B9135: Engineering Online Matching Markets
Spring 2017
Instructors: Yash Kanoria (Uris 404, ykanoria@columbia.edu) and Jay Sethuraman (Mudd 314, js1353@columbia.edu)
Fridays 1 to 4 pm in Uris 329
TA: Jiaqi Lu (Uris 4C, JLu20@gsb.columbia.edu)
This class will explore the intersection of operations, engineering and economics relevant to modern internet marketplaces, with a focus on matching markets. Matching markets allow compatible agents to match with each other for mutual benefit, including those for dating, labor, accommodation and rides. The topics covered will emphasize recent developments and research, technical tools that may help advance the frontier in this space, and open directions. We will not cover the important and heavily studied topics of stable marriage and auctions.
The lecture Notes links below may not work. Please find a zip file containing all lecture notes here
Session 1 (Jan 27): Introduction to two-sided platforms I Modified class time 12:30 to 3 pm in Uris 329
Lecture Note: Session 1: Intro to Two-Sided Markets
Rochet and Tirole (2003), Platform competition in two-sided markets
Rochet and Tirole (2006), Two-sided markets: A progress report
Armstrong (2006), Competition in two-sided markets
Weyl (2010), A price theory of multi-sided platforms
Richard Schmalensee(2011), Why is Platform Pricing Generally Highly Skewed?
Session 2 (Feb 3): Introduction to two-sided platforms II Guest lecture by John Horton, NYU during the first half
Lecture Note: Session 2: Intro to Two-Sided Markets (II)
John Horton (2017), Evidence from a Minimum Wage Experiment.
Armstrong (2006) above.
Session 3 (Feb 10): Search frictions in labor markets
Lecture Note: Session 3: Search Theory in Labor Market
Rogerson, Shimer & Wright (2005), Search-theoretic models of the labor market: A survey.
Hoppe, Moldovanu & Sela (2009), The Theory of Assortative Matching Based on Costly Signals.
Horton (2015), Supply Constraints as a Market Friction: Evidence from an Online Labor Market.
Session 4 (Feb 17): Design of the "search environment" on matching platforms Guest lecture by Hannah Halaburda during the first half
Send project teams by email before class (teams of size 1 or 2).
Lecture Note: Session 4: Design of the Search Environment on Matching Platforms
Halaburda, Piskorski & Yildirim (2015), Competing by restricting choice: the case of search platforms
Kanoria and Saban (2016), Facilitating the search for partners on matching platforms: Restricting agent actions.
Session 5 (Feb 24): The theory of optimal transport Guest lecture by Alfred Galichon, NYU during the first half
Lecture Note: Session 5: Optimal Transport
Alfred Galichon (2016), Optimal transport methods in Economics.
Session 6 (Mar 3): RMP in Ride-sharing Markets: a Queueing Approach Guest Lecture by Siddhartha Banerjee, Cornell University
Lecture Note: Session 6: RMP in Ride-sharing Markets
Banerjee, Freund & Lykouris (2017), Pricing and Optimization in Shared Vehicle Systems: Queueing Models and Approximation Algorithms
A Talk by Sid Banerjee on Youtube: Dynamic Pricing in Ridesharing Platforms (2015)
Session 7 (Mar 24): Ride-Sharing Networks
Lecture Notes: Session 7: Ride-Sharing Networks
Bimpikis, Candogan & Saban (2016), Spatial Pricing in Ride-Sharing Networks
Session 8 (Mar 31): Many to Many Matching with Price Discrimination
Lecture Notes: Session 8: Many to Many Matching with Price Discrimination
Gomes & Pavan (2016), Many to Many Matching with Price Discrimination
Session 9 (April 14)
Lecture Notes: Session 9: Strong Duality for a Multiple-Good Monopolist
Session 10 (April 21 & April 28): Exploration v.s. Exploitation
Lecture Notes: Session 10: Implementing the Wisdom of the Crowd & Incentivizing Exploration
Kremer, Mansour & Perry (2013), Implementing the Wisdom of the Crowd
Frazier, Kempe, J. Kleinberg & R. Kleinberg (2014), Incentivizing Exploration
Other papers:
Kanoria & Saban (2017), Facilitating the Search for Partners on Matching Platforms: Restricting Agent Actions