Andrei Kalk
Andrei Kalk
Welcome to my website! I am an economist employing dynamic models to study long-run economic phenomena. My current research primarily lies in environmental economics, with interests in topics such as sustainable development, energy transition, and climate policy.
I am completing my PhD in Economics at the University of Vienna, with the defense scheduled for September 2025. Previously, I finished the APE Master's program at the Paris School of Economics.
I am actively looking for academic positions (Postdoc or Assistant Professor). Here you can find my CV and my job market paper.
Job Market Paper
We study the interplay between individuals' voluntary contributions to environmental protection and public environmental policy in a dynamic general-equilibrium model. To capture the observed discrepancy between the willingness of individuals to pay for public and private environmental protection, we treat the quality of the environment as a public good and assume that voluntary contributions are motivated by a `warm glow' of giving. We show that in the laissez-faire scenario without government intervention, the strength of warm glow negatively affects aggregate output and positively affects environmental quality in the long run. However, when the government intervenes and decides on environmental policy in the interests of individuals, the warm-glow strength has a negative long-run effect on both variables. Thus, our results suggest that advocating for private actions to ensure a better environment in the future may be counterproductive in the presence of public environmental policies.
Publications
“Social security, bequests, and social comparisons” in Journal of Public Economic Theory, Vol. 26, 2024, e12698 (with K. Borissov)
We examine the long-run impact of unfunded social security on capital stock and wealth inequality in an overlapping generations (OLG) model where newborn individuals differ in their inheritance. In our model, individuals' decisions are subject to social comparisons, which can lead to overspending on personal consumption and result in zero bequests left within poor families. In this scenario, unfunded social security increases long-run wealth inequality by redistributing wealth from poor to rich families, who always leave bequests. However, it increases long-run capital stock, too. We also show that when none or all of the families leave bequests in the long run, our model predicts negative and neutral effects of social security on capital accumulation, in line with the standard OLG models of Diamond (1965) and Barro (1974). Thus, our results emphasize the need to account for heterogeneity in bequest behavior in the analysis of social security.
“Climate policy under political pressure” in Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Vol. 122, 2023, 102900 (with G. Sorger)
It is widely acknowledged that there is an urgent need for policies that can reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Yet, the policies implemented by governments are far from sufficient to reach their long-term climate targets. In this paper, we propose a theoretical framework to study the implications of political pressure on optimal climate policy. A key feature of the framework is its ability to capture dynamic inconsistency, which naturally arises from the long time horizon of climate policies and their susceptibility to modifications due to political pressure. Our findings offer a new rationale for why green lobbying can make pollution regulation less stringent. We also show that political pressure from the polluting sector leads to a higher rate of clean energy investment chosen by the government and can shift the energy mix towards renewables in the long run. Similarly, this long-run shift can be caused by political pressure from members of the public who care only about immediate consumption.
“Why do we postpone annuity purchases?” in Journal of Mathematical Economics, Vol. 95, 2021, 102500 (with H. d'Albis)
This paper seeks to explain why annuity purchases are postponed to a later age. We consider an overlapping generations model with uncertain lifetime and two types of annuities. It is shown that, if the economy is dynamically inefficient, individuals demand annuities without delay. However, if it is efficient, annuity purchases are postponed. We also show that these results are robust to several extensions.
“Public debt, positional concerns, and wealth inequality” in Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Vol. 170, 2020, 96-111 (with K. Borissov)
We consider an AK growth model with positional concerns and public debt financed by distortionary income taxes. We show that if positional concerns are not too strong, there is a threshold level of the debt-to-GDP ratio. For the debt-to-GDP ratio below this level, the economy converges to a unique egalitarian balanced-growth equilibrium, whereas if this ratio is above the threshold level, the economy eventually settles on a two-class balanced-growth equilibrium. The rate of growth in the egalitarian equilibrium is higher than that in any possible two-class equilibrium. Thus, a reduction in public debt may cause the economy to switch from the two-class regime to the egalitarian regime and accelerate growth. Our results also suggest that policies aimed at reducing initial inequality using public debt may, in fact, increase wealth inequality in the long run.
Work in Progress (selected)
"Kantian Equilibrium in a Simple Model of Spending a Carbon Budget" (with M. Pakhnin)
We develop a dynamic game in which heterogeneous countries choose their extraction rates, influencing the state of a global carbon budget. Our focus is on the distinction between rational and moral behaviors.
"Migration and Environmental Risks'' (with A. Brausmann)
Using a dynamic stochastic life-cycle model, we explore the economic and environmental conditions that drive climate-induced migration. We distinguish between fast- and slow-onset environmental risks.
"Environment, Social Norms, and Inequality"
I examine how social norms about consumption and pro-environmental behavior affect environmental quality and wealth inequality in a growth model with intergenerational altruism.