RESUMO 02 | PALESTRA INTERNACIONAL

Frege, modern logic, and the continental roots of analytic philosophy

GABRIEL, Gottfried | Universität Jena, Germany

Accounts of analytic philosophy often give the impression that this tradition arose in opposition to continental philosophy. This may be true of British philosophers such as Russell and Moore. But it is certainly not true of Frege. Although he makes little explicit reference to other authors in his writings, many parallels and even influences can be found especially in the value-theoretic tradition of neo-Kantianism (Otto Liebmann, Wilhelm Windelband, Heinrich Rickert) that goes back to Hermann Lotze. Frege’s anti-psychologistic epistemology, with its strict distinction between the validity (Geltung) and genesis (Genese) of knowledge, is in substantial agreement with positions that had been developed in neo-Kantianism. This agreement reaches into Frege’s logic. In particular, Frege’s theory of judgement, with its emphasis on judgement as an act, is the result of a systematic transformation of views propounded in the post-Kantian debate about the forms of judgement in the nineteenth century. With reference to this debate, my paper focuses on the relationship between Frege and Windelband concerning the concept of basic logical laws and the distinction between logical proof and transcendental justification.