are a number of capable and upright former judges who gave up their posts rather than violate their oath of office to uphold the constitution. A commission comprising some of these judges should be set up to scrutinize the qualifications and performance record of all sitting judges of the Supreme and High Courts, and those who are found to be unfit should be removed. This commission should also fill the resulting vacancies. Future appointments to these courts should be made through a process in which the judiciary and the legal profession have a major voice, not politicians.

Administration : The administrative services of government should be placed under the control of independent Public Service Commissions, appropriately staffed. These commissions should control and manage the hiring, appointments and promotions of managerial level public servants. The government Rules of Business should clearly prescribe and require that ministers lay down policies but cannot interfere in their detailed implementation by public servants. The audit of government fiscal management and expenditures should be carried out by independent bodies on a real-time basis.

When these reforms are in place, it would remain the duty of the military to ensure that these institutions and practices function as the nation expects them to, and to provide them with any support and assistance that they may need to properly carry out their functions. This requirement would, hopefully, decrease over time, and ultimately become unnecessary.

Pakistan’s military stands at a difficult crossroads. It can either continue with business as usual, paying lip-service to the mantra of non-intervention (which doesn’t apply to our circumstances), nudging here, pushing there, until either the next adventurer reaches the top and decides he needs to “save” the nation, or the whole edifice comes crashing down. Or, it can realize that its mission of defending the country and ensuring the security of its people requires it to act now, urgently, and use its leverage to assist civil society in bringing into being the safeguards that will protect the people and save country.


* * *

The Pakistan Problem

[ Written in 2009 ]

Pakistan has suffered for long from a host of severe systemic problems. Because of them it has had several bouts of military rule, flirted with bankruptcy two or three times, and had a part of the country break away. On the other side of the ledger, in spite of these problems, Pakistan has conducted a very successful proxy war against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, then set up a client buffer state in that country, developed ‘home-grown’ nuclear weapons and sophisticated missile delivery systems, created what is reputed to be a world-class intelligence service (and also produced some extremely wealthy individuals, the sources of whose wealth does not bear too close a scrutiny!).

Some of these problems have now become acute, especially because the country has got caught up in Bush’s GWOT and its current successor, which has resulted in strong external pressure from the US and a powerful internal reaction from religious fundamentalists. Because of its acute systemic problems, Pakistan cannot cope adequately with either of these forces. As a result, the government and military have sought to temporize on both fronts, and lost ground on both. The new Obama policy appears designed to end this pussyfooting, and is likely to do so. The result will probably be that the chances of a fundamentalist take-over in Pakistan will increase greatly.

The fundamentalist threat to Pakistan comes from two forces — the unsophisticated, mullah-led jihadis operating mainly in the NW tribal and adjoining areas, and the educated, ideological believers in theocracy who operate in mainstream society. The former, a relatively recent phenomenon, believe in imposing their views through force. The organizations that comprise the latter category have been working assiduously for decades through preaching, advocacy and organizing, with the aim of winning over important sectors of society and key players in powerful organizations. Their initial attempts at seeking power through the ballot box having failed, they have switched to using their organizational muscle to boost popular upsurges, thus increasing their stature and influence. They are also reputed to have clandestine cadres in key government and military structures.

By themselves, neither of these two fundamentalist forces has any chance of taking over Pakistan. The danger will arise if and when the bulk of the ordinary people of the country give up on the system of governance that has so badly failed them for so long. They are then likely to turn to those who have always claimed that they alone are able to set up the true Islamic state that would solve all the problems that have perpetually plagued the country, and have now reached critical proportions. The simple mullahs of the Taliban could set up their rule in Afghanistan, but in Pakistan it will not be them but the committed ideologues (such as those now ruling Iran) that may be able to do so.

The acute systemic problems that have so badly weakened Pakistan, and caused its people to lose faith in the country’s institutions, are mainly: unrepresentative government; acute, pervasive corruption; absence of the rule of law; and a broken administrative system that serves itself and the powerful while ignoring or oppressing the people. There are recognized ways of solving each one of these problems; it is when they are all present together, and in such acute form, that the task becomes complicated and difficult. When this task has to be performed in a country under siege from within and without, it becomes well nigh impossible. Unless a special and concerted effort is made by all those who have a vested interest in such reform.

