EcoPo-Pop
The political economy of populism
EcoPo-Pop
The political economy of populism
The EcoPo-Pop project aims to advance understanding of the political economy of populism (PEP) through an integrated four-phase research design that progresses from historical and theoretical analysis to empirical investigation. The multidisciplinary team working on this project consists of approximately fifteen members from various subfields of economics, political science, and sociology. The project benefits from the financial support of the French National Research Agency. See the website for more information!
You will find below the abstracts of the project's articles as well as previous articles related to it.
Modelling Democracy, Epistocracy and hybrid decision-making : information specificity and costs of political governance. with Cyril Hédoin, Journal of Institutionnal Economics, preprint .
This paper provides a new theoretical framework and a criterion to model the choice between democratic, hybrid, and epistocratic modes of political governance. From a normative perspective, we claim that the specificity of information should guide the choice between these modes of political governance because of its impact on costs of political governance. Any issue has a degree of information specificity that determines costs of political governance, which are combined in a Social Costs Function. Therefore, the model helps to assess the relative efficiency between democratic, hybrid, and epistocratic decision-making procedures to reach collective choices. The last section proposes extensions of the model by discussing how political, cultural, and epistemic institutions as well as polycentric governance modify the parameters of the model.
An economic theory of populism : Uncertainty, Ideology and public interest. with Cyril Hédoin. Revue d'économie politique, 135(5), 735-762. [Media: The Conversation]
This paper provides a positive economic theory of populism departing from the mainstream account of populism in contemporary political economy. Building on Downs’s economic theory of democracy, it hinges on three core assumptions: uncertainty, rationality, and democratic stability. This theory considers three main types of actors: citizens, political parties, and information providers. It accounts for populism as a political force in every democracy rationally promoted by political parties when the democratic minimal consensus required for democratic stability is in crisis. The fact that populism necessary emerges because of a crisis generated by a gap in representativity between polarized preferences of citizens and parties’ platforms provide the rationale behind populist opposition against ruling elites. By studying the dynamics of political equilibrium, the paper also explains why populism is likely to regenerate as much as to sound the death knell of a liberal democracy.
Trust in a national anti-corruption agency: A survey experiment among citizens and experts. with Benjamin Monnery. European Journal of Political Economy, vol. 85, 2024, (Rank A/2).
Are anti-corruption agencies able to secure public trust, promote public integrity and fight political corruption in the eyes of the general public? The paper investigates this question by focusing on France, which became a leader in the fight against corruption after the launch in 2013 of the High Authority for the Transparency in Public Life (HATVP). We run a survey experiment among 3000 citizens and 33 experts to collect their prior beliefs about political corruption, and then evaluate the impact of granting information about the track record of the national agency on citizens' perceptions of its effectiveness and legitimacy. The paper provides four main results. First, as expected, information provision has meaningful and positive impacts on citizens’ perceptions of the HATVP, political transparency, and representative democracy. Second, while most beneficial impacts are broad-based, treatment effects are as large or even larger among the most poorly informed and distrustful citizens. Third, the experiment points toward the existence of a modest “integrity paradox”, i.e., an increase in the salience or perceived severity of corruption when citizens are better informed about the anti-corruption agency. Fourth, information provision reduces the divergence of opinions between the average citizen and experts about the effectiveness of the HATVP and the dynamics of political integrity.
Démocratie de la demande versus démocratie de l’offre : Reconstruction et interprétation des analogies démocratie-marché. Oeconomia, 12(1), 55-91, 2022.
Starting from the distinction between “categorical” and “formal” analogies, this paper proposes a reconstruction of the analogies between market and democracy as well as an interpretation of their uses. This reconstruction reveals two main ideal-typical representations of economic and political processes conveyed by the use of democracy-market analogies by 20th century economists. Some of them consider that the outcomes of economic and political processes are or should be essentially determined by the demand side of the market, i.e. by the preferences of consumers and citizens. This is a political worldview that we call “demand-side democracy”. Others believe, on the contrary, that the economic system and democracy are processes driven by the supply side of the market. In terms of the positive use of the analogy, we argue that the demand-side democracy view is directly dependent on the assumptions underlying neoclassical economics, so that the more an economist distances himself from them, the more he proposes a “supply-side democracy” view. The normative uses of the analogy are however resistant to any simplistic characterization.