I am a Researcher (CRN) at the French National Centre for Scientific Research (CNRS), affiliated to LAMSADE - UMR 7243, Université Paris Dauphine-PSL, Paris, France
My research interests lie in the area of Optimization, Computational Complexity and Game Theory with applications in AI
Short Bio
Education
2009. Ph.D. in Computer Science, Dept. of Computer Science, University of L’Aquila, Italy
2005. M.s. in Computer Science, Dept. of Computer Science, University of L’Aquila, Italy
Appointments
May '22 - present. Researcher (CRN) - CNRS, LAMSADE, Université Paris Dauphine-PSL, Paris, France
Oct. '12 - Apr. '22. Researcher (CRN) - CNRS, CREM, Université de Caen Normandie, Caen, France
Oct. '09 - Oct. '12. Research Fellow - Division of Mathematical Sciences, SPMS, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore
Apr. '09 - Sep. '09. Research Fellow - Lehrstuhl für Informatik I (Algorithms and Complexity), RWTH Aachen University, Germany
Jan. '09 - Mar. '09. Research Assistant - Lehrstuhl für Informatik I (Algorithms and Complexity), RWTH Aachen University, Germany
Selected Publications
I. Caragiannis, A. Fanelli. On approximate pure Nash equilibria in weighted congestion games with polynomial latencies. Journal of Computer and System Sciences, 117: 40-48, 2021
E. Elkind, A. Fanelli, M. Flammini. Price of Pareto optimality in hedonic games. Artificial Intelligence, 288: 103357, 2020
I. Caragiannis, A. Fanelli. An almost ideal coordination mechanism for unrelated machine scheduling. Theory of Computing Systems, 63(1): 114-127, 2019
V. Auletta, A. Fanelli, D. Ferraioli. Consensus in opinion formation processes in fully evolving environments. 33th Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2019
V. Bilò, A. Fanelli, M. Flammini, G. Monaco, L. Moscardelli. Nash stable outcomes in fractional hedonic games: existence, efficiency and computation. Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research, 62: 315-371, 2018
I. Caragiannis, A. Fanelli, N. Gravin, A. Skopalik. Approximate pure Nash equilibria in weighted congestion games: Existence, efficient computation, and structure. ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation, 3(1): 2, 2015
I. Caragiannis, A. Fanelli, N. Gravin, A. Skopalik. Efficient computation of approximate pure Nash equilibria in congestion games. 52nd Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, FOCS 2011
Manuscripts and working papers
A. Fanelli, D. Fotakis. Preference games with local aggregation. https://arxiv.org/abs/2002.01251
A. Fanelli, L. Gourvès, A. Igarashi, L. Moscardelli. Individually stable dynamics in coalition formation over graphs. https://arxiv.org/pdf/2408.11488
V. Bilò, A. Fanelli, L. Gourvès, C. Tsoufis, C. Vinci. Minimizing Rosenthal's potential in monotone congestion games. https://arxiv.org/pdf/2408.11489
A. Fanelli. On computing approximate pure Nash equilibria in exact potential games.
A. Fanelli. Convergence properties of the coevolutionary Hopfield models.
A. Fanelli, L. Moscardelli. Approximately stable matching.
Contacts
Institutional Email angelo DOT fanelli AT cnrs DOT fr
Personal Email angelo DOT fanelli AT gmail DOT com
Office Université Paris Dauphine-PSL, Paris, France