Fake ID New York

 Inside the Identity System — What Court Records Reveal About Counterfeit Licenses, DMV Corruption, and Digital ID Fraud

Executive Summary

A fake ID is often imagined as a counterfeit plastic card: a convincing photograph, a fabricated name, and a document designed to survive a quick visual inspection. Publicly documented cases in New York reveal a more complicated problem.

The threat does not begin and end with counterfeit printing. It can arise when a document is fabricated, when a legitimate licensing process is manipulated, or when an image of a supposedly official identity document is used to deceive an organization that never physically inspects the card.

These are distinct forms of failure. They involve different evidence, different control systems, and potentially different legal consequences.

This investigation examines three documented developments:

Together, these cases demonstrate that identity fraud can exploit more than one layer of a document system. They do not, by themselves, establish the total number of fake New York IDs in circulation, the proportion of documents that are fraudulent, or the failure rate of the state’s verification systems.

That distinction is central to the investigation.

The strongest conclusion supported by the available records is not that every New York ID can be forged or that the DMV system is broadly compromised. It is that documented cases expose several different pathways through which the authority represented by an identity document can be abused — and that public case announcements alone are insufficient to measure the full scale of the problem.

1. The Central Finding: A Fake ID Is Not One Type of Failure

The phrase “fake ID” collapses several different problems into a single label. That makes for a simple search term, but a poor investigative framework.

A counterfeit card, an unlawfully obtained government-issued credential, and a manipulated digital image are not equivalent. A document may be physically counterfeit while using fabricated information. It may also contain the real personal information of an innocent person. Alternatively, a credential may have been issued through an official process that was allegedly corrupted.

A useful investigation must separate the object from the process that gave it apparent authority.

Three pathways into identity fraud

                           THE IDENTITY TRUST PROBLEM

                                                        |

                   +-------------------------------+-----------------------------+

                   |                                    |                                   |

                 ▼                                 ▼                                 ▼

      COUNTERFEIT           COMPROMISED                DIGITAL

        DOCUMENT                 ISSUANCE            REPRESENTATION

                   |                                    |                                   |

       Fake physical           Official process             Image or file

         credential              allegedly abused           used remotely

                   |                                    |                                   |

                 ▼                                 ▼                                 ▼

   Document-level              Process-level              Verification-

       deception                      corruption               channel abuse

                   |                                    |                                   |

                   +-------------------------------+-----------------------------+

                                                        |

                                                      ▼

                           FRAUD / IMPERSONATION RISK

The diagram describes analytical categories, not a claim that every case contains all three elements.

The distinction matters for investigators, regulators, businesses, and individuals trying to understand whether an apparently suspicious New York driver’s license is a counterfeit object, a legitimately issued credential obtained through fraud, or an image being used to misrepresent someone’s identity.

A security feature can help assess a physical document. It cannot, by itself, establish that the person presenting the document is its rightful holder. Likewise, an image that looks convincing is not proof that an underlying government credential exists.

The investigative question is therefore broader than “Does this card look real?” It is “What evidence connects this document, its issuance, and the person using it?”

2. Case One: The Alleged DMV Licensing Scheme

What authorities announced

On July 1, 2025, the Richmond County District Attorney’s Office, the New York State Inspector General, and partner agencies announced indictments against 14 defendants in an alleged scheme involving New York State driver’s licenses.

According to the official announcement, the investigation concerned a network involving multiple motor vehicle examiners, a Queens-based driving school, individuals allegedly taking tests on behalf of other applicants, and applicants who allegedly paid to obtain licenses illegally.

Authorities alleged that some examiners accepted money to falsify road-test results or allow applicants to bypass testing. The announcement also stated that, in some instances, the learner’s permit prerequisite had allegedly been obtained fraudulently.

Primary source: New York State announcement, July 1, 2025

Why this matters to identity security

This case illustrates a category of risk that ordinary discussions of fake ID rarely address.

If an official licensing process is manipulated, the problem is not necessarily a counterfeit card. The document may have been produced through an official system, yet the process that should justify its issuance may have been compromised.

That creates a different investigative challenge. A visual inspection of the physical credential may not answer questions about whether the required examination occurred, whether the correct applicant took the test, or whether official records accurately reflect the transaction.

The distinction is consequential because document authenticity and procedural integrity are separate questions.

