Frege and Husserl on Intentionality and Truth
Luis Niel
The paper focuses on Frege’s and Husserl’s philosophies of meaning and reference. As a point of departure I consider a certain ‘Platonism’ that characterizes both positions—in the case of Husserl, at least in the period around the Logical Investigations . I then address the concept of intentionality and its relation to this form of semantic Platonism, in order to show some non-explicit phenomenological concepts that play an important role in Frege’s philosophy, such as those of intentionality, intuition, and givenness, all of which are related to the concept of truth. By these means, I attempt to draw out the close relation between both philosophies, as well as the possibility of a complementary and non-reductive reading of Frege’s logical analysis and Husserl’s early phenomenology.