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If there is an asterisk next to the expected family contribution (EFC) on your Student Aid Report (SAR), your application has been selected for verification. NSU may also select a record for verification.

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*To obtain your IRS Return Transcript, you can order it online at irs.gov, contact the IRS at 800-908-9946, visit your local IRS office, or mail a completed Form 4506T-EZ available on the IRS website to the IRS. In lieu of an IRS transcript, institutions may accept a signed copy of tax returns for verification documentation.

The Department of Education uses verification tracking flags to place students selected for verification into different verification tracking groups. Students and/or their parents must verify information based on the tracking group to which they have been assigned.

Please Note: Verification must be completed before your need-based financial aid funds can be disbursed. If you have been awarded certain need-based funds, such as SEOG or FSAG, and your verification has not been completed by the end of the registration period, these funds may be subject to forfeit. Your documents must be reviewed and verification completed no later than four weeks prior to the end of your enrollment period for the academic year in which you are applying for aid. Failure to do so may result in ineligibility or cancellation of aid previously offered.

I am using ubuntu 12.04 and running openstack, I have set the enviroment variables for nova-api to work from command line i.e. nova list , nova flavor-list etc are working perfectly, but when I try to use curl:

OpenStack now supports signature verification for signed images. However, itdoes not support strong certificate validation for certificates used togenerate image signatures. Specifically, nova has no mechanism to identifytrusted certificates. While nova verifies the signature of a signed imageusing cursive, there is no way to determine if the certificate used togenerate and verify that signature is a certificate that is trusted by theuser. This change will introduce an addition to the nova API allowing theuser to specify a list of trusted certificates when creating or rebuildinga server. These trusted certificates will be used to conduct certificatevalidation in concert with signature verification in cursive, providing theuser confidence in the identity and integrity of the image being booted.

Note that this threat model considers glance to be untrusted and does notinclude threats to the integrity, availability, or confidentiality of nova. Itassumes that: (1) an attacker has access to the certificate manager and isable to store certificates for use with image signing, and (2) this attackeris unable to access arbitrary certificate public/private key pairs belongingto other users. An attacker with such access would be able to impersonate theuser, replacing signed images and perfectly updating the corresponding imagesignatures and metadata as needed to conceal the attack.

With this change, a nova user can specify the identities of trustedcertificates when creating/rebuilding a server from a signed image ifsignature verification and certificate validation are enabled. One of thesetrusted certificates is expected to be the signing certificate of thecertificate used to generate the image signature.

With certificate validation enabled, image signature verification will onlysucceed if the image signing certificate was generated by a trustedcertificate. This allows users to place themselves in-the-loop of thesignature verification process, requiring valid certificate information forboot to succeed.

Supporting certificate validation requires several changes. The initial changeadds a pair of new configuration options. The first configuration option,enable_certificate_validation, will enable the use of the cursive certificatevalidation routine when conducting image signature verification (see thefifth change below). This option will only be used if verify_glance_signaturesis set to True and will default to False, allowing signature verification towork without certificate validation until a compute deployment has fullyupgraded. Certificate validation will only be performed if this option is setto True.

The third change adds a parameter, trusted_certificates, to the serverrebuild command of the nova API. This parameter is identical to the parameterdescribed in the first change above. This parameter is optional and isignored by nova when rebuilding a server with a non-signed image or whencertificate validation is not enabled. If provided, the value of the parameteris saved and will persist for the lifetime of the server data. If theparameter is not provided when rebuilding a server with a signed image, theprior set of trusted certificate IDs associated with the server will bepreserved.

The fourth change adds a certificate verification context to conductcertificate validation. This work will live alongside the signatureverification routine in the new cursive certificate_utils module. Theverification context stores an arbitrary set of certificates and uses them tovalidate individual certificates submitted for certificate validation. Thecontext attempts to build a certificate chain for submitted certificates,cryptographically verifying that each parent certificate in the chain hassigned its child certificate. pyca/cryptography is used to conduct allcertificate and cryptographic operations here. The context also checks variousconstraints to determine if a certificate is valid, including valid timestampchecks. If the context cannot build a valid certificate chain for a submittedcertificate, or if any of the certificate constraint checks fail, thesubmitted certificate fails validation.

The sixth change updates the nova data model to support certificatevalidation during server operations, like server evacuation and cold or livemigrations. More generally, this applies to any operation that may be done byan admin against the server without all the information the end useroriginally supplied to the nova boot command. To support these cases, thetrusted certificate IDs used for certificate validation must be stored withthe instance data, since the user cannot be expected to provide them. TheInstanceExtra functionality in nova already supports keypairs associated withinstances. This change will update the InstanceExtra schema to support atrusted_certificate_ids column, which will contain the list of trustedcertificate IDs. The underlying storage will leverage oslo versionedobjects,requiring a new trusted_certificate_id module in nova/objects.

The seventh change updates the novaclient/openstackclient to support thetrusted_certificates parameter for the server create/rebuild commands. Thisincludes support for a new environment variable, OS_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_IDS,that can be used to define a comma-delimited list of trusted certificate IDs.If the trusted_certificates parameter is not used, the client will pull thevalue of the environment variable and use it instead. This value will beconverted into a list before being passed on.

An alternative approach to certificate validation here would be to supportcertificate trust stores, collections of trusted certificates associated withindividual users or projects. When creating a new server, the user wouldspecify their trust store as a source of trusted certificates, replacing thelist of certificates provided in the trusted_certificates parameter. Thereare many ways to support trust stores, including: a filesystem directorytrust store containing trusted certificate files stored locally on thecompute host, a metadata/managed resource approach supported under serviceslike nova or keystone, and a container-based secret storage approachsupported by services like barbican. While useful in defining collections oftrusted certificates, a trust store approach would need to scale for largecloud deployments which may be difficult from a management and maintenanceperspective. Trust stores also introduce a new construct that must betrusted by the user, especially if the user is not directly responsible formaintaining their trust store. These restrictions may not be feasible forsome cloud deployments.

An alternative to the user providing trusted certificates, or storing trustedcertificates in a trust store, would be to dynamically fetch certificatesusing information stored in the Private Internet Extension of the signedcertificate being validated. This approach allows deployers and users to usesigning certificates without needing to pre-fetch all of the root andintermediate certificates required to complete the certificate validationprocess. However, this approach requires the compute service have persistentnetwork access to all possible certificate repositories where root andintermediate certificates may be stored. In many cases, this will includenetwork access to the public Internet which may not be feasible for a genericdeployment.

An enhanced certificate validation routine would include certificaterevocation, supporting commonly used approaches like certificate revocationlists (CRLs) and/or the Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP). Supportingcertificate revocation would allow the compute service to dynamicallydetermine when certificates become invalid in real time due to compromise,further improving the security of booting signed images. However, supportingcertificate revocation involves dynamically fetching and trusting networkresources, often under the control and authority of third-parties. This maynot be feasible for some deployments. It is possible that certificaterevocation could be integrated outside of the compute service, for examplewithin the certificate manager or through another third-party service. Thiswould grant nova the benefits of timely revocation without complicating thesignature verification and certificate validation features in nova itself. 17dc91bb1f