Research Interests:
1. The methodology of conceptual ethics
When we conduct an evaluative inquiry into concepts, how should we proceed? Is there a notion of conceptual function that is useful for assessing concepts? How do epistemic and practical considerations regarding the value of concepts interact? Can we make progress on these questions by viewing concepts as artefactual tools?
2. Conceptual corruption & conceptual abandonment
What should we do with concepts that are defective or heavily exploited? Under what conditions (if any) is it appropriate to stop using such concepts altogether?
3. The ethics of conceptual exportation
In cross-cultural exchanges, it often happens that one society exports into another society’s repertoire conceptual resources that were originally developed in response to its own contingent needs and circumstances, but whose suitability for the recipient society is uncertain. I am interested in the normative status of conceptual exportation: under what conditions is it permissible? What risks does it involve, and what are its potential benefits? How should it be conducted?
Published Papers:
1. Why ‘Democracy’ Is Still a Word Worth Using. Asian Journal of Philosophy. Forthcoming. [link]
Abstract: In his 2023 book The Concept of Democracy: An Essay on Conceptual Amelioration and Abandonment, Herman Cappelen argues that we should stop using ‘democracy’ and ‘democratic’ (D-words). In this paper, I critically engage with Cappelen’s argument, focusing primarily on his contention that D-words likely fail us semantically, either by being meaningless or by having massively mismatched extensions. Against Cappelen, I argue for three claims. First, even if D-words aren’t fully semantically settled, they are likely at least partially settled. Second, even if D-words are only partially semantically settled, they can be useful enough to retain in our conceptual repertoire. Third, even if the extension of D-words is massively mismatched, this would be a serious consideration for their abandonment only under specific conditions that don’t seem to obtain in the case of the mismatches that Cappelen considers. I also address the objection that my defense of D-words is overly optimistic, as it underestimates the extent of their normative exploitation.
2. Unpacking Conceptual Function as Tool Function. Synthese. 2025. [link]
Abstract: It is increasingly argued that conceptual engineering should be sensitive to the functions that representational devices serve for their users. Less clear, however, is how to interpret conceptual function. This paper addresses this question through what I call the ‘analogy-based strategy’, focusing on linguistic conceptual engineering that targets referential expressions. The analogy-based strategy builds on the observation that referential expressions are treated in conceptual engineering as a subset of human tools. Accordingly, it aims to develop an interpretation of conceptual function that takes seriously the analogy between conceptual functions and other tool functions, and draws on this analogy to reveal new theoretical roles that conceptual function can play in conceptual engineering. After introducing four desiderata for such an interpretation and explaining their significance, I critically assess two candidate interpretations of conceptual function that follow dominant philosophical approaches to function: the proper-function interpretation and the system-function interpretation. I show that both fail to meet key desiderata. As an alternative, I develop a novel motivation-based interpretation, which understands conceptual function in terms of those actual or potential effects of an expression that are central to why a user group is, often implicitly, motivated to retain it in their conceptual repertoire. I argue that this interpretation provides an attractive notion of conceptual function that meets all four desiderata and proves useful for certain kinds of conceptual assessment.
3. Linguistic Imposters (w/Edison Yi) The Philosophical Quarterly. 2024. [link]
Abstract: There is a widespread phenomenon that we call linguistic imposters. Linguistic imposters are systematic misuses of expressions that misusers mistake with their conventional usages because of misunderstanding their meaning. Our paper aims to provide an initial framework for theorising about linguistic imposters that will lay the foundation for future philosophical research about them. We focus on the misuses of the expressions ‘grooming’ and ‘critical race theory’ as our central examples of linguistic imposters. We show that linguistic imposters present a distinctive phenomenon by comparing them to some adjacent phenomena, namely conceptual engineering, linguistic hijacking and dogwhistles. We also address four objections about the extensional adequacy of our definition of linguistic imposters. Finally, we argue that, as linguistic imposters spread, they make some inferences featuring misused expressions more cognitively accessible and seemingly socially licensed to misusers and discuss four types of harms that linguistic imposters are conducive to through these effects.
Work in Progress (email me for drafts):
A paper on conceptual abandonment (R&R from Australasian Journal of Philosophy)
A paper arguing against non-epistemic considerations being the wrong kind of reasons for engineering concepts (in preparation for a Routledge edited volume)
A paper on epistemic-moral conflicts in conceptual assessment
A paper on thick ethical concepts
A paper on extrapolation in cross-cultural conceptual ethics
A paper on engineering the concept of dehumanization
Some Recent Talks:
Sep 2025. Sichuan Rethinking Metaphysics Reading Group (hybrid): Navigating Epistemic-Moral Conflicts in Conceptual Ethics.
Apr 2025. APA Pacific Division (San Francisco): What Do Dehumanizers Believe?
Oct. 2024. Hong Kong University ConceptLab: When Do Referential Mismatches Support Abandoning a Concept?
Aug 2024. 45th International Wittgenstein Symposium (Kirchberg am Wechsel): The Exportability of Embedded Social Kinds.
Jun 2024. Annual Meeting of the Canadian Philosophical Association (Montreal): Explaining the Extension and Value of Thick Concepts.
Feb 2024. Bochum/Warsaw Workshop on CE in HPI (online): De Novo Conceptual Engineering in Translation: A Case Study of Japanese Translation Words in the Meiji Era.
May 2023. Tokyo Forum for Analytic Philosophy, May 2023: Linguistic Imposters (w/Edison Yi).
