See You at Night: Unintended Consequences of Raising Provider Payments for Nighttime Emergency Care
with Hsien-Ming Lien [Draft]
Using administrative data from Taiwan’s single-payer healthcare system, this paper studies a 2010 reform that increased nighttime payments to emergency department (ED) physicians by 25 percent. Exploiting the resulting payment discontinuity, we employ a regression discontinuity in time (RDiT) design and adopt an augmented local linear approach to address identification challenges inherent to time-based running variables. We find no effects on overall care provision or visit volume. Instead, we document a 33 percent increase in the share of low-acuity visits during nighttime hours, with no corresponding change among high-severity cases, consistent with hospitals strategically re-timing low-acuity patients to increase reimbursement. Using daytime visits as a within-hospital control in an event-study framework, we find little impact on hospitalization, length of stay, costs, or mortality up to one year after implementation. The results suggest no evidence of substitution between emergency and primary care, indicating that the observed responses reflect supply-side behavior rather than patient demand.