The United States has a vital national security interest in preventing Pakistan from going under the control of Muslim fundamentalists. Many people in Pakistan have an equally vital interest in this. Every Pakistani can be expected to have such an interest in the solution of the problems that create this danger. There are institutions in Pakistan that are well placed to initiate and shepherd the process of reform that needs to be undertaken. There are also powerful vested interests that do not want such reforms to be initiated or to succeed. The United States is currently in a unique position to influence events in Pakistan. Its recent involvement in the political crisis over the reinstatement of the Chief Justice showed both its capacity to intervene effectively as well as its ability to do so with finesse.

The United States should encourage the appropriate institutions in Pakistan to have the process of reform initiated, and then support it as it progresses. It also needs to use its influence to prevent vested interests from hindering the process. These days when the United States is prepared to spend huge sums of money in support of its strategy in that region, the cost-benefit ratio of such an initiative in Pakistan would be stupendous. In these hard times, even the world’s richest country perhaps needs to count its pennies. And the most powerful needs to limit the number of challenges it faces in the world.


* * *

General Kayani’s Extension

[ Written in 2010 ]

The 3-year extension of Gen Ashfaq Parvez Kayani’s term as army chief has aroused considerable comment. Many media pundits have pontificated gravely, using many words to say little. Others have criticized what they term a sell-out due to personal ambition. Quite a few well-meaning people have expressed regret that he did not follow the example of Gen Abdul Waheed (Kakar) and decline the offer. In view of the outsized role that the army chief plays in Pakistan, it matters a great deal what lies behind his acceptance of the extension.

One obvious reason why anyone would willingly choose to continue presiding over Pakistan’s deadly downward spiral is that they are either a super-crook (like President Zardari) or a super-buffoon (like Prime Minister Gilani). Since Gen Kayani is neither a villain nor an idiot, we must look elsewhere. Another possible reason could be that he believes that no one else could steer the country safely through the treacherous shoals of the geopolitical and military conflicts roiling the region, as he has done for the last few years. The crowd of sycophantic courtiers that usually collects around powerful men in Pakistan makes it easy for them to believe such things. However, the general is reputed to be a simple, down-to-earth person ‒ and intelligent.

Thus, for the many who are desperately worried about the future of the country, there are some grounds to hope that he accepted the extension because he feels the need to do more than what he has done in his present tenure. Because he realises that, if he merely continues in his past role, down the road he may find himself one day commanding an army without a country. Or, that there could come about such a transformation in both army and country that they bear no resemblance to what they are now, likely followed thereafter by neither army nor country remaining.

Surely, Gen Kayani can see that the country is unravelling before his eyes. With this happening, what use is it to merely strengthen the army, or fight extremists, or manoeuvre cleverly around foreign friends and enemies? So far, he has been very circumspect about stepping outside the military sphere or that of national security (while firmly resisting any attempts by others to intrude into them). He rightly sees that the newly restored political process must be allowed to continue and gain strength and momentum, and that any heavy-handed military intrusion would be extremely detrimental in the long run. The dilemma he faces is that, left to their own devices, the people running the political process will run it, and the country, into the ground.

There is a way out of this dilemma. It is possible to stop this relentless slide downward without touching the political process, political structures or even a single politician. The two major (and related) causes of Pakistan’s breakdown are terminal misgovernance and megacorruption. In its terminal stage, misgovernance results in not only the absence of all governance but also the creation of centrifugal forces that tear apart the fabric of the country and its people. Megacorruption is very different, in both nature and effect, than ordinary corruption. It is the systematic looting of the country’s wealth and resources (both present and future) by those at the helm of affairs.

To save Pakistan, the essential pre-requisite is to put a stop to both these evils. It can be done ‒ and without touching the hair of any politician!

In every democratic country, there are two basic rules of governance. The first is that the politicians in power make government policy, while the civil service executes these policies within established laws and rules, and without political interference. To ensure that this works, the second rule is that the service conditions of civil servants (their hiring, promotions, assignments, etc) are insulated from political control and influence. (Dictators obviously don’t like this; that is why one of the first steps of ZA Bhutto, upon becoming President and CMLA in 1971, was to rescind the second rule. That is when the rot began).

