I am a Researcher (CRN) at the French National Centre for Scientific Research (CNRS), affiliated to LAMSADE - UMR 7243, Université Paris Dauphine-PSL, Paris, France
My research focuses on Optimization and Game Theory, with applications in AI. Currently, I am particularly interested in game-theoretic approaches to predictive modeling, design of decentralized multi-agent systems, and computational challenges in multi-agent reinforcement learning
2009. Ph.D. in Computer Science, Dept. of Computer Science, University of L’Aquila, Italy
2005. M.s. in Computer Science, Dept. of Computer Science, University of L’Aquila, Italy
May '22 - present. Researcher (CRN) - CNRS, LAMSADE, Université Paris Dauphine-PSL, Paris, France
Oct. '12 - Apr. '22. Researcher (CRN) - CNRS, CREM, Université de Caen Normandie, Caen, France
Oct. '09 - Oct. '12. Research Fellow - Division of Mathematical Sciences, SPMS, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore
Apr. '09 - Sep. '09. Research Fellow - Lehrstuhl für Informatik I (Algorithms and Complexity), RWTH Aachen University, Germany
Jan. '09 - Mar. '09. Research Assistant - Lehrstuhl für Informatik I (Algorithms and Complexity), RWTH Aachen University, Germany
I. Caragiannis, A. Fanelli. On approximate pure Nash equilibria in weighted congestion games with polynomial latencies. Journal of Computer and System Sciences, 117: 40-48, 2021
E. Elkind, A. Fanelli, M. Flammini. Price of Pareto optimality in hedonic games. Artificial Intelligence, 288: 103357, 2020
I. Caragiannis, A. Fanelli. An almost ideal coordination mechanism for unrelated machine scheduling. Theory of Computing Systems, 63(1): 114-127, 2019
V. Auletta, A. Fanelli, D. Ferraioli. Consensus in opinion formation processes in fully evolving environments. 33th Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2019
V. Bilò, A. Fanelli, M. Flammini, G. Monaco, L. Moscardelli. Nash stable outcomes in fractional hedonic games: existence, efficiency and computation. Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research, 62: 315-371, 2018
I. Caragiannis, A. Fanelli, N. Gravin, A. Skopalik. Approximate pure Nash equilibria in weighted congestion games: Existence, efficient computation, and structure. ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation, 3(1): 2, 2015
I. Caragiannis, A. Fanelli, N. Gravin, A. Skopalik. Efficient computation of approximate pure Nash equilibria in congestion games. 52nd Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, FOCS 2011
A. Fanelli, L. Gourvès, A. Igarashi, L. Moscardelli. Individually stable dynamics in coalition formation over graphs. (Accepted at AAAI'25). https://arxiv.org/pdf/2408.11488
V. Bilò, A. Fanelli, L. Gourvès, C. Tsoufis, C. Vinci. Minimizing Rosenthal's potential in monotone congestion games. (Accepted at AAMAS'25). https://arxiv.org/pdf/2408.11489
A. Fanelli, D. Fotakis. Preference games with local aggregation. https://arxiv.org/abs/2002.01251
A. Fanelli, L. Moscardelli. Approximately stable matching dynamics.
A. Fanelli. Short trajectories to approximate equilibria in collaborative potential games.
A. Fanelli. The power of local search in maximum a posteriori estimation.
A. Fanelli. On the convergence properties of graphical potential games.
**Researchers interested in the topics mentioned above and eager to collaborate are encouraged to contact me via email.**
Institutional Email angelo DOT fanelli AT cnrs DOT fr
Personal Email angelo DOT fanelli AT gmail DOT com
Office P 220, Université Paris Dauphine-PSL, Paris, France