Hermann Lotze´s philosophy of language and its influence on Frege

The Future of Philosophy, Part Two: What Happens to the Individual Man or Ox?

Susan Krantz Gabriel

In an earlier piece, kindly accepted by Prof. Gabriel Ferreira for publication in the on-line journal, Geltung, I argued that in the wake of two world wars the analytic-Continental divide has left us with two incomplete philosophical worlds, that a reconciliation is required for philosophy to become whole again. Here I propose to show that a further reconciliation is needed, that between the subjectively oriented philosophy of Descartes’s cogito and the objectively oriented philosophy of ancient and medieval substantialism. Rather than seeing contemporary philosophy as evidence of progress in philosophy, somewhat as we see science and technology as having progressed over time, we ought rather to see contemporary philosophy, indeed much of philosophy since Descartes, as complementary to ancient and medieval philosophy. 

Each of these two philosophical worlds begins with one of the two possible philosophical starting points – outer reality or inner reality – and philosophy first becomes complete when these are properly distinguished and related. This is, of course, a very broad claim, and I certainly do not anticipate that it would be accepted without further ado. Thus, in order to make it at least somewhat manageable and plausible, I focus on Franz Brentano’s later so-called reistic ontology which provides an example from the roots of contemporary philosophy of a kind of Cartesian Aristotelianism, i.e., a blend of substantialist and phenomenological methods, which I think shows the need for greater clarity in the future about the ramifications of our starting points.