Schematism of the pure concepts of understanding by Kant, its transformation in southeastern German neo-Kantianism and the late Kantian-oriented transcendental philosophy: a consideration from the history of its problems.
Christian Krijnen
In two recent dissertaions on Kant by Mathias Birrer, a problem that has always been central and had an important role in the discussion with Kant, turned vital by the Heidegger, emerged: the problem of schematism. The amplitude of interpretation essays is surprising, considering that Kant himself qualified schematism as one of the most important parts of his "Critique of Pure Reason" (Refl 6359, AA 18; Vgl. Prol AA 04: 316). These essays range from their superficiality in front of the transcendental deduction of the pure concepts of understanding up to the original justification that it provides of this same deduction.
It is striking that current literature have not properly discussed the systematic attempts of the transcendental philosophy of neo-Kantianism and the post-war German thinkers strongly influenced by it (like Hans Wagner and Werner Flach), because the referred literature relativize the heterogeneity of sources of knowledge and the sensitivity through a fundamental unit. Certainly, Hegel's intent of surpassing Kant's "dualist conception" through a speculative structure of the concept's self mediation (Selbstvermittlung) does not seem to be a serious sistematic proposition.
However, in the Kantian transcendental philosophy and Hegelian speculative idealism, schematism does not hold the "important" role attributed by Kant himself. Rather, both currents view the solution to Kant's schematism problem in not allowing it to occur.
This paper exposes the above context in relation to the Kantian oriented transcendental philosophy. My thesis sustains that such transcendental philosophy helps, indeed, to relieve a delicate point in Kant's own transcendental philosophy. If, perchance, it can dominate likewise the Hegelian challenge of the concept, this cannot be investigated here. In any case, the discussion on the relevance of Kant's schematism requires perspectives that exceed the usual interpretative models.