The study of fiction raises fundamental questions about cognition, such as the nature of belief and imagination. The interest of fiction and fantasy-based phenomena have increased in recent years but have been carried out in relatively isolated areas such as media studies, narrative comprehension, philosophy, and psychology (e.g., Mar & Oatley, 2008; Busselle & Bilandzic, 2008; Altmann et al., 2014; Hartung et al., 2017; Hopkins & Weisberg, 2017; Jacobs & Willems, 2018; Consoli, 2018; Maier & Semeijn, 2021; Brône & Oben, 2021; Triantafyllopoulos et al., 2021; Kapitány et al., 2022; Abraham, 2022). Within psychological research, memory of fiction has recently received focus as a significant part of human memory (Marsh & Yang, 2020; Rubin, 2022; Yang et al., 2022; Gander & Gander, 2022), with connections to other memory-related phenomena involving imagination and mental simulation (Berntsen, 2019; De Brigard et al., 2020; Jeunehomme & D’Argembeau, 2021).

The current symposium draws together researchers with various perspectives on cognition and fiction. Central is cognitive processing of fiction and fictional information, which will be illuminated through research on memory, learning, education, influence, and cognitive development, with researchers from fields such as cognitive science, psychology, philosophy, pedagogy, neuroscience, artificial intelligence, linguistics, media studies, and anthropology.

The aim is to share research findings, conceptualizations, and methodology from various perspectives. Differences in cognitive processing of fact versus fiction will be discussed. Furthermore, connections will be drawn between the phenomena fiction, pretense, fantasy, imagination, and mental simulation. The plan is to integrate various approaches and examine the possibility of common definitions of fiction and fictional information. 

Anna Abraham, University of Georgia, US

Rick Busselle, Bowling Green State University, US 

Rohan Kapitány, Keele University, UK 

Merel Semeijn, University of Groningen, Netherlands 

Brenda Yang, Duke University, US 

Kata Szita, Trinity College Dublin, Ireland 

Lauren Christophers, UCD School of Medicine/National Rehabilitation Hospital, Ireland 

Alexandra Effe, University of Oslo, Norway

Jasmin Richter, University of Oslo, Norway

Valerie van Mulukom, Coventry University, UK

Lindholmen Conference Centre (located in Lindholmen Science Park) - Conference room Tesla, Lindholmspiren 5, 417 56 Göteborg, Sweden. (In Google maps)

Accommodation for speakers: Radisson Blu Riverside hotel 

Location information: Gothenburg's Official Visitor's Guide: https://www.goteborg.com/en. June is one of the best months to visit Gothenburg, with temperatures around 20°C (68°F) and 18 hours of daylight: https://www.google.com/search?q=weather+in+gothenburg+june

The program starts after lunch Day 1 and ends by 15.30 Day 2 to allow for the possibility to travel and stay only one night (for those coming from Europe). For those who stay longer and can come earlier, there is an optional meet-up on the 8th at 11:15 and a pre-symposium lunch.

Time zone is Central European Summer Time (CEST).

June 8

11:15 (pre-symposium meet-up for those who can make it, we meet indoor by the entrance to Lindholmen Conference Centre)

11:30 (pre-symposium lunch for those who can make it)

13:00 Main start of the symposium: Introduction (Pierre Gander)

13:20 Brenda Yang

13:50 Merel Semeijn

14:20 Rohan Kapitány

14:50 Jasmin Richter

15:20 Coffee Break

15:40 Anna Abraham

16:10 Pierre Gander

16:40 Panel Discussion 1 (Speakers of Day 1 in the panel: themes and issues from the day)

17:20 End of Day 1

18:30 Dinner (invited speakers), Restaurant Cuckoo’s Nest, Radisson Blu Riverside Hotel

June 9

09:00 Introduction to Day 2

09:10 Rick Busselle

09:40 Alexandra Effe

10:10 Kata Szita

10:40 Coffee Break

11:00 Lauren Christophers

11:30 Valerie van Mulukom

12:00 Lunch Break

13:00 Panel Discussion 2 (Speakers of Day 2 in the panel: themes and issues from the day)

13:40 Coffee Break

14:00 Workshop (invited speakers): Explore feasibility of common definitions and possible future collaborations

15:30 End of Day 2

Participation in the symposium is free. Travel, accommodation, coffee, lunch, and dinner are included for invited speakers.

