Alan Moreira

Assistant Professor of Finance

email: alan.moreira at simon.rochester.edu

Expertise: Asset Pricing, Financial Intermediation

Currently, I'm an assistant professor of finance at University of Rochester Simon Graduate School of Business. From July 2011 to June 2017, I was an assistant professor of finance at Yale University Yale School of Management. I did my PhD in Financial Economics at the University of Chicago, graduating in 2011, and my undergraduate and master studies back in Brazil at the Rio de Janeiro Federal University and PUC-RJ respectively.

Curriculum Vitae

Publications

News Implied Volatility and Disasters Concerns , Journal of Financial Economics, January 2017

We extend back to 1890 the volatility implied by options index (VIX), available only since 1986, using the frequency of words on the front-page of the Wall Street Journal. News implied volatility (NVIX) captures well the disaster concerns of the average investor over this longer history. NVIX is particularly high during stock market crashes, times of policy-related uncertainty, world wars and financial crises. We find that periods when people are more concerned with a rare disaster, as proxied by news, are either followed by periods of above average stock returns, or followed by periods of large economic disasters. We estimate that the disaster probability has a half-life of four to eight months and annual volatility of 4% to 6%. Our findings are consistent with the view that hard to measure time-varying rare disaster risk is an important driver behind asset prices.

The Macroeconomics of Shadow Banking , Journal of Finance, December 2017 [Lead Article]

We build a macro-finance model in which intermediaries issue equity without friction. In normal times, they maximize liquidity creation by levering up the collateral value of their assets, a process we call shadow banking. A rise in uncertainty causes investors to demand liquidity in bad states, which forces intermediaries to delever and substitute toward safe liabilities; shadow banking shuts down, prices and investment fall. The model is consistent with a slow economic recovery especially when intermediary capital is high. It features collateral runs and flight to quality, and it provides a framework for analyzing unconventional monetary policy and regulatory reform proposals.

Volatility Managed Portfolios , Journal of Finance, October 2017

Managed portfolios that take less risk when volatility is high produce large alphas, substantially increase factor Sharpe ratios, and produce large utility gains for mean- variance investors. We document this for the market, value, momentum, profitability, return on equity, and investment factors in equities, as well as the currency carry trade. Volatility timing increases Sharpe ratios because changes in factors’ volatilities are not fully offset by proportional changes in average returns. Our strategy is contrary to conventional wisdom because it takes relatively less risk in recessions and crises yet still earns high average returns. This rules out typical risk-based explanations and is a challenge to structural models of time-varying expected returns.


Should Long-Term Investors Time Volatility?, Accepted , Journal of Financial Economics

We study the portfolio choice decision of a long-horizon investor when volatility and expected return dynamics are estimated using US data. Investors should reduce exposure when volatility increases, and ignoring variation in volatility leads to large utility losses. Volatility timing is more beneficial than expected return timing, par- ticularly when parameter uncertainty is considered. We show that longer-horizon investors should engage in less volatility timing if increases in volatility also increase the amount of mean-reversion in returns. Nevertheless, we provide new empirical evidence that this channel is not strong enough to substantially decrease the gains from volatility timing.

Working Papers

We show, both theoretically and empirically, that liquidity creation induces negative exposure to volatility risk. Intuitively, liquidity creation involves taking positions that can be exploited by privately informed investors. These investors' ability to predict future price changes makes their payoff resemble a straddle (a combination of a call and a put). By taking the other side, liquidity providers are implicitly short a straddle, suffering losses when volatility spikes. Empirically, we show that short-term reversal strategies, which mimic liquidity creation by buying stocks that go down and selling stocks that go up, have a large negative exposure to volatility shocks. This exposure, together with the large premium investors demand for bearing volatility risk, explains why liquidity creation earns a premium, why this premium is strongly increasing in volatility, and why times of high volatility like the 2008 financial crisis trigger a contraction in liquidity. Taken together, these results provide a new, asset-pricing view of the risks and rewards to financial intermediation.

Capital Immobility and the Reach for Yield, Revise and Resubmit, Journal of Economic Theory

In this paper, I build a model where financial intermediation slows the flow of capital. Investors optimally learn from intermediary performance to allocate capital toward profitable intermediaries. Intermediaries reach for yield, i.e invest in high tail risk assets, in an attempt to drive flows and reduce liquidation risk. Reaching for yield is stronger among intermediaries with weak opportunities, resulting in a reduction in the informativeness of performance; investors take longer to learn and capital flows become less responsive to performance. Capital becomes slow moving because the reach for yield dampens learning. The model predicts capital immobility to be stronger when tail risk is high; when tail risk is underpriced; and in asset classes with large cross-sectional variation in tail risk exposures.

Many hedge funds restrict investors' ability to redeem their investments. We show that lockups alleviate a delegation friction. In our model hedge funds can enter a long-term trade that increases expected returns but lowers short-term returns. Investors who rationally learn from returns may mistake a skilled manager who pursues the long-term trade for an unskilled manager. Skilled managers therefore have an incentive to avoid the long-term trade to enhance short-term returns. The tradeoff between the benefits of the long-term trade and investors' fears of being stuck with an unskilled manager determines the optimal lockup. We calibrate the model to hedge fund data and show that arbitrage remains limited even with optimal lockups; the average manager sacrifices 146 basis points in expected returns per year to improve short-term returns.

This subsumes an earlier working paper called "Limits to Arbitrage and Lockup Maturities".

(with Armando Gomes and David Sovich)

We study the problem of an investor that allocates analysts to assets to learn about future asset values. We show that when analysts are better at relative rather than absolute asset valuations the optimal matching of analysts to assets displays a balancedness property in which pairs of distinct assets are covered by a similar number of analysts. A balanced allocation allows the investor to efficiently aggregate information using the relative value between assets, eliminating the effect of the analyst-specific component. We show that the optimal matching of analysts to assets and the optimal portfolio decision depends on the structure of the analyst coverage network - the bipartite graph where the vertices are the firms and the edges are all the pairs of distinct firms that are covered by at least one common analyst. For example, capital is only reallocated between firms that are connected in the network, and the intensity of the reallocations depends on both the value of relative asset recommendations and the strength of the connection between the assets.

My model shows how limits to arbitrage arises endogenously from a positive self-enforcing feed-back between fund investors' liquidation decisions and manager's portfolio choice. A higher risk of fund liquidation leads managers to favor strategies that pay out quickly. Rational investors anticipate the managers' incentives, learn more from short-term performance and liquidate funds earlier. Investor's decisions feed back into the manager's portfolio through an additional reduction in the manager horizon, further amplifying the initial distortion. Equilibrium pricing reflects this fundamental delegation friction with mispricing becoming more severe as reputational capital becomes scarce.


Work in Progress


Hedging Risk Factors

(with Bernard Herskovic and Tyler Muir )

Text Selection

(with Bryan Kelly and Asaf Manela )

Personal




I was born and raised in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, where I acquired my passion for economics and finance living through the (ultimately successful) monetarist experiments to conquest the Brazilian inflation. I also give a lot of credit to my experience at PUC-RJ, which has a truly outstanding culture for research and teaching in economics. More importantly, it was in Rio de Janeiro where I first met my wife Beatriz. We live in Pittsford, Rochester with our daughter Marina.