出刊年月/Date of Publishing

2020.06

所屬卷期/Vol. & No.   第50卷第2期 Vol. 50, No. 2

類型/Type                 研究論文 Research Article

篇名/Title
反思機器人的道德擬人主義
Reflection on the Moral Anthropomorphism of Robots

作者/Author
何宗興 Tsung-Hsing Ho

頁碼/Pagination
pp. 179-205

摘要
如果機器人的發展要能如科幻想像一般，在沒有人類監督下自動地工作，就必須確定機器人不會做出道德上錯誤的行為。根據行為主義式的道德主體觀，若就外顯行為來看，機器人在道德上的表現跟人類一般，機器人就可被視為道德主體。從這很自然地引伸出機器人的道德擬人主義：凡適用於人類的道德規則就適用於機器人。我反對道德擬人主義，藉由史特勞森對於人際關係與反應態度的洞見，並以家長主義行為為例，我論述由於機器人缺乏人格性，無法參與人際關係，因此在關於家長主義行為上，機器人應該比人類受到更嚴格的限制。

Abstract
If robots are to function automatically, without human supervision, as depicted in sci-fi imagination, then we must ensure that robots not commit moral wrongs. According to the behaviourist conception of moral agency, if robots, assessed purely on the basis of behaviour, perform as morally as humans, they can be considered moral agents. This naturally leads to moral anthropomorphism: the position that whatever moral standards apply to humans apply equally to robots. I argue against moral anthropomorphism. In light of P. F. Strawson’s insights into interpersonal relationships and reactive attitudes, and drawing on paternalist actions as examples, I argue that robots, being not persons, are unable to participate in interpersonal relationships, and therefore their paternalist actions towards humans ought to be less permissible than humans’.

關鍵字/Key Word
機器人、人工智能、道德主體、道德擬人主義、反應態度
robots, artificial intelligence (AI), moral agency, moral anthropomorphism, reactive attitudes

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DOI
https://doi.org/10.7015/JEAS.202006_50(2).0003

學門分類/Subject
哲學 Philosophy