Family And Friends 5 Special Edition Student Book Pdf Free Download !!TOP!!

Once again, graduating FST students have been given an opportunity to share with us some of their favorite memories of their time at Ohio State in this special edition newsletter. Many also took the opportunity to give a shoutout to those that supported them, befriended them, and helped make the journey one to remember.

Family and friends recently gathered at the Great American Pub in Conshohocken for the Sean A. Hughes Memorial Fund Kickoff Party - a very special evening featuring Irish music, food and drink to celebrate the life of Sean Hughes and to kick off fundraising for an amazing memorial to him on the campus of his beloved Lower Merion High School!

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But then, of course, whatever derivative reason an agent has to carefor her intimates is determined by the nature of her contingent,empirical circumstances. If I find myself causally and epistemicallypositioned to do greater good by ignoring my intimates and serving theneeds of strangers, then that is what I ought to do, according to theconsequentialist. In fact, if I have the choice of providingx units of good to my friend or x+1 units of good toa complete stranger, then, barring any further long-run negativeeffects on my character, my friendship, or the institution offriendship, I ought to provide the x+1 units of good to thestranger. Commonsense morality, however, as we have seen, regards thefact of my standing in the friendship relation to someone as morallysignificant in and of itself. In so far as the consequentialist isunable to grant friendship (or promising, etc.) any such independentmoral significance, it remains out of step with commonsenseunderstanding of the status of special obligations.

Unlike natural duties, special obligations are grounded on somethingother than (or, in addition to) the intrinsic nature of the obligee.The voluntarist worries support the view that special obligations canonly be acquired through the voluntary actions of the agent whoseobligations they are.[3] (It is important to recognize that voluntarism is a thesis aboutspecial obligations alone. The question being pressed by thevoluntarist concerns obligations over and above those owed to allpersons in virtue of their intrinsic nature or those that we have topromote intrinsically valuable states of affairs.) Thus, thevoluntarist will grant that special obligations are acquired throughpromises and contracts, because, in making a promise or contract, theagent voluntarily agrees to bear a certain burden for the person towhom she makes the promise or contract. But other sorts of purportedspecial obligations, in particular those owed to family members or tofellow citizens, would not be acquired through the voluntary actionsof the obligor: one does not choose to be born into a certain familyor as a citizen of a given country, so why suppose that, simply as aresult of luck, either good or bad, I have obligations, over and abovemy natural duties or my consequentialist duties, to my family membersand to my fellow citizens?

Let us begin with option (i). According to this option, in addition towhatever natural duties we have, we have only those furtherobligations that we have acquired through explicit promises orcontracts. The difficulty with this option is that it does little toaccommodate the range of special obligations acknowledged bycommonsense morality. For example, most of us do not make the sorts ofpromises that we make to spouses to all of our friends. I have neverexplicitly promised my best friend to love and care for her. Thisdifficulty is even more apparent in the case of familialrelationships. We do not enter into contracts with our parents of theform: take care of me as a child and I will reciprocate when you areolder and need care. Nonetheless, it does seem that parents andchildren owe one another a special degree of concern and commitment.If the defender of special obligations is attempting to accommodatecommonsense morality, then she will have done so to a very limitedextent if she allows only those special obligations that are acquiredthrough explicit contracts or promises.

The third strategy available to a voluntarist defender of specialobligations is to argue that while it is not the case that all specialobligations are reducible to contractual obligations, nonetheless, allspecial obligations share the feature of voluntary assumption withcontractual obligations. All special obligations, according to thisaccount, are forms of voluntary commitments undertaken by theindividual moral agent. While not all actions that constitute theundertaking of a commitment mimic those involved in the making of apromise or contract, they are all such that the agent can choosewhether or not to perform them. Also, while promises and contracts aretemporally discrete events, a commitment may be undertaken via atemporally extended series of events, each of which, in and of itself,has no moral significance: it is only the series taken as a whole thatgenerates or grounds special obligations. While this strategy has thevirtue of being able to accommodate obligations of friendship withoutdistorting the nature of friendship, it, like the previous voluntaristoptions, holds out little hope of accommodating political or familialspecial obligations. At this point, the voluntarist is faced with achoice: either reject her initial commitment to voluntarism regardingspecial obligations or reject the commonsense claim about theextensive range of special obligations that we have.

