I am an Assistant Professor at HEC Montreal.
Fields of Interest: Political Economy, Public Finance, Environmental Economics
Email: eric.avis@hec.ca
I am an Assistant Professor at HEC Montreal.
Fields of Interest: Political Economy, Public Finance, Environmental Economics
Email: eric.avis@hec.ca
Language and Identity: Evidence from a Schooling Reform, Forthcoming, Journal of Public Economics, 2026.
Abstract: Governments have long imposed a common language of schooling on linguistic minorities in the hope of forging a shared national identity, yet whether such mandates integrate minorities or provoke backlash remains contested. We study Quebec's 1977 Charter of the French Language, which required younger cohorts of immigrant children to enroll in French instead of English schools. Using a difference-in-differences estimation strategy we compare cohorts required to be schooled in French with those exempted from the requirement. We find that two to four decades later, children who were required to attend French schools were more likely to adopt French as a home language and less likely to adopt English, with part of the shift away from English going to heritage languages rather than to French. These shifts in language carry over to changes in identity and political attitudes: treated cohorts are more likely to identify as Québécois or French-Canadian, less attached to Canada, and more supportive of Quebec independence. We find no robust evidence of effects on education or income, and no evidence of cultural or political backlash among those who remained in Quebec. The clearest resistance took the form of exit, as treated families were twice as likely to leave the province.
Beyond the Early Era of EVs: Evidence from the Staggered Rollout of the HOV Lane Network in California (with Jing Li and Katalin Springel), Forthcoming, Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 2026.
Abstract: Local policies like high-occupancy vehicle (HOV) lane exemptions play an important role in encouraging electric vehicle (EV) adoption, a key component of climate programs. Using tract-level vehicle registrations and detailed data on HOV lane openings from 2012 to 2024, we study the causal effect of HOV policies on EV adoption in California. We find that HOV exemptions significantly increased EV uptake, with effects that were stronger in later years as EV technology and markets advanced. The impact is also greater in more congested areas with longer commutes and concentrated in higher-income tracts, highlighting both the effectiveness and distributional implications of HOV incentives.
Money and Politics: Estimating the Effects of Campaign Spending Limits on Political Entry and Competition (with Claudio Ferraz, Frederico Finan and Carlos Varjão), American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 2022.
Abstract: This paper studies the effects of campaign spending limits on political entry and competition. We study a reform in Brazil that imposed limits on campaign spending for mayoral elections. These limits were implemented with a discontinuous kink that we exploit for causal identification. We find that stricter limits increase political competition by creating a larger pool of candidates that is on average less wealthy. Stricter spending limits also reduce the likelihood that mayors are reelected. We interpret our reduced-form findings using a contest model with endogenous entry of candidates.
Do Government Audits Reduce Corruption? Estimating the Impacts of Exposing Corrupt Politicians (with Claudio Ferraz and Frederico Finan), Journal of Political Economy, 2018.
Abstract: This paper examines the extent to which government audits of public resources can reduce corruption by enhancing political and judiciary accountability. We do so in the context of Brazil’s anticorruption program, which randomly audits municipalities for their use of federal funds. We find that being audited in the past reduces future corruption by 8 percent, while also increasing the likelihood of experiencing a subsequent legal action by 20 percent. We interpret these reduced-form findings through a political agency model, which we structurally estimate. Our results suggest that the reduction in corruption comes mostly from the audits increasing the perceived nonelectoral costs of engaging in corruption.
Interest Groups, Campaign Finance and Policy Influence: Evidence from the U.S. Congress, Revisions Requested, Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization
Abstract: This paper structurally estimates a spatial voting model in which politicians weigh campaign contributions against ideological preferences, and interest groups allocate contributions strategically to influence bill passage. Linking interest group positions across bills to campaign contributions and roll call votes, I document a robust contribution-vote relationship. Estimating the model on the 110th through 114th U.S. House, I find that moderate Republicans are more responsive to contributions than ideologically extreme Republicans, while no analogous pattern appears among Democrats. Counterfactual simulations show that interest groups altered the outcomes of several major bills, with the largest effects concentrated on legislation that passed with bipartisan support and significant interest group backing.
Political Networks and Accountability Failures: Detecting Displacement of Corruption and Patronage in a Malfunctioning Democracy (with Gustavo J. Bobonis and Anke Kessler)
Does Money Make Congress Work? The Effects of Office Budgets on Legislative Productivity
Road Access and Congestion: Driver responses to Changing Travel Incentives (with Katalin Springel)