          NORMAL LICENSING PROCESS


 Applicant

     ▼

 Required tests and checks

     ▼

 Recorded results

     ▼

 Eligibility decision

     ▼

 Official credential

     ▼

 Legitimate use



           ALLEGED FAILURE PATH


 Applicant / intermediary

     ▼

 Improper payment or impersonation

     ▼

 Allegedly false or bypassed checks

     ▼

 Compromised licensing decision

     ▼

 Credential issued through

 an allegedly unlawful process

The lower path represents the allegations described by authorities. It is not a finding that every credential associated with the case was invalid, nor does it establish that every defendant performed every alleged act.

What the case establishes — and what it does not

The official announcement establishes that a significant investigation led to charges involving alleged manipulation of the licensing process. It identifies the types of actors and conduct investigators said were involved.

It does not, on its own, establish:

Those are not minor details. They determine whether a case should be understood as a contained criminal scheme, evidence of a recurring control weakness, or part of a broader pattern.

Without final court dispositions, administrative records, and comparable data, it would be premature to choose among those interpretations.

The control question

The case raises a specific oversight question: how can a licensing authority independently verify that the examination recorded in its system was actually performed by the eligible applicant?

Potential safeguards to examine include examiner audit trails, independent review of anomalous test outcomes, separation of duties, documented controls against impersonation, and procedures for reviewing suspicious transactions.

These are investigative questions and possible control measures — not claims that New York currently lacks each safeguard.

A complete follow-up investigation would seek the agency’s documented procedures, the findings of any internal review, and records showing what changed after the alleged scheme was uncovered.

3. Case Two: Christopher Hernandez and the Cross-State Document Collection

What the federal record says

On August 4, 2026, the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Western District of New York announced that Christopher Hernandez, 31, of Bergen, New Jersey, had pleaded guilty to fraudulent production of more than five identification documents, authentication features, or false identification documents.

According to the prosecution’s announcement, investigators found fraudulent documents in an iCloud account and later seized additional materials and equipment during an investigation at Hernandez’s residence.

The government reported approximately:

+----------------------------------------------------------+------------+

| Item reported by prosecutors             | Quantity |

+----------------------------------------------------------+------------+

| Driver's licenses from about 21           |              |

| states                                                       | 106      |

| Debit and credit cards                           |  67       |

| Social Security cards                             |  15       |

| Passport cards                                       |   9         |

| Permanent Resident Alien Card          |   1          |

| MTA Transit Track Safety                     |               |

| Certifications                                          |   3         |

+----------------------------------------------------------+------------+

The figures are approximate quantities reported by prosecutors, not a statewide estimate of counterfeit documents.

The same announcement stated that a fraudulent New York State driver’s license used the name and other personally identifiable information of a Western New York resident. Prosecutors also described fraudulent checks involving three victims and amounts of $175,400.80, $10,900, and $79,500.89.

Primary source: U.S. Attorney’s Office, Western District of New York, August 4, 2026

The prosecution’s announcement said sentencing was scheduled for November 17, 2026. As of the research cutoff for this article, that date was still in the future; no later sentencing outcome is asserted here.

The significance of the New York credential

The New York license described in the announcement is important because it illustrates the potential harm to someone who did not create, request, or knowingly use the fraudulent document.

When another person’s personal information is incorporated into a fake identity document, the consequences may extend beyond the immediate fraud. The person whose information was misused may have to respond to suspicious financial activity, identity-verification problems, or records that appear to associate them with conduct they did not commit.

But the available announcement does not quantify all such downstream consequences in this case. It identifies a victim whose information appeared on a fraudulent New York license; it does not provide a complete account of every consequence experienced by that person.

What the numbers mean

The reported collection of approximately 106 licenses from 21 states suggests that the investigation was not limited to a single New York credential. It involved a broader collection of identity documents and other instruments.

However, three distinctions are necessary:

The figures are evidence about the scope of the materials described in this prosecution. They should not be repurposed into a claim that hundreds of thousands of fake New York IDs exist, or that a particular verification method routinely fails.

The deeper lesson: identity fraud can cross systems

A fraudulent identity document can be part of a wider chain of activity. The Hernandez announcement links identity-document production with alleged financial fraud involving substantial checks.

