I am an Assistant Professor at the Department of Economics at the Universidad de la Republica, Uruguay. I was previously a Postdoc in the Hausdorff Center for Mathematics and in the Institute for Microeconomics at the University of Bonn. I obtained a Ph.D. in Economics from the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor in 2021.
My research interests are in microeconomic theory, specifically information and mechanism design.
Contact information: rosina.rodriguez@cienciassociales.edu.uy
Published and Accepted Papers:
"Strategic incentives and the optimal sale of information" (American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2024)
Abstract
A monopolist data-seller offers information to privately informed data-buyers. I characterize the data-seller's optimal menu, which screens between two types of data-buyers. Data-buyers' preferences for information allow the data-seller to extract all surplus and the optimal menu's features are determined by the interaction between data-buyers' strategic incentives and the correlation of their private information. The data-seller offers perfect information to the data-buyer with the highest willingness to pay and partial information, which makes this type indifferent. Both experiments are informative even when data-buyers have congruent beliefs if they have coordination (anti-coordination) incentives and their private information is negatively (positively) correlated.
Working Papers:
"Optimal disclosure of private information to competitors" (3rd Round R&R at American Economic Journal: Microeconomics)
Abstract
I study the incentives of an informed firm to share its private information with a competitor, and the incentives of a regulator to restrict or mandate disclosure in order to benefit consumers. Firms offer differentiated products and compete à la Bertrand, with one firm holding an informational advantage about demand over its competitor. I show that full disclosure is optimal for the informed firm, as it increases price correlation and enhances surplus extraction from consumers. A regulator can increase expected consumer surplus and overall welfare by limiting disclosure. However, consumers may benefit when the regulator privately discloses some information to the uninformed firm. The consumer-optimal disclosure policy is designed to induce high cross-price elasticities and generate coordination failures in pricing.