Charles Pébereau

Work in progress

None of your business! Efficient disclosure policies with heterogeneous audiences [job market paper] (pdf)

Abstract: This paper studies the efficient disclosure of performance information by a principal about an agent with career concerns vis-à-vis heterogeneous employers. Employers hire for jobs more or less similar to the job the agent is evaluated for and thus value information differently. The principal trades off effort incentives and the agent’s welfare. In equilibrium, the principal discloses information differentially and information structures are non-decreasing in job similarity. Setting high evaluation standards for less similar jobs is only efficient for incentivizing high effort. The model can rationalize laws differentially restricting access to worker and consumer personal data, and inform privacy debates.

Barriers to real-time electricity pricing: Evidence from New Zealand  -- with  Kevin Remmy (pdf) 

International Journal of Industrial Organization 2023, 89, 102979