That matters because the value of a fake credential may lie not in the physical object itself, but in the transactions it enables. A document may be used as one element in a larger attempt to impersonate a person, establish an account, access a service, or support another fraudulent act.

This is why an investigation that counts counterfeit cards alone may miss important aspects of the problem. The more complete unit of analysis is the document, the identity it represents, the person using it, and the transaction in which it appears.

4. Case Three: OnlyFake and the Shift from Plastic to Digital

A different verification environment

On February 26, 2026, the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York announced that Yurii Nazarenko had pleaded guilty in connection with operating OnlyFake, a service that sold digital fake identification documents.

According to the government, the service generated at least approximately 10,000 digital fake IDs from around 2021 through 2024 and received at least hundreds of thousands of dollars from customers. Prosecutors stated that the service offered digital versions of identity documents, including driver’s licenses, and that customers could request images presented in different photographic styles.

The government also stated that Nazarenko agreed to forfeit $1.2 million representing proceeds of the operation.

Primary source: U.S. Attorney’s Office, Southern District of New York, February 26, 2026

The public court record also indicates that on June 26, 2026, the court imposed a sentence of time served. That outcome is specific to the defendant and proceeding; it should not be treated as a general statement about penalties for fake ID offenses. Public case record

Why digital fake IDs change the analytical problem

A physical counterfeit and a digital fake image can look similar on a phone screen, but the security questions are different.

A physical credential may be examined as an object. A digital submission may be reviewed through a website, app, or remote onboarding workflow. In the latter situation, a business may be assessing a submitted image rather than examining the credential in the holder’s possession.

That distinction can matter to banks, online platforms, payment providers, age-restricted services, and other organizations that rely on remote identity verification.

The OnlyFake prosecution demonstrates that digital fake identification was sold at substantial scale, according to the government’s account. It does not establish that every customer successfully deceived a financial institution or that every organization using remote verification was vulnerable in the same way.

A simplified model of the risk

        REAL-WORLD IDENTITY

                          |

                         ▼

         Digital representation

                          |

                         ▼

   Submitted to a remote service

                          |

                         ▼

        Verification decision

                          |

           +-----------+---------+

           |                          |

         ▼                       ▼

  Accepted           Rejected /

  or flagged         escalated

         |

       ▼

  Potential downstream

  transaction or access

The diagram is conceptual. It does not describe OnlyFake’s technical implementation or provide instructions for creating, modifying, or submitting fraudulent documents.

Its purpose is to show where a remote verification workflow makes a decision: between the submitted representation and the organization’s acceptance of the claimed identity.

The limits of visual inspection

A visually convincing image is not proof of a valid government-issued credential. Nor does the existence of digital counterfeits establish that every image-based verification process is ineffective.

A responsible verification system may combine multiple checks, escalate suspicious cases, or request additional evidence. Which controls were used by any particular organization — and whether they worked — must be established from evidence rather than assumed.

The public case supports a narrow but important conclusion: digital representations of identity documents can be manufactured and sold for fraudulent purposes, and remote verification is one context in which such documents may be used.

It does not support an unsupported claim that a particular fake ID is “scannable,” that it will pass a specific scanner, or that it will be accepted by a particular business.

5. Evidence Matrix: What the Three Cases Actually Show

The cases are most useful when their findings are compared without pretending they measure the same thing.

+---------------------------------------+---------------------------------------+-----------------------------------+

| Case                                   | Established in the             | Not established by     |

|                                             | cited public record           | that record alone         |

+---------------------------------------+---------------------------------------+-----------------------------------+

| NY DMV scheme              | 14 defendants were         | Final guilt of every       |

| announced July 2025      | indicted in an                    | defendant; statewide  |

|                                             | alleged licensing               | prevalence; total         |

|                                             | corruption scheme           | affected licenses        |

+---------------------------------------+---------------------------------------+-----------------------------------+

| Hernandez                         | Guilty plea; approx.         | Percentage of NY         |

| announced Aug. 2026     | 106 licenses from            | licenses that are          |

|                                             | 21 states reported            | fake; total use of         |

|                                             | by prosecutors                  | every seized item        |

+---------------------------------------+---------------------------------------+-----------------------------------+

| OnlyFake                            | Guilty plea; at least          | Success rate against  |

| announced Feb. 2026      | approx. 10,000                 | each verification          |

|                                             | digital IDs reported          | provider; prevalence    |

|                                             | by prosecutors                  | in New York alone       |

+---------------------------------------+---------------------------------------+-----------------------------------+

This comparison highlights a central limitation of public criminal-case announcements: they provide detailed evidence about specific investigations, but they do not automatically create a consistent statistical series.