If General Kayani wishes to end Pakistan’s terminal misgovernance, he has to get the government rules of business changed to reflect the first rule of governance in a democracy. To implement the second rule, the federal and provincial public service commissions should once again be given control of their respective civil services, as they used to have once. To achieve these he will need to exert some heavy pressure behind the scenes. He has done that before, when he felt the country faced a serious emergency or national security was at risk. This crisis is worse than any previous one, and national security is much more seriously at risk than it was then. Achieving these goals would not disrupt any valid political process, nor would it (publicly, at least) touch any politician.

Dealing with megacorruption would be a more delicate matter. Of course, ending the worst of misgovernance would automatically reduce it significantly. But the addiction is too firmly entrenched among the present rulers to end on its own. The most discreet method of sending the right signals is for the military to repeat the ‘Riaz Lalji tactic’ a few times. Politicians indulge in megacorruption through intermediaries and agents, who are well known to the ISI. If, every time some big ‘deal’ was being cooked up, the agent was escorted to a quiet place and given some friendly advice, the word would spread quickly, leading to a marked reduction in this profession’s numbers. And, all without mussing any political hair.

Those who have expressed regret that Gen Kayani did not follow the example of Gen Abdul Waheed focus on a minor aspect of his actions. Yes, he did refuse an extension, but he did that only after he had stopped the country’s slide into a crisis, and set it on a path to recovery (without gaining anything personally). It is this example that one hopes Gen Kayani is really following. Gen Waheed’s actions were a remarkable display of patriotism and personal character. It is sad that his shining example is largely forgotten while the despicable roles of adventurers or clowns like Ayub, Yahya, Zia and Musharraf figure so prominently in the recounting of Pakistan’s tragic 60-year history.


* * *

Who killed BB?

[ Note: Written in 2010 ]

The recent publication of the UN commission’s report on the assassination of Benazir Bhutto has unleashed in Pakistan a torrent of speculation, finger pointing and conspiracy theories. It might be worthwhile to take a rational look at the event. When seeking to unravel a crime such as this, it is usual to consider motive and means.

The motive could not have been personal animosity, since that would have existed before she came to Pakistan and the deed could have been done more easily earlier. So, the motive is likely connected to her return to Pakistan. This return was through a US-imposed arrangement, the intended result of which was that Pakistan would clear FATA of jihadi militants (of all stripes) and establish control over this territory. This was widely known, and thus these jihadis had a clear motive to prevent this from coming about; the best way would be to eliminate BB before she proceeded much further. There were others who would be troubled by the expected working out of this US arrangement, but none to the extent that they would have as strong a motive as the jihadis to take such extreme measures.

Considering means, the killing was perpetrated by a suicide bomber who also fired some shots from a pistol before detonating his explosives. Suicide bombing is a standard technique used by the jihadi groups who had the strongest motivation for BB’s elimination. The means employed also tend to rule out any other quarter that might have such a motive: recruiting a suicide bomber is not something anyone can do; it is a highly specialized business, which the jihadis have proven their mastery of. Also pertinent is the earlier attempt in Karachi, in which the same means were used.

Not to leave conspiracy theorists completely out in the cold, it is entirely possible that elements within the Pakistan military were upset at the prospect of the unfolding of the scenario that BB was expected to bring about, since this would have shifted the military’s focus and deployment from the Indian border to FATA. It is even conceivable that some senior general (a la Henry II) expressed his frustration in an indiscreet fashion. But it is a far leap from there to pointing the finger at the military. At the most (if this conjecture be true), some intelligence functionaries could possibly be accused of providing some assistance.


* * *

What is Pakistan?

[ Note: Written in 2011 ]

The large crowds drawn by Imran Khan in his recent public meetings, especially the ones in Lahore and Karachi, have led to much commentary in the media, mostly focussed on the political implications of this development. But the real significance of this has little to do with the political future of Imran Khan or his party. What makes it meaningful and exciting is the fact that it shows that large numbers of Pakistanis, especially the young and educated strata, have not given up on the country, and still have hope that it can be rescued from the desperate state it is in. They flock to Imran’s meetings because he offers them a focus for their hopes and efforts.

However, if these enthusiastic and idealistic rescuers are to succeed in the difficult task ahead of them, they must get the first step right. And that is to be crystal clear in their thinking as to what Pakistan is, and what it is not. Much confusion exists, often deliberately created, on this crucial question. Pakistan is not a territory defined by certain borders, it is not a government in Islamabad, it is not some idea or ideology, nor is it a pillar or bastion of Islam (as many would like to portray it). This country is its people. Pakistan is the people who live in it.

