What Does 'Intentionality' Mean? Brentano's Account(s) Revisited

Luis Niel

Ever since the medieval concept of intentionality was reintroduced into the contemporary philosophical debate by Franz Brentano, intentionality has been one of the main topics for both phenomenology (since Husserl's phenomenology) and analytic philosophy of mind (mainly since Chisholm's work in the 1950's). Many theories and approaches have been presented since then, and it is not always clear whether they all mean the same or at least share some conceptual background, when they refer to 'intentionality'. Leaving aside some differences, it might be argued that there are indeed some common conceptual features shared by at least most positions, such as those of 'relation', 'aboutness', and 'directedness' of the mind. I will attempt to explain the meaning of these concepts by addressing Brentano's treatment of intentionality, focusing on his different approaches: first, on his early works on Aristotle and its operating notion of 'intentional' as something objective in sensations; second, on his 'intentionality passage', which, based on a psychological approach, presents intentionality as an immanent, two-term-relation between the mind and the immanent or intentional object; third, on his late 'reistic phase', which, based on a more ontological approach, offers a reformulated conception of intentionality as a one-term-relation (as something 'relativlich') or as the directedness of the mind towards real things. I will argue that Brentano's work enable different possible understandings of the concept of intentionality, depending on whether the description is based on more psychological or on more ontological concerns.