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• 第13回 CUESTセミナー

日時: 2025年3月18日（火）16:10-17:40

場所: 千葉大学西千葉キャンパス人文社会科学系総合研究棟（共通演習室4）

報告者: 山岸 敦 氏（一橋大学）

論題: The Economic Dynamics of City Structure: Evidence from Hiroshima's Recovery

要旨: We provide new theory and evidence on the resilience of internal city structure after a large shock, analyzing the atomic bombing of Hiroshima. Exploiting newly digitized data, we document that the city structure recovered within five years after the bombing. Our new dynamic quantitative model of internal city structure incorporates commuting, forward-looking location choices, migration frictions, agglomeration forces, and heterogeneous location fundamentals. Strong agglomeration forces in our estimated model explain Hiroshima's recovery, and we find an alternative equilibrium where the city center did not recover. These results highlight the role of agglomeration forces, multiple equilibria, and expectations in urban dynamics.

• 第12回 CUESTセミナー

日時: 2025年2月20日（木）16:10-17:40

場所: 千葉大学西千葉キャンパス人文社会科学系総合研究棟（共通演習室4）

報告者: 清水 木楠 氏（東京大学）

論題: Dynamics of Common Beliefs and the Value of Information Sharing

要旨: We analyze the evolution of common beliefs among two agents, where one agent (the informed) knows the true state while the other (the uninformed) learns the true state over T periods via i.i.d. private signals. We examine how information sharing among them affects the emergence of common beliefs. Information sharing is assumed to be non-strategic and imperfect in the sense that it imperfectly reveals the signals received by the uninformed agent. We define the value of information sharing as (the probability that the true state is common p-believed under information sharing) - (the probability under no information sharing), and we show that the value of information sharing depends on T (how long the uninformed agent learns). Intuitively, information sharing appears to help achieve common beliefs, but this is only true when T is small. The value of information sharing is positive for small T, but it becomes negative when T is larger. Moreover, the value of information sharing can be equal to zero for all sufficiently large values of T, and we provide almost necessary and sufficient conditions for this to hold.

• 第11回 CUESTセミナー

日時: 2024年11月22日（金）16:10-17:40

場所: 千葉大学西千葉キャンパス人文社会科学系総合研究棟（共通演習室4）

報告者: 関根 篤史 氏（明治大学）

論題: Pass-through of Exchange Rate, Import and Commodity Prices into Inflation: A STAR Approach

要旨: With rising import prices since the COVID-19 pandemic, I investigate pass-through of exchange rate and import prices into inflation in Japan and the U.S., assuming import prices as importers' marginal cost. By estimating the exponential smooth transition autoregressive model that considers past inflation rates, I show that the pass-through is higher in both countries when past inflation rates deviate relatively strongly from zero. This result highlights the importance of the state of inflation in explaining the rising pass-through since the pandemic. The pass-through has been high over time and more responsive to past inflation rates in the U.S., but low even during high inflation and less responsive in Japan, suggesting that Bank of Japan may not need to pay special attention to changes in import prices due to stickier prices. In Japan, contract-currency-based import prices or commodity prices have larger effect on inflation than exchange rate.

• 第10回 CUESTセミナー

日時: 2024年9月27日（金）16:10-17:40

場所: 千葉大学西千葉キャンパス人文社会科学系総合研究棟（共通演習室4）

報告者: 土屋 亮太 氏（東京大学）

論題: Taxing Cross-Border Online Sales for Pareto Improvement in Tax Revenue (with Hikaru Ogawa)

要旨: This study examines the effect of international taxation rules that allow market countries to tax the sales of a giant digital IT firm based outside the countries. It develops an asymmetric tax competition model where one country hosts an online service supplier selling digital services over the Internet worldwide. The main finding indicates that changes in tax rules improving market countries will not only benefit them but also the country hosting the global supplier whose tax bases would shrink.