This fallacy, that a country is something other than its people, is a deadly one, for it will destroy a country. This fatal fallacy is not peculiar to Pakistan; it is, and has been, endemic in human polities. The results are always the same: the people ‘opt out’ of the country, they transfer their allegiance to other things, the country and state are hollowed out. For a while they can be maintained by trickery, bribery or repression, but their foundations are so weakened that ultimately they will fall, due either to internal or external pressures.

This is the inevitable outcome, whether the object replacing the people is a person or group (as in Bourbon France (L’etat, c’est moi!), Czarist Russia, Mubarak’s Egypt or Qaddafi’s Libya), or an ideology (the Soviet Union’s perverted Communism), or something else. Marginalized, the people had no stake in their countries and effectively opted out; without the commitment of the people to the country, the states could not survive. The graveyard of history is dotted with the ruins of fallen empires and failed states that fell prey to this fallacy.

Paradoxically, we see this process occurring today even in countries that claim to be democracies. Democracy, after all, is the system that evolved in order to ensure that country and state were equated with the people. However, in many Western democracies, unrestrained capitalism has enabled big corporations and the very wealthy to capture the state. Their people no longer feel that their countries belong to them or that the state works for them, and are becoming increasingly alienated.

Pakistan was not created by Muhammad Ali Jinnah as just another country in a newly demarcated piece of land. He carved out a territory from the subcontinent so that the people who lived in it could lead better lives than they would be able to in an undivided India. These people were mostly Muslims, but his vision encompassed all who lived or chose to live in this new country, whatever their religion or ethnicity. All of us who joined this great struggle under his leadership were quite clear that this is what we were fighting for. The religious parties and groups that now claim that Pakistan was created to be an Islamic state bitterly opposed its creation, because they knew then that this was not what it was meant to be.

Pakistan’s greatest tragedy was that Jinnah did not live long enough to set his new country on the path that he envisioned for it. Instead of the real democracy that he wanted, which would have aligned the country with its people, his successors instituted a fake one in which feudal landlords ruled, treating the people as landless serfs to be exploited. Intermissions of rule by military dictators made no difference, for they were as self-serving as the politicians. Pakistan’s history is a sad tale of its ruling class plundering the country while its people survived as best they could.

It is not surprising that more and more of the people of Pakistan have, over the years, opted out of the country. The great majority, who live at the bottom of the economic and social structure, have switched their allegiance from Pakistan to concentrate on self-preservation; their allegiance is now to self, family and clan. The well-off send their children abroad to study and, if possible, find jobs there; they also strive for foreign citizenship for themselves and their families. The rich move their money abroad, and maintain homes there; they stay in Pakistan only so long as they can continue to squeeze more loot out of the country.

Many Pakistanis, feeling abandoned by their country, have done what Muslims tend to do when in dire straits ─ seek solace in their religion. Unfortunately, since the 1970s, an extremist version of Islam has been propagated in the country, to which many Pakistanis have switched their allegiance. From this stance, it is but a short step to move into militancy, thus creating the Islamist insurgency that is wracking Pakistan nowadays.

One of the most damaging aspects of this fallacy for the country has been the brainwashing of the military by its leaders (and the rulers) into believing that Pakistan is just a territory marked by its borders, and this is what they are charged to defend. While the military was defending the land of Pakistan, the real Pakistan ─ the people of the country ─ was being invaded and pillaged from within its borders. It was this fallacious belief that led to the loss of half the country in 1971. Even today, it is sad to see that the most patriotic, cohesive and powerful group in Pakistan ─ the younger officers of the military, and the men they command ─ continue to stand guard over the land, sacrificing life and limb in this endeavour, while their country is being lost from within.

If Pakistan is to be saved, whoever would embark on this Herculean task must remember that what they have to save and succour are the people, for they are the real Pakistan. This must be the foundation of whatever enterprise is launched to rescue the country. It must be the goal of everyone who participates in this mission.

Pakistan is its people!


* * *

End the farce ─ the emperor has no clothes!

[ Written in 2012 ]

For the last four years Pakistan has been living through a farce. Most people know it is a farce yet, for various reasons, choose not to admit it. The farce is that the country has in place a democratic system with an elected government that functions as democratic governments do in a country subject to the rule of law.

