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Goldman Sachs maintained that its net exposure to AIG was 'not material', and that the firm was protected by hedges (in the form of CDSs with other counterparties) and $7.5 billion of collateral, which would have protected the bank from incurring an economic loss in the event of an AIG bankruptcy or failure.[165][166] The firm stated the cost of these hedges to be over $100 million.[167] CFO David Viniar stated that profits related to AIG in the first quarter of 2009 "rounded to zero", and profits in December were not significant and that he was "mystified" by the interest the government and investors have shown in the bank's trading relationship with AIG.[168] Speculation remains that Goldman's hedges against its AIG exposure would not have paid out if AIG was allowed to fail. According to a report by the United States Office of the Inspector General of TARP, if AIG had collapsed, it would have made it difficult for Goldman to liquidate its trading positions with AIG, even at discounts, and it also would have put pressure on other counterparties that "might have made it difficult for Goldman Sachs to collect on the credit protection it had purchased against an AIG default." Finally, the report said, an AIG default would have forced Goldman Sachs to bear the risk of declines in the value of billions of dollars in collateral debt obligations.[169] Goldman argued that CDSs are marked to market (i.e. valued at their current market price) and their positions netted between counterparties daily. Thus, as the cost of insuring AIG's obligations against default rose substantially in the lead-up to its bailout, the sellers of the CDS contracts had to post more collateral to Goldman Sachs. The firm claims this meant its hedges were effective and the firm would have been protected against an AIG bankruptcy and the risk of knock-on defaults, had AIG been allowed to fail.[170] However, in practice, the collateral would not protect fully against losses both because protection sellers would not be required to post collateral that covered the complete loss during a bankruptcy and because the value of the collateral would be highly uncertain following the repercussions of an AIG bankruptcy.[171]

According to Joseph P. Kennedy II, by 2012, prices on the oil commodity market had become influenced by "hedge funds and bankers" pumping "billions of purely speculative dollars into commodity exchanges, chasing a limited number of barrels and driving up the price".[274] The problem started, according to Kennedy, in 1991, when

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just a few years after oil futures began trading on the New York Mercantile Exchange, Goldman Sachs made an argument to the Commodity Futures Trading Commission that Wall Street dealers who put down big bets on oil should be considered legitimate hedgers and granted an exemption from regulatory limits on their trades.The commission granted an exemption that ultimately allowed Goldman Sachs to process billions of dollars in speculative oil trades. Other exemptions followed,[274]

U.S. surplus was invested in the Philippines both in the form of direct investments and loan capital. Direct investments went mainly into the production of raw materials and into trade in U.S. finished products and local raw materials. Minor processing of raw materials was also introduced. Mineral ores were extracted for the first time on a commercial basis. On the other hand, loan capital served to support foreign trade and cover trade deficits, convert pesos into dollars for profit remittances, pay salaries of American bureaucrats and business personnel, cover the needs of the colonial government for various equipment and the like. Every year, raw material production and, therefore, the exploitation of the people had to be intensified by the colonial regime in order to increase its rate of profit.

Taking advantage of the political and economic difficulties of the Philippines, the U.S. government dispatched the Bell Mission to make an economic survey and make recommendations to the Quirino puppet regime. The Bell Mission paved the way for the imposition of the Economic and Technical Assistance Agreement of 1951 which required the placement of U.S. advisers in the strategic offices of the puppet government to ensure the perpetuation of the colonial policy. The newly-established Central Bank, desperately in need of dollars, became a ward of the U.S. Export-Import Bank and other U.S. banks.

In 1954, the Magsaysay puppet regime sabotaged the ceaseless popular demand for the abrogation of the Bell Trade Act by negotiating for its mere revision. Thus, the Laurel-Langley Agreement was made. This new treaty aggravated the economic subservience of the Philippines to U.S. imperialism by allowing the U.S. monopolies to enjoy parity rights in all kinds of businesses. Adjustments in the quota system and preferential treatment for Philippine raw materials were made only to deepen the colonial and agrarian character of the economy. The formal assertion of the independence of the peso currency did not remove it from the actual control of the U.S. dollar.

