The Algorithmic Learning in Games seminar is a joint effort between faculty at London School of Economics, the University of Waterloo, Imperial College London and, King's College London.
We meet once every fortnight to discuss problems and research in a range of topics related to:
Game Theory
Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning
Learning in Games
Multi-Agent Systems
Recordings of our past sessions can be found here.
Next Talk
Our next talk will be lead by Serdar Yüksel on November 24th 2025 at 16:00 GMT. Please see further details below:
Serdar Yüksel - Professor, Queen’s University, Canada
In multi-agent reinforcement learning, agents repeatedly interact and revise their strategies as new data arrives, producing a sequence of strategy profiles. Policy revision using such data induces a graph theoretic formulation raising questions on the existence of paths to equilibria and the nature of such equilibria depending on the information structure considered.
To set the context, we first study the case with weakly acyclic games, which generalize potential games and which in turn generalize stochastic teams. For such games, under only local action but with global state information, convergence to an equilibrium via best-responding under inertia was established via stochastic analysis in [Arslan et. al'17]. Realizing the critical role of the induced revision graphs for convergence and information structures for existence, we present a generalization of weakly acyclic games, and observe its importance in multi-agent learning when agents employ an experimental strategy update in periods where they fail to (\epsilon-)best respond. Sequences with this property are called satisficing paths, and games admitting such paths to equilibria are referred to as generalized weakly acyclic.
A fundamental question is whether for a given game and initial strategy profile, it is possible to construct a satisficing (or \epsilon-satisficing) path that terminates at an equilibrium. We present several characterizations and sufficiency conditions (including symmetry) under both pure and randomized strategies.
Finally, implications on reinforcement learning with local information via policy revision processes are presented: Building on the general approach for weakly acyclic games, corresponding learning results for generalized weakly acyclic games under both pure strategies and randomized strategies (with \epsilon-satisficing), and with various information structures (some of which may lead to equilibria that are only subjective) are presented. The mean-field game setting involving finitely many agents under various information structures will be studied as a mathematically insightful and practically significant case.
[Joint work with Gürdal Arslan and Bora Yongacoglu]
Organisers
London School of Economics
University of Waterloo
Imperial College London
King's College London
Schedule
We intend to meet every other Monday from 16:00 - 17:00 GMT - please allow for slight changes to this schedule as needed.
Upcoming Speakers
Past Speakers
Recordings of past sessions can be found here or via the title of the respective talk in the spreadsheet below.
Sign-Up Form
We are open to any interested in joining the seminar, both as a member of the audience and as a speaker. To get in touch, please fill out the form below and we will get back to you as soon as possible.