The reality is that none of this is true. This is nothing new; it has been the case in every period of rule by elected governments (whether of politicians or generals). What is new is the introduction of what may be called the Zardari doctrine (this is an innovation in Second/Third World politics which deserves such a title). The Zardari doctrine states that there is enough loot available in the country to satisfy everyone; therefore, instead of politicians fighting for power to obtain access to it they should join together and share it. Through this mantra Mr Zardari, in one clever stroke, removed all political opposition to his rule.

He extended the doctrine’s application to the other power centre in Pakistan (the military) by increasing their salaries, ignoring their money-making in commercial and land businesses, and thrusting extensions of service on their pliable generals. He did the same with the civil service: so long as they toed the line they could prosper by exploiting their positions for personal gain. Parts of the media have always been up for sale. For a while he had a pliant superior judiciary (until he was forced to accept the present Chief Justice of the Supreme Court).

All these people benefitting from this farce of ‘democratic government’ (the politicians, the military, civil servants, the media) were quite content to accept the fraud and pretend that it wasn’t really happening. There were others who saw the play-acting for what it was, and the terrible damage it was inflicting upon the country and its people, but realised that the time-honoured way of ending the charade through military intervention was even worse. They were forced to remain silent and hope that the country could survive till the next election; they, too, had to go along with the farce. Ordinary people realised a few months after the election what kind of government they had elected, but their opinion or voice doesn’t count.

Unfortunately for all those benefitting from it, this farce can no longer go on. The military is no longer prepared to tolerate the government’s attempts to enable the US to control Pakistan’s policies. The Supreme Court has reached the limit of its patience in being ignored and defied by the government in its attempts to ensure accountability and the rule of law. Underlying these crises is the steady eroding of the country’s economic situation due to the cessation of foreign aid and the massive corruption and maladministration of the government. This farce must be brought to an end in a manner that does the least lasting damage to the country. Otherwise, it will blow up in an uncontrolled way that could leave us worse off than we already are.

Mr Zardari seeks to deal with the current showdown with the Supreme Court by prolonging the farce. He plans to pre-empt the Court’s challenge by seeking the endorsement of ‘the sovereign parliament’. Everyone knows that parliament is no such thing; the majority of its members belong to his party and its allies, and they are completely beholden to him. To claim they represent the people is laughable, yet this is the farcical slogan that will be raised. All those who benefit from this regime will loudly parrot it. Those who wish to save the country from the turmoil that it is heading towards must call their bluff. This parliament does not represent the people. This regime does not govern for the people.

The solution to this critical situation lies in the hands of the Supreme Court. On Jan 16, the Chief Justice should convene a full court bench, as recommended by Justice Khosa. The Court should declare that the only viable solution to this grave constitutional clash between the Judiciary and the Executive (backed by the Legislature) is to seek a verdict from the ultimate sovereign authority ─ the people. That means an immediate end to the tenure of the current legislature. To ensure that these elections are free and fair they must be properly prepared and conducted under an impartial administration. This requires the immediate replacement of the present government by a non-political caretaker administration. The Court should also declare that if the people re-elect the PPP government then all judges who subscribed to this order would resign.

This is the only way in which this four-year old farce can be ended without further damage to the country. In fact, it may well lead to a better and brighter future for it!


* * *

The Profession of Arms

[ Note: I wrote this piece in 2014 ]

Soldiering is meant to be a noble profession. When a man becomes a soldier, he offers his service, and even his life, for whatever cause he is called upon to serve. If this cause is a worthy one, it makes his service noble. It is also necessary that a soldier's conduct be up to the same high standard as the cause that gives nobility to his profession. It is these things that make soldiering a noble profession.

It was not always so. In humanity's early days tribes and clans fought over territory and resources. Later, when kingdoms were established, rulers raised armies to wage their wars, and their soldiers fought for the king, not for some worthy cause.

Perhaps the first time that men fought for a noble cause was when the early Muslims waged war on the empires around the birthplace of Islam in order to establish a society where people owed their allegiance only to the one God and not to any human ruler or state. The nobility of the cause they fought for also ensured that their actions conformed to the highest standards. This was reinforced by the notions of honour in combat that many of the tribal Arabs already had.