Pierre Gander, University of Gothenburg, Sweden (pierre.gander@gu.se). Contact me if you are interested in participating as audience.  

The symposium is funded by the Marcus Wallenberg Foundation for International Scientific Collaboration and the Department of Applied IT, University of Gothenburg. 

Pretensive Shared Reality: On the seriousness of adults pretending 

Rohan Kapitány

Keele University, UK

Abstract: Adults do not engage in pretend play in the same way as children. Consequently, scholars of psychology and cognition (unlike other scholarly fields) have overlooked the phenomenon as either invisible or un-serious. Yet, adult pretend play is both common and a direct extension of childhood pretend play. We present a conception of adult pretend play that renders it visible and highlights the important role it can play in the lives of those who pretend. We term such adult pretend play 'Pretensive Shared Reality'. PSR describes how groups of adults employ higher-order cognitive functions to explicitly and implicitly share representations of a bounded fictive-reality in predictable, coherent and enduring ways, such that this reality may be explored and expanded in an ad hoc manner to narrative and interpersonal benefit of the group. Our conception of adult pretend play as 'PSR' allows for wide range of phenomenon - ranging from Halloween, cosplay, and table-top role-playing games to Kink-play and Live-Action Role-Playing - while excluding related-but-distinct phenomena - such as acting, and the production or consumption of fiction (such as literature or cinema). We argue this is an important topic of study in-and-of itself, as well as providing unique methodological opportunities for interrogating human psychology.

Toward a Theory of Perceived Realism 

Rick Busselle 

Bowling Green State University, Bowling Green, Ohio, USA 

Abstract: Research conducted since the 1970s demonstrates that people judge, or can be prompted to judge, the realism of a broad range of media content, including printed texts, fictional and reality-based television, advertisements, video games, and virtual reality environments. This research has produced more than a dozen conceptual dimensions and as many measurement scales. It has shown that perceived realism is related to the enjoyment of mediated experiences and the influence of content.   

Despite the centrality of perceived realism in understanding the influence of mediated texts, there is no overarching theoretical model that describes the nature of realism judgments, the processes that underlie them, and the conditions that prompt them. This paper attempts to provide such a theoretical model. It incorporates literatures related to discourse comprehension, deception detection, and the philosophy of fiction, as well as extant research into the perceived realism of mediated narratives, interactive videogames, and virtual reality environments. The goal is to provide a theory of perceived realism that addresses the nature of truth in representations, the evolutionary origins and functions of deception, deception detection, and fiction, and the cognitive processes that underlie and motivate judgments about the authenticity of representations. The paper concludes with recommendations related to measurement and manipulation, and questions for future research.

Cognitive Processing of (Auto-)Fictional Imaginaries: How Literature Challenges the Laws of Probability

Alexandra Effe

University of Oslo, Norway

Abstract: Autobiographies tend to adhere to real-world laws of what is possible and impossible, while fictional texts can freely diverge from such laws. In the recently highly popular genre of autofiction impossibilities abound, with authors who narrate their own death or afterlife, and selves that split or multiply, even though such texts also make claims to autobiographical referentiality. Backed up by narrative and cognitive theory, and drawing also on reader responses from Goodreads reviews, the paper asks whether autofictional transgressions of real-world rules of what is possible and impossible have a transformative potential for changing our conception of what is possible in a text but also in real life.

To be(lieve) or not be(lieve): The role of absorption in perceived realness of fictional imaginings

