See You at Night: Unintended Consequences of Raising Provider Payments for Nighttime Emergency Care
with Hsien-Ming Lien [Draft]
Using administrative data from Taiwan's single-payer healthcare system, this paper studies a 2010 reform that raised the diagnostic fee for nighttime emergency department (ED) visits by 25 percent. We exploit the payment discontinuity in a regression discontinuity in time design, adopting an augmented local linear approach. We find no effects on care provision, treatment intensity, or visit volume, and no substitution between emergency and primary care. What changes instead is the composition of nighttime visits: the share of low-acuity visits rises by 37 percent, with no corresponding change among high-severity cases. The pattern is consistent with hospitals delaying the registration of wait-tolerant patients until just after the payment cutoff: a purely temporal reallocation that raises reimbursement without altering the treatment delivered, the diagnosis recorded, or the patients seen. Downstream health outcomes are unaffected. Where a fee is paid to the organization rather than the practitioner, targeted subsidies may purchase administrative adjustment rather than the capacity they were designed to expand.