Axel Niemeyer

Working Papers

• Extreme Points in Multi-Dimensional Screening, with P. Lahr.

• Optimal Allocation with Peer Information, with J. Preusser.

  • Parts of this paper were previously circulated under the title “Simple Allocation with Correlated Types.” 

• Posterior implementability in an n-person decision problem.

• Mechanisms without transfers for fully biased agents, with D. Kattwinkel, A. Winter, and J. Preusser. 

  • Extended abstract at EC '22.

• On-the-match search and match-specific productivity growth, with S. Kreutzkamp and F. Schmieter.

Publications

• The limits of ex post implementation without transfers, with T. Feng and Q. Wu. Theoretical Economics, 18(2), 463-479, 2023. 

Teaching

Please see the respective Canvas pages for further details.

• SS 211a Advanced Economic Theory (Fall, PhD)

  • This course covers advanced topics in mechanism design and related areas. Topics vary from year to year according to the interests of students. The course format includes both lectures and discussion sessions where students present and discuss papers at the frontier of research.

• CS/Ec 149 Algorithmic Economics (Spring, Undergraduate)

  • This course will equip students to engage with active research at the intersection of social and information sciences, including: algorithmic game theory and mechanism design; auctions; computational social choice; fair division; matching markets. 

• SS 205c Foundations of Economics (Spring, PhD)

  • This is a first-year graduate course in the fundamentals of economics. Topics tba.

Contact: 

California Institute of Technology

Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences

1200 E. California Blvd.

Pasadena, CA 91125

niemeyer<at>caltech.edu