The three cases also differ in their underlying conduct, the agencies involved, and the stage of the proceedings. They should not be added together as though they were three observations of the same measurable phenomenon.

6. What New York Law Says About False Identification Documents

The legal consequences of fake identification depend on the conduct, the document, the defendant’s knowledge and intent, and the statutes charged. The phrase “fake ID” is not, by itself, a complete legal analysis.

Two New York Vehicle and Traffic Law provisions are particularly relevant to the conduct discussed here.

Vehicle and Traffic Law § 392

New York Vehicle and Traffic Law § 392 addresses specified false statements in applications, deception or substitution in connection with examinations, material alteration of certain documents, and knowing use of documents obtained in violation of the section.

The statute is relevant to allegations involving manipulated applications, substituted test-takers, or false examination records.

Official text: New York Vehicle and Traffic Law § 392

Vehicle and Traffic Law § 392-a

Section 392-a addresses the knowing sale, offer to sell, purchase, or offer to purchase a false, fraudulent, or stolen license, identification card, certificate of registration, or number plate.

The published statutory text identifies a misdemeanor for a first offense and a Class E felony for a second or subsequent offense committed within ten years of the prior offense.

Official text: New York Vehicle and Traffic Law § 392-a

Other state or federal laws may apply depending on the facts. Federal prosecutions involving document production, identity information, conspiracy, or financial fraud can involve statutes beyond these two New York provisions.

A charge is not a conviction. An indictment is an allegation, a guilty plea is a distinct procedural event, and a sentence is a later disposition. A sound article must preserve those distinctions.

Nothing in this section is individualized legal advice. Anyone facing an actual charge should consult a qualified attorney.

7. The Missing Measurement: How Many Fake New York IDs Are There?

This is the most important unanswered quantitative question — and the one that cannot responsibly be answered from the three cases alone.

The reviewed public announcements do not provide a comprehensive statewide estimate of counterfeit New York driver’s licenses or non-driver identification cards in circulation.

That does not prove that no relevant data exists within the DMV, law enforcement agencies, prosecutors’ offices, or other institutions. It means that the sources cited here do not establish a complete, comparable statewide series.

A statewide estimate would require a clear definition of what is being counted.

For example, the following categories are not interchangeable:

Counting all these events as “fake IDs” would risk double counting and could obscure whether the underlying problem is counterfeit production, identity theft, issuance fraud, or remote verification abuse.

The records that would make a stronger investigation possible

A rigorous follow-up should request and reconcile records from multiple sources rather than rely on a handful of high-profile prosecutions.

                        PUBLIC-RECORDS INVESTIGATION

                                                        |

                 +--------------------------------+--------------------------------+

                 |                                       |                                    |

                ▼                                   ▼                                  ▼

       DMV DATA                    COURT DATA         ENFORCEMENT DATA

                 |                                       |                                    |

   Complaints and             Charges, pleas          Seized documents

   confirmed cases         and dispositions         and case referrals

                 |                                       |                                    |

                 +--------------------------------+--------------------------------+

                                                       |

                                                      ▼

                                 NORMALIZE DEFINITIONS

                                                       |

                                                      ▼

                                    REMOVE DUPLICATES

                                                       |

                                                      ▼

                                 COMPARE YEAR BY YEAR

                                                       |

                                                      ▼

                             DOCUMENT WHAT IS KNOWN,

                          UNKNOWN, AND NOT RELEASED

This is a proposed research workflow, not a claim that such a consolidated database already exists.

A targeted New York Freedom of Information Law request could seek records such as:

The request should specify a period — for example, calendar years 2021 through 2025 — and seek annual totals rather than unrestricted access to personal records.

The agency may withhold some material under applicable law, and not every requested category may be maintained in the requested form. A refusal, partial response, or statement that records are not maintained should be documented precisely; it should not be portrayed as proof of concealment.

