I am assistant lecturer (ATER) at Université Paris 1 Panthéon Sorbonne. I am a PhD candidate at Université Paris 1 Panthéon Sorbonne - Paris School of Economics.
My research focuses on incentives and performance in the Public Sector. It uses the microeconomic tools from Contract Theory and, to a lesser extent, econometric analysis.
Fields: Contract Theory, Monitoring, Management of Public Information, Public Sector
Mailing: Maison des Sciences Économiques. 106-112, boulevard de l'Hôpital 75013 Paris. France
Work in progress
Incentives, procedure and the extra mile. Working Paper
We model the widespread intuition that more bureaucratic management can lead to less effort and quality in a principal-agent framework. Introducing a procedure aiming at codifying and easing verification of effort can be socially inefficient yet chosen by the principal. In the model with three performance levels, the agent can either shirk, work or go the extra mile, standard effort decreases the occurrence of bad performance, while the extra mile increases the one of the best and is harder to codify. The usual monotone likelihood ratio property naturally breaks down in such a setting. We show that the procedure makes the extra mile both cheaper and less implemented than without the procedure. The introduction of the procedure has implications for organizational design where the principal faces a trade off between incentive gains from task bundling and verification.
Information Management by a Budget constrained Principal. Job Market Paper
This paper contributes to the debate on transparency in the public sector by considering one of its major features: a limited budget. In a principal-agent model with moral hazard and bounds on transfers, I study an information design problem where the principal can either choose to be transparent and fully reveal information before the agent takes action, or remain opaque. On the one hand, transparency makes it possible for the principal to engage her limited budget only when the expected gain is worth the implementation cost. On the other hand, opacity does not allow for tailor-made contracts but rather ensures optimal incentives. I show that transparency is more likely to be optimal for the principal when the task is less valuable and the budget is lower. Furthermore, the optimal information structure is derived, requiring that the agent be told only what action to undertake.
Providing public utilities in a common agency framework: making, buying and level of association - with Alexandre Mayol and Benjamin Michalet. Working Paper
As public service providers, local governments have to deal with three issues: the global quality of the considered service, the production mode either in-house or private, and the level of association with other local governments. We use a Principal-Agent LEN framework with moral hazard to model the three identified levels of association : “commune”, “syndicat” and “communauté de commune”, and the two possible modes of production: public (in-house) and private (outsourcing) in the French Water Industry. We show that the production mode is not sufficient to explain price differences: the level of association is a crucial determinant of cost structures. This model makes it possible to clarify the tradeoffs faced by local governments, and allows us to identify the major drivers of their choice namely the power of the organizational scale (dis)economies and the magnitude of their accountability. Using data from 15000 French drinking water providers, we test these theoretical results by benchmarking the combinations between public/private and the three levels of association. Our results suggest that the organizational form explains the largest variations in the efficiency of local public services.