Much is made in Western literature and history of the chivalry of the knights of medieval Europe (that code of honour and idealisation of womanhood that governed their conduct). What is not widely known is that this code, and the practice of chivalry, was learned by them from the Muslims of Al-Andalus, the Islamic kingdom covering large parts of Spain and Portugal established in the early eighth century. It was these early Muslim warriors who taught them chivalry, and first made soldiering an honourable and noble profession.

Merely putting on a uniform and joining a military does not make a soldier honourable. That depends on the cause he fights for, and the standards to which his conduct conforms while doing so. It is these things that bestow honour and nobility on the profession of arms. It is these that distinguish this profession from other ways of just making a living, which make soldiering not just another job but a noble calling.


* * *

MA JINNAH -- Lahore Visit 1946

[ This account was written by me in 2020, in reply to an extract about Jinnah circulated by Zahid Saeed. I also sent copies to various relations ]

I was fortunate to have been alive during his lifetime, and had several opportunities to interact with him. One memorable occasion was his visit to Lahore in 1946. As I was involved in the preparations for his speech in Islamia College that afternoon, I couldn't go to the railway station when he arrived that morning. My brother, Kaiser, and Iffi (my cousin, who was Dr Shujaat Ali's younger son) did go, and later told me how the platform was absolutely packed with young people, mostly students, so that Jinnah couldn't get off the train, and his coach had to be detached from the train and shunted to a side-platform to enable this (Kaiser told me how he was literally lifted off his feet in the crush and moved around the crowd in this 'elevated' condition).

The Islamia College meeting that afternoon was arranged by the Muslim Student Federation branch of the college, and its (unofficial) leader, Qasim Rizavi. I worked with the latter, and he made elaborate preparations to avoid a repetition of the morning's chaos. The audience arrived early and the place was packed well before the speech (the estimate was that there were about 100,000 people in the crowd). There was a long, guarded path from the entrance to the platform from which Jinnah was to speak, and I was put by Rizavi in charge of the entrance gate to the venue. This, unfortunately, meant that I was quite far away from the platform during Jinnah's speech.

Anyway, Jinnah came and spoke to the crowd. Towards the end of his speech, someone from the crowd shouted something (apparently it was 'Allama' Mashriqi, the leader of the Khaksar movement, composed of pro-Congress Muslims). Jinnah finished his speech and went off, and I, and a few others, sat with Qasim Rizavi in a College building, relaxing, while the audience crowd slowly dissipated. I remember some students coming to Rizavi and seeking his permission to stab Mashriqi as he struggled to get out of the crowd, surrounded by a bodyguard of Khaksars. Rizavi, of course, refused.

The Quaid was staying the night at the house of Nawab Mamdot (President of the Punjab Provincial Muslim League), and a group of students, including me, were sent by Qasim Rizavi to guard the house. Some of these students were from Government College, Lahore, and lived in its New Hostel; they were naturally worried about spending the night away without getting permission from the Warden of the Hostel. I undertook to remedy this, and cycled off to the Warden's residence at the Hostel. The Warden was Dr Khanna, a professor at the College, and I explained the situation to him. He was very helpful, and told me he would look after the matter.

The Khaksars, obviously not willing to just give up, drove by in a bus on the main road nearby, shouting anti-Jinnah slogans. This caused the student-guards to all rush off towards the gate, leaving the house essentially unguarded. It seems word was also sent to Islamia College of this 'attack', for a bunch of students from their hostel (led by Qasim Rizavi) soon arrived on the double. Qasim rearranged the guards around the house, emphasizing to them that they should just guard their assigned sector and not move away, and he placed me in charge of the guard contingent.

A Cabinet Mission from the UK had come to India to try and resolve the differences between the political parties, and get them to support the British in the 1939-45 war. One of its members, Lord Pethick-Lawrence, came for talks with Jinnah that night, and I saw them close up when the former was leaving.

Next morning, Jinnah talked to the members of the Working Committee of the Punjab Muslim Students Federation, including me, and many of us got him to sign pictures of himself. This autographed picture remained displayed in our house in Lahore in a frame for many years (until it was 'swiped' by somebody while I was away).

Next day, Jinnah was to address the Muslim students of Islamia College in the College hall. This, too, was arranged by Qasim Rizavi and the Islamia College MSF. Once again, I was assigned to be among Mr Jinnah's bodyguards. The only 'weapon' I had, which could be used in this assignment, was a sword-stick that I had got from Sialkot (while visiting a family friend, Rahman Sahib, who was the District & Sessions Judge of the district). This sword-stick had a shiny axe-head on top as its handle, while the sword was inside the 'stick' portion (which served as a scabbard). All in all, it looked to be a nasty piece of business!

