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Secure two-party neural network inference (2PC-NN) can offer privacy protection for both the client and the server and is a promising technique in the machine-learning-as-a-service setting. However, the large overhead of the current 2PC-NN inference systems is still being a headache, especially when applied to deep neural networks such as ResNet50. In this work, we present Cheetah, a new 2PC-NN inference system that is faster and more communication-efficient than state-of-the-arts. The main contributions of Cheetah are two-fold: the first part includes carefully designed homomorphic encryption-based protocols that can evaluate the linear layers (namely convolution, batch normalization, and fully-connection) without any expensive rotation operation. The second part includes several lean and communication-efficient primitives for the non-linear functions (e.g., ReLU and truncation). Using Cheetah, we present intensive benchmarks over several large-scale deep neural networks. Take ResNet50 for an example, an end-to-end execution of Cheetah under a WAN setting costs less than 2.5 minutes and 2.3 gigabytes of communication, which outperforms CrypTFlow2 (ACM CCS 2020) by about 5.6 and 12.9, respectively.

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The information in this document was created from the devices in a specific lab environment. All of the devices used in this document started with a cleared (default) configuration. If your network is live, ensure that you understand the potential impact of any command.

This document describes the different types of wireless roaming and fast-secure roaming methods available for IEEE 802.11 Wireless LANs (WLANs) supported on the Cisco Unified Wireless Network (CUWN).

Before a description of the different fast-secure roaming methods available for WLANs is given, it is important to understand how the WLAN association process works, and how a regular roaming event occurs when there is no security configured on the Service Set Identifier (SSID).

Once the Open System authentication process is completed successfully with a response from the AP ("cable connected"), the association process essentially finishes the 802.11 Layer 2 (L2) negotiation that establishes the link between the client and the AP. The AP assigns an association ID to the client if the connection is successful, and prepares it in order to pass traffic or perform a higher-level security method if configured on the SSID. The Open System authentication process consists of two management frames as well as the association process. Authentication and Association frames are wireless management frames, not data frames, which are basically the ones used for the connection process with the AP.

The wireless client begins with the Authentication frame, and the AP replies with another Authentication frame. The client then sends the Association Request frame, and the AP finishes in a reply with the Association Response frame. As shown from the DHCP packets, once the 802.11 Open System authentication and association processes are passed, the client begins to pass data frames. In this case, there is no security method configured on the SSID, so the client immediately begins to send data frames (in this case DHCP) that are not encrypted.

What information appears when the client roams? The client always exchanges four management frames upon establishment of a connection to an AP, which is due to either client establishment of association, or a roaming event. The client has only one connection established to only one AP at a time. The only difference in the frame exchange between a new connection to the WLAN infrastructure and a roaming event is that the Association frames of a roaming event are called Reassociation frames, which indicate that the client is actually roaming from another AP with no attempts to establish a new association to the WLAN. These frames can contain different elements that are used in order to negotiate the roaming event; this depends on the setup, but those details are out of the scope of this document.

If you expect a roaming event, but the client sends an Association Request instead of a Reassociation Request (which you can confirm from some images and debugs similar to those explained earlier in this document), then the client is not really roaming. The client begins a new association to the WLAN as if a disconnection took place, and tries to reconnect from scratch. This can happen for multiple reasons, such as when a client moves away from the coverage areas and then finds an AP with enough signal quality to start an association, but it normally indicates a client issue where the client does not initiate a roaming event due to drivers, firmware, or software issues.

When the SSID is configured with L2 higher-level security on top of basic 802.11 Open System authentication, then more frames are required for the initial association and when roaming. The two most-common security methods standardized and implemented for 802.11 WLANs are described in this document:

It is important to know that, even though these two methods (PSK and EAP) authenticate/validate the clients in different ways, both use basically the same WPA/WPA2 rules for the key management process. Whether the security is WPA/WPA2-PSK or WPA/WPA2-EAP, the process known as the WPA/WPA2 4-Way handshake begins the key negotiation between the WLC/AP and the client with a Master Session Key (MSK) as the original key material once the client is validated with the specific authentication method used.

When WPA-PSK or WPA2-PSK is performed via Temporal Key Integrity Protocol (TKIP) or Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) for the encryption, the client must go through the process known as the WPA 4-Way handshake for both the initial association and also when roaming. As previously explained, this is basically the key management process used in order for WPA/WPA2 to derive the encryption keys. However, when PSK is performed, it is also used in order to verify that the client has a valid Pre-Shared Key to join the WLAN. This image shows the initial association process when WPA or WPA2 with PSK is performed:

As shown, after the 802.11 Open System authentication and association process, there are four EAPOL frames from the WPA 4-Way handshake, which are initiated by the AP with message-1, and finished by the client with message-4. After a successful handshake, the client begins to pass data frames (such as DHCP), which in this case are encrypted with the keys derived from the 4-Way handshake (this is why you cannot see the actual content and type of traffic from the wireless images).

When roaming, the client basically tracks the same frame exchange, where the WPA 4-Way handshake is required in order to derive new encryption keys with the new AP. This is due to security reasons established by the standard, and the fact that the new AP does not know the original keys. The only difference is that there are Reassociation frames instead of Association frames, as shown in this image:

When an 802.1X/EAP method is used in order to authenticate the clients on a secure SSID, there are even more frames required before the client begins to pass traffic. These extra frames are used in order to authenticate the client credentials, and dependent upon the EAP method, there can be between four and twenty frames. These come after the Association/Reassociation, but before the WPA/WPA2 4-Way handshake, because the authentication phase derives the MSK used as the seed for the final encryption key generation in the key management process (4-Way handshake).

Sometimes this exchange shows more or less frames, which depends on multiple factors, such as the EAP method, retransmissions due to problems, client behavior (such as the two Identity Requests in this example, because the client sends an EAPOL START after the AP sends the first Identity Request), or if the client already exchanged the certificate with the server. Whenever the SSID is configured for an 802.1X/EAP method, there are more frames (for the authentication), and hence, it requires more time before the client begins to send data frames.

When the wireless client performs a regular roaming here (the normal behavior, without implementation of a fast-secure roaming method), the client must go through the exact same process and perform a full authentication against the Authentication Server, as shown in the images. The only difference is that the client uses a Reassociation Request in order to inform the new AP that it is actually roaming from another AP, but the client still has to go through full validation and new key generation:

As shown, even when there are less frames than in the initial authentication (which is caused by multiple factors, as mentioned before), when the client roams to a new AP, the EAP authentication and the WPA key management processes must still be completed in order to continue to pass data frames (even if traffic was actively sent before roaming). Therefore, if the client has an active application that is sensitive to delays (such as voice-traffic applications, or applications that are sensitive to timeouts), then the user can perceive problems when roaming, such as audio gaps or application disconnects. This depends on how long the process takes in order for the client to continue to send/receive data frames. This delay can be longer, dependent upon: the RF environment, the amount of clients, the round-trip time between the WLC and LAPs and with the Authentication Server, and other reasons. e24fc04721