Valerie van Mulukom

Coventry University, UK

ac2492@coventry.ac.uk

Abstract: My talk will focus on research I have done examining how we come to believe the fictions and imaginings we engage with. First, I aimed to test reality monitoring theories: what makes certain imaginings feel more plausible or more real? Using the social sphere paradigm (n=25), I found that episodic imaginings with disparate details were rated significantly less plausible than those with more closely connected memory details. However, I was not able to deduce whether this rating was influenced by the number of details, fluency, or familiarity of the imaginings. Next, in another study using the same paradigm but with added ratings and an additional survey examining predispositions (n=72), I found that perceived realness of the imagined event was associated with absorption into the imagined event, rather than plausibility. This surprising result is explained in part by the finding that those who score high on fantasy proneness, trait absorption, and constructive daydreaming, rate their imaginings for higher realness and absorption. Finally, in a recent study (n=198), I designed a paradigm based on a neuroscience study of acting, whereby participants again do episodic imaginings, but from first person perspective (as themselves), third person perspective (as their best friend), or fictional person perspective (as Romeo/Juliet). I again found that the more absorbed people were in the imaginings, and the more flow they felt, the more they felt they were one with the imagined character. Again, these ratings were correlated with trait absorption and fantasy proneness. I will discuss implications and future directions for this research. 

Matraversian Scepticism and Memory

Merel Semeijn

University of Groningen, Netherlands 

Abstract: Traditionally, philosophers of fiction have drawn a sharp fiction/non-fiction distinction in the analysis of cognitive attitudes involved in our engagement with representations: whereas we believe non-fictional contents (e.g., the content of a newspaper), we imagine fictional content (e.g., the content of The Hobbit). Matravers (2014) has challenged this view and offers an alternative ‘two-stage’ model of narrative interpretation. In the first stage, we merely entertain (or build a ‘mental model’ of) the content of the (fictional or non-fictional) narrative. In the second stage, we decide whether to believe the entertained content (usual for non-fiction) or not (usual for fiction). There is thus no need to posit a separate cognitive attitude of ‘imagination’ for fiction.

I explore whether Matraversian skepticism (i.e., there is no cognitively interesting difference between our engagement with fiction and non-fiction) is appropriate for theorizing about memory. I explore the merits of a two-stage model for memory: When we remember something (fictional or non-fictional), we first simply entertain the content. In a second-order reflective stage, we label the memory as ‘to be believed’/real or ‘not to be believed’/unreal (e.g., because we tag it as a fiction, lie, mistake, illusion, dream, etc.). I compare this model to existing frameworks of fictional and non-fictional memories (e.g., Yang et al., 2022; Rubin, 2022; Gander et al., p.c.) and explore some of its implications (e.g., there is no need to posit separate categories of ‘fiction-memories’, and there is no fiction/non-fiction distinction for implicit memory).

The Recruitment of Fiction to Imagine the Unfamiliar: A Natural Experiment and Replication

Brenda Yang

Duke University, US 

Abstract: People expend a great deal of time and energy telling each other stories of events that are known to be invented, which can nevertheless leave an impact once a book’s cover is closed or the theater lights toggle on. In this talk, I'll briefly review evidence for characterizing "memories of fiction" as a form of event memory of the same natural kind as memories of personal events (Yang, Deffler, & Marsh, 2022; Marsh & Yang, 2020). Building on past work, I'll present two studies (Yang, Park, & Marsh; in prep) showing that people use memories of fiction to imagine possible futures, aligning with the theorized function of episodic memory: to "provide the raw material from which to construct and imagine possible futures" (Suddendorf & Corballis, 2007; see also Baumeister et al., 2016; De Brigard, 2014; Schacter & Addis, 2007). In Study 1 (n = 238), we investigate the hypothesis that people spontaneously recruit memories of fiction when asked to simulate scenarios for which they have little lived experience. One of these scenarios involved a global pandemic, which inadvertently served as a manipulation of direct experience, as data collection coincided with the arrival of COVID-19 within our participant population of undergraduate students. In Study 2 (n = 248), we replicate the findings of Study 1 in a different population and with a new set of materials. I invite discussion on the implications of these findings, especially when it comes to how fictional narratives can constrain, expand, and transform the collective imagination.

