Lange´s Naturalisation of Transcendental Freedom

Lange´s Naturalisation of Transcendental Freedom

Chiara Russo Krauss 

Friedrich Albert Lange is usually considered one of the main representatives of physiological neo-Kantianism. Literature on the topic ususally emphasizes that this current of thought focused on Kant’s theory of knowledge, paying less attention to the other themes of his philosophy. However, this may be true of other representatives of physiological neo-Kantianism, such as Hermann von Helmholtz, but not of Lange. Indeed, Lange’s interests go far beyond Kantian epistemology and concern Kant´s entire conception of man, i.e., his anthropology, ethics, universal history, and politics. In these areas, too, Lange tried to remain true to the core of Kant’s philosophy, while also basing it firmly on a scientific worldview and ridding it of all metaphysical residue. In my talk I will focus in particular on Lange’s attempt at naturalizing Kant’s concept of freedom. Lange retains the Kantian idea of freedom as the destination (Bestimmung) of man, that distinguishes us from all other living beings, but he places it on ground consistent with the new scientific worldview of the nineteenth century (Darwinian descent theory, determinism, psychologism, critique of metaphysics, etc.).