Working Paper

Altruistic Behavior and Government Interventions in Times of Crisis, joint with Marina Schröder & Maximilian Todtenhaupt

We analyze the response of charitable donations to restrictions on civil liberties. We argue that restrictions either increase altruistic behavior by raising the perceived benefit of donations, or crowd out altruistic behavior due to utility losses associated with restrictions. Using data on donations in Norwegian grocery stores, we find evidence for a significant increase in donation rates following the implementation of local restrictions. We provide evidence that this rise is likely driven by individuals not directly affected by the restrictions. Thus, the influence of government restrictions on altruistic behavior depends strongly on the impact of these restrictions for the individual.

The Bright Side of Tax Evasion, joint with Wladislaw Mill

This paper investigates whether tax evasion can be beneficial for an optimal income tax schedule. Past theoretical discussions have presented mixed outcomes as to whether allowing taxpayers to opt into uncertainty could indeed enhance overall tax revenues. In this study, we conducted an original real effort experiment in an online labor market with almost 1,000 participants to test this hypothesis empirically. Our findings show significant positive labor supply responses to the opportunity to evade (increased labor supply by 37%). More importantly, the expected tax revenue significantly and substantially increased by up to more than 50%. As an example, our data suggests that a 40% tax rate with complete enforcement could be replaced with a 28% tax rate with the option of tax evasion, without any loss in tax revenue. Strikingly, this effect persists when comparing effective tax rates: Lowering effective tax rates through probabilistic enforcement (the opportunity to evade) is more efficient than simply lowering statutory tax rates. Our findings suggest that the opportunity for tax evasion can increase tax revenues beyond what a corresponding decrease in nominal rates would achieve. For welfare analyses, this highlights the importance of not only considering the elasticity of taxable income (ETI) but total earned income elasticities. 

Courts and Public Opinion in International Multi-Level Court Systems, joint with Pascal Langenbach

In this paper, we report results from two online vignette experiments on how de- cisions in international multi-level court systems can influence public opinion about national policies. Specifically, we study the German Federal Constitutional Court and the European Court of Human Rights. The experimental design emphasizes the possible conflict between court decisions at the national and the international level. Our vignettes examine four different policies. The results suggest that both courts can influence domestic public opinion, and that the European court’s decision can serve as a counterbalance to the public-opinion effects of the national court’s decision. Notably, the presence and magnitude of these effects are highly context-dependent. While the national origin of the case seems not to matter for public opinion on average, we find heterogeneous treatment effects for subsamples of the political right.

Biased Preferences for Wealth Taxation: The Case of Misperceived Tax Burden Consequences,  joint with Malte Chirvi & Hans-Peter Huber, 2021;  TRR 266 Accounting for Transparency Working Paper Series 54

It is well documented that humans have difficulties in understanding nonlinear growth. This paper explores to what extent this type of bounded rationality translates into preferences for specific wealth-tax designs. In particular, we quantify shifts in stated preferences for wealth taxation caused by misperceived burden consequences of commonly politically discussed tax parameters: tax allowances and tax rates. For this, we conducted a randomized survey experiment with over 1,200 respondents in Germany. In a 2x2 design, our respondents were randomly selected to indicate both their preferred tax allowance and tax rate for either a yearly or a one- time wealth tax. Our treatment group was provided with easy-to-understand information on the resulting total tax burden for the respective wealth tax instrument. We find the preferred effective tax rate drops by almost 15 percentage points for a yearly wealth tax if our participants are fully informed, whereas we do not find this effect for the one-time wealth tax. We argue that both the total tax burden and the perceived feasibility of single payments are factors that form preferences for tax parameters.

Preferences for Wealth Taxation - Design, Framing and the Role of Partisanship, joint with Malte Chirvi, 2020; arqus Working Paper 260

Empirical literature on preferences for wealth taxation almost exclusively focuses on either the emotionally loaded estate tax or rather general concepts of redistributive preferences. Yet, it remains unclear whether the exceptional opposition towards the estate tax is applicable to other instruments of net wealth taxation. This study presents, to our knowledge, the first investigation of how individuals want to tax wealth - across a variety of tangible wealth tax instruments. In doing so, we particularly test for the presence of framing effects, incidence concentration and the role of wealth characteristics within the different tax configurations. For this, we conducted a factorial vignette survey experiment with over 3,200 respondents on Amazon‘s Mechanical Turk (MTurk). Each respondent was randomized into one of four burden-equivalent wealth tax instruments: an estate tax, a one-time wealth tax, a decennial wealth tax or a yearly wealth tax. Subsequently we asked each respondent to state her preferred overall lifetime tax burden for a set of hypothetical individuals. Our findings yield several interesting insights. First, we find that the exceptional opposition towards the estate tax is not applicable to other instruments of wealth taxation and is only valid for certain sub- groups. In general, our empirical findings provide preferred tax rates between 12.8 to 14.9 percent of overall lifetime tax burden. Second, we document an exceptional opposition towards the mere name “estate tax” in relation to equivalent wealth tax instruments for certain subgroups. Republicans particularly reject the estate tax with a lower proposed effective tax rate of around 3.1 percentage points compared to all other wealth taxes - even the perfectly congruent one-time wealth tax. Third, we uncover the influence of normative preferences for specific design features on the support for a wealth tax. Proposed effective tax rates of the estate tax and the one-time wealth tax show a significant progressivity, whereas no progressivity can be observed for both periodical taxes. The presence of children has an especially significant negative effect in one-off wealth taxes at the end of the lifetime.