“Dignity, Worth, and Bioethics”
Advisor: Jason Eberl
Committee members: Eleonore Stump, Bryan Pilkington, Jeffrey Bishop
Many bioethicists assert that human dignity is an ambiguous or even vacuous concept. Debates surrounding physician-assisted death provide a salient example: one side argues that patients have a right to what is called “death with dignity,” while the other side argues that it is a fundamental violation of human dignity for physicians to intentionally kill their patient, even with the patient’s consent. Since both sides employ the same term as justification for their claims, many bioethicists have concluded that human dignity is a meaningless concept that ought to be excised from bioethical discourse. I disagree with this conclusion, however, and instead argue that, properly understood, human dignity is indispensable for medical decision-making. To make this argument, I set out to answer three fundamental questions about the concept of human dignity: what is human dignity? What invests human persons with dignity? And what does it mean to violate or promote human dignity? To the first question, I argue that human dignity is a dual-character concept. I distinguish here between what I call intrinsic dignity and inflorescent dignity—two aspects of dignity that are distinct and yet interrelated. The result of this account is the conclusion that dignity is at once a property possessed to an equal degree by all human persons, and at the same time a property possessed by some human persons more than others. Explaining how this can be is the project of the second chapter of my dissertation. In chapter 3 I answer the second question and argue that human persons are invested with dignity on account of the kind of thing that humans are, namely rational animals. This account, which relies on a Thomistic conceptions both of natural kinds and of potentiality, can explain why all—not some—human persons have dignity. In chapter 4, I answer the third question--what invests human persons with dignity? Here, I return again to my dual-character account of human dignity to argue that violations of human dignity primarily concern what I call intrinsic dignity, whereas promotions of human dignity concern what I call inflorescent dignity. My final chapter explores the connection between human dignity and the Christian notion of the imago dei, “image of God,” two concepts many thinkers throughout the Christian tradition have thought are tightly connected. I thus conclude the dissertation by surveying how Christians have traditionally thought about the relationship between human dignity and the imago dei and then suggest how my account of human dignity might be related to and complementary to this classical Christian doctrine.
"For the Beauty of Glory: Aquinas, Disability, and Resurrection," in Disability Theology & Eschatology: Hope, Justice, & Flourishing, eds. Hill, Preston and Aaron Brian Davis (Lexington Books, forthcoming), invited, under review
Abstract: Will there be disabilities in heaven? Many Christians believe there will not, with some scholars marshalling the work of Thomas Aquinas in support of their view. These scholars characterize Aquinas as believing that disabilities make those who have them intrinsically worse off, and since the resurrected bodies of the saints will be perfected, all disabilities will be eliminated in heaven. In this paper, I argue this view is mistaken. That is, I argue both that there will be disabilities in heaven and also that the work of Thomas Aquinas gives reason to think so. Contrary to how some scholars interpret him, I argue Aquinas believes that disabilities sometimes make a person more perfect.
“Bioethics and the Contours of Autonomy,” Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 47, no. 4 (Aug. 2022): 495-502.
Abstract: The principle of respect for autonomy often dominates bioethical discourse. Yet despite its prominence, the exact contours are not always well defined. Widespread disagreement about the nature of autonomy has led some to conclude that autonomy is hopelessly vague and therefore ought to be abandoned in contemporary bioethics. But despite calls to move beyond it, autonomy remains at the center of bioethical reflection. The challenge, then, if autonomy is to function as a bedrock of contemporary bioethics, is to define more clearly the shape of autonomy, to more precisely mark its conceptual boundaries, and to delineate more carefully how best autonomy is put into practice in medical ethics. In this paper, I raise questions about the ways autonomy is used in theory as well as the ways that it is operationalized in practice.
“Religious Epistemology in the Churches of Christ.” Stone-Campbell Journal 24, no. 2 (Fall 2021): 195-205.
Abstract: Although the Churches of Christ (a cappella) have developed a distinct culture of attention to epistemological issues, little has been written about the epistemic framework that animates responses to these issues. The tradition’s significant emphasis on apologetics, debate, knowledge of absolute truth, and highly developed exegetical philosophies are tightly connected to the tradition’s religious epistemology. In order to understand this religious epistemology, this paper closely analyzes and critiques the epistemology of Thomas B. Warren, a prominent philosopher within the tradition.