I remember Jinnah, who sat at a table for two (the President of the College MSF, Aftab Qarshi, was the other 'seater') several times glancing at this axe-head as I stood next to him with my hand on it (possibly, he wondered what damage I could do to him were I to suddenly go mad, or 'rogue', and attack him; little realising that I would have gladly laid down my life in defending him from any attack). I suppose he was by then accustomed to being surrounded by (half-mad) supporters; the price of being a leader who aroused such strong emotions among his followers (in those 'mad' times).

It was indeed a strange time to have lived through. As one of the very few remaining survivors, I think I have a responsibility to recount my experiences.


A Few Closing Thoughts

Pebbles on the Beach

As one goes through life, one acquires a lot of goods -- money, valuables, housing, clothes, perhaps a car…..

As one approaches its end, one’s needs become less and less, and most of these things lose their value, and one can shed them gradually.

Until, finally, as one comes to the shore of the ocean at the end of the world, and walks down the beach to the water’s edge, one sheds the last of one’s possessions, down to the clothes one is wearing. All that is left are the few bright, shiny pebbles one has collected on life’s journey, which we hold in our hands as we enter the water, and the waves come soaring up to the knees, and then ebb down to the ankles, and then back again, each time a little higher……

As I come to this stage in my life, and walk into the lapping waters, I, too, have in my hands a few shiny pebbles, after shedding most of my worldly possessions.

One of them is something that Manzur Qadir (he was probably then the principal lawyer in Pakistan; he had been Chief Justice of the Lahore High Court; a man of outstanding moral principles) said in Attock Fort (where he was defending some of us in the General Court-Martial being held there). It was a hot summer afternoon; he had come from the Rest House, where he (along with some other lawyers) lived, to discuss with me some issues regarding the next day’s court proceedings. He brought up a suggestion that someone had made; I replied that I could not, in good conscience, agree to that course of action.

Manzur Qadir said in a low voice, almost as if talking to himself: "I think, for Brigadier Ali, this is all a matter of conscience!"

The second pebble I hold in my hand is something that Kathy once said. Kathy Bleyer had worked with me for many, many years in Emergency Planning Ontario, but now was a senior Nuclear Plans Officer, while I had retired and was a consultant working on contract to rewrite the Provincial Nuclear Emergency Plan. I was explaining to her some point for inclusion in the plan, and it occurred to me that I was going into too much detail. I stopped talking, and apologised.

Kathy, who was listening with a look of concentration on her face, replied in a low voice, almost as if speaking to herself: "No, no, go on, you can see these things!"

The third pebble I shall carry is what my friend, Ihsan, remarked once. We were returning in my car from a dinner where many mutual friends were present, and, at its conclusion, Ihsan had given a 'dars' from the Qur'an ( as was the custom at dinners held among this group in Karachi). I complimented him on it, and he said, "Coming from you, that is high praise, indeed!"

Another pebble I have is something that Saeed Akhtar Malik wrote in an email to me. This was just after Colonel Javed Iqbal had died, and he was regretting that he (and Major Farouk Adam) had not told him of the high regard in which they held him -- and now it was too late!

He said they did not want that to happen with me, and went on to tell me what Farouk Adam had said:

"I spent a good three hours with Farouk Adam today. He was in a wheel chair, so obviously not in fine fettle -- his knees buckle under his weight, not because he is too heavy, but because his knees have become too weak for not being exercised enough over the years.

He talked of you with the utmost reverence and how it was his great privilege and good fortune, that Attock bestowed on him, to have got to know a man like you. He asked me to convey these sentiments to you, which I assured him shall most dutifully be done".

Still another pebble is something Ingolf recently (Nov 6, 2019) wrote in an email to me. Referring to some work I'd done on the Index to this Writings section, he said, "Very good, I'm seriously impressed ". This pleased me a great deal -- making all the drudgery I'd undergone in getting the Index into some shape, worthwhile.

The esteem and affection of all these wonderful persons (and of the many other friends I have had during my life), and the love of my family, is a fistful of shiny pebbles that shall accompany me as I finally walk into the water.


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