出刊年月/Date of Publishing

1992.06

所屬卷期/Vol. & No.   第22卷第2期 Vol. 22, No. 2

類型/Type                 研究論文 Research Article

篇名/Title
認知的證成與可靠理論
Epistemic Justification and Reliabilism

作者/Author
黃懿梅 Yih Mei Huang

頁碼/Pagination
pp. 77-105

摘要
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Abstract
This paper is concerned with reliabilism as a theory of justified belief. According to Goldman, a person S rationally believes a proposition P if and only if his belief is caused by a reliable cognitive process. It is a reliable process theory. (RP) Likewise, Swain claims that S rationally believes Pon the basis of reason R if and only if S’s believing that P on the basis of indication theory. (RI)

In this paper, I have discussed some problems of reliabilism, especially the problem of whether RP is inconsistent with RI or not. I have argued that reliabilists have not solved all of these problems:

1. Reliability is not a sufficient condition for a justified belief. It is not necessary for justifiedness. I have argued that several proposals are unsatisfactory.

2. Reliabilism encounters “the problem of generality.” Reliabilists fail to give any account of the type of relevant processes or the relevant characteristics that are broad enough to avoid “the single case problem” but not so broad as to encounter “the no-distinction problem.” I have argued, in particular, that reliabilists do not provide an acceptable solution to the no-distinction problem.

3. Reliabilism is an externalism. It cannot avoid the difficulties of externalism.

4. As for whether RP is inconsistent with RI or not, I have argued that reliable processes may be one of the cognizer’s relevant characteristics C. So conceived, RP is consistent with RI. The problem is how to provide an account of the relevant characteristics.

關鍵字/Key Word
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DOI
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學門分類/Subject
哲學 Philosophy