The resulting analysis would need to distinguish allegations from confirmed incidents, unique credentials from repeated reports, and criminal outcomes from administrative actions.

Only after that work could a journalist reasonably assess whether reported cases were increasing, whether a specific control weakness recurred, and whether reforms appeared to have measurable effects.

8. Why Enforcement Numbers Alone Cannot Measure the Problem

Criminal cases are visible because they produce announcements, charging documents, pleas, and sometimes trial records. But enforcement statistics are not the same as the prevalence of an underlying activity.

An increase in cases could reflect more offending, improved detection, a change in prosecutorial priorities, a new reporting channel, or some combination of those factors.

A decrease could mean less offending — or fewer investigations, less reporting, a change in classification, or a shift toward cases that are harder to detect.

A meaningful trend analysis therefore needs denominators and stable definitions.

For example, a count of confirmed counterfeit documents would be more informative if the agency could also explain how suspicious documents are identified, how many are examined, how duplicates are removed, and whether the reporting rules changed over time.

The same principle applies to prosecutions. A rise in indictments is not automatically proof that the underlying problem has grown. A high-profile case is not automatically proof of a widespread vulnerability.

The responsible question is not simply how many cases were announced. It is how those cases were detected, classified, counted, and connected to a larger population of transactions or documents.

9. Authenticity, Verification, and the Meaning of “Scannable Fake ID”

Searches for “scannable fake ID,” “New York fake driver’s license,” “fake ID scanner,” and similar phrases often blend together several questions.

A scanner may read data from a document or its machine-readable elements. A verification service may compare that data with other information. A person may also inspect a document visually. These are not necessarily the same process, and none should be assumed to provide every possible assurance.

A successful read does not, on its own, prove that a document was lawfully issued or that the presenter is its rightful holder. Conversely, a failed read does not by itself prove criminal intent; equipment, document condition, workflow errors, or other factors may be relevant.

The same caution applies to phrases such as “REAL ID compliant,” “official-looking,” and “verified ID.” These expressions can be misused in marketing and should not substitute for an independent assessment of the actual credential and the transaction.

This article does not test, certify, or endorse any seller advertising fake New York IDs. It does not establish that a particular product is scannable or will pass a particular scanner, age check, bank process, or identity-verification system.

The relevant public-interest issue is the reliability of the verification decision — not how to defeat it.

10. Lost, Stolen, or Damaged New York ID: The Lawful Route

The existence of counterfeit documents does not make a lost or damaged license fraudulent. Nor should someone need to turn to an unofficial seller to replace a document that has been lost, stolen, or damaged.

New York DMV publishes procedures for replacing licenses, permits, and non-driver identification cards. The correct process depends on the document and the circumstances.

If your New York driver’s license or ID is lost

Start with the official DMV service and follow the current instructions for your document. Use the DMV’s own online service where eligible, or follow its instructions for an in-person transaction.

Official starting point: New York DMV

If your document was stolen or your identity was misused

The DMV recommends reporting stolen photo documents to local law enforcement before applying for a replacement. If a police report is available, bring a copy when visiting the DMV.

If you believe someone used your DMV license, permit, or non-driver ID information to commit fraud, the DMV instructs affected individuals to report the misuse and submit supporting evidence.

Official guidance: Report a Problem to DMV — License or Registration Fraud

The DMV’s FI-17 process is specifically relevant to unauthorized use of DMV-issued license or registration information. Its instructions recommend reporting relevant criminal activity to local law enforcement, notifying financial institutions where appropriate, maintaining a record of actions taken, and submitting the form with pertinent evidence.

Official form and instructions: FI-17 — Report of Unauthorized Use of License/Registration

If the card is damaged

Use the DMV’s replacement instructions rather than attempting to alter the document yourself. Keep the damaged credential available if the DMV’s instructions require it, and follow the agency’s current directions for submitting or surrendering it.

Replacement costs and requirements

Fees and requirements can change. The DMV’s ID-44 application guide lists approximate fees, including replacement fees, but applicants should confirm the current amount and the applicable transaction before paying.

Official guide: DMV ID-44

For a REAL ID or Enhanced credential, review the current official eligibility and documentation requirements rather than relying on a third-party seller’s description.

