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I'm an assistant professor in the department of linguistics and philosophy at MIT.
I work in the philosophy of mind and language, metaphysics, and epistemology. My research focuses on the nature of representation and the structure of reality. In the course of pursuing these issues, I write about mental content, metaphysical determination, the vehicles of mental representation, and the connection between truth and different epistemic notions.
Before MIT, I was a Mellon postdoctoral fellow at Rutgers. Before that, I got my PhD from NYU, and my BA from the Hebrew University.
Publications
Publications
Forthcoming. Reliabilism and Defeat. Oxford Studies in Epistemology. (With Richard Roth.) [draft to come]
Rethinking the concept of reliability helps realibilism account for defeat.
Forthcoming. Epistemic Akrasia and Treacherous Propositions. Philosophical Quarterly. [preprint] [final]
Epistemic akrasia is impermissible for epistemic reasons.
2024. The Euthyphro Challenge in Metasemantics. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. [preprint] [final]
Functionalist metasemantic views fail because they reverse the order of explanation.
2022. Losing Grip on the Third Realm: Against Naive Realism for Intuitions. Analysis. (With Preston J. Werner.) [preprint] [final]
2022. Losing Grip on the Third Realm: Against Naive Realism for Intuitions. Analysis. (With Preston J. Werner.) [preprint] [final]
Naive Realism about Intuition cannot ultimately explain our epistemic access to causally inefficacious domains.
Work in Progress
Work in Progress
Determination itself is asymmetric.
The content of a mental representation is determined by what causes the formation of that item.
A paper developing a novel view of vehicles of representation. (With Verónica Gómez Sánchez.)
A paper about quantified representations.
A paper about determination and extensibility.
Dissertation
Dissertation
2024. Explaining Content. [preprint]
Since determination is asymmetric (ch. 1), prominent metasemantic views fail to allow mental content to play its explanatory and justificatory role in our mental lives (ch. 2). We should adopt a causal-historical view instead (ch. 3).
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