Rosina Rodríguez Olivera

Research

Published and Accepted Papers:

"Strategic incentives and the optimal sale of information" (AEJ: Microeconomics, 2024)

Abstract

A monopolist data-seller offers information to privately informed data-buyers. I characterize the data-seller's optimal menu, which screens between two types of data-buyers.  Data-buyers' preferences for information allow the data-seller to extract all surplus and the optimal menu's features are determined by the interaction between data-buyers' strategic incentives and the correlation of their private information. The data-seller offers  perfect information to the data-buyer with the highest willingness to pay and partial information, which makes this type indifferent. Both experiments are informative even when data-buyers have congruent beliefs if they have coordination (anti-coordination) incentives and their private information is negatively (positively) correlated.

Working Papers:

"Optimal disclosure of private information to competitors" (R&R at AEJ: Microeconomics)

Abstract

I study the incentives of an informed firm to share its private information with its competitor and the incentives of a regulator to constrain or enforce disclosure in order to benefit consumers. Firms offer differentiated goods, compete a la Bertrand  and one firm has an information advantage about demand over its competitor.  I show that full disclosure of information is optimal for the informed firm, because it increases price correlation and surplus extraction from consumers. A regulator can increase expected consumer surplus and welfare by restricting disclosure, but  consumers can benefit from the regulator privately disclosing some information to the competitor. Disclosure increases the ability of firms to extract surplus from consumers, but private disclosure creates a coordination failure in firm pricing.   The optimal disclosure policy is chosen to induce goods to be closer substitutes and intensify the competition across firms.