Ashwin Kambhampati

(ush-win come-bum-paw-tea)

PhD, University of Pennsylvania, 2021

Assistant Professor of Economics, United States Naval Academy

My research is in the area of microeconomic theory. I am particularly interested in contract theory, matching theory, and market design.

Since joining USNA in Fall 2021, I have taught three class sections per semester. This semester, I am teaching two sections of Game Theory (SE450) and a Capstone Seminar in Microeconomic Theory (SE475). In the past, I have taught Industrial Organization and Intermediate Microeconomics.

Email: kambhamp [at]



Economics Letters, August 2023, Vol. 229.

Final working paper here. This is Ryan's AY2023 honors project, co-supervised with Scott.

Journal of Economic Theory, January 2023, Vol. 207.

Final working paper here.

RAND Journal of Economics, Fall 2022, Vol. 53.

Final working paper here. Companion working paper here. Online Appendices here.

Working Papers

Randomization and the Robustness of Linear Contracts (coming soon: preliminary draft available upon request), with Juuso Toikka and Rakesh Vohra

Abstract: We consider a principal-agent model with moral hazard, bilateral limited liability, and bilateral risk-neutrality. The principal knows a surplus-generating action the agent can take, but is concerned that others may be available. Hence, she chooses a contract to maximize her profit guarantee over all possible action sets consistent with her knowledge. We show that there exists an optimal contract that is simple a uniform lottery over two linear contracts. The value of randomization is arbitrarily large.

Here are some slides

Conditionally accepted at Theoretical Economics.

Earlier version assuming that the agents are identical. Earlier abstract published in EC '21.

Revise and resubmit (second round) at Games and Economic Behavior.

Revise and resubmit at Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization.

A continuous version of Matching to Produce Information: A Model of Self-Organized Research Teams (Online Appendix) with a complete characterization of inefficiency.

In Progress

Proper Robustness and the Efficiency of Monopoly Screening

Service Assignment at the United States Naval Academy, with CDR Chad Redmer and Naomi Utgoff


A Theory of Firm Boundaries with Long-Run Incentives and At-Will Employment, with Gorkem Bostanci

Search Committees with Disparate Costs, with Nageeb Ali and Aislinn Bohren