No Moral Truth in the Mind: Moral Judgments Do Not Rely on the Same Cognitive Processes as Truth Judgments

Jasmin Richter

University of Oslo, Norway

Abstract: Does a person making a moral judgment state a fact? Philosophers have been debating this question for centuries and related research in moral psychology suggests that individuals believe that some moral statements and convictions are objective facts. The current research aims to investigate whether moral judgments and truth judgments involve the same cognitive processes. It is well-established that repeating a statement increases its perceived truth. In six studies (total N = 4,340), we tested whether repetition of a statement has similar effects on moral judgments. We predicted that if moral judgments and truth judgments tap the same cognitive processes, effects of statement repetition on both types of judgments should be similar. Consistent with previous research, we found that repetition decreased perceived moral wrongness of moral transgressions and increased perceived truth of the same statements. Yet, repetition affected moral wrongness much less than truth. Moreover, memory of repeated statements predicted truth judgments but not moral judgements. Together, these findings suggest that moral judgments do not tap the same cognitive processes as truth judgments. Thus, inconsistent with some philosophical accounts and individuals’ subjective beliefs, moral judgments, by their cognitive nature, do not seem to be statements of fact.

Cognition and detection of fictionality in extended reality

Kata Szita

Trinity College Dublin, Ireland

Abstract: Immersive experiences, such as those occurring in virtual (VR), augmented (AR), or mixed reality (MR) environments provide a specific form of sensation of realism. Virtual reality affords bodily and sensory immersion, where the movements of a user’s body and their gestures and verbal expressions are projected onto a digitally created persona, an avatar. This avatar serves as the vessel for communication and interactions, and as the agent that navigates the virtual environment. By masking sensory access to the sounds or visual details of the physical world, the virtual world is perceived as a new reality—even if its elements are generally closer to being cartoonish than photorealistic. Augmented and mixed reality, on the other hand, enable sensory access to the physical surroundings while juxtaposing digital elements, such as objects, people, and animals, or changing the sensory characteristics of real-world objects. By exploring the flux between the sensations of realism and fictionality, this paper reflects on the opportunities and potential harmful effects of the different types of extended reality experiences. Its aim is to initiate a discussion on how new digital immersive technologies can affect perceptions of reality and human interactions.

Subjective Realism in Media Entertainment: Empirically Testing a Dual Awareness Hypothesis

Lauren Christophers

UCD School of Medicine/National Rehabilitation Hospital, Ireland

Abstract: Much work has been done to explore judgements of perceived realism in narrative (media studies) and to explicate the experience of presence/realism in virtual reality (VR studies). However, few studies have drawn from both fields to inform a more holistic model of realism. While the work presented draws from different disciplines and is designed to make an interdisciplinary contribution, it has a focus on cognition rather than specific media we engage with. Specifically, I aim to understand subjective thoughts and feelings of realism as a psychological process in the context of media and entertainment. Drawing from my thesis and published papers, I present findings which support a dual process model of subjective realism that distinguishes between evaluations realism and felt realism. This is grounded theoretically in Tan’s (2008) dual awareness model of entertainment engagement. Our first study demonstrates a three-factor structure to a subjective realism measure, and piloted virtual stimuli. Our second study uses this measure and stimuli to test the effect of virtual manipulations of both content and form on subjective realism. Results indicated that perceptual and conceptual realism were rated higher in normal, everyday virtual environments while felt realism was higher in abnormal weird environments – such as underwater or the moon. Furthermore, visual quality had a significant impact on perceptual realism but not conceptual or felt realism. Importantly, these findings emerge from pre-registered empirical studies. In my talk I will contextualise these findings within the broader context of realism theory and emphasise the power of “unreal”, fantastical media and entertainment for felt realism.

Why understanding the reality-fiction distinction matters

Anna Abraham

University of Georgia, US

Abstract: In this talk, I briefly review the BLINCS model - my proposal for how we implicitly make reality-fiction distinctions - before engaging in some tentative explorations of the consequences of using such a model. I explore how this implicit understanding could become blurred in the emerging post-truth and AI-dictated world order. 

A Framework for Memory of Fictional Information

Pierre Gander (joint work with Kata Szita, Andreas Falck, and Robert Lowe)

University of Gothenburg

Much of the information people encounter in everyday life is not factual; it originates from fictional sources, such as movies, novels, video games, and from direct experience such as pretence, role-playing, and everyday conversation. Despite the recent increase in research on fiction, there is a lack of a theoretical account of how memory of fictional information is related to other types of memory, and which mechanisms allow people to separate fact and fiction in memory. We present a theoretical framework that places memory of fiction in relation to other cognitive phenomena as a distinct construct and argue that it is an essential component for any general theory of human memory. We show how fictionality can be integrated in an existing memory model by extending Rubin’s dimensional conceptual memory model. Thereby, our model can account for explicit and implicit memory of fictional information of events, places, characters, and objects. Further, we propose a set of mechanisms involving various degrees of complexity and levels of conscious processing, that mostly keep fact and fiction separated, but also allow information from fiction to influence real-world attitudes and beliefs: content-based reasoning, source monitoring, and an associative link from the memory to the concept of fiction.