“Dignity as Worth”
Abstract: Broadly speaking, accounts of human dignity fall into three main types. There are worth-based, status-based, and attitude-based accounts. In this paper, I dileneate the fundamental commitments of each approach to dignity. I argue that status-based and attitude-based accounts of dignity are inadequate and instead defend the prospects of worth-based accounts. I conclude with suggestions for what such a worth-based account of dignity might look like and show how this account responds to some of the criticisms philosophers have given against the concept of human dignity.
“Human Flourishing and the Proper Ends of Medicine.”
Abstract: What are the proper ends of medicine? Some bioethicists have argued that the proper end of medicine is health. The healing view of medicine, however, rules out things like vasectomies, physician-assisted death, and gender-affirming care. For this reason, some bioethicists object to the healing view. They argue that medicine is aimed instead at promoting patient values. In this paper, I argue against both of these views and instead offer an alternative—what I call the flourishing view of medicine. According to the flourishing view of medicine, the proper end of medicine is human flourishing. If my account is right, religious bioethicists cannot oppose procedures such as gender-affirming care or physician-assisted suicide simply on the grounds that they do not contribute to health. What instead they must show is that they do not contribute to human flourishing.
“Epistemic Injustice and Human Dignity in Healthcare.”
Abstract: Women are believed less than men when they report pain to healthcare providers. The research on this is definitive. Yet while the research on the degree to which women are not believed is substantial, only recently has research been done on the ethics at stake in these cases. The growing subfield of epistemic injustice has provided a fruitful lens for reflecting on the kinds of wrongs—both moral and epistemic—common in health care contexts. In this paper, I employ recent research on epistemic injustice to analyze the common occurrence in healthcare settings of women’s symptoms of pain being treated less seriously than men’s. Specifically, I argue that women who are not believed when they report symptoms of pain are subject to a form of objectification, and that furthermore, this objectification is a violation of dignity. Appeals to dignity, however, are controversial in contemporary bioethics. It is commonly objected that the concept of dignity is an unclear notion that, at best, amounts to no more than respect for autonomy or respect for rights. I argue on the contrary that this eliminativist view of dignity is mistaken. Cases of epistemic injustice help show why.
“Infidelity and the Significance View of Sex”
Abstract: Sexual infidelity is a serious wrong. It is taken to be so serious, in fact, that sexual infidelity can and sometimes does result in the dissolution of what were otherwise happy marriages or relationships. This raises the question: what is it that makes the wrong of sexual infidelity so serious? The answer to this question will depend on one’s views about the ethics of sex in general. Consider two such views. There is on the one hand the Casual View of Sex, according to which sex is morally just like any other pleasure and is constrained only by the sorts of moral constraints that follow all other pleasure-seeking activities. There is on the other hand the Love View of Sex, according to which sex is a morally special sort of activity and may only be permissibly enjoyed between individuals who share feelings of affection that are commensurate with the intimacy of the sexual activity. In this paper, I argue against both of these views and propose instead a third: the Commitment View of Sex. I draw on philosophy about the ethics of infidelity to make this argument.
“Natural Family Planning is Morally Equivalent to Contraception.”
Abstract: Friends of natural law theory often oppose contraceptive methods like condom use, sterilization, chemical birth controls, and coitus interruptus. Many who oppose these contraceptive methods, however, believe that Natural Family Planning (NFP) is morally permissible. In this paper, I argue that this combination of views is inconsistent. That is, those who oppose condom use and coitus interruptus should also oppose NFP. This is because the intent behind each of these actions is the same: they are each meant to avoid the conception of children. For this reason, NFP is morally equivalent to many contraceptive methods.
“Normative Properties and the Powers Metaphysic.”
Abstract: In The Powers Metaphysic, Neil Williams defends an ontology according to which properties are “powers and only powers.” In this paper, I raise a problem for the powers metaphysic. I argue that ontologies that take properties to be powers (and only powers) cannot adequately accommodate normative properties. This is because normative properties are causally inert—they do not provide their possessors with the ability to bring about states of affairs. If this is right, then defenders of the powers metaphysics are faced with a dilemma: they must either deny realism about normative properties, or they must deny monism about properties. I conclude by raising objections to my argument that defenders of monist powers metaphysics might give and show why these objections fail.
** Drafts may be available upon request