出刊年月/Date of Publishing

2020.09

所屬卷期/Vol. & No.   第50卷第3期 Vol. 50, No. 3

類型/Type                 研究論文 Research Article

篇名/Title
從同婚爭議論公共理性的完備性
On the Completeness of Public Reason in the Same-Sex Marriage Debate

作者/Author
吳澤玫 Tse-Mei Wu

頁碼/Pagination
pp. 523-569

摘要
羅爾斯主張公共理性是完備的，即根據共享的政治價值和推論方式做判斷，將可對具爭議的重要制度和法律得出合理答案。本文的目的是要從同性婚姻合法化的爭議，檢視公共理性的完備性意涵。筆者將指出，各種政治正義觀可能得出不同的政治價值合理排序，且公共理性觀無法解決「何謂婚姻？」這個背景問題的歧見，因此完備性不能理解為對爭議議題「達成共識」。在「達成可合理接受的制度方案」的意義下，公共理性的完備性則可成立。為此，必須在公共理性的基礎上補充民主多數決和立法的道德妥協。

Abstract
Rawls claimed that public reason is complete; that is, it allows citizens to formulate a reasonable answer to controversial institutions and laws through judgments that appeal to shared political values and reasoning methods. The aim of this paper is to examine the meaning of the completeness of public reason by discussing the dispute over the legalization of same-sex marriage. I will point out that various political conceptions of justice may lead to different, reasonable, orderings of political values. Moreover, the conception of public reason cannot resolve the background question, “What is marriage?” Therefore, the meaning of the completeness of public reason cannot be understood as “achieving consensus” on controversial issues. Public reason is complete in the sense of “achieving an institutional solution that can be reasonably accepted.” To this end, it is necessary to supplement the democratic majority and legislative moral compromise based on ideals of public reason.

關鍵字/Key Word
公共理性、完備性、同性婚姻、羅爾斯、道德妥協
public reason, completeness, same-sex marriage, John Rawls, moral compromise

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DOI
https://doi.org/10.7015/JEAS.202009_50(3).0002

學門分類/Subject
哲學 Philosophy