When and if we are able to defend the claim that we have fundamentalagent-relative special obligations, we need to determine which specialobligations we have. The political community, friendship, andpromising/contracting have already been discussed as arenas in whichspecial obligations may or may not arise. All of these areas of themoral life have received extensive attention in the philosophicalliterature. But there are two important contexts that have receivedless attention, but, for various reasons, are becoming more pressingfor moral agents in our society today. Hopefully, philosophers willbegin to pay these contexts the attention they urgently need.

Many of us assume obligations when we assume professional roles. As aphilosophy professor at a state university, I have obligations to mycolleagues, my students, and the taxpayers of the state of Iowa.Physicians and therapists have obligations to their patients, policeofficers to the citizens of their jurisdictions, ministers and prieststo their flocks, etc. Are these obligations mere obligations of rolewithout moral implications, or are they genuinely moral specialobligations? These questions are particularly pressing, given howoften our professions can force us to make morally charged decisions:any study of history shows how dangerous it can be for people to bowunreflectively to what they take to be the duties of their roles. AsJoel Feinberg points out, conflicts between perceived specialobligations of position and more general duties created great tensionand conflict for American abolitionist judges prior to the Civil War.In an era of increased concern about professional ethics, we need tohave some account of which professional roles, if any, generategenuinely moral special duties. (See Almond.)

Special relationships take many forms, and the parties to thoserelationships range across the entire spectrum of moral character (atleast according to some views), from the extremely virtuous to thedownright bad, with most of us falling somewhere in the middle of thatrange. This fact about the human beings who make promises, stand infamilial relationships, and have friends, leads to the worry thatspecial obligations, in certain circumstances, will license, andperhaps even require, very bad behavior.

However, there will be other times such that our special obligationsare weighty enough that we ought to do that which, in othercircumstances, would be immoral for us to do. But this should not besurprising or troubling to us, if we accept that friendship, promises,collegial relationships, etc., have moral, or at least rational,significance. Such significance inevitably changes the landscape ofreasons.

But, recently, some philosophers have begun to focus their attentionon companion animals, i.e., those cats, dogs, fish, birds, etc., thatmany of us take into our homes and care for as pets. (SeeBurgess-Jackson, Rollin, Palmer.) Americans spend small fortunesproviding medical care for their animal companions, and lavish time,attention, and love on them. Many of us regard our cats or dogs asmembers of our family, and we feel ourselves obligated to take specialcare of our animal companions. But can we really have specialobligations to non-human animals? If not, how can we possibly justifythe resources expended on companion animals, given the amount of humansuffering in the world?

In order adequately to address the question whether we have specialobligations to our companion animals, we need to do more investigationinto the nature of the relationship that we have to animals and thenature of our companion animals. Can we be friends with creaturesother than human beings? (See Jeske 2008b.) Can we make promises toanimals? Can we bear relevant psychological connections to animals?These questions need serious attention if we are to insure that wemeet our moral obligations to the vulnerable creatures that we callpets.

We have seen that the issue as to whether we have special obligationsis relevant to some of the central issues in contemporary ethics,including the viability of consequentialism as a moral theory, thepossibility and nature of agent-relative reasons, the relationshipbetween voluntary action or association and the acquisition of dutiesor responsibilities, and the nature of self, family, friendship, andpolitical community. In attempting to ground special obligations, thedefender of special obligations must face issues about the role of themetaphysics of personal identity in determining features of moralityand questions in moral epistemology, among other issues. Thus, thetopic of special obligations is central to debates in both normativeand meta- ethics. 006ab0faaa