I'm trying to put together a script which will update Windows 7 with the latest Windows Defender Antivirus definitions. Microsoft continues to provide updates on their website, being most recently updated July 2021.
Offline definitions can be downloaded and installed offline. This will successfully update the definitions file. However, it is not updating mpsigstub.exe, despite the updated file being contained in the definition update mpas-fe.exe.
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Windows Update will continue to report that the latest definitions are not yet installed but will reduce the file size to only a few hundred kilobytes. Downloading this update will correctly update only mpsigstub.exe as expected.
So it is a whitelisted clean file. Now that I have GlassWire set at Ask To Connect, this problem occurs: this file is created in a random folder such as C:\Windows\Temp\randomLettersAndNumbers\MpSigStub.exe
The problem is you get dozens of popups asking Allow/Deny each time the installer creates a new instance, for the identical .exe file. That results in dozens of mpsigstub.exe entries in the GlassWire Firewall (perhaps that is not optimal), even the files are identical (just different folders). On the other hand, generally it is good that I can have different instances of the same .exe in different folders, with different firewall settings.
This RCE vulnerability caught the attention of security professionals and system administrators alike, as it had already been exploited in the wild. Microsoft swiftly provided mitigation guidance on May 30, but full patches weren't released until June 14.
You'll act as part of a SOC team that has identified numerous phishing emails coming in claiming to have a document about an upcoming round of layoffs in the company. The emails all contain a link to diagnostic.htb/layoffs.doc. The DNS for that domain has since stopped resolving, but the server is still hosting the malicious document (your docker). Your job is to figure out what's going on.
CVE-2022-30190, also known as Follina, is a critical vulnerability in the Microsoft Windows Support Diagnostic Tool (MSDT). MSDT is a built-in feature found in various Windows operating systems. Like a mechanic for your computer, it detects problems and conducts routine examinations to ensure smooth performance.
Now, envision a scenario where someone can mislead this mechanic into accidentally unlocking the doors to critical areas of your computer system. These doors could lead to valuable information or even control over essential functions. This is, in essence, what happened with CVE-2022-30190.
A vulnerability was discovered in MSDT that could grant unauthorized individuals access to vital components of a Windows system. They could manipulate, retrieve, or even destroy critical information through remote code execution.
This alarming revelation highlights the importance of the diagnostic tool itself and the need for its rigorous security measures. By understanding how the tool functions, we can further grasp the nature of the vulnerability and the way attackers could exploit it.
The core of CVE-2022-30190 lies in a flaw within Microsoft's Diagnostic Troubleshooting executable, msdt.exe, specifically in how MSDT processes malformed URIs, typically characterized by an unusual length and ending with '!'.
The most common delivery mechanism for Folina is through a Microsoft Word document. The malicious URI is too long to embed directly, so an HTML reference is downloaded automatically on open, and it uses JavaScript to invoke the malicious URI for MSDT.
Upon opening the Word document, the HTML payload is fetched and executed. The payload exploits the ms-msdt URI scheme to set up the PowerShell execution. It must exceed 4096 bytes for successful execution.
At the time of writing, only a few antivirus engines flag this activity, making it stealthy and difficult to detect. Windows real-time protection is among the few defenses capable of stopping it. However, given the low detection rate, other evasion tactics could potentially be deployed.
The exploit culminates in the execution of mpsigstub.exe, operating with the local user's permissions. This could be a foundation for additional privilege escalation or lateral movement if coupled with other vulnerabilities.
The Follina vulnerability ingeniously exploits Microsoft Word's remote template feature, ms-msdt URI schemes, and msdt.exe's parameter handling. Its multi-stage nature and ability to bypass various security mechanisms make it a highly sophisticated and severe threat.
There is a Metasploit module for Follina. The source code for it can be found on Packet Storm.
This Metasploit module crafts a Microsoft Word document that, once loaded, leverages the remote template feature. By fetching an HTML document, it utilizes the ms-msdt scheme to carry out PowerShell code execution.
Creation of malicious components: The exploit generates three critical components: a malicious DOCX file, an HTML payload, and a JavaScript payload. The DOCX file is crafted using a default or user-specified MSF template.
DOCX manipulation: Between lines 126-160, the exploit modifies the document.xml.rels file within the DOCX (which is essentially a ZIP archive). It inserts a malicious MSDT URI, preparing the document to fetch the HTML payload.
HTML payload generation: The HTML payload is generated between lines 95-124 and is responsible for executing the embedded JavaScript. The JavaScript content, potentially obfuscated depending on user settings, is constructed to redirect the browser to the malicious URI using window.location.href, which triggers the PowerShell execution.
Hosting and payload delivery: The Metasploit module hosts the HTML payload on a web server. When the target opens the manipulated DOCX file, Microsoft Word attempts to download the HTML payload due to the alterations made in the document.xml.rels file. This is orchestrated between lines 162-189, with specific response handling for .html and .ps1 requests, facilitating the delivery of both HTML and PowerShell payloads.
Finalizing and packing DOCX: Around lines 191-224, the modified DOCX file is finished and packed, containing the necessary alterations and injected payload, ready to be delivered to the target with the filename specified in the module's datastore options.
Helper functions: Lastly, the module utilizes helper functions between lines 226-251 for URI normalization, random integer generation, and DOCX unpacking, assisting in the seamless execution of the exploit.
This modular approach, facilitated by the Metasploit Framework, exemplifies the ingenuity behind exploiting seemingly innocuous features in Microsoft Word. By leveraging remote templates, URI schemes, and PowerShell execution, it creates a sophisticated multi-layered attack mechanism. 152ee80cbc
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