The first executive act performed by Macapagal when he assumed the puppet presidency in 1962 was to proclaim immediate and full decontrol. Local U.S. firms were enabled to remit huge profits even without having to conceal them any more through overpricing of goods and services bought from their mother and sister companies in the United States or elsewhere abroad. The comprador big bourgeoisie and the big landlord class gobbled up their dollar income from the export of raw materials and freely converted their pesos into dollars for the import of finished commodities. Graft and corruption shifted from the Central Bank to the Bureau of Customs and the long seacoasts of the archipelago as the system of dollar allocations was replaced by a readjusted tariff system intended to draw government revenues.

Taking advantage of the financial plight of the Philippine puppet government, U.S. imperialism through the International Monetary Fund has dictated the devaluation of the peso at the expense of the broad masses of the people. At the beginning of 1970, the value of the peso sank to the level of more than P6.00 per U.S. dollar from the previous level of P3.90 per U.S. dollar. This is the second time in only eight years that devaluation has been imposed on the people without any corresponding increases in their income. Since 1962, the prices of many basic commodities have gone up by more than 150 per cent. There is not a single commodity in the Philippines that is not affected by the rising costs of imported fuel, equipment, spare parts, raw materials, and the like. The Filipino national bourgeoisie is daily facing bankruptcy because its products are being squeezed out of the local market and it cannot avail itself of adequate credit assistance from a bankrupt puppet government.

As a result of the peso devaluation, the value of U.S. assets in the Philippines and also of Philippine foreign debt has automatically increased. It is idle and downright stupid to expect the reactionary government or private Filipino stockbuyers to be able to buy out the U.S. monopolies. On the other hand, the reactionary government has become worse as a beggar of usurious foreign loans and Filipino-owned enterprises have become more than ever subject to takeover, assimilation or crushing by the U.S. monopolies. Devaluation has only made the Philippines more dependent on the U.S. dollar and has only served to aggravate the semicolonial and semifeudal character of the economy.

The profit remittances of U.S. firms were officially reported by the Philippine reactionary government as reaching tens of millions of dollars annually during the sixties, specifically an average annual rate of a little over $40 million. Nevertheless, there were unidentifiable transactions in Central Bank records amounting to several hundreds of millions of dollars every year, ostensibly for the payment of imports, travel abroad, and several other transactions involving the disbursement of foreign exchange. According to estimates made by the Economic Monitor, the U.S. firms holding $500 million investments in the Philippines made remittances arnounting to $2.2 billion from 1962 to 1969 or an annual average of $316 million. On top of this, dollar payments for miscellaneous invisibles totalled $2.7 billion or an annual average of $304 million. The Americans for Peace in Indochina, an association of Americans in the Philippines opposed to the U.S. war of aggression, claims that in 1969 alone, U.S. investors remitted $3.0 billion from the Philippines.

By the nature of its exports the bulk of which comprises sugar, logs, lumber, coconut products, abaca, tobacco and unprocessed minerals, the Philippines cannot earn enough U.S. dollars to pay for the importation of foreign manufactures coming principally from the United States which command higher prices. As of 1968, only 8.3 per cent of Philippine exports could be categorized as manufactured goods. The Philippine economy is so uneven and lopsided that it has to import even such agricultural products as poultry and dairy products, cereals and cereal preparations which are still in the bracket of the ten top imports. In the world capitalist market, the foreign monopolies consistently jack up the price of their manufactures and other products and force down the price of raw materials that they purchase from the colonies and semicolonies like the Philippines. The result is chronic deficit in the foreign trade of the Philippines. The annual foreign trade deficit rose from $147.1 million in 1955 to $249.7 million in 1967 and to $301.9 million in 1968. The rapid rate of increase in deficit is due to the effects of U.S. imperialism and all other imperialist powers to squeeze out more profits from their foreign trade as a measure of facing up to their own balance-of-payments problem. They are now viciously trying to pass on the burden of their general crisis to their colonies and semicolonies by stepping up their own exports, by exporting inflation, by forcing weaker countries to devalue their currencies and by practising usury. 2351a5e196