Frege's Critique of Psychologism and his conception of Subjectivity

Mario Ariel González Porta

The fact that Frege remits the problem of how do we grasp thoughts to psychology has led many scholars to sustain that the author doesn’t leave any room for considerations on subjectivity. This claim, however, is false. Frege holds a conception of subjectivity that, in the context of the 19 th century german philosophy, is to be taken as a novelty and, just like Husserl’s conception, is to be regarded as an intentional and non-naturalistic one. In order to demonstrate this thesis, we must proceed a reconstruction of a broader historical-philosophical context, within which the analysis that we are about to effectuate will be endowed with meaning.

My exposition will be developed in three parts:

I. A general consideration of the psychologism quarrel and its history;

II. An analysis of Frege’s critique of psychologism, which will focus in the

role played by Frege in the context to be presented;

III. An exposition of the different moments of the Fregean conception of

subjectivity.