Welcome to my research page!
Here are some facts about me: I received my PhD in game theory at the department of Microeconomics at RWTH Aachen University in 2018. Before that, I studied Business Mathematics at the Philipps-Universität Marburg and graduated in 2012 (major fields of study: Probability theory and Optimization). During my time in Aachen, I signed up for the Master's program in Mathematics at RWTH Aachen University to expand my knowledge, e.g., in the mathematics of machine learning and the theory of partial differential equations, and graduated in 2019.
Since February 2022 I am a professor of mathematics in business and economics at SRH University of Applied Sciences in North Rine-Westphalia. Before that, I worked for three years as a consultant/project manager for game theory applications in business at TWS Partners in Munich.
If you like to get in touch, check my contact details at the bottom of the page. I look forward to hearing from you.
My main interests are mathematical modeling and particularly game theory. For example, applying game theory to mechanism design and auction theory as well as the mathematics of machine learning (and its algoritihms).
Abstract
A willingness-to-pay (WTP) – willingness-to-accept (WTA) disparity is particularly interesting when the agents do not know whether they will be the buyer or the seller of an object---then they are forced to assess both their WTP and their WTA. This phenomenon occurs in partnership dissolution mechanisms. We identify a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of an individually rational, ex post efficient, budget balanced and incentive compatible dissolution mechanism for the prominent equal-share partnership. In contrast to the standard case where WTP and WTA coincide, we find that the existence of such a mechanism cannot be guaranteed.
"Partnerships, k+1-price Auctions, and the Difference between Willingness-to-Pay and Willingness-to-Accept".
Abstract
A difference between the willingness-to-pay (WTP) and the willingness-to-accept (WTA) affects properties of mechanisms to dissolve partnerships. In an independent private values setting, we analyze properties of a widely used dissolution mechanism that is known to be efficient if the WTP and the WTA coincide: The k+1-price auction. If there is a difference between the agents' WTP and WTA, it is no longer efficient---it loses its value-maximizing property and the agents might prefer not to participate in the auction. In addition to characterizing equilibria, we identify the sources of the occuring inefficiencies. Moreover, we propose and analyze variations of the k+1-price auction that guarantee participation but still cannot achieve full efficiency. In a last step we compare the performance of all considered mechanisms with respect to efficiency and ex ante expected utilities.
"The Performance of Core-Selecting Auctions: An Experiment", with Thomas Kittsteiner and Marion Ott.
Abstract
Combinatorial auctions, in particular core-selecting auctions, have increasingly attracted the attention of academics and practitioners. We experimentally analyze core-selecting auctions under incomplete information and find that they perform better than the Vickrey auction. The proportions of efficient allocations are similar in both types of auctions, but the proportions of stable (core) allocations and the revenue are higher in the core-selecting auctions. This is in particular true for an independent private values setting in which theory does not predict this better performance of the core-selecting auction. We trace the causes of the performance differences back to patterns in bids. The core-selecting auctions provide incentives for overbidding the own valuation and---under certain conditions---also for bid-shading, which can hamper performance. In the experiment, bidders react in the predicted direction to these incentives, though less pronouncedly than predicted.
"Competing Sellers and Ascending Auctions", with Thomas Kittsteiner und Marion Ott.
Abstract
We experimentally analyze reserve price setting by competing auctioneers. Each seller sells one item in an English auction with reserve price. Buyers have unit demand and may bid in all auctions. We predict theoretically and find experimentally that sellers set significantly lower reserve prices if they face competition as compared to the benchmark setting without competition. Merging two markets is predicted to be advantageous for both market sides, and our findings show that sellers are no worse off and buyers are better off after the merger.
"Combinatorial Partnership Dissolution"
Abstract
tbd
08/2018 71st European Meeting of the Econometric Society, Cologne (Germany).
07/2016 and 07/2018 International Conference on Game Theory, Stony Brook, New York (USA).
06/2018 Economic Science Association World Meeting, Berlin (Germany).
09/2017 Economic Science Association European Meeting, Vienna (Austria).
06/2017 Economic Science Association World Meeting, San Diego, California (USA).
07/2016 5th World Congress of the Game Theory Society, Maastricht (Netherlands).
Master-Level: Lectures in Operations Research, Business Mathematics, Big Data and AI, Business Intelligence, and Risk Management
Master-level: Tutorials in Advanced Microeconomics, and Industrial Organization.
Bachelor-level: Tutorials in Managerial Economics, and Microeconomics.
Tutorials in Numerical Analysis 1, Linear Algebra 1, Linear Optimization, and Combinatorial Optimization (as a student assistant).