The study of dynamic interactions with communication networks. A communication network depicts the communication possibilities of the agents: agents can send (receive) messages only to (from) their neighbors. Given a network, what type of strategic communication shall be observed at equilibrium? What is the impact of the network structure on the payoffs and the types of communication observed at equilibrium? Conversely, which network structure emerges from strategic communication? Is it possible to construct communication protocols which exhibit some desirable properties (e.g. secrecy, security, reliability)? What happens if the network evolves dynamically through time? If the players build themselves the network?
The study of dynamic interactions with information networks. Here, the information that agents acquire in dynamic interactions depends on the network structure: either agents get information about their direct neighbors only, or they have the ability to monitor distant players with delay (or noise), this delay (or noise) depending on the network. What are the equilibria of these games? How does the network structure affects payoffs and strategies, in particular regarding the strategic use of information? Is it possible to construct procedures to learn how to better play in these games? What happens if the network evolves dynamically through time? If the players build themselves the network?