Psychologists are far from consensus on how to classify disorders. As a result, the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM; by far the most authoritative source in the field) has adjusted its classifications considerably between editions.
A forum in Knowledge Organization (38:5) on philosophy focused on the DSM challenge. Cooper follows the general argument of Dupre that classes can be subdivided along multiple dimensions, and notes that some psychologists stress physiological symptoms and others psychological symptoms (and more generally that they emphasize symptoms predicted by a particular theory). But Cooper nevertheless appreciates that the widespread use of DSM indicates that its classifications must capture some important causal distinctions. Mazzocchi in reply notes that Aristotle, though he argued for natural kinds, also appreciated that in some domains there were multiple dimensions. Aristotle felt that natural kinds reflected causation: when there was one causal force at work there would be one way of classifying. These anlyses suggest that the use of linked notation may at least alleviate the DSM challenge. That is, we can classify a disorder as (disorder)(causes)(symptom).