Publications:  

Inequality and Financial Fragility (2020),  Journal of Monetary Economics. 

Allocating Losses: Bail-ins, Bailouts and Bank Regulation (2023), Journal of Economic Theory, (with Todd Keister).

A Theory of Debt Maturity and Innovation (2024), Journal of Economic Theory. 

Private Sunspots in Games of Coordinated Attack  (2025), Theoretical Economics. 

Unequal and Unstable: Income Inequality and Bank Risk  (2026), Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, (with Ulrich Schüwer).

Working papers: 

When does overlapping ownership soften competition? The role of agency frictions and repeated interaction 

with Konrad Adler

Tacit collusion among firms is not necessarily easier when firms are owned by the same investor. Going from separate to common ownership actually sometimes has a pro-competitive effect.  

Smart Banks 

with Alkis Georgiadis-Harris and Maxi Guennewig

Since Diamond and Dybvig (1983), banks have been viewed as inherently fragile. We challenge this view in a general mechanism design framework with limited commitment. 

Oprimal Financial Intermediation 

with Maxi Guennewig

We revisit the Diamond-Rajan model of financial intermediation and demonstrate that a bank with an optimal financing structure is immune to runs. 

Why Safer Borrowers Can Increase Bank Risk: An Equilibrium Simpson's Paradox

with Ulrich Schüwer

A reduction of borrowers' exposure to aggregate risk, through economic or policy changes, can paradoxically increase banks' systematic risk. 

Work in progress:

• The costs and benefits of greenwashing (with Paul Povel and Günter Strobl)

• Bailout limits and the bail-in game (with Todd Keister)

• Anticompetitive effects of loan covenants (with Konrad Adler) 

Teaching: 

• Corporate Governance (MSc), University of Vienna

• Microeconomics II (MSc), University of Vienna

• Fixed Income Analysis (MSc), University of Vienna and Central European University (CEU)

• Finance (MSc), University of Bonn

• Financial Intermediation (MSc, PhD), University of Bonn 

Discussions: 

Banks and Non-Banks: Competitors in loans origination, partners in regulatory arbitrage by Chiara Lattanzio, 4th Workshop on Markets and Intermediaries, 2026. 

Contingent Fees to Contain Bank Runs by Matta, Oostdam, and Perotti; Conference on The Future of Banking, 2025. 

Bank Runs in the Digital Era by Llambias and Ordonez; Oxford Saïd – VU SBE Macrofinance Conference, 2025. 

Optimal Design of Contingent Capital by Melin and Panjwani; 1st CEPR Frankfurt Hub International Conference, 2024. 

A Theory Model of Digital Currency with Asymmetric Privacy by Katrin Tinn; Fintech and Digital Currencies RPN Workshop, 2024. 

A New Theory of Credit Lines (With Evidence), by Donaldson, Koont, Piacentino, and Vanasco; EFA, 2024. 

Optimal Communication in Banking Supervision by Kim, Kim, Liu, and Tanner; IBEFA summer meeting, 2024. 

Learning in Bank Runs by Schliephake and Shapiro; 11th EBC Network Conference, 2022. 

Adding Fuel to the Fire Sales: Banks, Capital Regulation, and Systemic Risk by Rosen, 4th Bristol Workshop, 2021. 

Is Corporate Credit Risk Propagated to Employees by Correia, Cortez, and Silva; WEAI Virtual 95th Annual Conference, 2020.

Asset Encumbrance and Bank Risk by Banal-Estañol, Benito, Khametshin, and Wei; FIRS, 2019. 

Insurers as Asset Managers and Systemic Risk by Ellul, Jotikasthira, Kartasheva, Lundblad, and Wagner; IWH-FIN-FIRE, 2018