Abraham, A. (2022). How we tell apart fiction from reality. The American Journal of Psychology, 135 (1), 1–18. https://doi.org/10.5406/19398298.135.1.01

Altmann, U., Bohrn, I. C., Lubrich, O., Menninghaus, W., & Jacobs, A. M. (2014). Fact vs fiction: How paratextual information shapes our reading processes. Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience, 9(1), 22–29. https://doi.org/10.1093/scan/nss098

Berntsen, D. (2019). Spontaneous future cognitions: an integrative review. Psychological Research, 83, 651–665. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00426-018-1127-z

Brône, G. & Oben, B. (2021). Monitoring the pretence. In G. Kristiansen, K. Franco, S. De Pascale, L. Rosseel & W. Zhang (Eds.), Cognitive sociolinguistics revisited (pp. 544–556). De Gruyter Mouton. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110733945-044

Busselle, R., & Bilandzic, H. (2008). Fictionality and perceived realism in experiencing stories: A model of narrative comprehension and engagement. Communication Theory, 18(2), 255–280. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2885.2008.00322.x

Consoli, G. (2018). Preliminary steps towards a cognitive theory of fiction and its effects. Journal of Cultural Cognitive Science, 2, 85–100. https://doi.org/10.1007/s41809-018-0019-5

Gander, P., & Gander, A. (2022). Visual perspective in imagination and memory of factual and fictional stories. Journal of Cognitive Psychology, 34(1), 112–126. https://doi.org/10.1080/20445911.2021.1928144

Hartung, F., Withers, P., Hagoort, P., & Willems, R. (2017). When fiction is just as real as fact: No differences in reading behavior between stories believed to be based on true or fictional events. Frontiers in Psychology, i, 1618. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2017.01618.

Hopkins, E. J., & Weisberg, D. S. (2017). The youngest readers' dilemma: A review of children's learning from fictional sources. Developmental Review, 43, 48–70. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.dr.2016.11.001

Jacobs, A. M., & Willems, R. M. (2018). The fictive brain: Neurocognitive correlates of engagement in literature. Review of General Psychology, 22(2), 147–160. https://doi.org/10.1037/gpr0000106

Kapitány, R., Hampejs, T., & Goldstein, T. R. (2022). Pretensive shared reality: From childhood pretense to adult imaginative play. Frontiers in Psychology, 13, 774085. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2022.774085

Maier, E., & Semeijn, M. (2021). Extracting fictional truth from unreliable sources. In E. Maier & A. Stokke (Eds.), The language of fiction. Oxford University Press.

Mar, R. A., & Oatley, K. (2008). The function of fiction is the abstraction and simulation of social experience. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 3, 173–192. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1745-6924.2008.00073.x

Marsh, E. J., & Yang, B. W. (2020). Broadening the autobiographical record to include memories of fictional events. In A. M. Cleary and B. L. Schwartz (Eds.), Memory quirks: The study of odd phenomena in memory. Routledge Press.

Rubin, D. C. (2022). A conceptual space for episodic and semantic memory. Memory & Cognition, 50(3), 464–477. https://doi.org/10.3758/s13421-021-01148-3

Triantafyllopoulos, M., Li, B., Schnabel, M., & Breithaupt, F. (2021). The effect of fiction vs nonfiction in the digital era: Text comprehension not influenced by genre expectations. Discourse Processes, 58(10), 886-902, https://doi.org/ 10.1080/0163853X.2021.1992234

Yang, B. W., Deffler, S. A., & Marsh, E. J. (2022). A comparison of memories of fiction and autobiographical memories. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 151(5), 1089–1106. https://doi.org/10.1037/xge0001125