Official guide: Enhanced or REAL ID — New York DMV

If your personal information has been used fraudulently

Keep copies of letters, notices, financial statements, police reports, and other relevant records. Contact affected banks or other institutions through their official channels. For broader identity-theft recovery steps, the Federal Trade Commission provides a government resource at IdentityTheft.gov.

This is general information, not a substitute for advice tailored to an individual case.

11. What Institutions Should Be Asked to Prove

The cases examined here point toward a practical accountability framework. It does not presume that any particular agency or business failed. It identifies the questions that a serious audit or investigation should answer.

For a licensing authority

For a business that verifies identity

For investigators and prosecutors

These questions move the discussion beyond the superficial debate over whether a counterfeit card looks convincing. They focus on accountability, evidence, and the integrity of the process that turns an identity claim into an accepted decision.

12. The Three-Layer Model of Identity Assurance

The cases can be organized into three layers. This model is an analytical framework for this article, not an official New York State classification.

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

| LAYER 3: PERSON AND TRANSACTION                  |

|                                                                                         |

| Is the presenter the person they claim to be?         |

| Is the document being used for a legitimate           |

| purpose?                                                                        |

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

                                           ▲

                                            |

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

| LAYER 2: ISSUANCE AND RECORDS                        |

|                                                                                         |

| Was the credential issued through a lawful            |

| process? Do the underlying records support it?     |

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

                                           ▲

                                            |

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

| LAYER 1: DOCUMENT AND REPRESENTATION      |

|                                                                                         |

| Is the physical credential or digital                           |

| representation authentic and unaltered?                 |

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

A weakness at one layer does not prove a weakness at every other layer. A counterfeit physical document, an allegedly corrupted licensing process, and a deceptive digital submission require different forms of evidence.

The model also explains why a single visual inspection cannot resolve every identity question. Document authenticity, lawful issuance, and rightful use are related, but distinct.

13. What Would Raise This Investigation from a Case Review to a Full Investigation?

This article is based on cited public records, official agency announcements, statutory text, and published government guidance. It does not claim to be a completed field investigation involving original interviews, a finished FOIL analysis, or an independent technical test of verification systems.

To move from a strong document-based investigation to a more conclusive statewide study, the next steps would be:

First, verify case outcomes. Obtain available charging documents, plea agreements, sentencing records, and final dispositions for the relevant defendants. Distinguish allegations in an indictment from facts admitted in a plea or established in a court’s findings.

Second, obtain comparable agency data. Request annual figures for suspected and confirmed fraud, investigations, referrals, administrative actions, and affected credentials, with definitions for each category.

Third, test for repeat patterns. Determine whether the same type of control failure appears across independent cases, different offices, or different years. A pattern should be demonstrated, not inferred from the seriousness of a single prosecution.

Fourth, assess the response. Examine audit findings, policy changes, training, supervisory controls, and evidence of implementation after the cases became public.

Fifth, seek informed responses. Request comment from the DMV, the relevant prosecutors, and experts in identity verification and public-sector auditing. Record what each party confirms, disputes, or cannot answer.

These steps would make it possible to evaluate the scale of the problem more rigorously and determine whether documented cases point to isolated misconduct, recurring weaknesses, or a measurable statewide trend.

Conclusion: The Real Question Is Not Whether Fake IDs Exist

The public record establishes that New York has faced several distinct forms of identity-document abuse: alleged corruption in a licensing process, fraudulent production involving a New York credential and documents from multiple states, and a digital fake-ID operation prosecuted in federal court.

Those cases are serious. They show why identity security cannot be reduced to the appearance of a plastic card or the presence of a barcode.

But seriousness is not a substitute for measurement. Three prominent cases cannot establish the statewide prevalence of counterfeit IDs, the failure rate of verification systems, or the effectiveness of every control used by the DMV and private institutions.

The evidence supports a more precise conclusion: identity assurance depends on the integrity of the document, the process that issues it, the records behind it, and the decision made by the person or institution accepting it.

A stronger public investigation would connect criminal case records with comparable agency data, examine final outcomes, and test whether reforms changed measurable results. Until that work is completed, claims about the total scale of fake New York IDs should be treated cautiously.

The public deserves more than sensational claims about counterfeit licenses. It deserves a transparent account of what investigators have established, what institutions can demonstrate, what remains unknown, and what safeguards are needed to protect both public safety and people whose identities may be misused.


Sources and Research Notes