RESUMO 43 | COMUNICAÇÕES

The origin of the analytic-continental split and the problem of origin in contemporary philosophy

VAN DER WIELEN, Julie | Universidad Diego Portales, Chile

As I see the analytic-continental split as an important event at the origin of contemporary philosophy, an event of which we still have to measure the scope, and which is characteristic of the contemporary philosophical landscape, and as I believe the two currents in contemporary philosophy have few interconnections and do not communicate much, I propose to hold a presentation which has as its aim to lead to a fruitful and open discussion between analytic and continental philosophers. I hope to generate a discussion about the difference between the two currents in philosophy (concerning their objectives as well as methods), and to question if and how there could be mutual enrichment between these.

In order to lead to this discussion, I will first briefly address the main differences between the two traditions as described by Michael Friedman (A Parting of the Ways. Carnap, Cassirer, Heidegger) and Neil Levy (“Analytic and Continental Philosophy: Explaining the Differences”). Then I will expose Gilles Deleuze’s view on philosophy, for I believe he is one of the contemporary continental philosophers who devoted the most attention to the question of what philosophy is, or should be. Indeed, Deleuze devoted large parts of what could be called his main work (namely Difference and Repetition) to this question, as well as a whole book (What is Philosophy?, which he wrote together with Félix Guattari). I will describe what, for Deleuze, the disciplines of history of philosophy and of philosophy should do, and what they shouldn’t. In the context of this description I will mention the problem of the beginning or origin, which is for Deleuze essential in truly philosophical (-historical) thought. Using some other examples from the continental tradition (such as Husserl and Heidegger), I will argue that at the origin and core of continental philosophy (in contradistinction to analytic philosophy and thus at the source of the rupture) lies the problem of origin itself, this is to say, the problem of thinking an origin in philosophy.

In a last part I will discuss the reasons why for Deleuze (and Guattari) philosophy should be as described, and what this entails for its method. I will end by briefly contrasting this with what I understand analytic philosophy to be. As I am only a little familiar with the analytic endeavour, I will end by openly asking the participants to contribute to the description, hoping this will open up to a fruitful and open discussion between participants from both traditions, regarding the objectives, problems, and methods of these latter.